Dasein, by his very nature, is a being-in-the-world. His being-in-the-world is characterized by care, with its threefold concerns. Dasein’s epistemological concerns stem from the fact that he finds himself in the world, understands the world and expresses his understanding in discourse. As a result of this ‘being-in’ of Dasein, he possesses the characteristics of existence, mineness and authen-ticity or inauthenticity and enjoys a priority over every other entity in the world. Dasein also has a relational concern, which takes him to encounter entities and other Daseins, like himself. The network of relationships he forms by these twofold encounters, constitutes what can be called Dasein’s world. Besides, Dasein faces an existential concern in which he has to cope with his fallenness, authenticity and temporal-historical nature. This chapter attempts to unfold the threefold concerns of Dasein that constitute his being as care in his being-in-the-world.


Dasein is a unique being. On the one hand, he is "like any other entity, present-at-hand as real",1 and on the other hand, he is not a ‘mere thing’ because he is involved with entities in circumspective concern (Besorgen) and discovers the kind of being a thing is. "Dasein . . . is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement . . . as their kind of being, and which, thus, can make themselves known as they are in themselves."2 Human existence understood in this sense of the horizon in which every other reality in the world can have their meaning, Heidegger calls ‘transcendence’. The term ‘transcendence’ means ‘to pass over’, ‘to step over’ and ‘to go through’.3 Heidegger understands the term in relation to Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’. As transcendence, Dasein goes beyond all entities, including himself as a being and understands himself4 and other things in their being. As Heidegger puts it: "What is transcendence is, indeed beings themselves and that every being that can be and become unconcealed to Dasein, including, that being which exists as ‘its (his) self’ (i.e. Dasein)."5 In other words, the human existent is the ‘formative’ agent of the world. He transcends beings and draws them out of their fundamental hiddenness and endows them with being, i.e., with meaning and truth. Dasein, by his very nature, is transcendence and only by transcending beings is his nature is realized.6 Speaking on this point J.L. Metha says:

Heidegger defines transcendence as the ground of ontological difference;7 it is by virtue of his transcendence that man (human existence) can distinguish between Being and being and so relate himself to essents in the light of his comprehension of Being. In transcendence, Dasein goes beyond all essents as such, including itself (himself) reaching up world, which is part of the structure of tran-scendence, of Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’.8

Having stated that Dasein is unique and different from all essents, in the following pages we shall proceed to consider this human transcendence by analyzing his nature, characteristics, and priority.


Heidegger characterizes human existence as ‘being-in-the-world’. This expression contains two notions: ‘being-in’(In-Sein) and ‘in-the-world’ (in-der-Welt).9 Thus, human existence is es-sentially ‘being-in’. It involves the idea of ‘there’(Da).10 So human existence is the ‘Da’ of the ‘Sein’ of the world. In other words, it is in the ‘there’ of human existence, i.e., in his ‘being-in’ the world that being is disclosed. Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is the basis of his familiarity with the world and in which the structure of the world is disclosed.11 The main concern, of this section is to dwell on the nature of Dasein by analyzing the way in which Dasein is in his ‘there’, viz., his ‘being-in’. In elaborating this point, we will consider the meaning and modes of Dasein’s ‘being-in’ and knowing the world as a typical mode of Dasein’s ‘being-in’. Meaning of Dasein’s ‘Being-in’

Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is not the same as "withinness" (Inwen-digkeit), in which sense we speak of one present-at-hand essent in another. Here the term ‘in’ is taken in its spatial sense and we consider something as containing a thing. For example, apple is in the basket, water is in the bucket and the garment is in the cup-board.12 "`Being-in’ is distinct from the present-at-hand insideness of something present-at-hand ‘in’ something else that is present-at-hand".13 So Dasein’s ‘being-in’ does not mean a spatial ‘in-one-anotherness’ (In-einander)14 or ‘side-by-sideness’ (Neben-einan-der).15 ‘Being-in’ also is not to be understood on the subject-object schema because such a schema would divide the ‘being-in’ between the subject and the object, which amounts to side-by-side presence of the present-at-hand entities as the subject and object.16

Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is not spatial, but existential. In this sense, the term ‘in’ derives from terms ‘innen’ (to reside), ‘wohnen’ and ‘sich aufhalten’ (to dwell).17 Thus, ‘being-in’ here means ‘to be at home with’, ‘to reside alongside’, ‘to be familiar with’, ‘to be in-volved in’ and ‘to be entrusted with that familiarity with the world about’.18 In this sense we speak of someone ‘being in a profession’, ‘being in a conspiracy’ and ‘being in love’. Here ‘being-in’ refers to a personal and existential ‘inhood’ which implies the relationship of dwelling and involvement. Thus, ‘being-in’ means Dasein’s being accustomed to his environment and in relationship to the entities of his surroundings. In other words, it involves Dasein’s entanglement with things of his world.19 Dasein’s `being-in’ comes in various ways. It consists in having to do something, producing something, consuming something, abandoning something, interrogating, consi-dering, and determining. All these activities show Dasein’s interest in things and his concern for them. They can be called Dasein’s care-taking (Besorgnis).20

The care-taking or ‘being-in’ is not an occasional property of Dasein which he sometimes has and other times does not have. We cannot speak of Dasein without his ‘being-about’ with entities. So ‘being-in’ is the essence of Dasein’s being.21 The most fundamental trait of Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is what Heidegger calls ‘Erschlossenheit’, i.e., the disclosedness of Dasein: "Dasein is its (his) disclosed-ness."22 Hence, Dasein’s ‘being-in’ or ‘there’ is the clearing (Lich-tung) within which the world is discovered or disclosed. Referring to the traditional metaphor of human nature in man, Heidegger says that this metaphor is an ontic way of pointing to the existential-ontological structure of human existence as disclosedness. To say that Dasein is ‘lit up’ (erleuchtet) means that as ‘being-in-the-world’ he is cleared (gelichtet) or is a lighting-process. Dasein is illumined not by any other kind of being, but by his opened-up-ness to entities, which belongs to his very structure. It is the clearing of Dasein towards all entities of the world and is the basis of his familiarity with the world; it enables Dasein to encounter entities and be involved with them.23 Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is identical with the disclosedness of the world. To quote Heidegger: ". . . the world is ‘there’ its being-there is (Dasein’s) ‘being-in’."24 We could say that Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is a state of Dasein’s being, in which as opened-up-ness or the lighting-process he dwells among entities in con-cernful dealings (Besorgen) and discovers (endeckt) them in their being. Modes of Dasein’s ‘Being-in’

In clarifying the meaning of Dasein’s ‘being-in’, we have been looking at the general lay-out of the ‘Da’ or the ‘there’ of human existence. In this section, we want to look into the ‘how’ of this ‘Da’ of Dasein, i.e., the ‘how’ of Dasein’s ‘being-in’. In other words we would like to consider the basic modes or ways in which Dasein is disclosive. There are three modes of Dasein’s ‘being-in, i.e., Dasein discloses himself in three ways: `state-of-being’ (Be-findlichkeit),25 ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) and discourse (Rede). We shall briefly consider each of these. State-of-Being

Heidegger gives the name ‘state-of-being’ (Befindlichkeit) to the first determining awareness of oneself as ‘being-in-the-world’. It refers to the way Dasein is ‘placed’ (sich finden) in life and in the world. It is the ‘already-being-found-himself-thereness’ of Dasein.26 The state-of-being, for Heidegger, is an existential of Dasein, which is prior to all psychological moods27 and belongs to Dasein’s existential structure. What is indicated ontologically by this term, ‘Befindlichkeit’, is what is ontically most familiar to Dasein, viz., his moods (stimmung) and his ‘being attuned’ (Gestim-mtsein) to the world. In other words, the existential structure of Dasein’s state-of-being is revealed through his ontic moods. "Mood", thus "is the lived expression of the state-of-being."28 Dasein, as state-of-being, is never free of moods and is attuned to the world in one way or other. With the help of the moods Dasein discovers that he is in a particular way.

State-of-being with its ontic expression or moods discloses the ‘being-in’ of Dasein in three ways, viz., in Dasein’s being delivered over to his moods, in his concernful dealing with entities and in his being submissive to the world. In the state-of-being, firstly, the Dasein is, as it were, ‘delivered over’ to his moods29 and finds him-self in one or other type of encounter which is beyond his control. Moods often overcome Dasein and he could affect them only to a limited degree. Often Dasein does not choose the particular situa-tion, in which, he finds himself. For example, Dasein is thrust into a fearful mood without wanting to enter into that state. Thus, Dasein is always in one or another mood and shows himself "as a naked ‘that it (he) is’ and has to be."30 Consequently, Dasein does not start his existence, but finds himself as already existing, whether it be in a given situation or from his origins. His existence has already started without his ever knowing or choosing. Dasein’s Being as "that it (he) is" does not give a clear indication as to his origin and destiny. The ‘whence’ (woher) and the ‘whither’ (wohin) of Dasein remain obscure and hidden. Though these are hidden, Dasein is disclosed as a being that already is in one or another mood. It is Dasein’s non-theoretical awareness of himself as being revealed in his moods, as an essent that is delivered, and which is a naked fact that Heidegger calls ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit).31

Dasein is thrown and is in a continuous throw which he can ‘never get back behind’.32 Dasein’s thrownness must be conceived as the "facticity of its (his) being delivered over."33 Facticity is differ-ent from factuality (Tatsaechlichkeit) of the present-at-hand entities. Heidegger calls the factuality of entity the ‘factum brutum’ (brute fact).34 But Dasein’s facticity consists in that he is his ‘there’ in such a way that he finds himself in his world. Facticity is "the mood (that) brings Dasein before the ‘that-it (he) -is’ of its (his) ‘there’, which as such stares it (him) in the face, with the inexorability of an enigma."35 Facticity, therefore, refers to the unavoidable and unchangeable character of the thrownness of Dasein. Though in the state-of-being Dasein is factically thrown into his moods, he should master his moods through knowledge and will. In other words, Dasein should take responsibility for himself as if he were his own making, i.e., Dasein must overtake his own thrownness and accept it as his way to be (zu sein) and hold responsibility for it.36

Secondly, in the state-of-being the thrownness of Dasein is revealed as a thrownness into the world of entities. The thrown Dasein is not revealed as an isolated subject, but as a ‘totality-to-be-in-the-world’37 and as having inseparable relationships with the entities of this world. In other words, in Dasein’s thrown existence not only his own existence is revealed, but also the existence of other Daseins; the world with all its entities is disclosed. It would mean that in the state-of-being, Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’ is dis-closed, by which Dasein shows not only that he is a thrown Dasein among other entities, but also ‘that he has to be’, i.e., he is a thrown existence, who directs himself by being concerned with things and persons in the world. Thus in the state-of-being Dasein finds himself as a ‘way to be’, which is the basic condition for the possibility of discovering the world with its entities by moving towards them dynamically.38

Thirdly, since in the state-of-being Dasein is primarily dis-closed as a ‘being-in-the-world’ and is attuned towards entities in circumspective concern, he is disclosed as one who is submissive to the world. Considered as thrownness, Dasein finds himself in the world. He seems to be someone passive; the world moves towards Dasein and he has to submit himself, as it were, to the world. Through Dasein’s openness to the world, Dasein discloses himself as thrown to the submissiveness to the world. Since he is open to the world, Dasein can be affected, impressed and threatened in his ‘Da’ by entities and other Daseins. For example, a journey by a car or a train may be looked at as something dangerous or particularly wel-coming depending on the ‘what-for’ of the journey. The ‘what-for’ brings about different moods on Dasein and thereby affect his attitude towards the journey. If one expects something disturbing after the journey, this ‘what-for’, viz., the expectation of something disturbing, would effect the mood of fear. This, in turn, would make Dasein take the journey as something dangerous or the speed of the train as something alarming. On the other hand, if something par-ticularly interesting is expected after the journey, then the mood effected may be joy. In this mood, Dasein would see the very things -- the journey by the train and its speed -- as something welcoming.39 Thus, the world outside, by bringing about various moods in Dasein and changing his attitudes towards existential situations, affects Dasein and thereby makes him submissive. To quote Heidegger:

The fact that this sort of thing (an entity present-at-hand) ‘matters’ to it (Dasein) is grounded in one’s state-of-being; and as a state-of-being it (he) has already disclosed the world as something by which it (he) can be threatened for instance. Only something which is in the state-of-being of fearing (or fear-lessness) can discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by attunement of a state-of-being.40

In "Befindlichkeit", therefore, the compelling force of the world is revealed. Things encounter Dasein and in some way he is at the mercy of things, as he is constantly exposed to the world. Speaking of this characteristic of the state-of-being, Heidegger writes: "Existentially a state-of-being implies a disclosive sub-mission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us."41 In state-of-being, Dasein is disclosed as a thrown existence, which is involved with entities in the world, and thereby, in some way affected by them. As an essential mode of Dasein’s disclosedness, the state-of-being, by pointing to Dasein’s thrown-ness and facticity, represents more of Dasein’s passive mode of disclosednesss. Now, we turn our attention to the second mode of Dasein’s disclosedness, viz., understanding. Understanding

Traditionally ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) had a reference to the intellectual grasp of things. But, for Heidegger it is a mode in which Dasein can overtake his thrown existence of the state-of-being. ‘Verstehen’ implies the ability to stand Dasein’s thrownness, in the sense that it can be actively developed. Understanding is not a property of Dasein, but is rooted in Dasein’s ‘ability to be’ (seins-koennen); it is a basic mode of Dasein’s being. "Dasein is in every case what it can be and in the way in which it is its possibility."42

Though Dasein is primarily ‘being-possible’ (Moeglichsein), there is a difference in the way Dasein has possibilities and the way in which a present-at-hand entity ‘has’ possibilities. The possibility of an entity is discovered in terms of ‘what-it-is’, viz., its usability (Dienlichkeit) or serviceability (Verwendbark). But, Dasein con-stantly goes beyond ‘what-he-is’ towards ‘what-he-is-not-yet’. As regards understanding, Dasein’s ‘being-in’ involves that it is always directed towards some ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (Worumwillen). Since understanding is not merely a theoretical grasp of Dasein’s possibilities, but a capacity to achieve these possibilities, it posi-tively effects by manipulating the resource. For example, under-standing a hammer’s involvement consists not merely in knowing that a hammer is for driving nails, but in knowing how to carry this out.43 "Understanding is the existent being of Dasein’s own po-tentiality-for-being; and it is so in such a way that this being dis-closes in itself (himself) what its (his) being is capable of."44 This essential tendency of understanding to press forward into Dasein’s possibilities Heidegger refers to as projection (Entwruf). The term "entwerfen" literally means ‘to throw something off’. In ordinary usage it means to sketch, to draft or to design a project. Thus, for Heidegger the project of Dasein involves understanding himself -- as the thrown projection -- and the entities in terms of his possibilities, and to actualize these possibilities even though he does not have a full thematic grasp of this projection.45 "As projecting, under-standing is the kind of being of Dasein, in which it (he) is its (his) possibilities as possibilities."46

As understanding, Dasein is a being-towards-possibilities. The projecting of understanding has the possibility of developing itself (sich auszubilden) which Heidegger calls interpretation.47 In interpretation, understanding does not become anything different, but becomes itself. In fact, interpretation is grounded in under-standing and not vice versa. Nor does interpretation brings any new information about what is understood, but rather it consists in working out the possibilities which are already projected in under-standing. Thus, "in it (interpretation) the understanding appro-priates understandingly that which is understood by it."48 For example, we interpret a hammer, as a hammer having some assign-ment in an equipmental system.

There are two moments involved in the act of interpretation, viz., the ‘as structure’ (als-Struktur) and the ‘fore-structure’ (vor-Struktur). In his interpretative circumspection, Dasein understands an entity in its ‘in-order-to’, i.e., that an entity is for such and such purpose. When Dasein understands what something is for (Wozu), it is understood as what Dasein is to take the thing in question for; whenever Dasein sees something, he sees it as something. For example, he sees a table as a table, a chair as a chair, a door as a door, and a bridge as a bridge. The ‘as’ that makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood, Heidegger calls ‘as-structure’. The pre-predicative explication of what is under-stood by means of the ‘as’, lies before (liegt vor) Dasein making any thematic assertion about it. Again, in the understanding of some-thing as something, Dasein does not throw any signification over something that is present-at-hand or add a value on it, but rather Dasein lays-bare only what he has encountered in his involvement with that entity. In other words, in interpretation Dasein makes clear what is already there in entities, as entities.49 So, in interpretation the ‘as-structure’ is made explicit.

The exposition of the ‘as-structure’, i.e., interpretation, is grounded in the ‘fore-structure’, which consists of a ‘fore-having’ (Vorhabe), ‘fore-sight’ (Vorsicht), and ‘fore-conception’ (Vorgriff). Firstly, every case interpretation is based on something we have in advance, i.e. a fore-having. It consists in Dasein’s comprehension of his world, in its totality, purpose and involvements. In other words, what Dasein has, in advance, is the total range of ways in which Dasein relates to an entity, which is interpreted in terms of its ‘in-order-to’ or ‘what-it-is-for’. Secondly, interpretation is characterized by a fore-sight, which is an interpretative assimilation that takes place under the guidance of some consideration in respect to what is understood or explicated. Fore-sight, therefore, brings limits on fore-having by seeing something from a certain point of view. Thirdly, there is the fore-conception in which the interpretation occurs in terms of a conceptual scheme, whereby an entity is interpreted as itself. Thus, in every interpretation there is present a fore-structure and an as-structure. The clarification of the as-structure by the fore-structure is what we call interpretation. In other words, whenever something is interpreted as something it is based on a fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception.50

The entity that is interpreted is expressed in an assertion (Aussage). Heidegger considers assertion as a derivative form of interpretation, which in the final analysis is grounded in under-standing.51 In clarifying the full structure of assertion Heidegger attributes three significations to assertion. Firstly, the preliminary signification of assertion is "pointing out" (Aufzeigen) in the sense of ‘holding up for view’, ‘drawing attention to’ or ‘exhibiting’. In this sense Heidegger is referring to the original meaning of the Greek term "logos" as "appophanasis", viz., letting an entity be seen from itself.52 In the assertion ‘the hammer is too heavy’, what is dis-covered is not the meaning, but rather an entity ready-to-hand (Zuhanden).53 Thus, assertion ‘points out to’ and ‘represents’ the reality of the entity. Secondly, assertion means apredication in which a subject is given a specific character by attributing to it a predicate, and thereby determining the subject by the predicate. What has been exhibited in the first sense has been narrowed down by giving an added determination through the predicate. In the assertion ‘the hammer at the table is heavy’, we have narrowed down the denotation of the statement by a new predicate ‘at the table’. The second sense still has the idea of ‘pointing out’.54 Thirdly, assertion means communication (Mitteilung) or speaking forth (Heraussage). Assertion is communication in the sense that it lets other Daseins also see what is exhibited as thus determined. What is shared through communication is a common mode of concernfull dealing with an entity. The communication is aimed at inducing the other to adopt the same concernful relationship towards that entity.55 Bringing together these three significations of assertion, we can define assertion as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates."56 Discourse

Besides ‘Befindlichkeit’ and ‘Verstehen’, discourse (Rede) is the third fundamental existential of Dasein’s ‘being-in. For Heide-gger, "Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility."57 Discourse underlies both interpretation and assertion as both presuppose understanding and articulation in discourse. Thus, the intelligibility of being-in-the-world ". . . expresses itself as discourse."58 Heidegger distinguishes between discourse (Rede) and language (Sprache). Language is the spoken form of discourse. "The way in which discourse gets expressed is language."59 Language is a totality of words in which discourse has a "worldly" being of its own. The discourse is an existential of Dasein, while language is a fact, an entity present-at-hand-within-the-world and a ready-to-hand, with the help of which discourse can be expressed. Language can be broken up in words, but discourse is that which gives meaning. As meaningful articulation of the attuned understanding discourse is part of the existential constitution of the openness (being-in) of Dasein.60

There are basically four structural components of a discourse: What is spoken of (das Worueber der Rede); what is spoken as such (das Geredete als solches); Communication (Mitteilung); and Expression (Ausprechung). Firstly, what is spoken of in all forms of discourse -- whether it be accepting or refusing, demanding or warning, pronouncing, consulting or interceding -- are always about something. "Talking is talk about something."61 Thus, discourse shows in its own structure the basic pattern of Dasein’s mode of being, i.e., the disclosedness of being-in-the-world.62 Secondly, what is spoken about (das Beredete) in discourse -- whether it be request, question or statement -- is always a ‘talk to’ someone in a definite way. In other words, in discourse there is "something said-in-the-talk-as-such" (ein Geredete als solches) which is intended to reach someone outside of Dasein. "In this ‘something said’ discourse communicates."63 Thirdly, the discourse is not com-munication (Mitteilung) in the sense of giving some information and experiences, such as, opinions and wishes from within one Dasein to another. The communication Heidegger speaks of is taken in the wider existential sense, in which, Dasein-with is essentially manifested in a co-state-of-being (Mitbefindlichkeit) and a co-understanding (Mitverstehen). In discourse, being-with becomes explicitly shared, in the sense of taking hold of, and appropriated.64 Fourthly, through discourse Dasein expresses himself. Whenever Dasein communicates something in what is ‘said-to-talk’, he expresses himself (spricht sich . . . aus) in discourse. In this expression Dasein does not give something from within himself, because as being-in-the-world he is already "outside" when he understands and expresses. What is expressed, in discourse is pre-cisely this "being-outside", i.e., Dasein’s state-of-being. Dasein’s being-in, in its state-of-being, is made known in discourse and is indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the "tempo" of the talk and the way of speaking.65 These components of discourse are not to be considered as empirically determined properties of a language. They are existential characteristics rooted in the ontolo-gical structure of Dasein, which makes language ontologically possible.66

Discourse, as an existential state of Dasein, discloses and constitutes Dasein in his possibilities. ‘Hearing’ (Hoeren) and ‘keeping silent’ (Schweigen) are two modes that belong to discourse. Besides, these two show how discourse and understanding are interconnected. We would briefly look into the two modes of dis-course. When we do not hear something aright, we say we have not understood what is said by the other. It is not by some accidence that we say this, because Dasein hears only because he understands. Besides, ‘giving ear to’ is an existential openness of Dasein for others and for his own potentiality-for-being. The ability to hear, which basically comes from understanding, in the primordial sense of ‘being-open’ is the basis of what Heidegger calls ‘hearkening’ (Horchen). It is a type of listening which is prior to sensing tones and sounds. Dasein, as dwelling along side the entities within-the-world, ‘just hears something all around’ (das nur-herum-hoeren), like sounds of motorcycles, moving cars and talking. This type of hearing is a privation. But hearkening consists in the existential possibility of the talking being understood. Understanding arises neither in too much talk (zu vieles reden) nor busily ‘hearing all around’; only one who understands can hearken or listen (zu-hoeren).67

Another important mode of discourse is keeping silent, which also has its basis in understanding. In conversation, he who keeps silence can contribute more by developing a more authentic under-standing. But, the one who talks too much can do a lot of damage in the sense that he reduces comprehension to triviality by his incessant talk. But, to be silent does not mean that one should be dumb. A dumb person, not being able to speak, will all the more like to speak. One who is accustomed to keeping silence all the time is not able to keep genuine silence at a given moment, as he would never be speaking anyway. One can keep silence authentically, only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silence, Dasein must have something to speak, i.e., he must have understanding.68

Now that we have considered the modes of Dasein’s ‘being-in’, viz., state-of-being, understanding and discourse, we shall analyze Dasein’s knowing the world (theoretical knowledge) as a mode of Dasein’s ‘being-in’ founded in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Knowing the World: A Founded Mode of Dasein’s ‘Being-in’

Traditional epistemology considered Dasein’s knowing the world with reference to the subject-object relationship. Dasein is the subject and the world is his object. Such a conception presumes Dasein as an entity present-at-hand; the knowledge he has by the subject-object relationship is, as it were, a quality of the subject. But Heidegger considers Dasein’s basic constitution as being-in-the-world. ‘Being-in’, as we have seen, is an existential of Dasein in the sense that Dasein is familiar with his world. His involvement and familiarity with the world is one of concern and care-taking. Thus, every dealing of Dasein relating to the world is founded on this care-taking involvement of Dasein. Therefore, knowing, which is a primordial involvement of Dasein with the world, must funda-mentally be a care-taking. Heidegger says: "Knowing is a kind of being which belongs to being-in-the-world."69 Therefore, the inter-pretation of knowledge as a relation between subject and object lacks the truth. "Subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world."70

From what we have said it is clear that Dasein’s knowing the world is grounded in Dasein’s ‘being-already-alongside-the-world’. It involves not a mere fixed staring at something that is present-at-hand, but it is being fascinated by the world with which Dasein is involved. Though fascinated by the present-at-hand entity and being alongside this entity, by abstaining from manipulations with it Dasein thereby stands face to face with it as a spectator. Looking at an entity in this mode is characteristic of the cognitive care-taking of Dasein’s knowing the world. Cognitive care-taking, i.e., Dasein’s knowing the world by means of his looks which are more or less determined by his view points, amounts to a mode of dwelling alongside the entities within the world. In such a dwelling, where Dasein holds himself back from all manipulation and utilizations,71 the perception of the present-at-hand (the world) is completed. So, the perception is reached when Dasein addresses himself to some-thing as something and discusses it as such. In other words, percep-tion becomes an act of making something determinate when the something is interpreted as something. What is perceived and made determinate by interpretation can be expressed in a proposition. According to Heidegger, the perceptive retention of an assertion about something is not a mere representation of the knowledge that is appropriated by Dasein, but is itself a way of being-in-the-world.72

When Dasein directs his looks towards something and under-stands it as something he does not come out of an "inner sphere" in which he was initially; rather he is always "outside" alongside entities, thus belonging to a world which is already discovered by him. Again, in such an act of knowing the Dasein does not go out of an "inner sphere", when it dwells alongside the entity to know and determine its character. Rather, it is still "inside" in the sense that he is himself "inside" as a being-in-the-world, which knows. To quote Heidegger: ". . . the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which he knows remains outside. It (he) does so as Dasein",73 i.e., as a being-that-is-already-alongside-entities. Heidegger, thus, considers all forms of knowing, whether it be perception in which knowledge is attained, forgetting, error or delusion in which knowledge is seemingly obliterated, as modifica-tions of Dasein’s primordial being-in as a being-in-the-world.74

On account of Dasein’s knowing the world, which is founded on his care-taking involvement with the entities, he achieves a new status of being towards (Seinstand) the world, which Dasein discloses in himself. This involvement of Dasein with the world, viz., his ‘being-in’, is not arrived at in the phenomenon of knowing, nor does it arise from the way in which the world acts upon Dasein. Rather, only because Dasein is ‘being-in’ has he the capacity for this specific mode of cognition, i.e., knowing the world. Thus, "knowing (the world) is a mode of Dasein founded upon (its) [his] being-in-the-world."75


Dasein’s nature cannot be expressed as to his whatness (Was-sein), but has to be understood in his own way of being (Zu-sein). In other words, the essence of Dasein cannot be described by enumera-ting his qualities and attributes, but only by analyzing how he is in relation to himself and to his world.76 Dasein is a unique being, different from mere present-at-hand entities. Dasein is an ‘existent being’, while the present-at-hand entities just ‘are’. While Dasein is the questioner of the being of entities, the entities are things that are questioned.77 Heidegger thus characterizes the nature of Dasein as existence, mineness and authenticity or inauthenticity. Existence

According to Heidegger, "the essence of Dasein lies in its (his) existence."78 Heidegger’s use of the term ‘existence’ must be distinguished from the traditional term ‘existential’, which refers to the entities present-at-hand.79 The German term ‘Existenz’ etymolo-gically means ‘to stand out from’. Dasein ‘ex-sists’,80 i.e., stands out from all other things in the world in the sense that, unlike all other things, Dasein is open to himself and to his world. Besides, he also takes responsibility for himself and the world; to some extent, he can shape his destiny and that of his world.81 In this sense, Dasein, as existence, is ec-static, which literally means: standing beyond the static entities of this world. For Heidegger, all other beings are, but they do not exist. He highlights this point as follows: "Man (Dasein) alone exists. The rock is, but it does not exist. The tree is, but it does not exist. The horse is, but it does not exist. The angel is, but it does not exist. God is, but he does not exist."82 In this statement, Heide-gger does not deny the reality of entities like rock or tree, but only points to the unique type of being of Dasein as existence Dasein as existence "is set apart in the realms of beings as the only existing being which can undertake an inquiry into Being in terms of his peculiar existence."83

This ecstatic nature of Dasein as existence, i.e., standing be-yond things that are static and understanding their being, brings to light another significant aspect of human existence. Since Dasein is not a mere thing but is "to be" (zu-sein) or existence, he is not some-thing static, but a reality that is to be achieved. To exist is to-be-on-the-way (unterwegssein). This would imply that Dasein is always stretched forward towards his still-to-be-realized being. Thus, human existence is never complete in his being and we can never aim at possessing an exhaustive understanding of his nature at a given moment, as there always is something outstanding. Dasein is an existence, which is "already-begun-still-to-be-achieved."84

In this regard other things present-at-hand are different from Dasein. They possess a static quality about them; they have their fixed and given essences; their properties and qualities can be listed. For example, a table or a piece of stone can be described in terms of color, hardness, length and weight. Besides, for them, their own being is never an issue; they do not transcend their realm. Dasein, however, is not stable, but dynamic. Human existence cannot be understood in terms of properties, but only in terms of his possibi-lities. Dasein does not have a fixed essence as things have. The essence of Dasein, if we can speak of one at all has to be related to the fulfilling of his possibilities in the context of his concrete existence. Heidegger says: ". . . those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity (Dasein) are not proportion present-at-hand of some entity. . . . (But) are in each case possible ways for it (him) to be and no more than that."85 Thus, "in each case Dasein is its (his) possibility and it (he) ‘has’ this possibility but not just as a property . . ., as something present-at-hand would."86 So, as existence, Dasein is a being which stands out above other entities present-at-hand and moves towards actualization of its possibilities, thereby ever re-maining ‘on the way’ (unterwegs). Mineness

Dasein is existence and is his own possibilities, which are yet to be realized. Therefore Dasein does not have any fixed essence, and there is a uniqueness about the individuality of Dasein. Dasein is always someone’s own existence. Human existence cannot be grasped as an instance or special case of some genus of the things present-at-hand.86 To these present-at-hand entities, their own being is never an issue. But Dasein is "that entity which in its (his) being has this very being as an issue. . . ."88 Therefore, unlike other entities, human existence cannot be a matter of indifference and he can never be substituted for another.89 So Dasein ". . . is in each case mine."90 Since human existence by his very nature is one’s own and cannot be treated as a specimen of a class, "one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it (him)."91 Therefore, Heide-gger concludes that the essence of Dasein lies in the fact "that in each case it (he) has its (his) being to be and has it as its (his) own."92 Authenticity or Inauthenticity

Since Dasein is existence, i.e., he is not a finished product, but an on-going possibility which is one’s own (Jemeinigkeit), he has constantly to choose from the possible ways for him to be. That is why Heidegger says: "In each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it (he) is in each case mine."93 Dasein, thus, has the ability to choose the particular way of his being-in-the-world. "And because Dasein is in each case essentially its (his) own possibility, it (he) can in its (his) very being ‘choose’ itself (himself) or win itself (himself); it (he) can lose itself (himself) and never win itself (himself) or only ‘seem’ to do so."94 This would mean that Dasein is a possibility which can realize or neglect, develop or reject, build up or forget his own being. Human existence is what he makes of himself, and his own being becomes for himself his own constant problem. In other words, Dasein can either stand out as the dis-tinctive type of being that he is, or he can be involved in a routine manner of living in which his possibilities are not determined by himself, but are taken over and dictated to him by the pressures of circumstances and society, and thereby live a mediocre existence.95

Thus, we can speak of two fundamental ways in which Dasein can exist, viz., an authentic and an inauthentic human existence. Human existence is authentic (eigentlich) when he ‘owns’ his own possibilities of being or chooses himself as his ownmost possibility. It is inauthentic (uneigentlich) when he is blind to his own possi-bilities either by ignoring or giving them up.96 Dasein often finds himself in the inauthentic state; but authenticity is not something which can be gained once for all, but must be decided as new situations come along. Besides, inauthenticity is not a less or lower degree of being or a mere aspect of authenticity. As modes of Dasein, authenticity and inauthenticity are based on Dasein’s character of ‘my-ownness’. Dasein is an issue for himself not only in the state of authenticity, but also in the state of inauthenticity, even though the latter is a mode of fleeing.97


Our consideration of the characteristics of Dasein, viz., Dasein as existence, which is characterized by his own possibilities, which can be realized or neglected depending on his choices that are authentic or inauthentic respectively, clearly points to the fact of the priority of Dasein over other entities. Dasein is a special being, which is capable of encountering beings and laying-bare their being, meaning and truth. In this section, in considering the priority of Dasein, we will attempt to uncover the relationship of Dasein to Being (das Sein), meaning and truth. Dasein and Being

Speaking of Dasein and his relationship to being, Heidegger remarks the following:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it (he) is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its (his) very being, that Being is an issue for it (him). But in that case, that is a constitutive state of Dasein’s being, and this implies that Dasein in its (his) being, has a relation-ship towards Being -- a relationship which itself is one of Being.98

Thus, Heidegger claims that Dasein, even before he poses the question of Being, has some comprehension of Being. In Dasein’s relationship with other beings, they are open to him, and he is able to know not only what they are, but also how they are. In other words, Dasein is able to comprehend what makes them what they are, viz., their being. When Dasein expresses his moods in exclamations (e.g. Snake!) the ‘is’ is already presupposed. Besides his own moods express his being, i.e., it is in such and such a way.99 Dasein’s com-prehension of Being is not a clear concept, but obscure, pre-concep-tual and for the most part undetermined and vague. Dasein’s primor-dial comprehension of Being is not only pre-conceptual, but also unquestioning in the sense that it calls no attention to itself and raises no questions. Speaking of Dasein’s basic understanding of Being, Heidegger states: ". . . this vague average understanding of Being is still a fact."100

Though Dasein’s understanding of Being is preconceptual and vague, it renders the Being-question possible. If Dasein did not have this fundamental comprehension of Being, he would never be able to raise the question of Being at all. This comprehension of Being is not something accidental to Dasein. The very name Heidegger ascribes to human existence, viz., Dasein (the ‘Da’ of ‘Sein’) points to how the comprehension of Being is fundamentally rooted in Dasein’s Being. In other words, this primordial comprehension of Being con-stitutes Dasein’s ontological structure. That is why Heidegger remarks: "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being."101 This quality of Dasein’s comprehension of Being makes Dasein ontically distinct from all other entities, even though Dasein, like any other entity, is an entity in the world. "Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it (he) is ontological."102 Our earlier characterization of Dasein as existence is founded on his understanding of Being. "It is only on the basis of Comprehension of Being that existence is possible."103

Heidegger, thus, speaks of a threefold priority of Dasein due to his relation to Being. Firstly, Dasein has an ontic priority in that he is existence, i.e., he is ecstatic, stands out from (ek-sistiert) and transcends other beings, besides his openness to Being. Secondly, it has an ontological priority because Dasein is able to understand Being (Sein-Verstand). Thirdly, Dasein has a priority, which Heide-gger calls an ontico-ontological priority, in that by his under-standing of Being he understands his own being, that of other Daseins and that of entities. In such understanding Dasein provides the ontico-ontological conditions for the possibility of any other ontologies.104 Thus, Dasein is the worldly human being which provides in himself an opening for the Being to be revealed. Human existence is the questioner of Being and in posing the question about Being he creates an opening that transcendentally grounds all other realms of inquiry.105 Since the meaning of entities and their truth are grasped in their relation to Dasein, we shall move on to consider Dasein’s relation to meaning and truth. Dasein and Meaning

Generally speaking the meaning of something is that which makes it intelligible or understandable. In other words, anything that is intelligible is said to have meaning, even though it is not expressed explicitly or thematically. "Meaning is that wherein the intelligi-bility . . . of something maintains itself."106 A being is intelligible, i.e., it has meaning, only when it is revealed in its enabling ground, viz., Being. In this sense meaning really refers to Being of beings. When one comprehends the Being of beings, then the entities become meaningful. That is why Heidegger writes: "Strictly speaking, ‘meaning’ signifies the ‘upon-which’ of the primary projection of the understanding of Being."107

Since the meaning of a being is related to the understanding of its being, and the understanding of the Being of beings is something that belongs to the structure of Dasein, we can say that the meaning of beings is something essentially related to Dasein. So the meaning of the phenomena and that of the propositions, in the final analysis, depends on Dasein. The human Dasein, thus, is the meaning-giver of his own existence and that of the things present-at-hand. In the strict sense, we cannot speak of non-human entities having meaning, as their meaning ultimately depends on the meaning-giver, i.e., the human existence. For example, the meaning of a tree is discovered, not by the tree itself, but by Dasein as a meaningful object of aesthetic beauty or that of a thing ready-to-hand; or a building is not a home unless Dasein gives it that meaning by dwelling or by caring for it. Thus, the meaning of beings is fundamentally based on the concernful dealings of Dasein towards these entities. To quote Heidegger:

Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying ‘behind’ them, or floating somewhere as an ‘intermediate domain’. Dasein only ‘has’ meaning, so far as the disclosednesss of ‘being-in-the-world’ can be ‘filled-in’ by entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be meaningful . . . or meaningless. . . . That is to say, its (his) own being can be appro-priated in understanding or can remain neglected to non-understanding.108 Dasein and Truth

In putting forth his theory of truth, Heidegger begins with the traditional understanding of truth. Traditional thinkers gave a logical interpretation of truth and said that the essence of truth lies in the correspondence (adequatio) between the intellect and the object. The ‘place’ of the logical truth, thus arrived at, is assertion or judgment.109 Heidegger, while not denying the validity of this interpretation of truth, considers it as inadequate, as it does not enter into the deeper existential level. In all such agreements the relation is between two entities, as subject and as object. This relation is of such a nature, that the judgment ‘so’ expresses that which is judged ‘as’ it is in itself. Thus, the ‘so . . . as’ (sowie) constitutes the nature of the agreement. Heidegger raises the question of the basis of the ‘so . . . as’ agreement. According to him, the agreement is based on what he calls ‘confirmation’. "Confirmation signifies the entity’s showing itself in its self-sameness. The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity’s showing itself."110 The assertion ‘someone is coming in’ is true not because there is an agreement between my intellect and the coming in, but because it can be confirmed by looking towards the entrance of the house and by checking it for myself. In other words, the logical agreement ‘so . . . as’ is based on a deeper experience of the one coming in and confirming in exist-entially.111 Therefore, the truth is not founded in the agreement between the knower and the known object, but rather, it consists in uncovering or discovering (Entdeckend-sein) the what of the entity’s showing itself by confirmation. So, we can speak of a state-ment being true only when we discover the essent in itself and give utterance to it by letting-itself-be-seen. Thus, "being-true (‘truth’) -- means Being uncovering."112

From what we have said, it is clear that truth in its most primary form is Being-discovering, whether it be in entities or in Dasein. This mode of uncovering of Being is a mode which is disclosure or unconcealment (aletheia). Since Dasein is that being which is disclosure par excellence, he is the basic truth on whom all other truths are rooted. The truth of any being is discovered so long as Dasein is. The truth of things present-at-hand is secondary to that of Dasein’s way of being. Dasein’s truth consists in Being-dis-covering, while the truth of things depends on being discovered in their discoveredness. Even a scientific principle such as Newton’s law, the principle of contradiction and all such truths are true only so long as Dasein is. Until Newton discovered the law, it was hidden and concealed. It became a law only when it was discovered and exhibited by Newton. Since all truths are rooted in Dasein, we cannot speak of eternal truths, unless Dasein is eternally existing.113 On this point Heidegger remarks as follows:

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness is essen-tially in truth. Disclosedness is a kind of being which is essential to Dasein. ‘There is’ truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed.114

To say that all truth is relative to Dasein, however, does not mean that the truth is subjective in the sense of being left out in the hands of an arbitrary subject. Nor do we say that entities are in untruth. Heidegger stresses the primacy of Dasein in the disclosure of truth. The discovery of truth is made possible through Dasein’s openness to Being in essents, and through the truth of the essents being disclosed to him independently of his subjective whims. This, also, adds to truth an universal validity.115 In other words, we could say that Dasein is, as it were, a screen on which the truth of essents can come alive. Dasein does not create truth, but only lays-bare and uncovers the truth that is in an essent. Only as related to Dasein can an essent have its truth.

From our consideration of Dasein’s nature, characteristics and priority, we aimed at clarifying the epistemological concern of Dasein. This is based on his ‘being-in’ as existence and marks his being qualitatively different from that of any other entities of the world. Having done that, we can analyze the ‘in-the-world’ aspect of Dasein’s being, viz., his relational concern.


By the very fact that Dasein is in-the-world, he is relational. In his everyday existence Dasein is involved actively with other entities towards which he has concernful involvement and other Daseins, who are similar to him and towards whom he has the relationship of ‘being-with’ (Mitsein). Considering Dasein in his relational dimen-sion, in this section, we would make an attempt to see Dasein as related to entities, to other Daseins and to the world, which is the totality of Dasein’s network of references regarding entities and other Daseins.


When we consider Dasein as relational, the first notion we encounter is Dasein’s being as part of the environment. It is indicated by the German term ‘Umwelt’,116 i.e., the environmental world. It is that which is closest to Dasein in his encounter as a being-in-the-world.117 The environmental world of Dasein’s en-counter is filled with entities other than Dasein. These entities ‘be-long to the world’ with which Dasein has dealings (Umgang).118 In order to understand Dasein’s relation to these entities of the environ-mental world, we must clarify their nature and the nature of Dasein’s dealings with them. Entities as Present-at-Hand and Ready-to-Hand

The entities of the environmental world are viewed by Dasein from two perspectives, viz., the theoretical and practical. When Dasein adopts a viewing that is theoretical119 in the sense of obser-ving (Hinschauen), the entity appears to Dasein as something present-at-hand (das Vorhandene). This present-at-handness (Vor-handenheit) is the state of something being ‘on hand’. Looking at an entity from this perspective conveys a sense of objectification to the entity in question. Here the entity is seen apart from its sphere of daily involvement, and therefore as something static which occupies a place. In this way an entity is considered as a ‘mere thing’ out there.120 If Dasein views an entity from the practical point of view, i.e., in Dasein’s concernful dealings with that entity, then the entity presents itself to the Dasein as an ‘equipment’ or a ‘tool’ (Zeug) that can be put to use for a particular purpose. Thus, we can speak of equipment for writing, working, transporting and measuring. This ability to be used for a purpose is characteristic of equipment.121 Because of this quality, Heidegger refers to equipment as the ‘ready-to-hand’ (das Zuhandene), that is, something handy, conveniently near and suited for use by Dasein. Just as a hand is familiar with the glove which is on the hand, so also Dasein is familiar with entities within-the-world.122

From what we have said so far, about entities, it is clear that Heidegger speaks of the same entity as something present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. This does not imply a division within the entity itself. The difference comes about because of the way Dasein views the same entity. If Dasein views the entity in the theoretical pers-pective, he sees the entity as present-at-hand, out there. If he views the same entity from the practical point of view, i.e., in terms of his concernful dealings with the entity, he sees the entity as a tool, ready-to-hand. In the former case, the entity is seen in its static nature, while in the latter case, the entity is seen in its dynamic aspect of usability or serviceability.123

For Heidegger, Dasein’s relationship with entities is mainly one of proximity and involvement.124 This overall involvement of the care-taking of Dasein towards equipment and the encountering of them as ready-to-hand, Heidegger calls concern (Besorgen). In this state of concern equipment and its being matter to Dasein. The concern of Dasein towards entities is characterized by an existential cognition which Heidegger calls circumspection (Umsicht). ‘Umsicht’ means ‘to look around’ or ‘to look about’. Circums-pection is characterized not by a detached looking at entities, but involves the actual use of the equipment. In circumspection Dasein ‘looks about’ to see if the tools are in order for a particular purpose, or if the tool selected is best for the job. For example, circumspection is concerned about discovering whether a hammer is appropriate for the job of hammering. Thus, concern does not just dwell on the entity, like theoretical cognition, but instead passes through and goes beyond to the task to be accomplished. Besides, circumspection reveals not only the ‘in-order-to’ of a ready-to-hand, but also dis-covers the particular equipment in relation to the equipmental system of which, it is a part.125 Circumspective concern, thus, is that which reveals to Dasein the being of equipment, viz., its equip-mentality (Zeughaftigkeit).

Now that we have considered the difference between the present-at-hand and the read-to-hand entities, and the basic type of involvement of Dasein towards them, viz., the circumspective con-cern, we can turn our attention to the Being of such equipment which is Dasein’s concern. Entities in Their Equipmental Referential Totality


Equipment, as we mentioned is basically an ‘in-order-to’ or "for-the-purpose-of" (Um-zu) and its reality is always understood in relation to something else. For example, the pencil is for writing and the car is for driving. "In the ‘in-order-to’ as structure there lies an assignment or a reference of something to something."126 Since in its very structure equipment is related to another, we cannot speak of an implement having meaning in itself, but always in relation to an equipmental totality. So the reference ‘for’ (food for eating and money for buying) is the basic feature of equipment, in its relation both to other equipment, and to an equipmental system to which it belongs. To quote Heidegger:

Taken strictly, there is no such thing as equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipments, in which it can be the equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially ‘some-thing in-order-to’. . . . A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of un-zu the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.127

Therefore, the equipmentality of the equipment consist in that it always belongs to and accompanies other instruments, and resides in a purposeful referential totality of equipment. Only by being part of such a referential whole can the purpose of equipment be achieved and actualized. For example, inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, door and room, never show themselves as they are for themselves. But if understood as equipment for residing, taken in its totality, all these individual equipments have their signi-ficance in relation to the unity of the pattern of these references.128

Equipment shows its equipmentality, not only in its dealings with the other tools alone, but also with the work (Werk) as that which is produced as a result of ‘working at’ something, for example, footwear. "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered."129 The work produced, i.e., footwear, is the ‘towards-which’ (the purpose) of the tools; besides it also has a reference to its own ‘towards-which’ in relation to its usability. Again, it has a reference to the material ‘out of which’ or ‘whereof’ (Woraus) it is made, i.e., the leather. Finally the work produced has a reference to the ‘for-the-sake-of-whom’, viz., the person, who would use it.130 Thus, the equipmental dealings are conditioned by the various modes of reference and assignments of the ‘in-order-to’ relating to the work itself.131

The equipmental dealings, therefore, are not isolated involve-ments only among the tools, but also are closely related to other such complex patterns relating to the work done and ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ it is done. All these relational patterns relating to the equip-ments are interrelated, which results in an equipmental system or an equipmental referential totality. The complex equipmental involve-ments often remain unnoticed or are taken for granted by Dasein in his everyday existence. But Dasein comes to grip with them and becomes aware of such a relational complex only when the smooth functioning of these systems is disturbed. "The assignments them-selves are not observed; they are rather there when we concernfully submit ourselves to them. . . . But when an assignment has been disturbed -- when something is unusable for some purpose -- then the assignment becomes explicit."132

Heidegger speaks of three ways, in which, the breakdown in the equipmental system can take place and, in turn, can bring to Dasein’s circumspection the complex equipmental references which he tends to lose sight of in his everyday existence. Firstly, the equip-mental system is disclosed to Dasein in its totality when he is doing a work, especially when he encounters equipment as damaged and unusable. In this state the implement falls out of its totality and becomes unusable to do the work for which it is intended. Heidegger calls this inability of the equipment to be an equipment ‘con-spicuousness’ (Auffaelligkeit). Here we see that equipment, having lost its equipmentality, lies before us as a present-at-hand entity or as something ‘un-ready-to-hand’. Secondly, the equipmental system discloses itself when Dasein discovers that particular equipment, which is intended to be used for performing a task, is missing. The more urgently Dasein needs the equipment to that extent authen-tically it encounters un-readiness-to-hand of the missing equipment. This absence of the equipment to perform a task is called obstru-siveness (Aufdringlichkeit) where equipment presents itself as un-readiness-to-hand by its non-availability. Thirdly, an equipmental system is disclosed, when the equipment, losing its readiness-to-hand, stands in the way of achieving an ‘in-order-to’ or purpose. This type of presence of an equipment, as blocking the achievement of the purpose is called obstinacy (Aufaessigkeit). Here the equip-ment is neither unusable nor missing, but becomes un-readiness-to-hand by not letting the intended purpose be achieved.133

In each of these modes, viz., conspicuousness, obstrusiveness and obstinacy, the equipment, as it were, loses its character of readi-ness-to-hand and brings to the fore the characteristic of the objective present-at-handness of an entity. In other words, in all these modes, a particular equipment presents itself in an un-readiness-to-hand in a given equipmental-referential complex. In presenting itself thus, an equipment not only reveals itself to Dasein’s circumspection as unusable, unavailable or missing and thereby, standing in the way of a task to be performed, but also reveals everything connected with this equipmental system, viz., the work and all that goes with it.134 We could, for example consider the carpenter at work in his work-shop. His work goes on smoothly and while involved in work the whole working referential complex is, as it were, lost to him. Suddenly, he finds the hammer missing or the plane no longer works. This breakdown in the equipments, hammer or plane, reveals to him not only that a particular equipment is out of order, but also the work situation in which this particular tool has failed. In this connection, Arland Ussher remarks: "The world as world is only revealed when things go wrong."135 To quote Heidegger:

When something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence . . . has been so obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, thus making a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with and what it was ready-to-hand for (the equipmental system). The environment announces itself afresh.136

Thus, in the context of the equipment, the totality of the equipmental referential complex is lit up, and the equipmentality of the equipment and the environmenting world is revealed to the circumspective concern of Dasein.

The entities are present in the environmental world as equip-ment ready-to-hand and things present-at-hand in the cognition of the equipmental referential system. The notion of the environment involves the idea of space. So, in the next section, we shall consider the entities as related to space, i.e., in their spatiality. Entities in their Spatiality

Heidegger, like Descartes,137 did not think of space as some-thing that is empty and later filled up with things. For Heidegger, space is not something limited to entities in the world, but is also related to Dasein. It is only in relation to Dasein’s spatiality, that the spatiality of the entities ready-to-hand can be grasped. So, in his analysis of space, Heidegger looks into the spatiality of entities and that of Dasein.138

The spatiality of entities ready-to-hand is manifested in two ways. Firstly, in his everyday dealing with an equipment, Dasein finds the ready-to-hand equipment as being close to Dasein. The term Heidegger uses, namely, ‘Naehe’ can be translated as ‘close-ness’ or ‘nearness’. It indicates the nearness of something close to us.139 The term ‘readiness-to-hand’ indicates the characteristic of closeness. Every entity that is ‘at-hand’ or that can be handled points to the varying closeness or distance from, and to, the one who handles that entity. But this ‘closeness’ which is the fundamental characteristic of the entity’s ready-to-hand is not to be taken in measurable distances, but in terms of Dasein’s circumspective concern. In this sense we can speak of the spectacles that one wears on the nose as being further away than the picture out there on the wall; or the bus for which one is running is closer than the ground on which one runs.140 The second characteristic that the ready-to-hand entities reveal is one of direction (Richtung). It also must be under-stood in relation to Dasein’s circumspective concern.141

These two features, viz., closeness and direction, give equip-ment a place (Platz) in the equipmental-referential totality. In other words, they constitute a piece of equipment in a ‘locality’, giving it a fixed locus and setting it in the proper place in the schema of equipmental referential totality. Thus, ‘having-a-place’ is different from ‘being in a position (Stelle) in space’, which is a ‘random occurring’, ‘lying around’ or ‘being a present-at-hand entity some-where’. Thus ‘having-a-place’ or ‘locality’ and belonging to an equipmental totality give an answer to the question about the ‘whither’ (das Wohin) of an equipment. The ‘whither’ is an ontolo-gical condition for the possibility of an equipment to have a place in the equipmental totality.142 "This ‘whither’ which makes it possible for equipment to belong to somewhere . . . we call the region."143 The referential totality of the equipment is ontologically prior to the equipmentality of particular equipment. In the same way, the region as the ‘whither of the equipmental totality is ontologically prior to the ‘locality’ of particular equipment.

Speaking of the region, Heidegger says that it should not be understood in the geographical sense. But, the region is the ‘whither’ the readiness-to-hand is put to account as a matter of Dasein’s con-cern. For example, Heidegger speaks of regions of life and death in relation to churches and graves, which are laid according to the rising of the sun and its setting.144 Thus, all these features, viz., closeness and direction and their togetherness constituting the region relating to the spatiality of the equipment, can be discovered only in relation to the spatiality of Dasein. So, let us move on to consider the spatiality of Dasein.

Corresponding to the spatiality of the equipment, Dasein’s spatiality is constituted of two existentials, viz., de-distancing (Ent-fernung) and directionality (Ausrichtung).145 The first is de-dis-tancing, for which Heidegger uses the German term ‘Entfernung’. The term communicates the idea of ‘bringing closer’, de-distancing "amounts to making farness vanish, . . . making remoteness of something disappear (and) bringing it close."146 In other words, it is a capacity of Dasein to bring about closeness. By its active circum-spective concern Dasein can bring an entity close. For example, when one learns about the plan and means of building a shopping complex in the city, one brings closer the parts of this equipment totality. By so doing one brings close circumspectively the equip-ment which one will use as a means to actualize the project and achieve one’s ends. Thus, de-distancing is a circumspective bringing close of an equipment. It is possible for Dasein because it is an intrinsic tendency that belongs to the very being of Dasein. "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness"147 which is not a bringing close in terms of measurable distance, but one relates to the circumspective concern of Dasein. For example, ‘a good walk’ or ‘a stone’s throw’ has a definiteness relating to Dasein’s concern. Measurements, such as, ‘an half hour walk’ is to be understood in terms of duration rather than that of number. A pathway that is long ‘objectively’ may be shorter, very long or hard-going, depending on Dasein’s concernful look.148 "Circumspective concern decides the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally."149 Thus, "Dasein is spatial in the sense that it (he) discovers space circumspectively, so that indeed it (he) constantly comports itself (himself) de-distantly towards the entities, thus spatially encountered."150

The second characteristic of Dasein’s spatiality is directiona-lity. The idea of directionality is implied in de-distancing because every bringing close involves a direction from which the equipment is brought close, or the region in which it has locality. Dasein’s directionality, like that of de-distancing, is something that essen-tially belongs to him and he takes these directions along with him, being guided by circumspective concern.151 Dasein’s spatiality, by way of de-distancing and directionality, makes him encounter the equipmental ready-to-hand, in terms of the twin characteristics of equipment, viz., closeness and direction.152


In the last section, we have been dealing with the entities and their relation to Dasein. But, in Dasein’s being-in-the-world, he is not only involved with entities, but also related to other Daseins. Dasein’s world, whether it be related to entities or other Daseins, is a ‘with-world’ (Mitwelt). Dasein is ‘along-with’ (bei) entities; but he is ‘with’ (mit) Daseins. The other Daseins are neither present-at-hand entities or ready-to-hand tools, but are essents like Dasein. Heidegger remarks: "These entities (other Daseins) are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like very Dasein, . . . in that they are there too and with it (him)."153 In this section, we could explore the nature of Dasein’s relationship with other Daseins. Being-with: An Existential of Dasein

The nature of Dasein’s relationship with the other is charac-terized by ‘being-with’ (Mitsein). Dasein as being-in-the-world is always ‘Dasein-with’ (Mitdasein) and he shares a ‘with-like’ (Mithaften) character with others. Thus, Dasein as ‘being-in’ is always a ‘being-with"’ and his world is a ‘with-world’ (Mitwelt).154 The notion of Dasein as ‘being-with’ is indicated in Heidegger’s consideration of Dasein’s relation to the tools in a work produced (e.g. a footwear). The ‘towards-which’ of its usability is related to a ‘for-the-sake-of-whom’, i.e., to someone who would wear it. Thus, in a work-situation, Dasein is not only related to the environmental world of equipments, but in the last analysis also to essents with Dasein’s kind of being, which he encounters as the user, the wearer or the one who possesses. So, Dasein’s world is a co-world and his ‘being-in’ is ‘being-with-others’.155

The ‘being-with’ of Dasein is, in every case, characteristic of one’s own Dasein. The statement `Dasein is essentially being-with’ is not to be taken in the ontical sense of one concrete entity being related to another concrete entity environmentally and factically.156 It must be taken in the existential-ontological meaning, i.e., being-with as an existential of Dasein. Heidegger’s contention is that Dasein is always being-with in his structure, whether or not factically (ontically) the other is present-at-hand or perceived.157 This claim of Heidegger is based on another assumption, that in the pre-theoretical everyday experience of Dasein, i.e., in his existential perception, he has no experience of the self. The reason Heidegger is in favor of the assumption is the basic existential experience of Dasein. Dasein’s everyday life is lived amidst various demands to be met and tasks to be performed in relation to the others, and not as a self giving orders or as witnessing events that are taking place.158 The primary experience of Dasein as being-with is described by William Ralph Schroeder as follows:

The materials one works on are made by others; the tasks one performs are taught by others; the pro-ducts one makes are destined for others; the func-tional use of things come to them collectively -- everyone understands what things are for; one’s own understanding is a specification of this common sense. One’s existence is always articulated in a world . . . with others.159

For Heidegger, the relatedness of Dasein to the other is an a priori and it precedes all other empirical (ontical) relationships to the other. In fact the basic relationship of being-with is what makes possible an ontic encounter among Daseins.160 Not possessing this basic existential relatedness to the other amounts to lacking the specific mode of existence is characteristic of Dasein.161

Since Dasein’s primordial existential experience of his being is that of being-with-others, it follows that one cannot define others without any reference to Dasein. Nor can one think of the other in a detached manner of observation, but encounters the other in one’s practical concerns. Thus, the other is experienced not as distinct from oneself, but as similar to oneself, engaged in tasks like oneself and involved in cares like oneself. In other words, one experiences the other as one’s replica.162 Thus, Heidegger holds that Dasein’s basic experience of the other is not "that they are present-at-hand, self-sufficient beings whose minds are hidden, but rather that they are engaged, accessible beings, who share the same instruments and gathering places and function very much like oneself."163 It is only because every Dasein is essentially being-with that each can experi-ence the other Dasein in his own being-with. To quote Heidegger: "Only in so far as one’s own Dasein has the essential structure of being-with is its (his) Dasein-with as encounterable by others."164 Heidegger sums up the basic nature of Dasein’s relationship to the other as follows:

By ‘others’ we do not mean everyone else but me -- those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself -- those among whom one is too. This being-there-too . . . with them does not have the ontological character of a present-at-hand along ‘with’ them within a world. This ‘with’ some-thing is of a character of Dasein; the ‘too’ means sameness of being as circumspectively concernful being-in-the-world. ‘With’ and ‘too’ are to be understood existentially, not categorically. By reason of this with-like . . . being-in-the-world, the world is always the one I share with others.165

Now that we have analyzed Dasein’s being-with as an exist-ential of Dasein, expressed in the pre-ontological level, in a world which is common to all Dasein, we may move on to consider the modes of Dasein’s being-with. Modes of Dasein’s Being-with

Just as Dasein’s ‘being-in’ with the ready-to-hand is charac-terized by concern (Besorgen), the primordial relatedness of Dasein and other Daseins is referred to by Heidegger as solicitude (Fuer-sorge). There are two basic modes of Dasein’s solicitude, viz., negative and positive. The negative mode of solicitude is indiffer-ence (Gleichgueltigkeit) which fundamentally consists in one not mattering to another. Thus, in this state, one fails to show positive solicitude towards the other.166 Positive solicitude is of two modes.

The first positive mode of solicitude is that which leaps in (einspringen) for the other. It is a kind of solicitude in which one takes over the cares and worries of the other by taking over his place. The one who was overburdened so far is relieved and he steps back, as the matter had been looked into. In such solicitude, the one who comes to help out by taking over the responsibility of the other fully dominates the other and interferes with the freedom of the other. Let us take the example of a person who is burdened with the responsi-bility of preparing an academic project. If a person approaches this situation with the first mode of solicitude, he would leap into the situation and occupy the ‘Da’ of the other’s world and finish the academic project by himself. The other is dominated and he is not given the freedom to do the task in the way he wanted. Thus, the other is reduced to the level of equipment, as the other is treated as if he were an entity. The second type of positive solicitude is one of leaping ahead (vorausspringen) of the other. This type does not interfere or take away the freedom of the other. The other is freed for his own concern, in the sense that one anticipates and opens up to the other his own existential ability to be. In other words, by his support, assistance and suggestion, one opens up the care of the other so that he can existentially face it and solve the issue in his own way. Such a solicitude helps one become transparent in his own care and internally become free to face and solve it. Applying the same example to this type, would mean that one might discuss the project with the other and anticipate or open up the various possibilities of doing the project and help him to do the job in his own tempo and phase. Thus, in this solicitude the person is not dominated or interfered with, but only helped and freed for doing the project.167

Everyday being-with one another often takes one of the two forms of solicitude, viz., the negative mode or one of the two types of positive solicitude.168 The two types of positive mode of solicitude are guided by two forms of disclosure, viz., considerateness (Rue-cksicht) and forbearance (Nachsicht), just as Dasein’s concern towards entities (Besorgen) is directed by circumspection (Um-sicht).169

Heidegger speaks of various other modes in which Dasein is being-with, such as, "being-for, against, or without one another, passing one another by (and) not mattering to one another."170 But all these forms, according to Heidegger, can be brought under the positive and the negative modes we have discussed. These are expressions of the positive or negative modes. Again, modes of Dasein such as ‘being-for-oneself’, ‘being-oneself’, ‘being-alone’ and ‘being-away’ are all expressions of Dasein’s being-with in the negative mode. These expressions point to Dasein’s lack of aware-ness of his primordial existential being-with. Therefore, these are privative modes of Dasein’s fundamental being-with. To quote Heidegger: "Even Dasein’s being alone is being-with in the world. The other can be missing only in and for a being-with (i.e. Dasein)."171 This is true not only of the negative modes, but also of such positive modes as being empathetic towards the other. For Heidegger, "empathy does not first constitute being-with; only on the basis of being-with does empathy become possible. . . . "172 Thus, being-with is the existential of Dasein and all forms of being-with are expression of the positive or the negative modes of solicitude.

Dasein’s world is constituted by being-alongside-with-entities ready-to-hand in circumspective concern and by his being-with other Daseins in respectful solicitude. Having looked into Dasein in his relatedness to entities and other Daseins, we can enter into the study of Dasein’s relation to the world as a whole, in his relational totality.


Heidegger begins his analysis of the world and its relationship to Dasein by indicating the various senses in which the term ‘world’ is used. He identifies its four uses and limits himself to one. Firstly, it signifies the totality of the present-at-hand entities which Dasein encounters within-the-world. Secondly, it means the being of the totality of beings other than Dasein. In other words, in this sense, the term ‘world’ indicates any realm which comprises the multiplicity of entities. Thus, we can speak of the world of mathematics, which signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics. Thirdly, ‘world’ is taken as the complex which is opposed to Dasein, but ‘wherein’ factual Dasein lives. In this sense, the term ‘world’ has a pre-ontological existential signification. Here, ‘world’ stands for the ‘we-world’ (Wir-welt) with others and one’s own closest world of environment (Umwelt). Heidegger uses the term ‘world’ in this third sense. Fourthly, the term ‘world’ is used in the ontological-exist-ential sense and indicates the being of the world (Weltlichkeit) of Dasein’s ‘wherein’, i.e., the worldhood of the world. This meaning embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in general.173

Now, we turn our attention to Heidegger’s use of the term ‘world’ taken in the pre-ontological and pre-thematic sense. Under-stood in this sense, world has environmental and communal dimen-sions. It is a world, in which, Dasein is related to the entities and other Daseins, in circumspective concern and respectful solicitude respectively. ‘World’ taken in this sense is the matrix or horizon of Dasein’s total relatedness to entities and others (Bezugszu-sammenhang) and the matrix of total meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit) of Dasein himself, entities and others. We shall now consider the world in these two aspects. World: The Matrix of Dasein’s Relational Totalities

In dealing with Dasein and his relatedness to equipment, we mentioned that a piece of equipment is essentially ‘for the purpose of’ or ‘in-order-to’ (Um-zu) do something, and that it is not an isolated tool but has a relatedness to the whole equipmental totality of which it is a part. In other words, a piece of equipment, as a ready-to-hand, has a twofold reference (Verweisung), viz., to its own equipmentality, and to the equipmental referential totality of which it is a part. Firstly, equipment as a sign refers to its own ‘towards-which’. For example, the indicator in a motorcar points in the direc-tion towards which the driver is going to make a turn. Secondly, equipment also has a wider reference to the whole equipmental system to which it belongs. For example, the indicator in a motorcar has a reference to the whole sphere of traffic.174 So, for Heidegger, equipment is indicative of the ontological structure of the ready-to-hand entities and that of the referential totalities.175

From this, it is clear that the ontological structure of a ready-to-hand piece of equipment, has a reference which is beyond it own equipmentality. Firstly, by its very nature equipment has an involve-ment (Bewandtnis), which always implies two aspects, viz., the ‘with’ of the involvement (Womit der Bewandtnis) and the ‘in’ of the involvement (Wobai der Bewandtnis).176 For example, ‘with’ the hammer there is the involvement ‘in’ hammering. The ‘in’ of the involvement always has a ‘towards-which’ (das Wozu) of service-ability and the ‘for-which’ (das Wofuer) of usability.177 Secondly, this involvement of the equipment is not limited to its own isolated ‘Wozu’ and ‘Wofuer’, but is open to the pattern or matrix in which it finds itself (Bewandtnisganzheit), which in turn is part of a larger pattern. For example, ‘with’ the hammer there is the involvement ‘in’ hammering; ‘with’ hammering, there is an involvement ‘in’ nailing; and ‘with’ nailing, there is an involvement ‘in’ building a house. This process of ‘with . . . in’ does not go on indefinitely, because all these limited ‘Wozus’ lead back to an ultimate ‘towards-which’, which Heidegger calls ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (Worum-willen), which is always Dasein. In the given example, the house is for Dasein.178 Thus, for Heidegger, Dasein is the final center towards which all involvements are directed. That all such equip-mental involvements find their destination in Dasein, means that the worldhood of the world belongs to the being of Dasein himself. In the words of Heidegger:

But the totality of the involvements itself goes back ultimately to a ‘towards-which’ in which there is not further involvement: this ‘towards-which’ is not an entity with the kind of being that belongs to what is ready to hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world (Dasein), and to whose state of being, the worldhood itself belongs.179

Thus, the worldhood of the world, as belonging to Dasein’s being, is an existentiale. In other words, it is a necessary and a priori horizon of Dasein’s existential structure.180 The world is that ‘wherein’ (Worin) Dasein, as an entity, already was, and to which he can return (zurueckkommen) for any of its explicit thematizations.181 It is in the ‘wherein’ that Dasein encounters all other entities in circumspective concern and other Daseins in respectful solicitude. It is the ‘towards-which’ the equipmental systems in their relational complex are pointing by their structure.182 "World, then, is a non-ontic, non-thematic, pre-disclosed ‘there’ wherein There-Being (Dasein) encounters the purposeful beings with which it is preoccupied in its everyday commerce with the world-about."183

The world, as understood by Heidegger, is a ‘wherein’ of the matrix of Dasein’s total relatedness. This ‘wherein’ is not be taken in the spatial sense, but in the sense of a horizon in which converge all patterns of referential totalities, whether they belong to the environmental world (Umwelt) or the ‘we-world’ (Wir-welt), which has the nature of the community. The unity of this system of Dasein’s relations is Dasein himself, because he, as we mentioned earlier, is the ultimate ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of all equipmental and referential totalities. So, the world belongs to Dasein. The worldhood of the world consists in "the being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all."184 Therefore, worldhood of the world can be con-sidered formally as a system of Dasein’s total relatedness. Under-stood thus, it provides the basis on which entities can be discovered as they are in themselves.185 World: The Matrix of Dasein’s Total Meaningfulness

Since the world, as the matrix of Dasein’s relational totalities, consists in Dasein’s own being, the meaningfulness of these re-lational systems must be understood in Dasein’s own being. So, our speaking of the involvement of equipments towards Dasein, in fact, amounts to Dasein letting them be involved (Bewandtenlassen) with him. It implies that Dasein frees the ready-to-hand for meaning.186 In other words, the letting-be-involved of entities, by Dasein, is the ontological condition for an entity being encountered in its readi-ness-to-hand. An entity is freed for involvements in terms of its ‘with which’ and ‘in which’. For example, in terms of hammering, the hammer is freed for involvement.187 Understood ontologically, the letting-be-involved of entities by Dasein, amounts to Dasein’s dis-closing the totality of involvements as the world within which, entities can have their involvement. The freeing of entities for totality of involvements and the ‘for-which’ of their being freed must have been disclosed to Dasein primordially. In other words, Dasein has a prior understanding of the world towards which, he, as an entity comports himself.188 On this point Heidegger remarks:

That wherein (Worin) Dasein understands itself (himself) beforehand in the mode of assigning itself (himself) is that for which . . . it (he) let entities be encountered beforehand. The ‘wherein’ of the act of understanding which assigns or refers itself is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to involvements; and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which . . . Dasein assigns itself (himself) is what makes up the worldhood of the world.189

Since Dasein has a primordial understanding of this ‘wherein’, he is familiar with it. The familiarity is constitutive of Dasein and makes his understanding of beings. The complexity of relations, in which Dasein lives and from which he draws all meaningfulness of things, makes up the context in which he understands himself and his world. The matrix of meaningfulness, Heidegger calls ‘significance’ (Bedeutsamkeit). In his familiarity with significant relationality, Dasein constitutes the ontic condition for the possibility of dis-covering entities, which are encountered in the world with involve-ments. This meaning and significance is an existentiale of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.190 Thus, for Heidegger, the world is not a thing or collection of things. But, it is a matter of Dasein’s ‘being in’ in the matrix of relational and referential totalities. "The world", there-fore, " is an intersubjectively constituted referential totality in which it becomes possible for Dasein to encounter other entities, both of its (his) kind and the ready-to-hand."191

The worldhood of the world consists in the total meaning-fulness or significance of the relational structures of the referential totality. Thus, we can speak of as many worlds as there are different meaningful or significant referential totalities. For example, we can speak of a work-world or an academic-world. This is not the subjec-tivization of the world concept; but a mode of relating to beings, in concernful dealings always guided by a pre-thematic attunement, which, in turn, defines Dasein as a possibility of relating to beings. Taken in this sense, the world is not a creation of Dasein, but Dasein’s way of giving meaning to the existential relational complex in which he finds himself.192


Besides Dasein’s epistemological and relational concerns, he has an existential and personal dimension. Seen in this aspect, Dasein is a fallen existence (Verfallensein),193 called to be an au-thentic being and a temporal-historical being. In this section, we would like to consider Dasein in these aspects.


Here, we attempt to analyze the notion of Dasein’s fallenness, by spelling out its nature, motive and modes. Nature of Dasein’s Fallenness

The fallenness of Dasein is not to be viewed in the sense of negative evaluation. Neither is it to be understood in the sense of moral degradation or as a state comparable to that of original sin.194 Nor does it mean that Dasein altogether loses his being and becomes a being that is ‘no-longer-in-the-world’. It also does not imply that Dasein was in a ‘higher primal state’ and has fallen to a lower state of existence. Fallenness is not to be conceived as Dasein’s being an isolated ego, which has become displaced from himself to the world as a present-at-hand entity.195 Falling is not to be taken as an ontical assertion about the corruption of human nature. These ways of looking at Dasein would amount to ontical (anthropological) ways of perceiving Dasein’s fallen state. But, falling has to be understood in relation to Dasein’s existential constitution.196

In order to clarify the nature of the fallen Dasein, besides stating what falling is not, we must raise the question of the ‘who’ (Wer) of Dasein in this fallen state. On this point Heidegger states: "The ‘who’ is not this one, not that one, not oneself . . . not some people . . ., and not the sum of all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’".197 He attributes many characteristic to the ‘they’. The first is distentiality (Abstaendigkeit), in which the everyday Dasein stands in subjection (Botmaessigkeit) to others. In other words, the ‘they’ determine the everyday possibilities for Dasein. Here, Dasein is not his self, but taken over by the ‘they’. Distentiality consists in Dasein’s ‘being-with-one-another’. It dissolves one’s own identity completely into the being of the other, to such an extent that the distinction between the other and oneself is destroyed and, thereby, the total control of the ‘they’ is established. Thus, Dasein takes pleasure, reads, judges and is shocked based on the standards set by the ‘they’.198 Distentiality is founded on the second, viz., mediocrity (Durchschnittlichkeit).199 Having brought about the loss of identity of Dasein by distentiality, the ‘they’ maintains this loss factically in mediocrity. Here, everything exceptional and extraordinary is done away with. Every type of priority is suppressed and all possibilities of Dasein are leveled down (einbrenen). All these features come together to constitute the third characteristic of the ‘they’, which Heidegger calls, publicness (Offenlichkeit). In it, all genuineness and specialty that essentially belongs to Dasein is obliterated and obscured. Only the superficial in things is touched upon. The ‘they’ controls the way, in which, the world is interpreted. It presents every judgment and decides upon it and takes away Dasein’s respon-sibility.200 "It was always the ‘they’ who did it, and it can be said that it has been no more".201 Thus, in publicness, Dasein is fully disbur-dened by the ‘they’, and in this disburdening of responsibilities he finds a sense of security. Besides, the ‘they’ constantly accom-modates Dasein by the disburdening and subtly retaining its ‘stub-born domination’. The net result is "everyone is the other and no one is himself".202 These traits which we have described so far provide Dasein with a constant tendency (Staendigkeit) for the state of falling, from which he does not want to be disturbed. The ‘they’ is not a property of Dasein, but is an existentiale of Dasein. To quote Heidegger: "The ‘they’ is an existentiale; and as a primordial pheno-menon, it belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution."203

Having delineated the characteristics of the ‘who’ of Dasein in the fallen state, now we can elaborate the nature of the state of fallenness. This signifies Dasein’s state of absorption in (Aufgehen bei) or immersion204 in the world of his concern. Fallenness consists mostly in being lost in the publicness of the ‘they’. It is a losing sight of the truth about one’s own being; or a dimming of one’s under-standing of oneself, of one’s possibilities and limitations. In other words, fallenness is a state in which one fails to grasp one’s being with transparency and clarity. It is an entanglement with the life-world (Lebenswelt), so much so that Dasein loses sight of his roots.205 Falling is a state in which Dasein not only has lost his vision about himself, but understands himself in terms of others. One hardly realizes that one’s thoughts, feelings, beliefs and ideals are shared by others, even though they might appear to be one’s own. In fact, Dasein begins to guide his life in full conformity with every-thing the other expects of him. For example, the buyer determines what the producer must produce and the seller must sell. A professor or an officer becomes part of a setup and, in doing so, automatically takes over the norms and modus operandi of the system. Thus, in falling, Dasein loses his individuality, i.e., being-one’s-self, and allows his life-world to be guided by the ‘crowd’ or the ‘impersonal’ self.206

Caught up in this publicness and losing itself in the ‘they’, Dasein falls into a groundlessness. This domination of the ‘they’ becomes for the Dasein a constant temptation (Versuchung), in the sense that, it leads Dasein to falling. Since, Dasein is constantly tempted towards falling, he is gradually led to believe that, in such a state, he is secure and genuine and that the fulfillment of his possibilities are guaranteed. The supposition that Dasein’s life is genuine and that he is ‘in the best of order’ brings in Dasein is tranquillity (Beruhigung).207 "Falling ‘being-in-the-world’ which tempts itself, is at the same time tranquilizing."208 In tempting and tranquilization, the falling is aggravated as Dasein is not at peace or at rest. As falling gets aggravated, Dasein is moving towards an alienation (Entfremdung) in which, his own potentiality-for-being is hidden from him. "Falling being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing, it is at the same time alienating."209 Alienation does not tear down Dasein factically from itself, but rather closes off from Dasein his authentic possibilities. It results in Dasein falling into an entanglement (Verfaengnis) with himself.210 These four characteristics, viz., temptation, tranquilization, alienation and en-tanglement belong to the state of falling. Though, in falling Dasein takes a ‘downward plunge’ (Abstuerz) out of himself, into himself, into his groundlessness, he is under the impression that his way of living is an ‘ascending’, as the truth about his own true self is hidden from him. Heidegger uses the symbol of whirl (Wirbel) to indicate Dasein’s falling. In falling Dasein is ‘thrown’ into the bottomless living of everydayness and continues to be in this thrown state, totally whirled by the ‘they’.211

Having considered the nature of falling, the question arises as to why Dasein has the tendency to fall and remain inauthentic in his everyday existence. This is the topic of our consideration in the next section. The Motive of Dasein’s Fallenness

Speaking of the motive of Dasein’s falling, Heidegger says that the flight from Dasein’s own self and absorption in entities of the world and with others is due to Dasein’s experience of his own being as inherently dissatisfying. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is the ground of all his encounters; but this ground itself is experienced as groundless. Heidegger refers to this groundless and unsettling di-mension of Dasein’s being-in-the-world as guilt (Schuld). Thus, for Heidegger, this basic guilt is the motive of Dasein’s falling.212 Before we enter into analyzing the meaning of the term ‘guilt’, as used by Heidegger, we could consider its common and ordinary meaning.

In our everyday usage, the term ‘guilt’ has two meanings. Firstly, it has the sense of ‘owing’ or ‘having something due to an account’. Thus, ‘being guilty’ means ‘having debts’ (Schuld haben). The other modes of guilt, taken in this sense, are depriving, bor-rowing, withholding, taking and stealing. This sense lays emphasis on the claim of the other to whom one owes. The second ordinary signification of ‘being-guilty’ is ‘being responsible for’ (Schuldig-sein an). In this sense of ‘having responsibility for something’, the fact that someone has incurred a blame or committed a fault, for which he is responsible, comes to the fore. These two ordinary usages of the term ‘guilt’ together convey the notion of a failure to fulfill a requirement, through omission or commission, and that one is responsible for endangering, misleading or ruining the other in his existence.213

Heidegger uses the term ‘guilt’ in a more original and ontolo-gical sense. ‘Being guilty’ is a mode of Dasein and this notion must be freed from the moral and legal concepts. All moral notions which indicate a lack, such as ‘being indebted to’ and ‘being responsible for’ are based on the original notion of guilt, in which inheres the character of ‘not’ or ‘nullity’. In other words, the notion of guilt is not something which emerges from the violation of moral norms or an offense committed, but on the contrary, the latter itself is grounded in the more fundamental ‘not’ or ‘nullity’, that is charac-teristic of Dasein’s being, viz., guilt. To quote Heidegger: "Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness, . . . but on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only on the basis of primordial being-guilty".214 Thus, in the notion of guilt, taken in the primordial sense, lies the character of the ‘not’ or ‘nullity’. Guilt, therefore, is something that fundamentally belongs to Dasein. "Being-guilty belongs to Dasein’s being and signifies the null being-the-basis of a nullity."215 In order to understand guilt in this original sense, we must analyze that two existential limitations (Nichtig-keiten).216 These two existential limitations are two different ways in which Dasein’s being is dissatisfying to him. They lead Dasein into falling.217

The first existential limitation of which Heidegger speaks is Dasein’s facticity or thrownness. It refers to the way Dasein already finds himself in the world, i.e., in a particular complex of equip-mental system. Dasein finds himself (sich findet) in the world, having not chosen his world. In describing "Befindlickeit", we have explained the factical nature of Dasein. The significant aspect of this existential limitation consists in Dasein’s inability to be his own ground or change the state-of-being to which he is thrown. Dasein has no other way to go than to choose the situation in which he is thrown and make the best of it. Heidegger remarks: " As existent, it (Dasein) never comes back behind its (his) it (he)-is-and-has-to-be’ from its (his) ‘being-its (his)-self’ and lead it (him) into the there."218 This ontically and factically implies that one has no control to a great extent on the situation that went before his birth, early growth and development of skills, as most of these are determined for him by his thrownness. All that he can do is just be open to the possibilities of his thrown projection. In other words, it means that Dasein never has power over his ownmost being from the ground up, and he is never the cause of his own being.219 It is this thrownness, as an inability in Dasein to generate a world for himself and as an inability of Dasein to choose the basis responsible for his own choices, that constitutes the first existential limitation in Dasein.

The second existential limitation lies in the constitution of these choices themselves. In choosing one of the possibilities the Dasein has to give up the other. Dasein has no freedom to choose all possibilities. By nature, choice involves preferring one alternative to another. This inevitable preclusion of various possibilities which is inherent in the nature of choosing is the second existential limitation belonging to Dasein’s projective way of being. Heidegger remarks: "The nullity (existential limitation) we have in mind belongs to Dasein being-free for its (his) existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility -- that is, in tole-rating one’s not having chosen the others and one’s not being able to choose them."220 These two existential limitations -- Dasein’s thrown projective understanding which he cannot ground himself, and the limitation that is imposed in Dasein’s freedom to his own possibilities -- together constitute the guilt, in its primordial sense. Thus, guilt is the essential ‘lack’221 in Dasein’s nature to which he does not want to face up in his everyday existence.

The existential limitations which constitute Dasein’s guilt are essential conditions of his being-in-the-world, which disturb Dasein. Falling is nothing but a flight from the recognition of these dis-turbing conditions. Dasein is always aware of his guilt; but in the special state-of-being called anxiety,222 guilt as the motive of falling is explicitly and directly recognized. The anxious Dasein feels un-canny and not-at-home (Unheimlich)223 because in anxiety he comes in face to face contact with these existential limitations which constitute the guilt, and which are essential to Dasein being chal-lenged by his own guilt. In this situation, Dasein tries to get away from himself. In other words, Dasein flees from the direct recog-nition of these contingencies of his being, viz., his fundamental groundlessness, and drifts into everydayness. Falling, thus, amounts to Dasein’s way of avoiding an existential grasp of his guilt and an attempt to maintain his immersion among entities and others by merely preoccupying himself in existential possibilities in a given equipmental system. So, in falling, Dasein not only fails to face his true being, but also wholeheartedly identifies himself with the particular situation and accepts it as the true reality by ignoring all alternative ends and choices.224

From what we have said it is clear, that the primordial guilt constituted of existential limitations and Dasein’s unwillingness to face honestly his true being, which is essentially guilty in the sense we have explained, is the motive of Dasein’s falling. Having ana-lyzed the motives of falling, we could speak of its modes. The Modes of Dasein’s Fallenness

Heidegger speaks of three modes of Dasein’s falling. Dasein is not his genuine self in these three ways, viz., curiosity (die Neugier), idle talk (das Gerede) and ambiguity (die Zweideutligkiet). We shall consider each of these briefly and see how fallenness is manifested in these modes. Curiosity

In the fallen state, Dasein’s attitude towards the world and the entities within it Heidegger calls ‘curiosity’. This is a tendency to-wards ‘seeing’. In curiosity, Dasein allows himself to be carried away (mitnehmen) by the looks of the world. This is to see for the sake of seeing; what is seen is not seen in order to understand. Curious Dasein leaps from one new thing to another. What is aimed at, in seeing is not the truth of reality, but just novelty for the sake of novelty. Therefore, curiosity is characterized by a ‘not-abiding’ or ‘not-tarrying’ (unverweilen) alongside what is closest to Dasein. In curiosity Dasein is restless about novelties, constantly seeking excitement and changing encounters. This, in turn, leads to con-tinuous distraction and dissipation, thereby, always scattering into ever new possibilities. Being caught up in distraction, Dasein loses the sense of wonder or beholding the world with admiration. Curious Dasein, by his inability to dwell and to wonder about, and by his constant distraction, lives a life of ‘never-dwelling-anywhere’ (Au-fenthatslosigkeit). Curiosity takes Dasein everywhere and yet nowhere; it uproots Dasein in his genuine being. Thus, what is superficially seen in curiosity is expressed or given out in idle talk.225 Idle Talk

The German term "Gerede" is used by Heidegger to refer to the second mode of Dasein’s falling, viz., the talk is characteristic of everyday Dasein. Often it is translated as ‘chatter’, ‘gossip’, ‘prattle’ and ‘idle talk’. It comes about as a result of one gossiping or passing the word along. In idle talk what is talked about (das Geredete) is only heard in a random manner, but not understood. In other words, one is not fully involved with the content of the talk, but rather superficially and vaguely hears what is said. In this mode, speech becomes its own end, and diction, pronunciation and style of speaking become the criteria to decide about the genuineness and relevance of the speech. It involves a constant repetition. Even though idle talk is superficial and ungrounded, by repetition, it appears to be authoritative. Idle talk is not just limited to the vocal chatter, but also consists of a written form (das Geschreibe), which is based on the hearsay (Hoerensagen), that feeds on superficial reading. Though groundless, idle talk becomes easily public and thereby often is taken for genuine discourse. Besides, idle talk does not pass off consciously something as something, but instead remains on the superficial level and thus closes off (verschlissen) what it pretends to disclose (erschilessen), thereby discouraging any new inquiry, understanding, interpretation and communication. Thus, gossip cuts Dasein off from the primary ontological relation to the entities in the world, to the other Dasein and to his own self.226 Ambiguity

Ambiguity is closely related to curiosity and idle talk. Ambi-guity takes away the genuineness in both of these modes. It not only mars the truth of the world and Dasein’s being-with-others, but also gives a false impression of Dasein’s own understanding of himself. Ambiguous Dasein finds himself in the state of publicness and is unable to decide whether what has been disclosed is genuine or not. Being caught up in the whirl of daily activity, fallen Dasein is no more ‘straight-forward’. As ambiguity takes hold of Dasein, no genuine knowledge is possible, as everything is based on hearsay and without taking into consideration what is really happening. Ambiguity also dominates Dasein’s being-with-one-another. Every-one fixes his eye on the other and watches how the other will comport himself. ‘Being-together-with-the-other’ is characterized by a tense watching of one another, and by an ambiguous spying on each other, which involves a mutual overhearing.227 Heidegger says: "Under the mask of ‘for one another’ an ‘against one another’ is in play"228 in the mode of ambiguity.

All these three modes constitute Dasein’s falling, and are interconnected in their being. Heidegger remarks:

Dasein is always ambiguously ‘there’ -- that is to say in that public disclosedness of being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep ‘things moving’ where, in an everyday manner, everything (and at the bottom nothing) is happening.229

Thus, the fallen state of Dasein is disclosed through these modes of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity. In the following section, we could proceed to consider the manner in which Dasein can attain his authentic existence by moving away from the fallen state of existence.


Though Dasein is fallen in his everydayness, he is called to be an authentic human being. In this section, we will probe into the question of the authenticity of Dasein. Besides, we would show how the existential notion of the authentic whole Dasein is existentielly and ontically attested in Dasein himself. This we will clarify by the analysis of the notions of conscience and resoluteness. We will also deal with the question of the unity between the wholeness and authenticity of Dasein, by exploring the notion of anticipatory reso-luteness. Conscience

Heidegger’s analysis of conscience is different from the way traditional philosophy has thematized it.230 For him, conscience, as such, pertains not to the realm of knowledge, but to the realm of existence. It is an existential which belongs to Dasein in his concrete being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s analysis of conscience is different from the psychological, theological or popular interpretations, for he analyses conscience ontologically and existentially. In other words, the Heideggerian analysis traces conscience back to its existential structures which make it an existential of Dasein.231 Conscience: A Call

Conscience, as an existential of Dasein, is not a present-at-hand fact or event which occasionally occurs, to the justification of which inductive empirical proofs might be given; but it is a struc-tural mode of Dasein’s being, which is manifested in Dassein’s factual existence.232 Conscience is revealed as a call which (Ruf) has the character of an appeal (Anruf) to Dasein to be his own innermost potentiality-for-being.233 To this call of conscience there is a corres-ponding hearing or listening. Losing himself in the publicness and idle-talk of the ‘they’, Dasein fails to listen (ueberhoeren) to his own self, but listens rather to the ‘they’. The only way of freeing oneself from the self-forgetful giving of Dasein to the ‘they’ is to listen to the voice of one’s own conscience. The call of conscience, by its appeal, breaks Dasein’s listening to the ‘they’ and calls him out of this anonymous mode of existence. The call of conscience has the mode of discourse (Rede). As in discourse the vocal expression is not essential to Dasein, so the call of conscience is often a soundless giving-to-understanding (zu-Verstehen-geben). The call is unaffected by curiosity and idle-talk, it causes a jolt and an unsettling shake-up in the one who wants to be brought back from the sway of the ‘they’.234

The call of conscience, which is of the mode of discourse, has a number of characteristics. Firstly, what is spoken about in the call of conscience is the average everyday Dasein himself. The call itself is not vague or indifferent; it is presented in a way that Dasein, though caught up in his everyday care, can understand. Secondly, what is appealed to in the call of conscience is not what Dasein is expected to be, able to do, has achieved or stood for in the publicity of everyday life. Nor is it the self, which can become for itself an object of self-criticism and introspection, and which is separate from the outer world and caught up in analytically gazing at psychic conditions. The call of conscience passes over all these and appeals only to that self which is in the mode of being-in-the-world. Thirdly, what is appealed in the call of conscience, i.e., the content of the call, is strictly nothing. The call does not assert anything or give any information; neither is it a soliloquy. But it is the summoning of the self in himself, i.e., to his ownmost potentiality-for-being-his-self. In other words, what the call gives Dasein to understand is the funda-mental groundlessness of his being-in-the-world, viz., Dasein’s guilt.235 Fourthly, the call of conscience does not show itself in loud talk, but in the mode of silence and in it alone. The fact that what is called is not expressed in words or spoken aloud, does not make this call of conscience indefinite or mysterious, but only points to the fact that ‘what is given to understanding’ by the call does not depend on external articulation or communication. Neither does it make the call of conscience and its appeal less effective, because often silence is more effective than loud talk. Finally, though there is an apparent vagueness regarding the content of the call, what the call discloses is clear and unambiguous, viz., the direction which the self must take in order to move from the ‘they’ and to be authentic.236 Conscience: The Call of Care

Considering the conscience as a call, we stated that one to whom the call is addressed is the ‘they’. The one to whom the ‘they’ is called to move towards is also the same self, as the call of conscience is addressed to the self to be his self. The content of the call or what the call gives to understand is Dasein’s fundamental groundlessness, i.e., his primordial guilt.

Now the question we must ask ourselves is the ‘who’ of this call or the caller of the call of conscience. The caller of the call of conscience conceals himself in a peculiar indeterminateness and indefinability. The caller cannot be known, as entities in the world are known, by name, status, origin or repute. There is nothing specific that we can observe or say about the caller. One who calls holds himself aloof; his identity cannot be known. The only characterization we can give him is that he calls. We may say that Dasein is the caller and that he calls himself to himself. Even if this is so, there is some peculiar impersonal character about the call, because it comes unexpected, unwished for and independent of Dasein himself. Dasein himself never plans, neither is prepared for, nor voluntarily performs this call. At the same time, it is clear that the call does not come from some other Dasein in the world. Hei-degger remarks: "The call comes from me and yet beyond me and over me."237 So, there are some who hold the view that the call comes from some alien power, viz., God, while some others explain away conscience in terms of some biological theory. Heidegger does not approve of such theories, because the basic assumption behind these theories is that whatever exists must be present-at-hand reality. According to Heidegger, only the analysis of the existential consti-tution of this entity who calls can give us the clue to understanding him who does the calling.238

To clarify the subject of the call of conscience, Heidegger refers to the analysis of the thrownness of Dasein, which is his factical existence. In this thrown mode of existence the ‘why’ of Dasein’s thrownness is hidden from him, while ‘that-it(he)-is’ is disclosed to Dasein. The fact is that Dasein’s thrownness is revealed to himself in the state-of-being. Dasein often reacts to it by fleeing, because it brings Dasein face to face with his isolated being-in-the-world, which makes him feel not-at-home. Anxiety is the most fundamental state-of-being, which reveals Dasein fundamentally as the thrown. Heidegger suggests that the caller of conscience is this anxious Dasein in his not-at-homeness (Unheimlichkeit). In other words, the thrown and anxious Dasein becomes the caller of himself from his everyday fallenness.239 To quote Heidegger on this point: "The caller is Dasein in its (his) uncanniness: primordial, thrown being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home’- the bare ‘that-it(he)-is’ in the ‘nothing of the world’. The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice."240

Thus, the call of conscience summons Dasein to his ability to be (seinkoennen). The call speaks in the uncanny mode of silence. Conscience, having its basis in Dasein’s thrownness, calls Dasein back from the idle talk of the public, into his ownmost potentiality-for-being, at the face of anxiety. When existentially understood, the call of conscience constantly makes Dasein feel ‘not-at-home’ and anxious about his existence, thereby posing a constant threat to Dasein’s lostness in the ‘they’ and his forgetfulness of himself in his everydayness.241 Thus, the call of conscience shows itself as the call of care. Heidegger remarks:

Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which in its (his) thrownness (in his being-already-in), is anxious about its (his) poten-tiality-for-being. The one to whom the appeal is made is the very same Dasein, summoned to its (his) ownmost potentiality-for-being (ahead-of-himself. . . .) Dasein is falling into the ‘they’ (in being-already-alongside- the world of concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience -- that is, conscience itself -- has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its (his) being, is care.242

The conscience, which is the call of care, like death, is in every case ‘mine’ and is addressed only to me. For Heidegger, ‘public con-science’ or ‘world conscience’ is a dubious fabrication.243 Thus, conscience, as we have considered, specially with the character of ‘my-ownness’, is an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-being and this attestation lies in Dasein himself. But what is attested by conscience and the full nature of this attestation can be envisaged only when we deal with how this call of conscience is heard and understood. We move on to this point in the next section, which concerns resoluteness. Resoluteness

The co-relate to calling is listening. The proper listening to the call consists in wanting-to-have-a-conscience (Gewissen-haben-wollen). Only by wanting-to-have-a-conscience, can Dasein be his authentic potentiality-to-be. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is mani-fested in the mode of Dasein’s disclosedness, with its marks of understanding, state-of-being and discourse.244 Therefore, genuine hearing the call of conscience, first, involves the understanding of the existential of one’s own being and the existential limitations associated with guilt. In other words, it would mean Dasein’s under-standing of his ownmost potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Da-sein’s understanding of the call of conscience is accompanied by the state-of-being, anxiety, which brings to the fore the homelessness of Dasein’s own self. The mode of discourse that is characteristic of this anxious self-understanding, is not expressed aloud, but in silence, which the inauthentic Dasein must listen to in silence. So to the one who is caught up in idle talk and curiosity, the call of con-science in its silent manifestation would appear as non-existent. The pre-eminent and authentic disclosedness of Dasein attested to by Dasein’s wanting-to-have-a-conscience and shows itself as the silent and anxious self-projection, Heidegger calls resoluteness.245 To quote Heidegger:

The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience is thus constituted by anxiety as the state-of-being, by understanding as the projection of oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and au-thentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself (himself) by its (his) conscience -- this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety -- we call reso-luteness.246

From what Heidegger has said in the above quotation, it is clear that resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is the authentic mode of disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of Dasein.247 Since the disclosedness of Dasein is the primordial truth and the way in which Dasein is in truth,248 and resoluteness is the authentic mode of Dasein’s dis-closedness, resoluteness, as we described above, is the truth of Dasein which is the most primordial and authentic.249 Thus, the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness, recalls Dasein from his inauthentic everyday preoccupations to an authentic disclosedness. This does not change Dasein’s world, but rather transforms Da-sein’s awareness of his world and others. The world of Dasein does not suddenly have a new content, nor has the circle of people around him changed. But, there is a difference in Dasein’s comprehension of entities and other Daseins, as these are viewed from the point-of-view of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-being. In other words, Dasein’s authentic being-his-self, does not mean that he has a self that is unattached and cut off from the world, but Dasein’s ‘being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand’ and his ‘being-with-others’ "are given a definitive character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-being-their-selves."250

Hence, in resoluteness, Dasein does not stop taking care in his environmental world, nor does he stop his dealings with the com-munity to which he belongs, but only changes his attitude towards these, from one of inauthenticity to that of authenticity. The reason for this change in attitude is that in resoluteness "Dasein gets an authentic grasp of himself and comes to grips with things as they are"251 or authentically. Commenting on this point, B. J. Toussaint notes: "Resoluteness does not place Dasein in a different world; it does place the world in different light."252 Summing up this point Heidegger writes:

Resoluteness, as authentic being-one’s-self, does not detach Dasein from its (his) world, nor does it isolate it (him) so that it (he) becomes a free-floating I. How should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is authentically nothing else than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its (his) current concernful being-along-side what is ready-to-hand and pushes it (him) into solicitous being with others.253

Resoluteness, therefore, frees Dasein from himself for his world, in the light of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of his own poten-tiality-for-being. It also frees Dasein in his relationship with others in the sense that resoluteness enables him to allow them to be themselves. Thereby, resolute Dasein becomes, as it were, the conscience of others, which in turn brings about the disclosure of mutual potentialities to each other. This, in turn, helps them to be authentically ‘being-their-selves’ and authentically ‘being-with-one-another’.254

Resoluteness, so far we have considered, by its very onto-logical essence is related to a factical Dasein in a particular time. Resoluteness exists only in a resolution (Entschluss), which is the "disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible in the (given) time."255 Thus, only in a resolution, reso-luteness gets its existential definiteness. Thus existential definite-ness of resoluteness is elucidated by Heidegger with reference to the existential phenomenon called ‘Situation’.256 Though this term has a spatial reference, Heidegger uses it in the existential sense. Just as Dasein is disclosed in his ‘being-in’ or ‘there’, so also the resolute-ness of Dasein is disclosed in a Situation. In other words, Situation is the ‘there’ of an existing Dasein as disclosed by his resoluteness. It is essentially different from the objective framework or setting of the present-at-hand entities, circumstances, events and happenings, which constitute the background of Dasein’s activity. But, it is rather the internal ontological structure which makes such activities of Dasein possible. Dasein’s Situation is his own ‘being-in’ or the ‘being-there’ in the world, in so far as this is the ground of all actions and decisions. Situation has its being only in relation to resoluteness, which alone discloses resolutely the existing Dasein, just as Dasein can be spoken of as ‘being-in’ or ‘there’ only in and through his disclosedness. Thus, the call of conscience summoning Dasein in his ability-to-be attains a concrete and definite existence in resolute-ness.257 So, in the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness with reference to the existential Situation, a concrete attestation of Da-sein’s authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole occurs in Dasein himself. Anticipatory Resoluteness

So far, our consideration of the whole authentic Dasein has given us two significant phenomena, viz., first, the existential pro-ject of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole, which consists in the authentic being-towards-death, in anticipation of death, and, second, the existentielly demonstrated phenomenon of resoluteness as the wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which consists in authentic potentiality-for-being as resoluteness. These two pheno-mena seem certainly to be interrelated, as Dasein attains his whole-ness in anticipation and his authenticity in resoluteness. So the question that we face now is the nature of this relationship between anticipation and resoluteness. Only by bringing these two pheno-mena together could we have a full knowledge of Dasein’ s authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole. This is our task in this section.

Dasein in his existentiell actualization of authenticity in reso-luteness accepts guilt as his ever-present existential structure. The guilt which lies in the very core of Dasein is not a passing feature in Dasein, but it is something constant and extends to the entire being of Dasein "right to its (his) end".258 "Resoluteness is, thus, full and authentic only insofar as it acknowledges and accepts being-guilty unto the end, i.e., insofar as it coincides with a being-unto-death, which simultaneously accepts the being-guilty of Dasein."259 Through anticipation of death resoluteness reaches its own authen-ticity. To quote Heidegger:

As being-towards-the-end -- that is to say, as antici-pation of death -- resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness does not ‘have’ a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbors in itself authentic being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of one’s own authenticity.260

In other words, only by anticipating Dasein’s existential guilt right up to his end, i.e., until his death, does resoluteness becomes an authentic being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-being.261 Thus, "resoluteness is authentically and wholly what it can be, only in anticipatory resoluteness."262 On the other hand, anticipation which up to now has been considered only as a hypothetical existential projection, is given an existentiell and factical guarantee or attesta-tion through the addition of resoluteness. On this point Heidegger remarks: "Anticipation ‘is’ not some kind of free-floating behavior, but must be conceived as the possibility of the authenticity of that resoluteness which has been attested in an existentiell way -- a possibility hidden in such resoluteness and thus attested there-with."263 Thus, anticipation of death gives resoluteness its authen-ticity by making Dasein aware of the constancy of the existential guilt, until his end; while resoluteness gives anticipation its facti-city, i.e., its ontical dimension, and thus, completes Dasein’s whole-ness. From what we have said, it is clear that anticipatory resolute-ness makes us understand Dasein as existentielly structured (by anticipation of death) and existentielly attested (by resoluteness) authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole.264

Having already shown the interconnectedness of anticipation and resoluteness, Heidegger moves on to say that this union, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness, is not a connection that is forced from outside, but, that these two elements have real internal connection. To substantiate his claim, he proceeds to show how anticipation and resoluteness complement each other. Firstly, resoluteness, by wanting-to-have-a-conscience, i.e. by listening to the call of con-science, brings back Dasein from his lostness in the ‘they’ to the possibility of being his authentic self. Here, anticipation enters the picture and reveals death as Dasein’s ultimate potentiality, thereby making Dasein’s potentiality to be his self completely authentic and wholly transparent. Secondly, the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness, individualizes Dasein by manifesting to him his own being-guilty. Anticipation, by focusing Dasein’s attention on death as his non-relational possibility, further enhances and completes this process of Dasein’s individualization. Thirdly, resoluteness points to Dasein’s primordial being-guilty as a constant feature of Dasein’s existence and that it is not dependent on the incidence or the paying off, of the factical indebtedness or guilt. Anticipation, in its turn, uncovers the insumountability of this primordial guilt of Dasein by including in it the notion of death as something that cannot be out-stripped by anything.265

Carrying the comparison further, Heidegger calls our atten-tion to the similarity in the type of certitude that is found in resolute-ness and the anticipation of death. Resoluteness is certain of the existential guilt of Dasein, which makes Dasein’s existence inse-cure. Thus, in resoluteness, Dasein is certain about his own uncer-tainty of existence. This is so, because in resoluteness Dasein be-comes aware of that he cannot depend upon absolutes in any given situation, nor hold on to any decision for ever, but must hold himself open and free for factical Situations and possibilities.266 The last of these possibilities towards which Dasein is open in resoluteness is death, which is a certain possibility, yet there is an indefiniteness about it. But the anticipation of death, as the extreme possibility of Dasein, viz. that in death Dasein must simply ‘take back’ every-thing, gives resoluteness a certainty that is authentic and whole.267

Resoluteness in making Dasein aware of his primordial guilt, as mentioned earlier, also brings with it an indefiniteness which prevails throughout the whole of Dasein’s existence. This indefinite-ness of resoluteness, in turn, brings anxiety in Dasein. The antici-pation of death reveals the fullness of this indefiniteness for it opens Dasein for the greatest indefiniteness of his potentiality-for-being, i.e., death. The anxiety that arises in the face of the anticipation of death completes the anxiety that arises in resoluteness from Dasein’s awareness of guilt, because the indefiniteness in anticipation of death is the certain possibility of the impossibility of Dasein him-self.268

Thus, our analysis of the complementary nature of anticipa-tion and resoluteness, clearly shows that the various aspects of the existential concept of death are implicitly concealed in resoluteness, and they get completed when understood in the light of the anticipation of death. From this, it is clear that only in anticipatory resoluteness is Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole ultimately revealed. In doing so, we have also clarified both the existential-ontological structure of Dasein and the existentiell-ontical realization of the whole authentic Dasein,269 combining these two notions of ‘anticipation’ and ‘resoluteness’. J.M. Demske for-mulates the authenticity of Dasein or his authentic being-towards-death, as follows:

It is the understanding and acceptance of oneself in terms of the negativity of death as one’s ownmost proper and distinctive possibility-to-be (which is non-relational, irretrievable unsurpassable, certain and yet indeterminate as to its when), which nega-tively first announces itself through the call of conscience to the silent and unprotestingly anxious acknowledgment of one’s own existential guilt; this self-understanding reveals to Dasein its (his) con-dition of being lost in the inauthentic state of any-one-self (they) and brings it (him) face to face with the possibility of being its (his) own true self by accepting and affirming its (his) own negativity in an impassioned freedom unto death, liberated from popular illusions, factitious, sure of itself (himself) and anxious.270

Since outside of authentic being-towards-death, Dasein has no authenticity, authentic being-towards-death and authenticity of Dasein are one and the same, viz., anticipatory resoluteness. In this anticipatory resoluteness, we can understand Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-an-authentic-whole, i.e., a Dasein who is whole and authentic.


In the notion of anticipatory resoluteness we have come to understand Dasein in his wholeness and authenticity. A Dasein that is whole and authentic conveys the idea of relation to his end. In other words, in anticipatory resoluteness we have begun to under-stand Dasein in his finite. Now, Heidegger raises the question of that which enables Dasein to exist as anticipatory resoluteness in his finitude. In other words, Heidegger raises the issue of the ontological condition for Dasein’s existence, as the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole. In answering this question Heidegger presents tem-porality as the ground of Dasein’s being. In this section we will consider the notions of temporality and historicality, which, indeed, is a concretization of temporality. Dasein in His Temporality

In our ordinary understanding, we consider ‘time’ as a pure and indefinite sequence of ‘nows’ having no gap or interruption. This stream of ‘nows’ is endless and irreversible. In such a concep-tion of time, the future would consist of the ‘nows’ which were and which are no longer; and the present would be the ‘now’ which is the moment. In this view, time as such and its particular moments, i.e., the ‘nows’ are considered as some really present-at-hand.271 While Heidegger does not ignore the validity or justification of this concep-tion of time, he holds that this type of time is not a temporality of Dasein, because Dasein is transcendence. Thereby, he ex-ists or stands out above all other entities, in that by anticipation, he is what he can be, i.e., he is his own potentiality. The structure of Dasein’s temporality implies a future, a past and a present, and this is something proper to Dasein as existence. "The future, the character of having been (past) and the present, show the phenomenal charac-teristics of the ‘towards-oneself’, the ‘back-to oneself’ and the ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered-by’."272 These characteristics of ‘towards’, ‘to’ and alongside’ show temporality as ‘ekstatikon’, i.e., standing out of itself. "Temporality is the primordial ‘out-side-of-itself’ in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of future, the character of having been and the present ‘ecstases’ of tem-porality."273 Thus, in temporality the succession of ‘nows’ is not an entity. But the essence of temporality consists in the temporalizing unity of the ecstases and temporality itself cannot be spoken of as prior to the ecstases.274

As a process, temporality temporalizes in various modes. The basic modes are authentic and inauthentic temporality.275 The auth-entic mode of future ectasis is anticipation (Vorlaufen), in which, Dasein projects towards his final possibility, viz., death. The future ecstasis of inauthentic temporality is one of awaiting (Gewaertigen) one’s possibilities. The significance of awaiting consists in the actu-alization of the thing awaited.276 The authentic mode of past ecstasis is repetition (Wiederholung). It is the way in which Dasein’s thrownness can acquire a transparency. The inauthentic mode of the past ecstasis is having forgotten (Vergessenheit) in which the thrownness in hidden from Dasein’s view.277 The authentic mode of the present ecstasis is the moment of vision (Augenblick), which consists in Dasein being involved with the other two ecstases, viz., anticipation and repetition. In other words, it would amount to his involvement with environmental and communal worlds, without losing himself. The inauthentic mode of present ecstasis is making present (Gegenwaertigen), by which Dasein loses himself in the ready-to-hand.278 Unlike the inauthentic temporality, in which, the present ecstasis plays a significant role -- as the inauthentic Dasein is concerned mainly with the present -- in authentic temporality the ecstasis of future has pre-eminence. This is because by existing authentically towards death, as a future possibility in anticipation, Dasein exists finitely. Thus, since the futural ecstasis makes Dasein appropriate his own being, i.e., finitude, it has a priority over other ecstases.279

Now that we have clarified the notion of the temporality of Dasein in general and indicated its authentic and inauthentic modes, we could reinterpret our preliminary analysis of Dasein in terms of temporality. Temporal Noetic Dasein

Here our main concern is to reinterpret Dasein’s disclosedness or being-in (Da), viz., understanding state-of-being and discourse in terms of temporality. In other words, we want to show that these three modes of Dasein’s ‘standing in’ are not isolated modes, but rather that they constitute a temporal unity with the corresponding ecstases, viz., the future, the past and the present.

Understanding in its primary and existential sense always is a projecting towards Dasein’s potentiality-for-being, for-the-sake-of-which Dasein exists. That is to say that in understanding it is dis-closed to Dasein what he is capable of. The projection, in virtue of which a possibility of Dasein is understood, is always futural. Thus, understanding is fundamentally related to the ecstasis of future. The projective understanding, though it has future as its fundamental ecstasis, must also be related to the other ecstases of the past and the present in order to be authentic.280 In authentic understanding, Dasein perceives thing in their primordial light. Here, in involving himself in this interpretation, viz. the future Dasein interprets the present situation in the light of the past which constitutes Dasein’s being as the ‘has been’ (Gewesen), and that of the end which one intends to achieve. Thus, by anticipation authentic understanding takes hold of its past and all the significance it can offer to the present act of interpretation (a moment of vision) and freely moves towards the not-yet (future). Thereby, it brings new significance and meaning to the thing or the possibility that is understood. On the contrary, if Dasein loses the essential futurity of his projective understanding, forgets its ‘has been’ and its significance to the present and to the future, he fails to realize what things are really for and their genuine relatedness, as they simply make things present. In this attitude he waits for the actualization of the things waited for, that he can possess them. This leads Dasein not to see things in the new light, but in that of the preoccupation of daily life.281

Unlike understanding, which is grounded in the ecstasis of the future, the state-of-being, which is the fundamental condition of Dasein as thrown, is founded in the ecstasis of the past. Thus, in state-of-being, the other two ecstases, viz., future and present are modified by the past or ‘having been’. This is because, in state-of-being, Dasein’s past is given to him and he is focused towards the event of his origin; as a result, every other aspect of Dasein’s existence is ‘tuned’ by what has come before.

In spelling out the temporal interplay of the ecstases of ‘Befindlichkeit’, Heidegger specially deals with fear as the inau-thentic mode and anxiety as the authentic mode.282 In the inauthentic state-of-being, viz., fear, Dasein fails to be in touch with the past, and fails to see his relevance in the future and the present ecstases, because of his absorption in his concern. Thus, when Dasein is under the grip of fear, he is in a state of confusion. As a result, he is not able to understand his past, viz., his background and his respon-sibility to make something of the past in the present and in the future. So in the state of fear, there is involved, on the part of Dasein, a forgetfulness of the past, which brings about a disruption in the temporalizations of the present and the future. This, in its turn, bars Dasein from having a clear vision of the present, but instead makes the present his concern. In this state of affairs an authentic anticipation is not possible, but Dasein waits for the object of fear and for the means of escape.283

Anxiety, on the other hand, is fully open to Dasein’s past and helps Dasein to grasp the limits of his being-in-the-world, i.e., a thrown existence. Thus, guided by anxiety, Dasein takes hold of his past and his possibilities, and relives them in the present with re-ference to his own projections towards the future. In other words, in authentic state-of-being, i.e., in anxiety, Dasein remaining in the present turns back into the past to bring out what has been, viz., brings the past possibilities forward into the future.284

The disclosedness of Dasein, that is reached in understanding and state-of-being becomes articulated in discourse. Therefore, dis-course, as such, does not temporalize in any special ecstasis. But discourse, in itself, is temporal in the sense that, all discourses, whether they be talking about something or talking to someone, are grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. For discourse always is a making present understanding which is futural, and the state-of-being which primordially is related to the past. Thus, we can say regarding discourse that, though, in it none of the ecstases of temporality dominates, it is an integration of all the three temporal ecstases in a dynamic whole.285 Temporal Everyday Dasein

In this section, we want to reinterpret Dasein as everyday being-in-the-world from the aspect of temporality. Dasein, as everyday being, is ‘being-alongside-entities-within-the-world’. This mode of Dasein’s being raises two issues, viz., circumspective con-cern and the world. Besides, in his everydayness, Dasein is in the fallen state, in which he is constituted of care. So our task here is to consider the temporality of the following themes, viz., circumspec-tive concern, the world and fallenness, which fundamentally consti-tute Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-world.

Firstly, in Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-world, he encoun-ters the ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) and the present-at-hand (Vor-handen). Dasein’s circumspective concern for them emerges in the context of the total work-world, i.e., the equipmental system. The fact that Dasein is involved with equipment implies that he possesses a priori awareness of the destination or the ‘towards-which’ of the equipmental system, because Dasein allows the ready-to-hand to be involved with him only relating to his purposive activity. This means the ‘that-which-is-for’ of the involvement belongs to Dasein’s past and is retained as the ‘has been’. Dasein understands the purpose or the ‘towards-which’ of the equipment system, and also has the structure of awaiting, as it is oriented towards Dasein’s projective concern, and thus, has the ecstases of the future. Neither awaiting the ‘what-for’ (future) nor retention of the destination (past), taken in an isolated manner, constitutes the temporal background of the making present that is characteristic of the circumspective concern. Rather it is the unity of the three ecstases of temporality that con-stitutes the circumspective concern in its temporality. In other words, Dasein makes the equipmental system present in his circum-spective concern with reference to his future ends, i.e., awaiting the future ends, on the basis of the retention from the past.286 On this point Heidegger remarks: "The awaiting of what it (he) is involved in and -- together with this awaiting -- the retaining of that which is thus involved makes possible in its (his) ecstatic unity the speci-fically manipulative way in which the equipmental system is made present."287

The temporality of circumspective concern is clarified, fur-ther, with reference to the three modes of conspicuousness, obstru-siveness and obstinacy. In an equipmental whole, with which Dasein is involved, an equipment emerges into conspicuousness when it shows itself as unworkable or damaged, and thus, holds up the awaiting-retaining-making present, by bringing about a collision between the practical aim of Dasein and the ‘what-for’ of the equip-ment. Similarly, in Dasein’s circumspective look, he discovers an equipment as missing (obstrusiveness) only because the awaiting temporalizes itself in unity with the retention which presents itself. This is also true of obstinacy. In all these three cases, if Dasein does not expect the particular equipment in question to function in the present and in the future in the way it has done in the past, the break-down in the functioning of the tool will not be noticed. Thus, circum-spective concern is the fundamentally temporal unity of expecting (future)-retaining(past)-making present (present).288

Secondly, we have already seen that the world is a unity of Dasein’s referential totalities and their significance. Attempting to interpret the world in terms of temporality, Heidegger says: "The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon."289 The ecstases of this unity are not without any direction, but each of them has a ‘where to’ (ein Wohin) or direction, which Heidegger calls ‘horizonal schemata’. It is different in each ecstases. The schemata in which Dasein moves towards himself in the ecstasis of the future is the ‘for-the-sake-of-himself’. The schemata in which Dasein is disclosed to himself in the ecstasis of ‘has been’ (past), as thrown to a particular state-of-being, is the ‘before-what’ which includes ‘the face of which Dasein is thrown and the ‘to which’ he is abandoned. Dasein, thus, existing ‘for-the-sake-of-himself’ and as being thrown, finds himself alongside entities and makes himself present in his concernful dealings with them. Thus, the horizonal schemata of the present is marked by the ‘in-order-to’ of entities.290

The unity of this horizonal schemata is, in fact, grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. It determines the way in which factically existing Dasein is disclosed. In the ecstasis of the future Dasein’s potentiality-for-being is projected; in the ecstasis of the past Dasein is disclosed as ‘being-already; and in the ecstasis of the present Dasein in his circumspective concern is disclosed. Thus, Dasein in the ecstatic unity of temporality -- Dasein existing as a potentiality-for-being (future), as thrown (past) and as among essents (present) understands himself in terms of the unity of hori-zonal schemata. That is, he understands himself in terms of the connection between the ‘for-the-sake-of-himself’ of Dasein, the ‘in-order-to’ of the entities of Dasein’s concern, and the ‘before-what’ of Dasein’s ‘has-been’. So, in grounding the unity of the horizonal schemata of Dasein in the unity of the ecstases of Dasein’s tem-porality, the world is disclosed to Dasein as the mode of his own being.291 Heidegger remarks on this point:

In temporalizing itself (himself) with regard to its (his) being as temporality, Dasein is essentially ‘in the world’, by reason of the ecstatico-horizional constitution of that temporality. The world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality. With the ‘outside-of-itself’ of the ecstases, it `is’ ‘there’. If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either.292

Thirdly, in fallenness Dasein fails to hold on to the future and the past ecstases and increasingly limits himself to the present. ". . . falling has its existential meaning in the present."293 Though fallenness is characterized by three modes, viz., ambiguity, idle talk and curiosity, Heidegger restricts the investigation of the tem-porality of fallenness, by considering curiosity, as in curiosity the temporality of Dasein’s fallenness is easily seen.294 According to Heidegger, curiosity has a distinctive tendency for potentiality-for-seeing. It sees things not to understand them, but only for the sake of seeing and having seen. It does not have a future and a past ecstasis. Curiosity’s craving for the new is a projection towards the not-yet. But in making present the future possibility, Dasein is caught up in himself and sees the future inauthentically, in that he seeks to run away from waiting for the not-yet as a possibility and sees it, as it were, as something actual. Thus, Dasein is always on the move from one new thing to another and never dwells anywhere.295 The reason, for the curious insistence by Dasein’s on continued holding onto the present and avoiding the past ecstasis by retention and the future by anticipation of possibilities, is that in his being open to the past and future ecstases, there is a greater danger of facing the existential limitation essential to guilt and one’s own last possibility, viz., death and the anxiety that comes from it. The continued insistence on the present helps Dasein to exist in an unchallenged and inauthentic manner. Thus, we see that the falling of Dasein is fundamentally constituted of temporality.296 Temporal Whole Authentic Dasein

We have already seen that Dasein’s whole and authentic exist-ence is brought about by anticipatory resoluteness. According to Heidegger, this process of authenticity has a structure correspon-ding to that of the threefold structure of care. Firstly, the anticipa-tion of death concretizes the moment of authenticity which basically consists in Dasein’s being-ahead-of-himself. Secondly, resoluteness in the face of one’s own guilt concretizes the moment of already-being-in. Thirdly, the summons into the Situation is the concrete expression of being-with. In interpreting this process of authenticity temporally, Heidegger shows that in his authentic and total existence the being of Dasein is temporal.297

Dasein, as being-ahead-of-himself, understands himself with reference to his ownmost potentiality-for-being. In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein opens himself to his ultimate possibility, viz. death, and continues to understand it as a possibility. The standing before this utmost possibility allows him to come towards himself. "This letting-itself (himself)-come-towards-itself (himself), in that distinctive possibility which it (he) puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards."298 Thus, it is the coming of the future into the present as a possibility, which Hei-degger calls the phenomenon of futurity. This is possible only because Dasein as existence is ahead-of-himself and is oriented towards the future. In the next stage, anticipatory resoluteness in understanding Dasein’s own essentially being-guilty takes over this existential guilt as a thrown possibility, or as he is already-being-in. In so doing, Dasein comes back to himself, to his already-having-been, viz., to his past. The past can be appropriated to Dasein’s present experience only if he is oriented towards the future. At the third stage, anticipatory resoluteness discloses the Situation and Dasein is summoned to it, to the authentic acceptance of the truth of Dasein’s fallen being-alongside, a structure in which Dasein finds himself in his encounter with entities within-the-world. Such an encounter is possible by making such entities present.299

Anticipation of death, resolute acceptance of existential guilt and summon to the Situation are three moments, which are made possible on the basis of the three phenomena, viz., letting-oneself-come-to-oneself (future), coming-back-upon-oneself (past) and encounter (present). Thus, the authentic wholeness of Dasein is made possible by the fact that Dasein in his basic structure is fu-tural, having-been and presencing, i.e., temporal.300 In other words, the having-been existential guilt, by coming back upon itself, is appropriated into Dasein’s situation through its orientation towards coming, by anticipation of death. Together these constitute the being of the authentic whole Dasein. Thus, it is clear that the whole au-thentic Dasein is temporal. Dasein in His Historicality

In our consideration of death as the end of Dasein, antici-patory resoluteness as the basis of his authenticity and particularly temporality as the foundation of Dasein’s being, we have attempted to spell out Dasein’s authentic being-a-whole. Though our analysis has reached a certain amount of completeness, still it is incomplete. This is because our analysis has not delved into the question of Dasein’s birth and the stretch of life ‘between’ birth and death. So we have overlooked, in our study of Dasein’s being-a-whole, the ‘connectedness of life (Lebenszuzammenhang), which Dasein constantly maintains.301

At the first glance, this stretch between birth and death and its connectedness seems to be a matter of a sum of successive experi-ences taking place in time, between these two moments, viz., birth as something that was and is no longer and death as something that is not-yet, but will happen. The assumption behind this view is the perception of Dasein as a present-at-hand entity and birth and death as two concrete present-at-hand moments, which originate and terminate Dasein’s existence respectively, which two also happen in time.302 But Dasein’s stretching along is not of this type as it is being-in-the-world. Birth and death are ever present realities of Dasein’s existence as being-in-the-world. Dasein, thus, extends along in such a way that from the moment of his birth he is con-stituted as a stretching along. "The ‘between’ which relates to birth and death already lies in the being of Dasein."303 In other words, factical Dasein exists as born until he dies and from the moment of his birth he is dying because by his very nature Dasein is a Being-towards-death. Therefore, as long as Dasein exists factically both of these ‘ends’ and their ‘between’ are part of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.304 The movement that is characteristic of the connectedness of Dasein’s life, i.e., Dasein’s stretching himself along, Heidegger calls ‘historizing’ (Geschechen).305 By clarifying the structure of Dasein’s historizing and the existential temporal condition of his possibility, we can understand ontologically the historicality of Da-sein (Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins).306

This historicality of Dasein or his history (Geschichte) is not something different from temporality; rather the former must be elucidated in terms of the latter. To quote Heidegger on this point: "In analyzing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity (Dasein) is not temporal because it (he) stands in history, but that, on the contrary, it (he) exists historically and so exists, only because it (he) is temporal in the very basis of its (his) being."307 Therefore the interpretation of the historicality of Dasein is, indeed, a more concrete working out of Dasein’s temporality.308 Thus, our task in this section is to expose the problem of Dasein’s historicality in its authentic and inauthentic modes and present the historical Dasein as the existential basis of any science of history. Dasein: A Historical Being

Heidegger begins his exposition of Dasein’s historicality by considering the various meanings of the term ‘historical’ as under-stood in the ordinary everyday use of the term. Firstly, something is spoken as historical in the sense of past and bygone. Here the ‘past’ means ‘something no longer present-at-hand’. Secondly, something is seen as historical, in that, it has originated in the past, still con-tinues to be present having effects on the present, and will continue to affect the future. For example, a temple of the past is present now and will continue to be in the future, having certain effects on the people in the present and in the future. Thirdly, the term ‘historical’ is referred to the whole of beings that change in time as different from nature, i.e., human groupings, their cultures and civilizations. In this sense man becomes the subject-matter of history. Fourthly, something that is handed over, by way of tradition, is also called historical. All these significations are connected on one point, i.e., they all relate to man as the ‘subject’ of events.309

From our analysis of the various everyday meanings of the term ‘histrorical’, we can come to one conclusion, that this term is not only used of Dasein, but also of other entities. The question arises as to the origin of historicality: does it belong fundamentally and primarily to Dasein or to entities?301 In answering this question, Heidegger attempts to clarify the way in which the entities in the world such as nature, and the ‘world-historical’ entities (Welt-Geschiehtiche) such as antiques, works of art, books and buildings are historical. Nature, for example, is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as a site for a cult.311 Nature can be spoken of as historical, as it has its historizings (Geschichen) in the world, but its historicality is related to the one who makes them happen. In the example cited earlier, nature’s historicality is related to one who would exploit it as a countryside, battlefield, a place of colonization or a site for a cult. Taking another example, an article which is present now, but belongs to the past, is called historical, even though it is not strictly in the past in the sense of ‘being no longer’. But this article, which still exists as a present-at-hand entity, can have the character of the past and historicality because it belonged to an equipmental system which was part of the world of a Dasein that has-been-there (Da gewessen). Thus, this article is historical because of its affinity to the Dasein that has-been-there.312

The natural consequence that can be drawn from the preceding analysis is that what is primarily historical is Dasein, and the entities we encounter in the world, viz., nature and the world-historical entities are historical only in a secondary sense.313 Thus, in the ultimate analysis, "the historizing of history is the historizing of the being-in-the-world."314 So, the historicality of Dasein is the histori-cality of the world, because, "with the existence of historical being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world."315 Modes of Dasein’s Historicality

At the close of the last section, we reached the conclusion that Dasein is primarily historical and entities are historical to the extent they are related to Dasein’s historicality. But we have not yet spelled out the basic constitution of this historicality of Dasein. The authen-tic historicality is the ontological basis for the historicality as a con-stitutive state of Dasein. Hence, the study of authentic historicality and asking for the basic constitution of historicality is one and the same.316 Historicality is authentic if the historizing takes place in the world’s essential existent unity with Dasein. If the historizing takes place within-the-world of what is ready-to-hand or what is present-at-hand, then we have the inauthentic mode of Dasein’s histori-cality.317 In this section we will clarify the authentic mode of histori-cality and therefore explore the basic constitution of Dasein’s historicality and distinguish it from inauthentic historicality.

Since historicality is centered fundamentally on Dasein’s tem-porality, as the former is the concrete working out of the latter, the basic constitution of historicality must be sought in temporality, which is the being of Dasein. Since, temporality determines Dasein’s authentic whole existence in the mode of anticipatory resoluteness, authentic historicizing of Dasein and his authentic historicality (therefore, the basic constitution of Dasein as historical) must be founded on anticipatory resoluteness. In other words, we can speak of an authentic historicality of Dasein only in relation to temporality and anticipatory resoluteness.318

In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein understands himself with regard to his potentiality-for-being by standing face-to-face with death, taking upon himself his own thrownness and resolutely existing in a given situation, projecting upon a particular existentiell possibility. But, anticipation of death existentially as an unsurpas-sable innermost possibility only guarantees the wholeness and au-thenticity of resoluteness. But it does not disclose those existentiell-factical possibilities of Dasein which constitute the historizing of the stretch between birth and death. Even Dasein as a thrown being-in-the-world does not disclose the factical possibilities, as in his everydayness he has submitted himself to the sway of the ‘they’. The everyday Dasein’s possibilities or heritage (Erbe) is part of his thrown being-in-the-world, as Dasein is marked by ambiguity and his understanding is marked by the public way of interpreting his possibilities. But, in fact, it is in resoluteness, that Dasein comes back to himself, and it is resoluteness which discloses to Dasein his factical-existentiell possibilities of authentic existing. Thus, it is in resoluteness, i.e., in the resolute taking over of one’s thrownness, that the heritage -- the whole of givenness of Dasein, as being-in-the-world -- is handed down to himself.319 Heidegger remarks: " In one’s coming back resolutely into one’s thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having, thus, come down."320

Thus, the more Dasein opens himself to death in anticipation, and the more resolute he is, to that extent Dasein will find his possibilities. So, ‘being free for death’ gives Dasein his goal and leads him to his finitude. The Dasein that has grasped the finitude of existence -- the authentically existing Dasein -- frees himself from all possibilities of pleasure, of taking things lightly and of evasion, and accepts the heritage that he hands down to himself in his primordial historizing.321

The authentically existing Dasein takes over his heritage which "it (he) has inherited yet freely chosen",322 and understands himself in terms of ‘fate’ (Schieksal) and destiny (Geschick).323 ‘Fate’ consists in Dasein’s awareness of his finitude in one’s pos-sibilities and ‘Destiny’ is the communitarian dimension of finite ‘givenness’. The latter is not a sum-total of the former. Since Dasein is born in a community and his historizing until death takes place in relation to a community, fate cannot be understood apart from destiny. Therefore, Dasein’s historizing is always a co-historizing, in the sense, that though he has an individual fate, he still shares in the destiny of the community, as Dasein is an integral part of the community. "Only in communicating and struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its (his) generation goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein."324 This `fateful destiny’, which Heidegger calls ‘the power-less superior power’ (Ohnmachtige Uebermacht), i.e., Dasein’s finite freedom, makes death, guilt, conscience, freedom and finitude equiprimordially reside together in Dasein’s being, and thus effects Dasein’s authentic historicality.325 Heidegger sums this up as follows:

Only an entity which, in its (his) being, is essentially futural so that it (he) is free for its (his) death and lets itself (himself) be thrown back upon its (his) factical ‘there’ by shattering itself (himself) against death -- that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having been, can, by handing down to itself (himself) the possibility it (he) has inherited, take over its (his) own thrown existence and be in the moment of vision for ‘its (his) time’. Only authentic tempo-rality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate -- that is to say, authentic historicality.326

Resoluteness may not mean that the Dasein know the origin of his potentialities explicitly. But if he does know it explicitly, it is known in repetition (Wiederholung) which consists in handing down explicitly and going back into the possibilities as that-has-been-there. Thus, authentic repetition consists in anticipatory resolute-ness, for only in it can Dasein first make the choice which would make him free to faithfully hand-over what he considers worth repeating. Such repetition does not bring again (wiederbringen) something that is past, nor bind the present to that which is no longer, but makes a reciprocative rejoinder (erwiedert) to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there, understanding his genuine originality. Interpreted in this way, resolute historicality has its focus, not in the past, neither in the today, nor in its connection with the past, but in the authentic historizing of existence which originated from Dasein’s future, i.e., in Dasein’s authentic being-towards-death.327 "As a way of being for Dasein, history has its roots so essentially in the future, that death, as that possibility of Dasein, . . . throws anticipatory existence back upon its (his) factical thrownness, and so for the first time imports to having-been its (his) peculiarly privileged position in the historical."328 From this it is clear that Dasein does not first become historical in repetition, but only because he is historical as temporal can he take over himself in his historicality by repetition. "Authentic being-towards-death (anticipatory resoluteness) -- that is to say finite temporality -- is", therefore, "the hidden basis of Dasein (authentic) historicality."329 Such an authentic historical Dasein understands the entities in relation to himself and passes on this authentic dimension of his primary historicality to that of entities in his being-in-the-world. Therefore, a genuine world history is that which is understood in terms of Dasein’s fateful destiny.

Having explored the authentic mode of historicality, i.e., the constitution of Dasein as historical, we can move on to consider how inauthentic historiality is different from the authentic historicality of Dasein. The inauthentic factical Dasein in his fallenness is entangled with the objects of his concern. Such a Dasein considers himself ‘one-like -many’ under the influence of the ‘they’. He understands himself, in terms of the entities within-the-world, because in inau-thentic state Dasein himself is not the sphere of historizing, which takes place in the realm of present-at-hand entities. Thus, Dasein understands his history world-historically in which Dasein sees himself as the subject of events and circumstances, and thereby as having a substantial existence. This perception of his history brings to Dasein a disconnected view of his history so that inauthentic historicality lacks the connectedness of the authentic mode of his-toricality. Every event is an isolated moment which appears and after a while disappears.330 This perception is due to the fact that inauthentic Dasein is totally not in touch with the fundamental fea-tures of his being-in-the-world, i.e., his being as a continuous stretch from his birth to death. In other words, Dasein in his inauthenticity is blind to his fate, i.e., he is unaware of his finitude and wholeness. So, due to the lack of the awareness of the connectedness of exist-ence he lives today; in awaiting the new thing he has already forgot-ten the old. Under the sway of the ‘they’, inauthentic Dasein evades choice. Since he is blind to his possibilities, no repetition of the past is possible in the inauthentic state. All he has is left over from the past, i.e., information about that which was present-at-hand. Thus, Dasein’s present is loaded with the past.331 It is only in inauthentic historicality that the question of the connectedness of the stretch of life becomes a basic issue, for unlike in authentic historicality, here the former the unity of life is shattered.332 Thus, the inauthentic mode is not historicality in the strict sense, since it lacks the basic characteristics of being historical. Historical Dasein: The Existential Source of Historiology

We have already said that Dasein is historical in the primordial sense and the historicality of entities is only secondary. If this is the case every factual science must be dependent on the Dasein that is authentically historical. Further, historiology (His-torie) must be founded on Dasein’s historicality in an intimate way, as the former is the study of the history (Geschichte) of Dasein. The claim of Heidegger is that historiology is ontologically rooted in the historicality of Dasein and so it must not be conceived as an abstrac-tion made from the studies of other sciences.333 To quote Heidegger: "Whether the historiological disclosure of history is factically accomplished or not, its ontological structure is such that in itself this disclosure has its roots in the historicality of Dasein."334 To grasp the ‘how’ of this would amount to arriving at an existential origin of historiology the historicality of Dasein. We propose to do so in this section.

Historiology, as a science, aims at the disclosure of historical entities. Like any other science, it is done by thematizing. The ap-proach to the thematization delineates the realm of thematizing, which in turn provides methodological directives. If a historical entity of the past is to be investigated, it must be thematized in relation to the equipmental system. This belongs to the world of the Dasein as ‘having-been-there’, of which it was a part in the past. If the Dasein -- with reference to which this past entity is related -- no longer exists, then this object is related to the Dasein that has-been-there as such. Thus, the entity of the past, which we intend to thematize in historiology, also must have the kind of being of Dasein as the having-been-there, because only Dasein is primarily historical and every historiological thematization must be made in relation to the Dasein which is historical.335 Thus, relics of the past monuments, records and reports can function as possible matter for the historical investigation, only because they are already world-historical in their mode of being by their relationship to a Dasein that has-been-there. These entities, which are accepted for thematization as related to a Dasein that has-been-there, can be meaningfully studied, examined and assessed only on the basis of the historicality of the contem-porary Dasein, i.e., the historian who does the historiological in-vestigation. Thus, in authentic historicality of Dasein, manifested in the repetitive disclosure of what-has-been-there, lies the existential foundation of historiology, as a science.336 Thus, basing itself on Dasein’s authentic historicality, historiology reveals by repetition of the possibility of the Dasein which has been there, and thereby manifests the universal in the particular. Therefore, the theme of historiology is the authentic existential potentiality, as it has-been-there. "The theme of historiology is neither that which had happened once for all, nor something universal that floats above it, but the possibility which has been factically existent."337

Since the past Dasein, as the has-been-there, is the basic theme of historiology, and since it can be disclosed in repetition as a resolute fate, a true historian who treats this theme historiologically can powerfully disclose the history of the past in Dasein’s potenti-alities that he may have telling effects on the future. "Only by historicality which is factical and authentic can the history of what has-been-there, as a resolute fate, be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the ‘force’ of the possible gets struck home into one’s factical existence -- in other words, that it comes towards that existence in its futural character."338 Therefore, historiology takes its starting point not from the present and moves towards the past, but from the future. ". . . historiological discourse temporalizes in terms of the future."339 The selection of what is to be the object of historiology "has already been met within the factical existentiell choice of Dasein’s historicality, in which alone historiology first of all arises and in which alone it is",340 i.e., in the historian who does the historiological investigation.

According to Heidegger, such an unveiling of what has-been-there, based on fateful repetition and done by a genuine historian, is not to be considered ‘subjective’ in the negative sense. On the contrary, only such a thematization, based on authentic historicality by the historian, can guarantee the ‘objectivity’ of historiology. The validity of any science depends on its object being thematically pre-sented to understanding in its true being without any disguise. This would be true of historiology, if the historicality of the historian makes the theme objectively possible.341 But, Heidegger warns about the possibility of historiology being either used for life or abused, as historiology is based on Dasein’s historicality. If the historicality is genuine, authentic and founded on the fateful destiny of Dasein, then it is used for life. Founding historiology on inauthentic historicality would amount to abusing it.342


1. SZ, p. 201.; BT, p. 245.

2. SZ, p. 87.; BT, p. 120.

3. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 298 (hereafter: BPP).

4. Cf. SZ, p. 42.; BT, 67.

5. Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 18.

6. Cf. I.M. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy, trans. Nicholl and K. Aschenbrenner (London: University Califor-nia Press, 1974), p. 171.

7. Cf. BPP, pp. 227-228., 318-330. In these passages Hei-degger deals, in detail, with the problem of ontological difference.

8. J.L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), p. 95.

9. Cf. SZ, p. 53.; BT, p. 79.

10. Cf. SZ, pp. 132-133.; BT, p. 171.

11. Cf. ibid.

12. Cf. SZ, p. 54.; BT, p. 79.

13. Cf. SZ, p. 132.; BT, p. 170.

14. Cf. SZ, p. 54.; BT, p. 79.

15. Cf. SZ, p. 55.; BT, p. 81.

16. Cf. SZ, p.132.; BT, 170.

17. Cf. SZ, p. 54.; BT, p. 80. In Heidegger’s later writings the idea of ‘dwelling’ is a significant theme. "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" and ". . . dichterisch wohnt der Mensch", Vortraege und Aufsaetze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), pp. 139-156, 181-198 (hereafter: VA).

18. Cf. SZ, p. 54.; BT, p. 80.

19. Cf. VA, pp. 192, 202.

20. Cf. SZ, pp. 56-57.; BT, p. 83.

21. Cf. SZ, p. 57.; BT, 84. Cf. also Gilbert Ryle, "Hiedegger’s Sein und Zeit", Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays, ed. Michael Murray (London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 58-59.

22. SZ, p. 133.; BT, 171.

23. Cf. ibid.; Cf. also John Richardson, Existential Episte-mology: A Heideggerian Critique of Cartesian Project (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 25.

24. SZ, p. 143.; BT, p. 182.

25. The term ‘Befindlichkeit’ has been translated differently. William Richardson renders it as ‘disposition’, Cf. p. 64; John Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as ‘state-of-mind’, Cf. SZ, p. 133., BT, p. 172.; Vietta gives it a psychological meaning and renders it as ‘sensitivity’. Cf. Egon Vietta, "Being, World and Understanding: A Commentary on Heidegger", The Review of Meta-physics, 5 (1951), 157-172. Since this German term ‘Befindlichkeit’ refers to the state or the situation in which one finds oneself, we prefer to translate it as ‘state-of-being’.

26. Cf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Pheno-menology to Thought, p. 64.

27. Cf. SZ, p. 137.; BT, p. 175.

28. SZ, p. 134.; BT, pp. 172-173. Cf. also Roger Waterhouse, A Heidegger Critique, p. 85.

29. Cf. SZ, p. 134.; BT, p. 173.

30. Ibid.

31. Cf. SZ, pp. 134-135.; BT, pp. 173-174.

32. Cf. SZ, p. 135.; BT, p. 174. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 33-34.

33. SZ, p. 135.; BT, p. 174.

34. Ibid.

35. Cf. SZ, p. 136.; BT, p. 175.

36. Cf. ibid.

37. Cf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Pheno-menology to Thought, p. 65.

38. Cf. SZ, pp. 136-137.; BT, pp. 176-177. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 43-44.

39. Cf. SZ, pp. 137-138.; BT, p. 176-177. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 32-33.

40. SZ, p. 137.; BT, p. 176.

41. SZ, pp. 137-138.; BT, p. 177. Cf. also Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being (Indiana: Regenery/Gateway Inc., 1977), pp. 34-35 (hereafter: EB).

42. SZ, p. 143.; BT, p. 183.

43. Cf. SZ, pp. 144-146.; BT, pp. 182-186. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 26-27.

44. SZ, p. 144.; BT, p. 184.

45. Cf. SZ, p. 145.; BT, pp. 184-185. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 28.

46. SZ, p. 145.; BT, p. 185.

47. Heidegger uses two German terms for the English term "interpretation", viz., "Interpretation" and "Auslesung". The latter term is used in the broader sense of referring to Dasein’s activity that lays-bare (aus-legen) something as something. The former term is used to apply to interpretations, which are more theoretical and systematic, as in the exegesis of a text. Cf. SZ, p. 1.; BT, p. 19, fn. 3.

48. SZ, p. 148.; BT, pp. 188-189.

49. Cf. SZ, pp. 148-150.; BT, pp. 189-191. Cf. also Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1970.), p. 94.

50. Cf. SZ, p. 150.; BT, p. 191. Since every interpretation of something as something is based on the fore-structure, for Heidegger there is no interpretation without presupposition. An interpretation based on presupposition does not amount to a circular argument. Therefore, one must not try to get out of the circle, as only by entering the circle in the right way can one interpret an entity. Cf. SZ, pp. 150, 152-153.; BT, pp. 191-192, 193-195.

51. Cf. SZ, p. 154.; BT, p. 195.

52. Cf. SZ, pp. 32-34.; BT, pp. 55-58.

53. Cf. SZ, p. 154.; BT, p. 195. Cf. also BBP, p. 209.

54. Cf. SZ, pp. 154 -155.; BT, pp. 196-197.

55. Cf. SZ, p. 155.; BT, pp. 197-198. Cf. also BPP, 210.

56. SZ, p. 156.; BT, p. 199.

57. SZ, p. 161.; BT, pp. 203-204.

58. SZ, p. 161.; BT, p. 204.

59. Ibid.

60. Cf. ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Cf. ibid.

63. SZ, p. 162.; BT, p. 205.

64. Cf. ibid.

65. Cf. ibid.

66. Cf. SZ, pp. 162-163.; BT, p. 206.

67. Cf. SZ, pp. 163-164.: BT, pp. 205-208.

68. Cf. SZ, pp. 164 -165.; BT, p. 208.

69. SZ, p. 61.; BT, p. 88.

70. SZ, p. 60.; BT, p. 87.

71. Here, Heidegger is indicating the traditional distinction between the theoretical and practical knowledge. Knowing the world is a theoretical knowledge, which is founded on Dasein’s concernful being-alongside entities. Cf. SZ, pp. 61-62.; BT, pp. 88-89.

72. Cf. ibid. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, p. 33.

73. Cf. SZ, p. 62.; BT, p. 89.

74. SZ, p. 62.; BT, p. 90.

75. Ibid. Cf. also Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study (London: Routledge and Kegen Paul, 1977), p. 37.

76. Cf. SZ, pp. 12, 42.; BT, pp. 32-33, 67. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 26-27. Cf. also John McGinly, "Heidegger’s Concern for the Lived-world in his Dasein Analysis", Philosophy Today, 16 (1972), 104-105.

77. Cf. SZ, pp. 302, 436-437.; BT, pp. 350. 387. Cf. also Harold Alderman, "Heidegger on Being Human", Philosophy Today, 15 (1971), 19.

78. SZ, p. 42.; BT, p. 67. Cf. also SZ, pp. 12-13.; BT, pp. 32-33.

79. Heidegger uses the term ‘existence’ exclusively to Dasein. While Dasein exists, the other entities are. Cf. SZ, p. 42.; BT, p. 67. Since the nature of Dasein is characterized by existence, Heidegger calls Dasein’s existence-structure ‘existential’ and distinguishes it from categories which are characteristic of beings other than Dasein. ‘Existential’ refers to the ‘who’ (Dasein), while ‘categories’ refers to ‘what’ (the present-at-hand entities in the broadest sense). Cf. SZ, pp. 44 -45.; BT, pp. 70-71. Cf. also Werner Marx, Hei-degger and Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Green (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 87-88.

80. Heidegger often uses hyphenated words for the sake of emphasis. Here, the word ‘ex-ists’ (ek-sistiert) points to Dasein’s peculiar character of standing out among other entities. Cf. William J. Richardson, p. 39, fn. 31.

81. Cf. John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (London: Lutter-worth Press, 1968), p. 12.

82. Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik? (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), p. 16 (hereafter: WM).

83. Harold Alderman, p. 20.

84. William J. Richardson, p. 39. Cf. also James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger (Kentucky: The Uni-versity Press, 1970), pp. 19-20.

85. SZ, p. 42.; BT, p.67. Cf. also John Maquarrie, Martin Hei-degger, pp. 12-13.

86. SZ, p. 42.; BT, p. 67.

87. Cf. SZ, p. 42.; BT, pp. 67-68.

88. SZ, p. 42.; BT, p. 68.

89. Cf. ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. SZ, p. 12.; BT, pp. 32-33.

93. SZ, p. 42.; BT, p. 68.

94. Ibid.

95. Heidegger calls this factor that leads to an average and mediocre existence ‘das Man’, which is translated into English as the ‘they’ or the ‘they-self’. Cf. SZ, pp. 126-127.; BT, 164-165. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 30-31.

96. Cf. SZ, p. 43.; BT, p. 68. Cf. also John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, p. 14.

97. Cf. SZ, pp. 43, 44.; BT, pp. 68, 69. Cf. also BPP, pp. 170-173. Here, Heidegger speaks of mineness as the basis of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding, in relation to ‘for-the-sake-of-whom’. Cf. also SZ, p. 53.; BT, p. 78. 98. SZ, p. 12.; BT, p. 32.

99. Cf. SZ, p. 141.; BT, pp. 180-181.

100. SZ, p. 5.; BT, p. 27. Cf. also William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. 33-34.

101. SZ, p. 12.; BT, p. 32.

102. Ibid.

103. Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Bonn: Verlag Fred. Cohen, 1929), p. 205 (hereafter: KM).

104. For Heidegger, Dasein is the only being among all entities who can provide access to the question of Being. So only on the context of the fundamental ontology of Dasein’s existential analysis, can we speak of any other ontology. Cf. SZ, p. 13.; BT, p. 34.

105. Cf. Harold Alderman, p. 19.

106. SZ, p. 151.; BT, p. 193.

107. SZ, p. 324.; BT, p. 371.

108. SZ, p. 151.; BT, p. 193. The above given quote from Heidegger might convey the impression that he, like the idealists, makes meaning the property of Dasein, at the cost of the reality of the things present-at-hand. But if we understand what Heidegger says here in the context of his philosophy of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, we could say that he stresses only the primary role Dasein plays in the act of giving meaning and the secondary meaningfulness of entities. Cf. George J. Stack, "Heidegger’s Concept of Meaning", Philosophy Today, 17 (1973), 260.

Cf. also Edward G. Ballard, "Heidegger’s View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural Science", Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, ed. John Salis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970), p. 52.

109. Cf. SZ, p. 214.; BT, p. 257.

110. SZ, p. 218.; BT, p. 261.

111. Cf. SZ, p. 214.; BT, p. 257.

112. SZ, p. 219.; BT, p. 262.

113. Cf. SZ, pp. 226-230.; BT, pp. 269-273.

114. SZ, p. 226.; BT, p. 269.

115. Cf. SZ, p. 227.; BT, pp. 269-270.

116. The prefix of the term ‘Unwelt’, ‘um’ has a spatial meaning and is translated into English with the term ‘around’. Often ‘Umwelt’ is translated as ‘environment’, or ‘the world about’. The prefix ‘um’ is used in the same sense in words, such as, ‘Umgang’ (dealings), ‘Um-zu’ (in-order-to) and ‘Umsicht’ (circumspection). Cf. SZ, pp. 66-67.; BT, p. 95.

117. Cf. ibid.

118. Cf. ibid.

119. Cf. SZ, pp. 59-62.; BT, p. 97.

120. Cf. SZ, pp. 68, 69.; BT, pp. 96, 98-99. Cf. also Werner Marx, p. 86.

121. Cf. SZ, p. 68.; BT, p. 97.

122. Cf. Werner Marx, p. 89. Cf. also SZ, p. 69.; BT, p. 98.

123. Cf. SZ, pp. 61-62.; BT, pp. 88-89. Cf. also Leon Rosen-tine, pp. 337-338. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 15, fn. 69.

124. For Heidegger, the theoretical mode of knowing is one which lacks Dasein’s practical circumspective concern, as it is a mere speculative observation. He does not deny its value, as it is a mode of knowing that is founded on Dasein’s being-in-the-world. But Heidegger holds the value of existence over knowledge as, for him, ‘to be’ is more primordial than ‘to know’. Cf. SZ, pp. 59-62.; BT, p. 86-90.

125. Cf. SZ, pp. 68-69.; BT, pp. 97-98. Cf. also BPP, p. 163. Cf. also John Richardson, p. 18.

126. SZ, p. 68.; BT, p. 97.

127. Ibid.

128. Cf. SZ, pp. 68-69.; BT, pp. 97-98.

129. SZ, p. 70.; BT, pp. 99.

130. Cf. SZ, pp. 70-71.; BT, pp. 99-100.

131. Cf. SZ, p. 69.; BT, p. 98.

132. SZ, p. 74.; BT, p.105. Cf. also BPP, p. 309.

133. Cf. SZ, pp. 73-74.; BT, pp. 102-104.

134. Cf. SZ, p. 74.; BT, p. 104. The opposite of these three modes which bring about a break-down in the equipmental system, viz., ‘inconspicuousness’, ‘unabstrusiveness’ and ‘non-obstinacy’, do not, in any way, point to the objectivity of the equipment, as the equipmental referential complex. Cf. SZ, pp. 75-76.; BT, p. 106.

135. Arland Ussher, Journey through Dread (New York: The Delvin Adair Company, 1955), p. 80.

136. SZ, p. 75.; BT, p. 105.

137. Descartes considered ‘extension in space’ as the basic character of entities in the world, and they are different essentially from the ‘thinking I’ whose basic quality is thinking. Thus, he made a fundamental distinction between ‘ego cogitans’ and ‘res extensa’. Cf. SZ, pp. 89-101.; BT, pp. 122-134.

138. The spatiality of the ready-to-hand can be spoken of as the moematic dimension, while the spatiality of Dasein can be viewed as the noetic dimension. Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 18.

139. Cf. SZ, p. 102.; BT, p. 135, fn. 1.

140. Cf. SZ, pp. 102, 107.; BT, pp. 135, 141.

141. Cf. SZ, p. 102.; BT, p. 135.

142. Cf. SZ, pp. 102-103.; BT, pp. 135-136.

143. SZ, p. 103.; BT, p. 136.

144. Cf. SZ, pp. 103-104.; BT, pp. 136-137.

145. Cf. SZ, p. 105.; BT, p. 138, fn. 2.

146. SZ, p. 105.; BT, p. 139.

147. SZ, p. 105.; BT, p. 140.

148. Cf. SZ, pp. 105-107.; BT, pp. 140-142.

149. SZ, p. 107.; BT, p. 142.

150. SZ, p. 108.; BT, p. 143.

151. Cf. SZ, pp. 108-109.; BT, pp. 143-144.

152. Cf. SZ, p. 110.; BT, p. 144.

153. SZ, p. 118.; BT, p. 154.

154. Cf. SZ, p.118.; BT, pp. 154-155.

155. Cf. SZ, pp. 70-71, 117-118.; BT, pp. 100, 153-154.

156. Cf. SZ, p. 119.; BT, p. 155.

157. Cf. SZ, p. 120.; BT, p. 156.

158. Cf. SZ, pp. 115-116.; BT pp. 150-152. According to Heidegger, the notion of the ‘self’ as a subject that guides the events and is a witness to these events is not the existential (pre-theoretical) experience of Dasein. Only in highly reflective states of mind, such as Husserl’s epoche, can the notion of the self be attained. But the basic existential experience of Dasein about himself is ‘being-with’. Cf. William Ralph Schroeder, Sartre and His Predecessors: The Self and the Other (London: Routledge & Kegen Paul, 1984), pp. 131-132.

159. Ibid., p. 133. Cf. also SZ, pp. 117-118.; BT, pp. 153-154.

160. Cf. SZ, pp. 120-121.; BT pp. 156-157.

161. Cf. SZ, p. 123.; BT, p. 160.

162. Cf. William Ralph Schroeder, pp. 132-133.

163. Ibid. Schroeder holds the view that the main concern of Heidegger’s inquiry is not to question the nature and characteristics of the other; but rather to articulate the essential structures of human existence. In doing so, he presents the notion of the other as an ontological existential of Dasein. We do not subscribe to this view, as it undermines all Heidegger says about the other. Cf. ibid., pp. 129-130.

164. SZ, p. 121.; BT, p. 157.

165. SZ, p. 118.; BT, pp. 154-155.

166. Cf. SZ, p. 121.; BT, pp. 157-158.

167. Cf. SZ, p. 122.; BT, pp. 158-159.

168. Cf. SZ, p. 122.; BT, p. 159.

169. Cf. SZ, p. 123.; BT, p. 159.

170. SZ, p. 121.; BT, p. 158.

171. SZ, p. 120.; BT, pp. 156-157.

172. SZ, p. 125.; BT, p. 162.

173. Cf. SZ, pp. 64-65.; BT, p. 93.

174. Cf. SZ, pp. 76-78.; BT, pp. 107-109.

175. Cf. SZ, p. 82.; BT, pp. 113-114.

176. Cf. SZ, p. 84.; BT, p. 115.

177. Cf. SZ, p. 84.; BT, p. 116.

178. Cf. ibid. Heidegger’s insistence on Dasein as the ultimate reference of every other entity in the world does not amount to a doctrine of egocentricity, but indicates only that because of his ontological structure an entity is destined towards Dasein; whereas the being of Dasein is such that it cannot be referred to anything other than himself. Cf. SZ, p. 123.; BT, pp. 160-161.

179. SZ, p. 84.; BT, p. 116.

180. Cf. SZ, p. 64.; BT, p. 92.

181. Cf. SZ, p. 76.; BT, pp. 106-107.

182. Cf. SZ, pp. 85-86.; BT, pp. 118-119.

183. William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 56.

184. SZ, p. 88.; BT, p. 121.

185. Cf. SZ, p. 88.; BT, pp. 121-122.

186. Cf. SZ, p. 85.; BT, p. 117.

187. Cf. SZ, p. 85.; BT, pp. 117-118.

188. Cf. SZ, p. 86.; BT, 118.

189. SZ, p. 86.; BT, p. 119.

190. Cf. SZ, pp. 86-87.; BT, pp. 119-121.

191. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 24.

192. Cf. SZ, p. 87.; BT, pp. 120-121.

193. Heidegger uses the German term ‘Verfallen’ to refer to the everyday being of Dasein. As a noun it is usually translated into English as ‘falling’ or ‘fallenness’. As a verb it means ‘to fall’. It has the connotation of deteriorating, collapsing or falling down. Cf. SZ, p. 21.; BT, p. 42, fn. 2. Cf. also SZ, p. 134.; BT, p. 172, fn. 1.

194. The term ‘Verfallen’ is not used by Heidegger as having any moral signification. His use, here, is similar to what Heidegger speaks of in his later philosophy, viz., forgetting the truth of Being. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 329.; BW, p. 212.

195. Cf. SZ, pp. 175-176.; BT, p. 220.

196. Cf. SZ, pp. 179-180.; BT, p. 224.

197. SZ, p. 128,; BT, p. 164. The German term ‘das Man’ is often rendered in English as ‘the one’, ‘the they’, ‘the they-self’ and ‘the anonymous one’. Though inauthentic, ‘the they’ belongs to Dasein’s essential constitution.

198. Cf. SZ, pp. 126-127.; BT, p. 164.

199. The German term ‘Durchschnittlichkeit’ communicates the notion of doing the minimum. It has been translated into English as ‘averageness’. We prefer to translate this German term with the English term ‘mediocrity’, as it brings out the full connotation of the German term in question.

200. Cf. SZ, p. 127.; BT, pp. 165-166.

201. SZ, p. 127.; BT, p. 165.

202. SZ, p. 128.; BT, p. 165.

203. SZ, p. 129,; BT, p. 165.

204. Werner Marx uses the term ‘immersion’ to translate ‘Verfallen’. This translation brings out the actual meaning intended by Heidegger. Cf. Werner Marx, p. 91.

205. Cf. SZ, pp. 175-176.; BT, p. 260. Cf. also Edward G. Ballard, p. 55.

206. Cf. SZ, pp. 126-129.; BT, pp. 164-166. Cf. also William Ralph Schroeder, pp. 135-136. Cf. also Harlod Alderman, pp. 23-24.

207. Cf. SZ, p. 177.; BT, pp. 221-222.

208. SZ, p. 177.; BT, p. 222.

209. SZ, p. 178.; BT, p. 222.

210. Cf. SZ, p. 178.; BT, pp. 222-223.

211. Cf. SZ, pp. 178-179.; BT, p. 223.

212. Cf. SZ, pp. 284-285.; BT, pp. 329-331.

213. Cf. SZ, pp. 281-283.; BT, pp. 327-329.

214. SZ, p. 284.; BT, p. 329.

215. SZ, p. 305.; BT, p. 353.

216. The German term ‘Nichtigkeit’ is usually rendered in English as ‘nullity’. But, we translate it as ‘existential limitation’, as it refers to the fundamental lack that belongs to Dasein’s existential structure.

217. Cf. John Richardson, pp. 129-130.

218. SZ, p. 284.; BT, p. 330.

219. Cf. SZ, pp. 284-285.; BT, pp. 330-331.

220. SZ, p. 285.; BT, p. 331.

221. When we speak of guilt, as described by Heidegger, as a ‘lack’, we do not mean that it is an absence of present-hand-entity; but we are referring to Dasein’s ultimate groundlessness. This ‘being-guilty’ is the basis of all ontic expressions of guilt in the moral and legal aspect of human existence. Cf. SZ, p. 286.; BT, p. 332.

222. For Heidegger, ‘anxiety’ is a special state-of-being, which is different from fear. In fear, there is an object present-at-hand of which we are afraid. But, in anxiety, there is no object, as the very being-in-the-world of Dasein is threatened. In other words, in anxiety, the very being of Dasein is challenged. Cf. SZ, pp. 140-142, 184-191.; BT, pp. 179-182, 228-235.

223. Cf. SZ, pp. 185-186.; BT, p. 230.

224. Cf. John Richardson, pp. 136-140.

225. Cf. SZ, pp. 170-173.; BT, pp. 214-217.

226. Cf. SZ, pp. 167-170.; BT, pp. 211-214.

227. Cf. SZ, pp. 173-175.; BT, pp. 217-219.

228. SZ, p. 175.; BT, p.219.

229. SZ, p. 174.; BT, pp. 218-219.

230. The traditional philosophy considers conscience as the subjective condition for morality. Conscience is, thus, related to the intellect. Conscience has different functions before, during and after a human act is performed: I) before: it commands or forbids, coun-sels or dissuades the act; ii) during: it makes the doer aware of the act he is doing, as to its goodness or badness; iii) after: it approves or disapproves, praises or blames, induces satisfaction or uneasiness. Cf. Joseph de Finance, Ethica Generalis (Rome: Gregorian Univer-sity Press, 1959), p. 247.

231. Cf. SZ, pp. 268-269.; BT, p. 313.

232. Cf. SZ, p. 269.; BT, pp. 313-314.

233. Cf. SZ, p. 269.; BT, p. 314.

234. Cf. SZ, pp. 270-271.; BT, pp. 314-316. In this regard, Heidegger also maintains that conscience should not be reduced to any psychic faculties, such as thinking, feeling or willing. Cf. SZ, pp. 271-272.; BT, p.317.

235. Cf. SZ, pp. 280-289.; BT, pp. 325-335.

236. Cf. SZ, pp. 272-274.; BT, pp. 317-319.

237. SZ, p. 277,; BT, p. 322.

238. Cf. SZ, pp. 274-276.; BT, pp. 319-320.

239. Cf. SZ, pp. 274-276.; BT, pp. 319-320.

240. Cf. SZ, pp. 276-277.; BT, pp. 320-322.

241. SZ, pp. 276-277.; BT, p.321.

242. Cf. SZ, p. 277.; BT, pp. 321-322.

243. SZ, pp. 277-278.; BT, pp. 322-323.

244. Cf. SZ, p. 278.; BT, p. 323. In interpreting conscience as subjective, Heidegger opens himself for the criticism that his treatment of conscience lacks objectivity. But, for Heidegger, it is only by limiting the arbitrary domination of the they-self, that Dasein can have objectivity for the appeal of conscience for authenticity. Cf. ibid.

245. Cf. SZ, p. 278.; BT, p. 324.

246. Cf. SZ, pp. 295-297.; BT, pp. 341-343.

247. SZ, pp. 296-297.; BT, p. 343.

248. Cf. SZ, p. 297.; BT, p. 343. The etymological connection between these terms is note-worthy. ‘Erschliessen’ means ‘to open’ or ‘to disclose’. ‘Entschlissen’ also means the same. The prefix ‘ent’ is privative and so ‘ent’ + ‘Schliessen’ (to close), points to a resolute or self-decided opening. Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal. p. 60, fn. 103. 247 Cf. SZ, p. 212.; BT, p. 256.

249. Cf. SZ, p. 297.; BT, p. 343.

250. SZ, pp. pp. 297-298.; BT, pp. 343-344.

251. Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (London: Routledge & Kegen Paul, 1959), p. 38.

252. B. J. Toussaint, Interpretation of Self in Early Heide-gger (Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1977), p. 180.

253. SZ, p. 298.; BT, p. 344.

254. Cf. ibid. From what we have said here, it is clear that there is no indication of solipsism in Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s authenticity, which is attained when the call of conscience is ge-nuinely listened to in resoluteness, as Dasein continues to maintain all his relationships, but in a new authentic manner. Cf. James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger, pp. 42-43.

255. SZ, p. 298.; BT, p. 345.

256. Heidegger uses two German terms ‘Situation’ and ‘Lage’, which are rendered in English ‘Situation’ and ‘situation’, respectively. Here, he uses the first term. ‘Lage’ more in the spatial sense. Cf. SZ, p. 300.; BT, p. 346, fn. 1.

257. Cf. SZ, p. 298-301.; BT, pp. 344-347.

258. Cf. SZ, p. 305.; BT, p. 353.

259. James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger, p. 44.

260. SZ, p. 305.; BT, p. 353.

261. Cf. SZ, pp. 305-306.; BT, pp. 353-354.

262. SZ, p. 309.; BT, p. 356.

263. SZ, p.309.; BT, p. 357.

264. Cf. ibid. Cf. also James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger, p. 44.

265. Cf. SZ, p. 307.; BT, pp. 354 -355.

266. The attitude of resolute Dasein, i.e., his being free for current Situations and possibilities, does not amount to the indeci-siveness or irresoluteness of inauthenticity, but is the acknow-ledgement of the way things are, and confirmation of his own au-thentic resoluteness. By remaining ever open to the varying Situa-tions, Dasein is aware of his primordial groundlessness, i.e., his existential guilt. Cf. SZ, p. 308.; BT, pp. 355-356.

267. Cf. SZ, pp. 307-308.; BT, pp. 355-356.

268. Cf. SZ, p. 308.; BT, p. 356.

269. Cf. SZ, p, 309.; BT, pp. 356-357.

270. James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger, p. 46. Cf. also SZ, pp. 258-259, 266, 296-297.; BT, pp. 302-304, 310-311, 342-344.

271. Cf. SZ, pp. 329, 423-424.; BT, pp. 377, 475-476.

272. SZ, p. 329.; BT, p. 377.

273. Ibid. The root meaning of the word ‘ecstasis’ is standing out side. It is generally used in Greek to mean ‘removal’ or ‘displacement’ of something. Heidegger, using this word in relation to Dasein, refers to his quality of ‘standing out’ above all other entities. The term ‘existence’ also come from the same root word. Cf. ibid., fn. 2.

274. Cf. SZ, p. 329.; BT, p. 377.

275. Cf. SZ, p. 328.; BT, 377.

276. Cf. SZ, pp. 261-262, 336-337.; BT, pp. 306, 386.

277. Cf. SZ, p. 339.; BT, pp. 388-389.

278. Cf. SZ, pp. 328, 338.; BT, pp. 376, 387-388.

279. Cf. SZ, pp. 330-331, 426-427.; BT, pp. 378-379, 479.

280. Cf. SZ, p. 350.; BT, p. 401.

281. Cf. SZ, P. 336-339.; BT, pp. 385-389. Cf. also Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger, pp. 45-46.

282. Cf. SZ, p. 340.; BT, pp. 389-390.

283. Cf. SZ, pp. 341-342.; BT, pp. 391-392.

284. Cf. SZ, pp. 342-344.; BT, pp. 393-395. For Heidegger, fear and anxiety are not the only types of state-of-being; there are others, such as disgust, sorrow, despair, joy, enthusiasm and even hope. The state-of-being of hope seems to appear wholly in the future, as in it the past and the present flow into the future. Cf. SZ, p. 345.; BT, pp. 395-396.

285. Cf. SZ, p. 349.; BT, p. 400.

286. Cf. SZ, pp. 352-353.; BT, pp. 403-405.

287. SZ, p.353.; BT, p. 404.

288. Cf. SZ, pp. 354-356.; BT, pp. 405-408.

289. SZ, p.365.; BT, p. 416.

290. Cf. ibid.

291. Cf. SZ, p. 365.; BT, 416-417.

292. SZ, p.365.; BT, p. 417. Heidegger also explains the temporality of space, in terms of the ecstatico-horizonal character of Dasein’s being. Just as the world is understood in relation to Dasein and his temporal character, so also the temporality of space is understood in relation to Dasein. Cf. SZ, pp. 367-369.; BT, pp. 418-421.

293. Cf. SZ, p. 346.; BT, p. 397.

294. Cf. ibid.

295. Cf. SZ, pp. 346-347.; BT, pp. 397-399.

296. Cf. SZ, pp. 348-349.; BT, pp. 399-400. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 148-150.

297. Cf. James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger, p. 48.

298. Cf. SZ, p. 325.; BT, p. 372.

299. Cf. SZ, p. 325-326.; BT, p. 372-374.

300. Cf. James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger, p. 49.

301. Cf. SZ, pp. 372-373.; BT, pp. 424-425.

302. Cf. SZ, p. 373.; BT, pp. 425-426.

303. SZ, p. 374.; BT, p. 426.

304. Cf. ibid.

305. The term ‘Geschehen’ means a ‘happening’ or an ‘oc-currence’. It is translated as ‘historizing’, in the sense of ‘happening in a historical way’. In this sense, historizing is characteristic of all historical entities and not limited to historians alone. Cf. SZ, p. 20.; BT, p. 41, fn. 1.

306. In this context, we must distinguish between Heidegger’s two uses of the term ‘History’. He uses two German words: ‘Ges-chichte’ and ‘Historie’. ‘Geschichte’ means the actual historical process. The other terms associated with it are: ‘Geschchtlichkeit’ (historicality) and ‘geschichtlich’ (historical). The term ‘Historie’ means the study of the historical process, which is rendered in English as ‘Historiology’ or Science of History. The other terms associated with it are: ‘Historitaet’ (historicity) and ‘historisch’ (historic). Cf. SZ, p. 10.; BT, p. 30, fn. 1. Cf. also SZ, p. 378.; BT, p. 430.

307. SZ, p. 376.; BT, p. 428.

308. Cf. SZ, p. 382.; BT, p. 434.

309. Cf. SZ, pp. 378-379.; BT, pp. 430-431.

310. Cf. SZ, p. 379.; BT, p. 431.

311. Cf. SZ, pp. 388-389.; BT, p. 440.

312. Cf. SZ, pp. 380-381.; BT, pp. 431-433.

313. Cf. SZ, p. 381.; BT, p. 433.

314. SZ, p. 388.; BT, p. 440.

315. Ibid.

316. Cf. SZ, pp. 386-387.; BT, pp. 438-439.

317. Cf. SZ, pp. 389-390.; BT, pp. 440-441.

318. Cf. SZ, p. 382.; BT, p. 434.

319. Cf. SZ, p. 383.; BT, pp. 434 -435.

320. SZ, p. 383.; BT, p. 435.

321. Cf. SZ, p. 383.; BT, p. 345.

322. Heidegger’s implication in speaking of ‘inherited but chosen’ is that those who have not authentically opened themselves in accepting their fate, may not possess the fate. Cf. SZ, p. 384.; BT, p. 436.

323. The terms ‘Schicksal’ and ‘Geschick’ are related to the root word ‘schicken’ (to send). They are often used as synonyms. But, Heidegger uses these words to refer to the destiny of the resolute individual and the destiny of the community, respectively. Cf. SZ, p. 385.; BT, p. 436, fn. 1.

324. SZ, pp. 384-385.; BT, p. 436.

325. Cf. SZ, p. 385.; BT, p. 437.

326. Ibid.

327. Cf. SZ, pp. 385-386.; BT, pp. 437-438.

328. SZ, p. 386.; BT, p. 438.

329. Ibid.

330. Cf. SZ, pp. 389-390.; BT, pp. 441-442.

331. Cf. SZ, p. 391.; BT, pp. 443-444.

332. Cf. SZ, p. 390.; BT, pp. 441-442.

333. Cf. SZ, p. 393.; BT, p. 445.

334. SZ, p.392.; BT, p. 444.

335. Cf. SZ, pp. 393-394.; BT, pp. 445-446.

336. Cf. SZ, p. 394.; BT, p. 446.

337. SZ, p. 395.; BT, p. 447.

338. Ibid.

339. Ibid.

340. Ibid.

341. Cf. ibid.

342. Cf. SZ, p. 396.; BT, p. 448.