In our negative appraisal of Heidegger’s thought, we do not want to hold him responsible for what he did not include in his philosophy. It is not possible for a thinker to include everything under the sun in his philosophical reflection. It would be unreasonable to expect it from any thinker, however great he may be. Neither do we want to criticize him for the errors in his philosophy which are due to his background and intellectual heritage. But Heidegger can be held accountable for what is lacking in what he has said. In other words, we can criticize him for not saying what he should have said in what he said, viz., the inadequacies. Again we can criticize him for the lack of logical consistency and clarity in what he said, viz., discrepancies. So our negative appraisal focuses on the inadequacies and discrepancies of Heideggerian thought.

In this section we want to bring to light some inadequacies in Heidegger’s philosophy. Had he accepted these inadequacies and attempted to correct them, his work would have a completeness which it does not have.

Even in later Heidegger there is no objective theory of knowledge. Instead of ‘understanding’ of Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of ‘thinking’, ‘dwelling’ and ‘seeing’, referring to Dasein’s relationship to Being. Here, Dasein’s thinking is not objective rational thinking but a meditative reflection. The dwelling is a waiting-on and listening-to Being. Seeing consists in experiencing or realizing Being. Thus, Heidegger, in his later phase, is also left with the same problem of objectively validating and communicating Dasein’s experiencing of Being.

This lack of rational epistemology in Heidegger’s philosophy clearly points to his inability to clarify the question of the meaning of Being. Neither Being and Time, nor later Heideggerian thinking, has succeeded in objectively clarifying the meaning of Being. Early Heidegger inquired into the nature of Dasein and raised the question of Being, while later Heidegger highlighted the revealing of Being as a play in the epochal history, without ever attempting to clarify the meaning of Being and its objective validity in a rational way. All that Dasein could do, according to Heidegger, is to formulate the truth about his own experience of Being in himself and entities and hope that others would come in line with its experience.

Even though Heidegger speaks of ‘being-with’ as an existential of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, his consideration of Dasein’s communal world is rather deplorable. Heidegger’s analysis of inter-subjective relationship is very brief, and it is presented as a type of appendix to the analysis of Dasein as being-alongside-entities. In a work situation, the ‘towards-which’ of the usability or the ‘for-the-sake-of-whom’ of the work produced is the other Dasein. He also appears as the buyer and seller of the work produced, or as the provider of the material for the work to be done. Thus, Heidegger introduces one Dasein to another in the context of the ‘work-place’, where one is involved with the entities ready-to-hand. It is surprising that he, who speaks of Dasein as essentially ‘being-with,’ establishes inter-subjectivity in an indirect manner, i.e., through the entities, rather than in a direct face-to-face relationship between two Daseins.

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is no better, as there is hardly any mention of other Daseins. It is mentioned only in relation to the fourfold, where it is referred to as the mortal. Even here the indication is to the individual Dasein rather than to the intersubjective community of Daseins. As mortal, Dasein is understood only in relation to the other three of the fourfold, as the mortal Dasein is only a facet of Being. Besides, Being’s call, giving, regioning and poetic presencing are more directed to the individual Dasein who recalls, thanks, waits on and poetically dwells. The meditative thinking, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being, in some sense calls for a moving away from other Daseins, as only in absolute openness to Being can Being’s call be re-collected and gift be thanked. Again, later Heidegger speaks of Being’s giving of itself in things, in poetry, in art and in language. Dasein is called to shepherd Being’s presencing in all these. But we do not have any reference to Being’s revealing of itself to other Daseins or to an intersubjective community of Daseins of which Dasein is a shepherd. Being is spoken of as giving itself to Dasein through language, without a genuine intersubjective dialogue. Thus, both in the early and the later Heidegger, the analysis of Dasein’s inter-subjective relationships is deficient. Dasein is seen in both the phases as being alone, without genuine inter-subjective communion, dialogue and reciprocity.

Heidegger’s philosophy does not consider the possibility of God to whom man can have genuine relationship. Just as the notion of the other, in the sense of communal existence, is absent, so also the notion of the other, as the Absolute and Eternal Thou, is absent in Heidegger’s thought. In the early phase, Heidegger is totally indifferent to the question of God, while in the latter phase the notion of God is considered in a different name, viz., the Divine. Here the Divine is simply an aspect of the phenomenological revelation of Being. But the Divine, as spoken by Heidegger at the later phase, is of such nature that it would not in any way satisfy man’s religious aspirations. Nor is it such that man can offer his worship and adoration. Thus, though Heidegger has succeeded in thinking of God in a novel way, he has not provided a notion of God that will instill religious feeling in Dasein.

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is not very different. In considering Dasein as an aspect of the fourfold, which is the manifestation of Being in its spatiality, we can find a reference to Dasein being rooted in the spatial manifestation of Being. The same is also indicated in Dasein’s building things, by saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on Divinities and initiating its mortal nature. But these are only indications. The bodiliness of Dasein, as an essential aspect of its nature and being, is not considered in the latter phase as well.

The absence of the consideration of the bodilyness of Dasein in Heidegger’s Dasein analysis is the fundamental reason for all the above-mentioned deficiencies. Body is a significant reality as it is the point of contact in our concrete existence. If not for the body, no relationship of any kind can be built. Since this all-important dimension is missing in Heideggerian Dasein analysis, any relationship that is genuine and personal is missing, whether it be relating to God, the other or the community. Besides moral dimension and the intellectual dimension of the possibility of objective knowledge is related to Dasein’s bodily interactions. Thus, the omission of the analysis of the bodily nature of Dasein is a significant deficiency in Heideggerian thinking.

According to early Heidegger, human existence is characterized by a radical finitude. The situation of Dasein in the world is tragic and grim. Dasein is centered on himself, cut away from others, the Divine and Being. It is a state in which Dasein is lonely, helpless, anxious, and his life lacks meaning and purpose. Besides, human existence is characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and death. There is no one to help Dasein except himself. Dasein’s being-in-the-world is a state of inauthenticity, marked by involvements and entanglements with entities and other Daseins. Even the authentic state is far from being a desirable one, as it does not bring Dasein to the state of happiness, as Dasein is all by himself in a world that is separated and isolated. The situation of the world in which Dasein finds himself is no better. It is under the grip of metaphysical and technological thinking. The scientific approach to life and the technological attitude of domination has led to a thinking that is calculative. The will-to-power eliminates man in all his endeavors; the value of life and reality is lost. In the process of the struggle for power and survival, man himself is made a commodity and the most important raw material. Man has looked upon technology as a means to happiness. But technology has victimized man, as he is controlled by technology. Heidegger gives many images, such as, ‘world-night’, ‘a time of destitution’, ‘endless winter’ and ‘a time in which Gods have fled’ to refer to this depressing situation of modern man.

Even later Heidegger does not give a better view of Dasein’s existence and destiny. In the state of authenticity, Dasein accepts his inability to be the master of himself and totally depends on Being. Dasein is helpless, as all that he can do is to accept his inability to cope with his finitude and resign passively to the presencing of Being. Even this state of passive openness to Being is devoid of social and communitarian dimension. The authentic Dasein has no genuine and reciprocal relationship with the other, as there is no place for love, togetherness, genuine friendship, fellowship with the other, cooperation and one-to-one concern. Dasein, thus, is presented as a being that is incapable of any committed relationship, while he is only capable of anxiety in the face of death, guilt and existential limitations, and a tranquil waiting on the presencing of Being. The absence of genuine relationship in the totality of Dasein’s existence makes Dasein’s finitude more acute as he has, always, to face life all alone, having no word of encouragement and support from others. Thus, Heidegger’s philosophy of the radical finitude of Dasein leaves Dasein with an unhappy and a solitary existence.

According to Heidegger, to attain his goal of the experience of Being, Dasein must move through an ascending path of thinking of Being, dwelling in the neighborhood of Being and seeing the truth of Being. Essential thinking of Being is not merely having an opinion about something; neither is it representative thinking, nor a conceptual system of thinking, with a chain of logical premises which lead to valid conclusions. It is a call of Being that enables thinking in man. Though it is a thinking that comes about in man at Being’s initiative, Dasein is called to respond to the call of Being by concentrating on Being and its giving, by re-collection and thanksgiving. Dwelling in the neighborhood of Being consists in Dasein’s standing in the openness of Being as ek-sistence. It means that Dasein is attuned to listen to Being by ek-sisting in its neighborhood and is enabled to respond to the presencing of Being by his openness to the light of Being. Dwelling also involves Dasein’s building entities by sparing (tending) and guarding Being’s revealing in them. Seeing the truth of Being implies that Dasein attends on experiences and watches over the revealing-concealing time-space-play of Being. In this interactive giving of Being and Dasein to each other, they both enter into the realm of each other in a relationship of belonging-together and claim each other. In this claim, there comes about a mutual owning of Being and Dasein, which bestows on Dasein the dignity of being the shepherd of Being.

The Heideggerian path to experience Being, with its threefold ascending movements, is not a practical one. Heidegger, though he speaks of three stages of Dasein’s path to Being, does not give any practical steps that should facilitate Dasein’s movement at each stage. He speaks about these stages in a vague and abstract way. The value of any path to self-realization consists in how it helps the aspirant to move towards his ultimate destiny. Since the path proposed by Heidegger does not suggest any practical steps to enable the Dasein who seeks Being and its presencing, one wonders how practical and useful the path of Heidegger for the experiencing of Being is.

Besides, the above-mentioned inadequacies, there are a number of discrepancies in Heidegger’s philosophy. He leaves many concepts vague and unclear. Had he attempted to be precise and made an effort to clarify some of these concepts, many of the errors that are found in Heideggerian thinking could have been avoided. Now, we will highlight some of these discrepancies.

Heidegger’s distinction of entities as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is based on the way Dasein looks at an entity. There is no such division within an entity. If Dasein looks at an entity from a theoretical perspective, then it is seen as present-at-hand or as ‘out-there’. But if Dasein sees the same thing from the practical point of view, i.e., in relation to what he can do with that thing, then it would present itself to Dasein as a tool or the ready-to-hand. In making this distinction Heidegger clearly demarcates two types of Dasein’s attitudes, viz., the attitude of detached viewing of a thing and the attitude of encountering an entity in its practical mode. The former is the attitude of a scientist, while the latter is the attitude of a workman. The former refers to scientific and objective knowledge about things, whereas the latter points to understanding things in their essential ground in the Heideggerian sense.

This strict distinction — between things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand; scientific attitude and practical attitude; knowledge and understanding — remains only at the rational level and not in relation to the concrete situation of man. In a concrete experience we find that theoretical knowledge and practical attitude go hand in hand, as one is not complete without the other. We need understanding or practical attitude to do the work and require scientific or objective knowledge to make our practical attitude into a well-developed body of knowledge, which can be studied objectively. This is clear from our work experience. Thus, Heidegger’s strict distinction of knowledge and understanding and viewing them as having no relation to each other is inconsistent and inadequate.

Another obvious inconsistency in Heidegger’s thinking is its anti-conceptualist stand. In the early phase, Heidegger, stressing the importance of understanding, ignores the validity of objective knowledge and cognition. In the later phase, he is critical of metaphysical and representational thinking. He claims that his originative thinking is non-conceptual. But this claim is paradoxical, as nothing can be expressed without the help of concepts. The many volumes of Heidegger’s writing and the many lectures he gave were not devoid of concepts. Even the research that is done on Heidegger, uses concepts and interprets the concepts used by him. As a matter of fact, Heidegger uses the propensity of the German language to express philosophical concepts and forms new concepts and expresses them in terms, by playing on the prefixes and suffixes, giving them novel nuances and meanings. If not for using concepts he would not have written what he has about his non-conceptual and non-metaphysical thinking. Thus, Heidegger was, indeed, inconsistent in denouncing the value of conceptual knowledge, while using the very concepts to denounce their importance.

So far, we have looked into what Heidegger did not say, which he should have said, in what he said and the logical inconsistencies in what he said. Having done so, we do not want to give the impression that Heidegger’s thinking is basically negative in character. We, having distanced ourselves from Heideggerian thinking, wanted to look at it objectively, and we found it wanting in the aspects we have mentioned. It does not mean that the merit of Heidegger’s thinking is undermined. Now coming closer to it we want to highlight its positive aspects. This is our task in the next section.

All three stages of the Heideggerian path involve highly reflective and mystical states on the part of Dasein. The essential thinking of Being is attained in release, which involves a twofold ‘regioning’ on the part of Being and Dasein who must turn from non-willing and await upon Being. Dwelling in the neighborhood of Being is initiated by Being’s giving of itself as the Glad-some, the Holy, and the Source, that is the Origin and the Ground. This initiative of Being is given in an original poetic presencing of Being, which involves Being’s ‘homecoming’ as the Glad-some, the Holy and the Source. Dasein begins to dwell in Being’s neighborhood when he preserves this original ‘homecoming’ by recollecting poetically upon it as what-is-past, experiencing it as a reality still-to-come in the future and as a present experience of giving utterance to it in the words of his poetry. Dasein dwells in Being’s manifestation in things by sparing (tending) the fourfold: by saving the earth as the earth, by receiving the sky as the sky, by waiting on divinities as divinities and by initiating his own nature as the mortal. Dasein sees the truth of Being by opening himself to the initial giving of Being in the revealing-concealing process, which involves a mutual look of Being and Dasein on each other’s realms. Besides, truth of Being is experienced by Dasein by Being’s self-giving in language, the house of Being, and Dasein’s dwelling in it by co-speaking with language.

The three stages of Dasein’s attainment of the experience of Being mean that he is capable of deep reflection, understanding and intuitive experiencing of Being. It would be too much to expect such a high intellectual and reflective state from most people. So, it seems to us that most ordinary persons would find it difficult to use Heideggerian path to experience Being. But, the fact that Heidegger proposes this path as Dasein’s only way to Being may be that he was convinced that this way could help all. Heidegger does not specify this point in any of his writings. Nor does he propose that the scope of the Heideggerian path to the attainment of the experiencing of Being is very limited, as it can be used only by people capable of high intellectual and intuitive capacities. Therefore, Heidegger, by proposing such a path to experiencing of Being, either thinks that all categories of people are poets and thinkers or excludes all categories of people, except the poets and thinkers, from experiencing being. In both of these cases Heidegger’s view involves an inconsistency.

Here we focus our attention on Heidegger’s positive contributions in the field of philosophy and thinking, taking into account the aim, task and purpose of his philosophy.

Heidegger, by his philosophical enterprise, intended to call man, who is fragmented by the scientific-technological culture, to the wholeness and authenticity of his existence. It involved a calling back to their roots men who are caught up in the fragmented way of living that is characteristic of everyday existence, and opening them to the call of destiny. It is a summons to turn away from aimless living and an invitation to turn to a purposeful life. Thus, Heidegger’s philosophy, beyond any doubt, is a call to an authentic human existence and to genuine human living.

Having been convinced of the evil effects of the conceptualistic and logic-dominated metaphysical-technological thinking which led to scientism and technologism, Heidegger wanted to replace it with a new type of thinking which would obliterate the consequences of metaphysical thinking. In order to inaugurate this new thinking and thereby take man to his authentic destiny, Heidegger took a ‘step-back’ into the history of Western metaphysics, so as to effect a destruction of metaphysical thinking and in the process pave the way for his originative and primordial thinking.

Since Heidegger wanted to rectify the fragmentation brought about in human existence, thinking and knowing by metaphysical thinking and desiring to found them on an ontological ground, he limited his analysis of human existence and its authenticity to one dimension, viz., to the transcendental and ontological dimension of Dasein’s openness to the truth of Being. For him, the ontological dimension is the most fundamental aspect and the one on which all the other modes of human existence are based. Besides, the ontological consideration implicitly includes all the other dimensions, as it reveals human existence in its uniqueness. For example, to say that man ontologically ‘is’, includes implicitly that man is political, economic, social, psychological, moral, theological and bodily. It bases all these while transcending all adjectival and secondary aspects. Therefore, Heidegger’s analysis of human existence is primordial and his thinking is originative.

Many of the criticisms we have leveled against Heidegger come from the fact that the philosophical stand he has taken in his analysis of human existence is primordial and one-dimensional. He could have attempted to consider Dasein and his authentic existence of experiencing Being in a multi-dimensional manner, as have such thinkers as Levinas, Marcel, Buber, Sartre and Jaspers. But Heidegger did not want to do that. He did not want further fragmentation of Dasein in various dimensions, but rather preferred the bringing-together of all the dimensions of Dasein into one unifying ground, viz., Being. Thus, the uniqueness of Heideggerian thinking consists in that it is not multi-dimensional, but rather one-dimensional and primordial.

Metaphysics with its conceptualistic and logic-dominated thinking presents a view of reality that is static and reified. Everything is seen in term of the dichotomy between subject and object. But Heideggerian primordial thinking views everything in a new perspective that is dynamic. In this section, we highlight how the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being are seen in this new perspective.

While Heidegger does not deny the traditional cosmological view of the world or it existence, he views the world in a dynamic way that is different from the traditional conception. The world is always related to Dasein: it is always Dasein’s world. The world is understood in the context of Dasein’s being-alongside-entities and being-with-others. The world is constituted of the matrix of Dasein’s relatedness to the various equipmental systems and their interrelatedness. Besides, the world is understood in the totality of the significance of this interrelatedness. Thus, we can speak of as many worlds as there are meaningful interrelated equipmental systems. It is not a mere subjectivization of the world, but seeing the world from the ontological perspective of Dasein.

In the later Heidegger, the world is seen as the manifestation of Being in its spatial and temporal character. The spatial character of Being is given to Dasein in relation to the facets of Being, viz., the fourfold. It is the mirror play of the fourfold, i.e., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, that lets Dasein experience Being in its spatial dimension. The temporal dimension of Being is given in the inter-play of the three ecstases of time, viz, the past, the present and the future. Thus, Dasein’s experience of the world is, in fact, his experience of Being. The world history experienced by Dasein is the history of Being. But, in order to experience the history of Being in its authentic manifestation, Dasein must be open to the mystery dimension of Being’s giving as an essential thinker, a dweller in the nearness of Being and a seer of the truth of Being. Only in opening himself to the mystery of Being manifested in history does Dasein find his authentic world and also his authentic destiny.

Heidegger does not accept the traditional definition of man — rational animal — as complete. According to him, from the new and existential perspective such a comprehensive and all-embracing definition of human existence is not possible. In his existential analysis Heidegger distinguishes between Dasein and man. Man, in the metaphysical sense, is a being, whereas Dasein is a process that comes to pass ‘in’ man. Dasein, as a process, occurs only in man. Therefore, Dasein is not a statistically present being, but a dynamic process which must take over his existence by active resolve and by receptive openness to Being. Seen in Heidegger’s primordial perspective, Dasein is the ‘place’ in which innerworldly beings and Being are made manifest. Besides, the structure of the selfhood of Dasein is neutral, as it may occur in a male or female; in an ‘I’ or in a ‘thou’. But, this does not mean that Dasein is impersonal, but rather that he is pre-personal in the sense that he is the a priori basis for the possibility of ontic individual selves or persons. But in the later phase of his thought, Heidegger did not keep to this distinction between ontological and ontic levels in his understanding of Dasein. In the later thought, Heidegger sees Dasein as the ‘place’ that lights-up Being, in the threefold stages of Dasein’s journey towards Being, viz, thinking of Being, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being and the shepherd, who guards and preserves Being’s gift of itself to him.

Heidegger rejects all attempts to give a precise definition of Being. For him, any attempt to give a definition of Being would amount to tying down Being to a particular concept. Heidegger often speaks of what Being is not, rather than of what it is. Clarifying the notion of ontological difference, he says that Being is not being, i.e., it is neither an existing reality, nor a sum-total of such existing realities. If we compare Being with beings, the former is a ‘non-Being’ or ‘nothing’. Even though Being is not a being, yet it ‘lets-be’ particular entities; particular entities ‘enshrine’ the presence of Being. Being manifests itself in the revealing-concealing process. It comes over in the entities, unconceals itself in the process and reveals the entities. Being is to be understood in the ‘event’ of its historical sending. All these descriptions of Being point to the nature of Being which is a process or a historical sending rather than an entity. Speaking of the ‘why’ of the process, Heidegger just says that it is a ‘play of Being’.

Being, therefore, cannot be understood with the help of metaphysical-representational thinking. It can be understood only in its relation to the realm of Ereignis (event of appropriation), i.e., in relation to the essential belonging-together of Dasein and Being. Every aspect of Being’s revealing — through essential thinking, the fourfold, the poetic presencing, the unconcealing process, and the language — is to be understood in relation to the realm of Ereignis, which is a realm of deeper experience rather than mere intellectual knowing. Our consideration of Heidegger’s analysis of the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being, clearly highlights the new perspective that is characteristic of the primordial thinking which Heidegger has inaugurated. This new perspective does not base itself on logic, reason and conceptual formulation, but is founded as a deeper level of the existential experience of Being that is beyond the tangible and the visible.

In this chapter, we have seen the philosophy of Heidegger in both its negative and positive aspects. Many of the criticisms we have mentioned do not stand up if seen in the light of his primordial thinking and Being-centered philosophy. In spite of the drawbacks and differences, Heidegger proposes a philosophy that is Being-centered, besides suggesting the path for the attainment of total authenticity in Dasein. He is concerned about helping men to come into touch with the deeper dimensions of their lives and to live a life centered on Being. Though there may be a few drawbacks in Heidegger’s thought, the negative elements of his philosophy are outweighed by the positive.

1. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, p. 149.

2. Cf. SZ, pp. 59-62; BT, pp. 86-90.

3. Roger Waterhouse suggests that Heidegger’s main concern is Ontology and praxis-centered thinking, not a theory of knowledge. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 149-163.

4. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, Heidegger Critique, p. 176.

5. Cf. Rene Weber, "A critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Solicitude", in The New Scholasticism 42 (1968): 537-560.

6. Cf. SZ. p. 263; BT, pp. 307-308.

7. Cf. SZ., pp. 117-126; BT., pp. 153-163.

8. John D. Caputo speaks of an original-ethics in Heidegger, which refers to the thoughtful meditation upon the essence of dwelling as the issue of Being: "Heidegger’s Original Ethics", The New Scholasticism, 45 (1971), pp. 127-138; Giles Driscoll considers Heidegger as an ethical monist who gives an ontological structure for an ethics. "Heidegger’s Ethical Monism", The New Scholasticism, 42 (1968), pp. 497-510.

9. Cf. Anthony M. Camele, "Heideggerian Ethics", Philosophy Today, 21 (1977): 284-293.

10. Cf. Guentes Stern, "The Pseudo-concreteness of Heidegger’s Philosophy", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8 (1947/48): 337-371.

11. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 179-192

12. Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, trans. by Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), p. 10.

13. SZ, p. 181; BT, p. 225.

14. Cf. VA, p. 144; BW, pp. 327-328.

15. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 328; BW, p. 210.

16. Cf. TK, p. 45; QCT, p. 47.

17. For various interpretations on the nature of the relationship between the Divine and Being: Cf. John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London: SCM Press, 1966). Cf. also Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg Theologie (Zolliken: Evengelisches Verlag, 1955). Cf. also Thomas F. O’Meara, ‘Heidegger on God’, Continuum, 5 (1967/1968): 686-698.

18. Cf. SZ, pp. 267-295; BT, pp. 312-341.

19. Cf. Ralph Powel, "The Late Heidegger’s Omission of the Ontico-ontological Structure of Dasein," Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, ed., John Salis, pp. 116-137.

20. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 346; BW, pp. 228-229.

21. Gilbert Ryle, "Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit," The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 1 (1970), 13.

22. ED, p. 17; PLT, p. 9.

23. Cf. VA, p. 88; EP, p. 104.

24. Cf. Reynold Borzaga, ed., Contemporary Philosophy ( Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 114-122.

25. Cf. DT, pp. 48-49.

26. Ibid.

27. Cf. WD, p. 30; WCT, p. 82.

28. Cf. C. Astrada et al., eds., Martin Heidegger’s Einfluss auf die Wissenschaflen (Bern: A Francke AG, 1949). Cf. also William U. Spanos, ed., Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature (London: Indiana University Press, 1979).

29. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 348; BW, p. 230.