We have considered Shankara’s Advaitic concept of Brahmaanubhava, its attainment and his non-dualistic approach to reality. Now, we need to raise the question whether the philosophy of Shankara is a true explanation of reality and that of authentic human destiny? In other words, there arises the question, whether the non-dualism of Shankara, as a system, is sufficient to answer the various issues that arise in human existence. Many philosophers have ques-tioned the validity of the system of Shankara. Some have interpreted and criticized his system in terms of non-Indian traditions, and hence of categories less apt to express adequately his Advaitic mysticism. Here we shall attempt a critical and positive appraisal of the system of Shankara.

Our aim, in the critical appraisal, is to consider those issues in Shankara which lack clarity and need further elaboration. Some such questions which invite attention are the dualistic theory of knowledge, the incommunicability of the identity-experience, the role of the other in one’s authentic destiny, the practicality of the jnaana path and the bodily nature of man. We shall consider briefly each of these topics.

Shankara’s conception of knowledge is permeated by a dualism. Like Immanuel Kant, Shankara envisages two levels of reality, viz., the phenomenal and the noumenal and therefore has to hold for a dualistic theory of knowledge. Knowledge of the pheno-menal reality is characterized by a subject-object duality. Therefore, in this level of knowledge there is always the distinction between the experiencer and the experienced, the knower and the known, the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego. The seer is the perceiver, who is identical with the subject of the experience in question, and is of the nature of con-sciousness and intelligence. The seen is the thing perceived which is identical with the object, and is sentient by nature. Thus, the perceiver and the perceived are mutually opposed and never can be identified with each other. All means of empirical knowledge, such as, the percep-tion, inference, comparison, supposition, non-perception and scrip-tural testimony, presuppose the subject-object distinction and operate in the realm phenomenal reality. According to the Vedaanta school of thought, all these pramaanas are valid means of know-ledge as they give knowledge of the phenomenal world. But, we cannot hold them absolute, because their scope is limited to the empirical order. When considered in relation to the Paraa vidhyaa, their reality and the truth they give cease to exist. As a result, we cannot use them in the transcendental order. This does not mean that the pramaanas are useless. They are useful, valid and necessary as long as we are under the sway of the empirical consciousness of the jiiva. The noumenal state is characterized by a knowledge that is non-dual and unitive. It is based on the identity-experience of the seeker that his inner self, Aatman, is identical with Brahman. Such a knowledge is eternal and not bound by time. In it, there is no distinction between the seer and the seen, as they both are one and the same. Everything is experienced from the perspective of the primordial experience of Brahman.

From what we have said it is clear that there is an essential and fundamental difference between phenomenal and noumenal know-ledge. They are diametrically opposed to each other. One who is in the empirical existence does not possess the noumenal knowledge, while to the one who has attained the transcendental state of exist-ence empirical knowledge becomes unreal. Such an epistemological position amounts to a dualism, as it presupposes two unrelated levels of knowledge. In a dualistic epistemological stand, objectivity of knowledge would be lacking as each type of knowledge, viz., the phenomenal and the noumenal, would be true only from their respec-tive points of view. Besides, there is the difficulty of genuine com-munication between persons who belong to the phenomenal and noumenal levels of existence, as phenomenal knowledge would be unreal to the one in the noumenal state and the noumenal knowledge is inaccessible to the one who is in the phenomenal level. Thus, Shankara’s dualistic epistemological theory does not account for objectivity of knowledge and genuine objective communication.

The identity-experience is of the nature of Brahman. So it is without subject-object duality, eternal and uncaused, immediate and direct. Therefore, it is incomprehensible, indescribable and trans-empirical. Brahmaanubhava is not available to the empirical experi-ence as the scope of the former goes far beyond that of the latter. The words and languages we use refer to the phenomenal world and relative realities. As Brahman is beyond the phenomenal, Brahmaa-nubhava cannot be described in ordinary language. Therefore, one can speak of the identity-experience only by way of negation, by denying qualities of the empirical experience superimposed on it. For instance, the qualities that are attributed to Brahman, such as ‘reality’ (satyam), ‘knowledge’ (jnaanam) and ‘infinitude’ (aanan-dam) are not positive descriptions of Brahman, but are mere nega-tions of qualities superimposed on Brahman, such as, ‘unreality’, ‘ignorance’ and ‘finitude’. Thus, all statements we make about Brahman and Brahmaanubhava, are mere approximations in the light of the phenomenal knowledge. Such a philosophical position makes the identity-experience, for all practical purposes, incom-municable. Since, Brahmaanubhava is unknowable and indescribable, it cannot be communicated by the Brhamajnaani to any one in the realm of phenomenal existence. Since Brahman-experience cannot be passed on to the other in any form of communication, it would always remain the subjective experience of the Brahmajnaani. Any attempt to communicate it, using phenomenal language, would be nothing else but a mere phenomenal approx-imation of the noumenal experience. Such approximations would never take one to the core of the identity-experience itself, as it is incommunicable.

The Shankarite path of authentic human destiny, viz., the movement from aparaa vidhyaa to Paraa vidhyaa, basically is walked by the aspirant alone. The only involvement of the other in the aspirant’s effort to attain the goal of identity-experience is that of the guru. He is a detached guide, who helps the student to understand the true import of the Vedaantic statements, especially at the ‘hearing’ (sravana) state of Brahmaajijnaasa. The relationship that exists between the aspirant and the guru is that of a teacher and a student, in which, the aspirant is totally obedient to the guru, does personal service to him, looks after the daily chores of the ashram and listens to the teachings of the guru by sitting at his feet. This relationship is not one to one, I-thou relationship, in which one enters into the life of the other as an equal. Other than to the teacher, the aspirant does not have any significant relationship with any other person, as in all the three stages of Brahmaajijnaasa he or she has to be alone to hear the instructions of the teacher; to reflect on the content of the guru’s teachings, so as to remove the apparent contradictions and to be intellectually convinced of the true import of the scriptural aphorisms; and to meditate on the truth achieved through his hearing and reflection. The various stages of Brah-maajijnaasa in the jnaana path are so centered on the individual seeker and his personal effort that the presence of another in the process could only be an interference that would distract him from his goal. So the seeker is basically all alone throughout the process of Brahmaajijnasa. Even after the seeker has attained Brah-maabubhava, he does not need to have any such relationships, because all such relationships would be irrelevant and unreal to Brahmajnaani. Thus, Shankara’s path to authentic human destiny does not give any significance to genuine I-thou relationships and inter-subjective communication between human persons.

The Jnaana path to human authenticity involves a deep understanding of the illusoriness of phenomenal reality, the funda-mental oneness of everything in Brahman and a discriminative consciousness that would enable the seeker to break through the appearance and apprehend the underlying absolute reality. To attain this goal, the seeker must go through a rigorous path of physical, moral and intellectual preparations. The physical preparation involves the practice of Hathayoga, with its two steps: aasana and pranayaama. The moral preparation calls the seeker to practice the fourfold ethical disciplines called instruments of spiritual know-ledge, viz., the discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal, renunciation, the practice of the six virtues -- calmness, self-control, self-settledness, forbearance, faith and complete concentration, and the hunger for liberation. The intellectual preparation includes the three stages of hearing, reflection and meditation. Thus, the jnaana path of Brahman-experience demands that the seeker be a person of healthy body, strong will, keen mind and sharp intellect. If these qualities are expected of the aspirant, even before he begins the process of Brahmaajijnasa, a great majority of the people in the world would never be able to begin the process of Brahman-realization itself. This is probably the reason that Shankara spoke of the indirect method of karma and bhakti as a preparation for the jnaana path. Thus, the Shankarite path to human authenticity is not practical, in the sense that it aims at helping only the intellectual and wise persons to attain Brahmaanubhava.

Shankara does not give importance to the bodily nature of man. For him, body is part of the phenomenal existence, which is not the ultimate reality. Therefore, body has only a relative existence. He speaks of three levels in the bodily nature of man, viz., the gross body, the subtle body and the bliss body, each of which belongs to the realm of maayaa. Of these, only the gross body ceases at death, while the other two bodies survive death and constitute subtle and bliss bodies, giving the basis for the gross body jiiva takes in its next birth. The loss of the gross body, at the death of jiiva is compared to a snake casting off its skin, when it does not perform the proper function in the snake. Body is the seat of emotions and appetites which prevent the self from attaining the true goal of man. There-fore, one’s attitude towards one’s body is one of discipline and control. The body must be trained by the use of Hathayoga in order to be submitted to the directions of the inner self. Body and bodily existence are the result of the past karma. When all the fruits of the actions are removed, body will also cease to be. In the state of Jiivanmukti, the liberated person continues to live in the bodily state because of the effects of the accumulated karma still bearing fruit (prarabdha), but having no attachments to the body. In the state of Videhamukti, the videhamukta passes into a calm existence, having lost the empirical world and shedding his artificial personality, including the body, that is characteristic of the jiiva, the psycho-physical-conscious organism. Therefore, Shankara does not en-visage the existence of the body, at the final state of liberation, as Christianity recognizes the resurrection of body and a bodily exist-ence after resurrection. From what we have said it is clear that, for Shankara, the bodily state of man is a product of maayaa, and it ceases to exist at the dawn of true knowledge. Thus, in the Shan-karite system of thought, the bodily nature of man is not given a positive place, as it has no real existence and no place in the ultimate destiny of man.

This section takes up the defense of a few general issues which had been raised against Shankara by later Advaitic schools, most notably by the Qualified Non-Dualism (Vshistaadvaita) of Ramaa-nuja and a number of Western scholars. Of the many questions raised against the non-dualism of Shankara, we will consider five, which remain central today. The first issue pertains to the reality of the external world. In this regard some scholars consider Shankara as a subjective idealist as he seems to attribute no reality to the external world. Secondly, in the West, many may think that Advaita Vedaanta is a sort of pantheism, according to which the individual soul loses, as it were, its identity and becomes one with Brahman. Thirdly, Shankara is often accused of being non-ethical, as he did not work out a system of morality. The forth objection that is brought against Advaita Vedaanta is that it is anti-worship and anti-religion in character, since the liberated man is identical with Brah-man. Finally, many consider Shankara as negative and pes-simistic in his approach to reality as he gives prime importance to the nega-tive method for the understanding of reality and attaining authentic human destiny. In the following pages, we will take up these criticisms leveled against Shankara’s Advaita Vedaanta and see whether the contentions of these critics are founded on facts.

It would seem that the latter group of thinkers present the true position of Shankara on the reality of the external world. Shankara is neither a Hegelian, nor a Berkleyan, or any other kind of subjec-tive idealist. In order to understand the true position of Shankara on this point we need to make distinctions between different kinds of experiences. The first kind of experience is called pratabhasika (illusory experience), which consists in experiencing an object which is not present before one’s senses. For instance, a rope is seen as a snake, or a shell lying on the beach is seen as a piece of silver in the moon light. There is no real snake or silver piece; these are only mistaken perceptions. This kind of illusory experiences can be contradicted in the worldly state. For instance, the true nature of the things that appeared as a snake or as a piece of silver (viz., the rope and the shell respectively) can be known by a true perception of the same objects. Therefore, such experiences are false perceptions.

The second kind of experience is Vyavahaarika (the empirical experience), which consists in the universe of everyday perception, the world of names and forms. This is the realm of maayaa. It is not merely illusory, but phenomenal. Unlike the illusory experience, the phenomenal experience is neither non-existent (abhaava) nor void (suunya). The illusory experiences of seeing a snake when there is no snake and seeing a piece of silver on a shell take place in the pheno-menal realm. In this worldly state, the phenomenal world and its existence can never be contradicted. Therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world is never denied by Shankara, even though he denies the assumption that the vyavahaarika world is ultimately real. In the Brahma-Suutra Bhaasya we find Shankara giving a lengthy argument for the existence of the phenomenal world from the phenomenological point of view. He says that the external world is a fact of consciousness and so one cannot contradict its existence:

From this passage it obvious that Shankara does not deny the reality of the external world. He does consider the world as existing outside the subjective consciousness. The subject-object distinctions belong to the realm of phenomena. We do make use of the pramaana or the means of knowledge to attain some truth about relative realities. Thus, the empirical world is real from the phenomenal point of view and its existence is related only to the empirical realm. From the empirical perspective, we can never say that the world of our experience is unreal and non-existent.

From what has been said, it is clear that Shankara by his doctrine of Brahmaanubhava and the self’s absolute oneness with Brahman, does not speak of a dissolution of the world. Upon the attainment of Brahmaanubhava, the external world is not destroyed or annihilated. But the Brahmajnaani views the world no longer from the phenomenal point of view; he sees everything in terms of that oneness which is characteristic of Brahmaanubhava. Thus, from the point of view of a liberated man the phenomenal world is real in a relative sense, because the state he is in, i.e., his absolute identity with Brahman, is that which is really real. As long as one tries to understand Shankara’s Advaita philosophy purely from the phenomenal point of view, one will always meet with contradictions, for what is absolutely true is the transcendental and the trans-expirical.

At this early state of Brahmaasjijnassa the student has not attained the full knowledge about the absolute Brahman. Hence he is encouraged to worship the personal God and to practice all devo-tions. Worship of God and the devotional practices performed by the aspirant at this stage free him from the distractions and the attractions of the external world, help him to fix his mind on higher realities, and strengthen his power of concentration. Realizing his limitations the aspirant takes recourse to prayer and other external devotional practices which help him to move towards his ultimate end, i.e., Brahmaanubhava. Once he has reached this absolute state of Brahmaanubhava all the distinctions between the personal God and the worshiper vanish, as the self realizes its true nature. Just as a clay lion and a clay sheep are rid of their differences when they are reduced to their material cause or clay, so too the aspirant and the personal God are reduced to their ultimate cause Brahman and lose their differences when Brahmaanubhava is attained.

Thus according to Shankara, in the state of Brahmaanubhava there is no religion, devotional practice, or the worship of God. Unlike other theistic systems of thought, for Advaita Vedaanta religion and the worship of God are not an end in itself, but only a means to the ultimate realization of the self. Nevertheless, Shankara did recognized the important role worship and devotion play in the early stages of the aspirant’s way to self-realization. He wrote many hymns in praise of the popular deities like Siva, Vishnu, and the Divine Mother to help ordinary people move towards their ultimate realization. These devotions are aimed at helping ordinary people at the initial state of Brahmaajijnaasa. Therefore, for Shankara, devotion and worship of the personal God are significant in the life of the aspirant, but only as means rather than as the end.

We can summarize the main intent of Shankara as follows. Shankara’s non-dualistic approach to reality and his Advaitic understanding of Brahmaanubhava do give a reasonable explan-ation to the basic issues of philosophy, if, like Shankara, one accepts the distinctions between the phenomenal experience of reality (vya-vahaarika) and the transcendental experience of reality (Brahmaa-nubhava). This distinction is crucial for the understanding of Shankara’s Advaita philosophy. The two are different approaches to the one and the same reality. The former is characterized by duality and subject-object distinction, while the latter is characterized by oneness and identity. At the same time one must not take these two approaches as different world views imposed by the subjective consciousness as do scholars who consider Shankara as a subjective idealist.

In fact, the two approaches are not construction of the subjective consciousness, but two ontological states in one’s under-standing of reality. In other words, reality is eternally present in its true nature and does not depend on our subjective consciousness. The ontological truth about reality is that Brahman is the absolute reality in relation to which the phenomenal world is relatively real. This has always been the ontological fact. It neither comes about at the time when it is recognized by the subjective consciousness, nor is it constructed by the mental process of knowing. For Shankara this truth is obtained from the study of the scripture. As long as one is fully in the vyavahaarika world and is fully conditioned by it, one cannot recognize anything higher than the phenomena and accepts the phenomenal world as the absolute reality. When, by the removal of ignorance and its effects, one goes beyond the empirical experi-ence and experiences the identity of oneself with the absolute Brahman, one sees the true reality as it is. Then one recognizes the unreality or the passing nature of the phenomenal world.

In our critical appraisal of Heidegger’s thought, we do not want to hold him responsible for what he did not include in his philosophy. It is not possible for a thinker to include everything in his philosophical reflection. It would be unreasonable to expect that from any thinker, however great he may be. Neither do we want to criticize him for the errors in his philosophy which are due to his background and intellectual heritage. But Heidegger can be held accountable for what is lacking in what he has said. In other words, we can criticize him for not saying what he should have said in what he said, viz., the deficiencies. Again we can criticize him for the lack of logical consistency and clarity in what he said, viz., inconsis-tencies. So our critical appraisal focuses on the deficiencies and inconsistencies of Heideggerian thought.

In this section we want to bring to light some deficiencies in Heidegger’s philosophy. Had he accepted these deficiencies and attempted to correct them, his philosophy would have a complete-ness which it lacks. We shall examine these deficiencies.

Even in the later Heidegger there is no objective theory of knowledge. Instead of ‘understanding’ of Being and Time, Hei-degger speaks of ‘thinking’, ‘dwelling’ and ‘seeing’, referring to Da-sein’s relationship to Being. Here, Dasein’s thinking is not objective rational thinking, but a meditative reflection. The dwelling is a waiting on and listening to Being. Seeing consists in experiencing or realizing Being. Thus, in his later phase, Heidegger is left with the same problem of objectively validating and communicating Dasein’s experiencing of Being.

This lack of objectivity of knowledge clearly points to Hei-degger’s inability to clarify the question of the meaning of Being. Neither Being and Time, nor later Heideggerian thinking, has succeeded in objectively clarifying the meaning of Being. The early Heidegger inquired into the nature of Dasein, who raised the ques-tion of Being, while the later Heidegger highlighted the revealing of Being as a play in the epochal history, without ever attempting to clarify the meaning of Being and its objective validity. All that Da-sein could do is to formulate the truth about his own experience of Being and entities and hope that others come in line with this experience.

Even though Heidegger speaks of ‘being-with’ as an exist-ential of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, his consideration of Dasein’s communal world is rather deplorable. Heidegger’s analysis of the inter-subjective relationship is very brief and it is presented as a type of appendix to the analysis of Dasein as being-alongside-entities. In a work situation, the ‘towards-which’ of the usability or the ‘for-the-sake-of-whom’ of the work produced is the other Dasein. He also appears as the buyer and seller of the work produced, or as the provider of the material for the work to be done. Thus, Heidegger introduces one Dasein to another in the context of the ‘work-place’, where one is involved with entities ready-to-hand. It is surprising that he, who speaks of Dasein as essentially ‘being-with’, estab-lishes inter-subjectivity in an indirect manner, i.e., through the entities, rather than in a direct face-to-face relationship between two Daseins.

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is no better, as there is hardly any mention of other Daseins. It is men-tioned only in relation to the fourfold, where it is referred to as the mortal. Even here the indication is to the individual Dasein rather than to the intersubjective community of Daseins. As mortal, Dasein is understood only in relation to the other three of the fourfold, as the mortal Dasein is only a facet of Being. Besides Being’s call, giving, regioning and poetic presencing are more directed to the individual Dasein who recalls, thanks, waits on and poetically dwells. The meditative thinking, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being in some sense calls for a moving away from other Daseins, as only in absolute openness to Being can Being’s call be re-collected and the gift be thanked. Again, later Heidegger speaks of Being’s giving of itself in things, in poetry, in art and in language. Dasein is called to shepherd Being’s presencing in all these. But, we do not have any reference to Being’s revealing itself to other Daseins or to an intersubjective community of Daseins of which Dasein is a shepherd. Being is spoken as giving itself to Dasein through lan-guage, without a genuine intersubjective dialogue. Thus, both in early and later Heidegger, the analysis of Dasein’s social world is deficient. Dasein is seen in both phases as being alone, without genuine intersubjective communion, dialogue and reciprocity.

Heidegger’s philosophy does not consider the possibility of God to whom man can have genuine relationship. Just as the notion of the other, in the sense of communal existence, is absent, so also the notion of the other as Absolute and Eternal Thou is absent in Heidegger’s thought. In the early phase, Heidegger is totally in-different to the question of God. While in the latter phase the notion of God is considered under a different name, viz., the Divine. Here the Divine is simply an aspect of the phenomenological revelation of Being. But the Divine, as spoken by Heidegger at the later phase, is of such nature that it would not in any way satisfy man’s religious aspirations. Nor is it such that man can offer it his worship and adoration. Thus, though Heidegger has succeeded in thinking of God in a novel way, he has not provided a notion of God that will instill religious feeling in Dasein.

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is not very different. In considering Dasein, as an aspect of the fourfold, which is the manifestation of Being in its spatiality, we can find a reference to Dasein being rooted in the spatial manifestation of Being. The same is also indicated in Dasein’s building things by saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on Divinities and initiating its mortal nature. But, these are only indications. The bodi-lyness of Dasein, as an essential aspect of its nature and being is not considered in the latter phase as well.

The absence of the consideration of the bodilyness of Dasein in Heidegger’s Dasein-analysis is the fundamental reason for all the above-mentioned deficiencies. Body is a significant reality as it is the point of contact in our concrete existence. If not for the body, no relationship of any kind could be built. Since this all-important di-mension is missing in Heideggerian Dasein-analysis, any relation-ship that is genuine and personal is missing, whether it be relating to God, the other or the community. Besides, the moral dimension and the intellectual dimension of the possibility of objective knowledge are related to Dasein’s bodily interactions. Thus, the omission of the analysis of the bodily nature of Dasein is a significant deficiency in Heideggerian thinking.

According to early Heidegger, human existence is charac-terized by a radical finitude. The situation of Dasein in the world is tragic and grim. Dasein is centered on himself, cut away from others, the Divine and Being. It is a state, in which Dasein is lonely, help-less, anxious, and his life lacks meaning and purpose. Besides, human existence is characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and death. There is no one to help Dasein except himself. Dasein’s being-in-the-world is a state of inauthenticity, marked by involvements and entanglements with entities and other Daseins. Even the authentic state is far from being a desirable one, as it does not bring Dasein to the state of happiness, as Dasein is all by himself in a world that is separated and isolated. The situation of the world in which Dasein finds himself is no better. It is in the grip of metaphysical and technological thinking. The scientific approach to life and the technological attitude of domination have led to calculative thinking. The will-to-power eliminates man in all his endeavors; the value of life and reality is lost. In the process of the struggle for power and survival, man himself is made a commodity and the most important raw material. Man has looked upon tech-nology as a means to happiness, but technology has victimized man, as he is controlled by technology. Heidegger gives many images, such as, ‘world-night’, ‘a time of destitution’, ‘endless winter’ and ‘a time in which Gods have fled’ to refer to this depressing situation of modern man.

Even later Heidegger does not give a better view of Dasein’s existence and destiny. In the state of authenticity, Dasein accepts his inability to be the master of himself and totally depends on Being. Dasein is helpless, as all that he can do is to accept his inability to cope with his finitude and resign passively to the presencing of Being. Even this state of passive openness to Being is devoid of social and communitarian dimension. The authentic Dasein has no genuine and reciprocal relationship with the other, as there is no place for love, togetherness, genuine friendship, fellowship with the other, cooperation and one to one concern. Dasein, thus, is presented as a being that is incapable of any committed relationship, while he is only capable of anxiety in the face of death, guilt and existential limitations, and a tranquil waiting on the presencing of Being. The absence of genuine relationship in the totality of Dasein’s existence makes Dasein’s finitude more acute as he has, always, to face life all alone, having no word of encouragement and support from others. Thus, Heidegger’s philosophy of the radical finitude of Dasein leaves Dasein with an unhappy and solitary existence.

Besides, the above-mentioned deficiencies, there are a number of inconsistencies in Heidegger’s philosophy. He leaves many concepts vague and unclear. Had he attempted to be precise and made an effort to clarify some of these concepts many of the errors found in Heideggerian thinking could have been avoided. Here, we would highlight some of these inconsistencies.

Heidegger’s distinction of entities as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is based on the way Dasein looks at an entity. There is no such division within an entity. If Dasein looks at an entity from a theoretical perspective, then it is seen as present-at-hand or as ‘out-there’. But if Dasein sees the same thing from the practical point of view, i.e., in relation to what he can do with that thing, then it would present itself to Dasein as a tool or the ready-to-hand. In making this distinction Heidegger clearly distinguishes two types of attitudes on the part of Dasein, viz., the attitude of detached viewing of a thing and the attitude of encountering an entity in its practical mode. The former is the attitude of a scientist, while the latter is the attitude of a work-man. The former refers to scientific and objective knowledge about things, whereas the latter points to understanding things in their essential ground in the Heideggerian sense.

This strict distinction -- between things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, scientific attitude and practical attitude, knowledge and understanding -- remains only in the rational level and not in relation to the concrete situation of man. In a concrete experience we find that theoretical knowledge and practical attitude go hand in hand, as one is not complete without the other. We need under-standing or the practical attitude to do the work and require scien-tific or objective knowledge to make our practical attitude into a well-developed body of knowledge which can be studied objectively. This is clear from our work experience. Thus, Heideg-ger’s strict distinction of knowledge and understanding, viewing them as having no relation to each other, is inconsistent and does not bear up in life.

Another obvious inconsistency in Heidegger’s thinking is its anticonceptralist stance. In the early phase, Heidegger, stressing the importance of understanding, ignores the validity of objective knowledge and cognition. In the later phase, he is critical of meta-physical and representational thinking. He claims that his origi-native thinking is non-conceptual. But this claim is paradoxical, as nothing can be expressed without the help of concepts. The many volumes of Heidegger’s writing and the many lectures he had been giving were not devoid of concepts. Even the research done on Heidegger uses concepts and interprets the concepts used by him. As a matter of fact, Heidegger uses the propensities of German language to express philosophical concepts and forms new concepts and expresses them in terms, by playing on the prefixes and suffixes, giving them new nuances and meanings. If not for using concepts he would not have written what he has about his non-conceptual and non-metaphysical thinking. Thus, Heidegger was, indeed, incon-sistent in denouncing the value of conceptual knowledge, while using concepts to denounce their importance.

So far, we have looked into what Heidegger did not say but should have said, and into what he said and the logical incon-sistencies in this. Having done so, we do not want to give the impres-sion that Heidegger’s thinking is basically negative in character. We, having distanced ourselves from Heideggerian thinking in order to look at it objectively, have found it wanting in the aspects we have mentioned. This does not mean that the merits of Heidegger’s thinking are undermined. Coming closer to this we want to highlight its positive aspects, the task of the next section.

Here we will focus on Heidegger’s positive contributions in the field of philosophy and thinking, taking into account the aim, task and purpose of his philosophy.

Heidegger expressed his insight into the spirit of his age in a memorial address he delivered in honor of the famous composer Conradin Kreutzer, a native of his region:

By his philosophical enterprise, Heidegger intended to call man, who is fragmented by the scientific-technological culture, to the whole-ness and authenticity of his existence. This involved a recall of men, who are caught up in the fragmented way of living that is charac-teristic of everyday existence, to their roots and to openness to the call of destiny. It is a summons to turn away from aimless living and an invitation to turn to a life that is purposeful. Thus, beyond any doubt, Heidegger’s philosophy is a call to authentic human existence and to genuine human living.

Being convinced of the evil effects of the metaphysical-technological thinking which led to scientism and technologism, Heidegger wanted to replace it with a new type of thinking which would obliterate the consequences of metaphysical thinking. In order to inaugurate this new thinking and, thereby, take man to his authentic destiny, Heidegger took a ‘step-back’ into the history of Western metaphysics, so as to effect a destruction of the meta-physical thinking, in the process paving the way for his originative and primordial thinking.

Heidegger wanted to rectify the fragmentation brought about in human existence, human thinking, and in the sphere of knowledge by the metaphysical thinking and with the desire to find them on ontological ground. Hence, he limited his analysis of human exist-ence and its authenticity to one dimension, viz., to the transcendental and ontological dimension of Dasein’s openness to the truth of Being. For him, the ontological dimension is the most fundamental aspect on which all the other modes of human existence are based. Besides, the ontological consideration implicitly includes all the other dimensions, as it reveals human existence in its uniqueness. For example, to say that man ontologically ‘is’, includes implicitly that man is political, economic, social, psychological, moral, theolo-gical and bodily. Again, man’s ontological ‘isness’ is the basis of being political, economic, social, moral, theological and bodily, as the ontological dimension of human existence transcends all adjec-tival and secondary aspects. Therefore, Heidegger’s analysis of human existence is primordial and his thinking is originative.

Many of the criticisms we have leveled against Heidegger come from the fact, that the philosophical stand he has taken in his analysis of human existence is primordial and one-dimensional. He could have attempted to consider Dasein and his authentic existence in a multi-dimensional manner as have such thinkers as Levinas, Marcel, Buber, Sartre and Jaspers. But Heidegger precisely did not want to do that. He did not want further fragmentation of Dasein in various dimensions; rather he preferred bringing together all the dimensions of Dasein into the one unifying ground, viz., Being. Thus, the uniqueness of Heideggerian thinking consists in that it is not multi-dimensional, but rather one-dimensional and primordial.

Metaphysics with its conceptualistic and logic-dominated thinking presents a view of reality that is static and reified: every-thing is seen in terms of the dichotomy between subject and object. Heideggerian primordial thinking views everything in a new dnamic perspective. In this section, we will highlight how the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being are seen in this new perspective.

While Heidegger does not deny the traditional cosmological view of the world or it existence, he views the world in a dynamic way different from the traditional conception. The world is always related to Dasein; it is always a Dasein’s world. The world is under-stood in the context of Dasein’s being-alongside-entities and being-with-others. It is constituted of the matrix of Dasein’s relatedness to the various equipmental systems and their interrelatedness. Besides, the world is understood in the totality of the significance of this interrelatedness. Thus, we can speak of as many words as there are meaningful interrelated equipmental systems. It is not a mere subjectivization of the world, but seeing the word from the onto-logical perspective of Dasein. In the later Heidegger, the world is seen in relation to the fourfold of each, sky, divinities and mortals, in and through which the spatial dimension of Being is manifested.

Heidegger does not accept the traditional definition of man, rational animal, as complete. From the new existential perspective such a comprehensive and all-embracing definition of human existence is not possible. In his existential analysis Heidegger distin-guishes between Dasein and man. Man, in the metaphysical sense, is a being, whereas Dasein is a process that comes to pass ‘in’ man. Dasein, as a process, occurs only in man. Therefore, Dasein is not a statistically present being, but a dynamic process which must take over his existence, by active resolve and by receptive openness to Being. Seen in this primordial perspective of Heidegger, Dasein is the ‘place’ in which innerwordly beings and Being are made manifest. Besides, the structure of the self-hood of Dasein is neutral, as it may occur in a male or female; in an ‘I’ or in a ‘thou’. But, this does not mean that Dasein is impersonal; rather he is pre-personal in the sense that he is the a priori basis for the possibility of ontic individual selves or persons. But in the later phase of his thought, Heidegger did not this distinction between the ontological and ontical levels.

Heidegger rejects all attempts to give a precise definition of Being. For him, any attempt to give a definition of Being would amount to tying down Being to a particular concept. Heidegger often speaks of what Being is not, rather than what it is. Clarifying the notion of the ontological difference, he says that Being is not being, i.e., it is neither an existing reality, nor a sum-total of such existing realities. If we compare Being with beings, the former is a ‘non-Being’ or ‘nothing’. Even though Being is not a being, yet it ‘lets-be’ particular entities and particular entities ‘enshrine’ the presence of Being. Being manifests itself in the revealing-concealing process. It comes over in the entities and unconceals itself in the process and reveals the entities. Being is to be understood in the ‘event’ of its historical sending. All these descriptions of Being point to the nature of Being which is a process or a historical sending, rather than an entity. Speaking of the ‘why’ of the process Heidegger just says that it is a ‘play of Being’. Being cannot be understood with the help of metaphysical-representational thinking, but can be understood only in its relation to the realm of Ereignis (event of appropriation), i.e., in relation to the essential belonging-together of Dasein and Being. Every aspect of Being’s revealing -- essential thinking, the fourfold, the poetic presencing, the unconcealing process and the language -- is to be understood in relation to the realm of Ereignis, which is a realm of deeper experience than mere intellectual knowing. Our consideration of Heidegger’s analysis of the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being clearly highlights the new perspective that is characteristic of the primordial thinking Heidegger has inaugurated. This new perspective does not base itself on logic, reason and conceptual formulation, but is founded in a deeper level of exis-tential experience of reality beyond the tangible and the visible.

In this chapter, we have seen the philosophies of Shankara and Heidegger, both in their negative and positive aspects. Many of the criticisms we have mentioned do not stand up against them if seen in the light of their primordial thinking and Brahman / Being-centered philosophies. In spite of the drawbacks and differences, they pro-pose very similar paths to the attainment of authentic human destiny. Both are concerned about helping human touch the deeper dimen-sions of their lives and live a life centered on Brahman and Being.

1. Max Mueller F., The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), pp. 121-122.

2. Sures Chandra Chakravarti, The Philosophy of the Upani-shads (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1953), p. ix.

3. Ram Pratap Singh, Vedaanta of Shankara (Jaipur: Bharat Publishing House, 1949), p. 333.

4. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1958), p. 118.

5. K.A. Krishnaswami Iyer, Vedaanta or Science of Reality (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1930, p. 91.

6. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 585.

7. BSB., II, ii, 28, Thibaut, pp. 419-420.

8. Eliot Deutsch, p. 95.

9. Cf. R.V. de Smet, p. 266.

10. Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 99.

11. Cf. ibid.

12. Cf. AB, p. x.

13. Cf. ibid., p. xi.

14. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 184.

15. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, p. 149.

16. Cf. SZ, pp. 59-62; BT, pp. 86-90.

17. Roger Waterhouse suggests that Heidegger’s main con-cern is ontology and praxis-centered thinking, not theory of know-ledge. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 149-163.

18. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, Heidegger Critique, p. 176.

19. Cf. Rene Weber, "A Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Solicitude", in The New Scholasticism, 42 (1968): 537-560.

20. Cf. SZ. p. 263; BT, pp. 307-308.

21. Cf. SZ., pp. 117-126; BT., pp. 153-163.

22. John D. Caputo speaks of an original-ethics in Heidegger, which refers to the thoughtful meditation upon the essence of dwell-ing as the issue of Being, "Heidegger’s Original Ethics", The New Scholasticism, 45 (1971), pp. 127-138; Giles Driscoll con-siders Heidegger as an ethical monist who gives an ontological structure for an ethics "Heidegger’s Ethical Monism", The New Scholas-ticism, 42 (1968), pp. 497-510.

23. Cf. Anthony M. Camele, "Heideggerian Ethics", Philosophy Today, 21 (1977): 284-293.

24. Cf. Guentes Stern, "The Pseudo-concreteness of Hei-degger’s Philosophy", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8 (1947/48): 337-371.

25. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 179-192.

26. Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, trans. by Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), P. 10.

27. SZ, p. 181.; BT, p. 225.

28. Cf. VA, p. 144.; BW, pp. 327-328.

29. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 328.; BW, p. 210.

30. Cf. TK, p. 45.; QCT, p. 47.

31. For various interpretations on the nature of the relation-ship between the Divine and Being: Cf. John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London: SCM Press, 1966). Cf. also Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg Theologie (Zolliken: Evengelisches Verlag, 1955); and Thomas F. O’Meara, "Heidegger on God", Continuum, 5 (1967/1968): 686-698.

32. Cf. SZ, pp. 267-295.; BT, pp. 312-341.

33. Cf. Ralph Powel, "The Late Heidegger’s Omission of the Ontic-ontological Structure of Dasein", Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, ed. John Salis, pp. 116-137.

34. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 346.; BW, pp. 228-229.

35. Gilbert Ryle, "Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit", The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 1 (1970): 13.

36. ED, p. 17.; PLT, p. 9

37. Cf. VA, p. 88.; EP, p. 104.

38. Cf. Reynold Borzaga (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 114-122.

39. Cf. DT, pp. 48-49.

40. Ibid.

41. Cf. WD, p. 30.; WCT, p. 82.

42. Cf. C. Astrada et al., eds., Martin Heidegger’s Einfluss auf die Wissenschaflen, (Bern: A Francke AG, 1949). Cf. Also William U. Spanos, ed., Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature (London: Indiana University Press, 1979).

43. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 348; BW, p. 230.