INTRODUCTION

 

 

History in its unfolding blesses humankind with eminent persons, who with their thinking and living make a difference not only for the people of their time and culture, but also for others and for many generations to come. One of such great minds whom Germany has given to the present is Martin Heidegger, who left an indelible mark on contemporary thought. Before we attempt to study Heidegger’s philosophy of Being, in the first section of the introduction, we look into his life, background and thought. The last section will spell out the plan by which we shall analyze the Heideggerian perspective of the experience of Being.

 

1. HEIDEGGER’S LIFE AND THOUGHT

 

Here, we look into the life and background of Martin Heidegger, focusing on his multifaceted personality and on the quality of seeking which is characteristic of him. In attempting to understand Heidegger’s thought, the threefold interpretation by different thinkers will be analyzed.

 

1.1. HEIDEGGER’S LIFE AND BACKGROUND

 

Martin Heidegger, who is acclaimed as a seminal thinker and a significant philosopher of the present era, is sometimes referred to as "a man without a biography’.1 Though this might be an exaggeration, yet his life was simple and normal as that of an ordinary German professor. Except for the period between May, 1933 to February, 1934 during which he was involved with the Nazi party of Hitler, his life was basically uneventful.2 He was born at the little town of Messkirch, in Southwest Germany on September 26, 1889. For the most part he lived and worked there, in the town of his birth - except for the five years at Marburg - until he died on May 26, 1976, four months before his 87th birthday.3 Some of his writings highlight his life and his multifaceted personality. The Course of My Life,4 A Recollection,5 and My Way to Phenomenology6 give biographical details regarding Heidegger’s life, education, academic pursuits and the influence of other thinkers upon him. His essays Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?7 and Pathway8 point to Heidegger’s desire for oneness with nature, which one can experience only in the simple, still, calm and rustic life of the country. Such a natural environment gave him the perfect space and the solitude9 that was needed for his philosophical search.

Throughout his life, Heidegger was a seeker. As every seeker is called to be, Heidegger was courageous in his search never being afraid of going wrong while seeking. But, when he realized that he was in the wrong, he was never apologetic about it; nor did he regret his having gone astray from the truth. Instead, he moved forward and continued his search. This is clear from the statements he made during the Der Spiegel Interview.10 This attitude made Heidegger isolate himself from National Socialism and resign the office of the Rector of the Freiburg University.11 He did not count the cost of choosing what is true, when he knew it to be the truth. Bernhard Welte gives the following tribute to Heidegger:

 

He [Heidegger] was always seeking and always underway. At various times he emphatically characterized his thinking as a path. He traveled this path without ceasing. There were bends and turns along it; certainly there were stretches where he went astray. Heidegger always understood the path as one that was given him, sent to him. He sought to understand this word as a response to an indication to which he listened without respite. For him, to think was to thank, to make a grateful response to that appeal.12 

 

1.2. HEIDEGGER’S THOUGHT

 

The ‘matter-for-thought’ of Heidegger’s seeking has been received with great interest, even though he himself has been suspect due to his involvement with Nazism. Heidegger is one of the few thinkers to whom much attention has been paid by researchers and scholars during his lifetime. There are differences of opinion among the Heideggerian scholars over the manner in which his philosophy should be viewed and interpreted. Heideggerian commentators give a threefold interpretation of his thought. We shall consider each of them in detail.

 

1.2.1. The Threefold Interpretation of Heidegger’s Thought

 

One opinion sees the whole of Heidegger’s thinking as contained in his major work, Being and Time, as it anticipates all the themes that occur in his later writings.13 Another view recognizes three separate periods in Heidegger’s path of thinking.14 A third view speaks of two periods in Heidegger’s thinking named Early Heidegger or Heidegger I, and Later Heidegger or Heidegger II. This view is held by a number of reputed commentators of Heidegger. According to them there was a shift15 in Heidegger’s thinking that made him move from the early to the latter phase, though they differ among themselves regarding the nature of the shift. Thinkers like John Wild, Alphonse de Waelhens, Lazalo Versenyi and some others see a break in Heidegger’s thought such that there is no bridge leading from Heidegger I to Heidegger II. In other words, they speak of a complete break between the two phases. Others, such as Otto Poeggeler, William J. Richardson, Walter Schulz and Werner Marx, though recognizing the shift in Heidegger’s thinking, hold for a coherence and unity of both phases. In other words, they see both phases, not as isolated from each other, but, as having a continuity, both in content and aim, though the perspective is different. Thus, for them, Heidegger II is an explication and an interpretation of Heidegger I from the perspective of Being.16 

The view of the second group of thinkers seems to be in agreement with what Heidegger himself thought about the shift in his thinking. For Heidegger, the change involved in the shift is neither a break in his thinking, nor an abandonment of the earlier standpoint for the later. To quote him: "This turning [shift] is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but it is the thinking that first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced."17 Besides there are some topics which Heidegger promises - at various places in Being and Time - that he would take up in the section of ‘Time and Being’,18 for example, the fuller development of the idea of phenomenology,19 of ontology20 and the discussion on language.21 The fact that Heidegger wanted to publish these topics in the unpublished section of Being and Time, viz., ‘Time and Being’, from a different perspective, substantiates Heidegger’s claim that the change envisaged in the shift is already present at the initial stage of Being and Time. Heidegger clarifies this point when he says: " Only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to be thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thoughts of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is in [Heidegger] II."22 Thus, the ‘matter-for-thought’ in Being and Time has not really changed even after the shift, but the perspective with which it is considered changes. Heidegger remarks: ". . . the road [Being and Time] has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being."23 Commenting on this point J.L. Mehta concludes that the writings after the shift are a critique and a commentary on Being and Time.24 Therefore, for Heidegger, the completion of the shift "is not a turning to a new position, but rather is a return to the original point of departure and a return to the ground upon which the circle-of-thought has rested from the beginning."25 

 

1.2.2. Circumstances of the Shift in Heidegger’s Thought

 

Two events seem to have contributed to the shift in Heidegger thought. They are: the failure of Being and Time to accomplish its intended task of clarifying the meaning of Being and Heidegger’s political involvement. In Being and Time, Heidegger raises the question of Being26 and analyzes it in relation to time.27 He chooses the existential analysis of Dasein28 in man and Dasein in his later writings, as he uses them as synonyms. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 346.; BW, pp. 228-229. So there is an inconsistency in Heidegger’s use of these terms. We translate it as ‘human person’ or ‘man’, as the self-structure Heidegger speaks of in the term ‘Dasein’; in the last analysis, it is the human entity. In clarifying the nature of Dasein Heidegger distinguishes between two types of analysis, viz., the existential-ontological and the existentiell-ontical. The first pair refers to the realm of structures underlying Dasein, while the second pair refers to the level of the concrete acts of existence. It is in the latter that the former is actualized in its various possibilities. Man is existentiell and ontic; but Dasein is that which constitutes the ‘Da’ of ‘Sein’ in man. Cf. SZ, pp. 11-13.; BT, pp. 32-34. Cf. also James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger, p. 17. In later Heidegger, he ignores this distinction as well. to clarify the meaning of Being, as he has the ontic, ontological and ontico-ontological priority.29 In this endeavor, that which interrogates (das Befragte) is Dasein; that which is interrogated (das Gefragte) is Being; and that which is to be found out by asking (das Erfragte) is the meaning of Being.30 Even though this was Heidegger’s aim, he did not succeed, as he dealt only with the preparatory analysis of Dasein and his relationship to temporality; section three that should have treated the relationship between temporality and Being, viz., `Time and Being’ did not appear as per the original plan.31 Heidegger indicates the inadequacy of Being and Time to accomplish the task of clarifying the meaning of Being at the end of the written portions of Being and Time as follows:

 

. . . our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s being remains only one way which we take. . . . Whether this is the only way or even the right one at all, can be decided only after one has gone along it. The conflict as to the interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, because it has not been enkindled. . . . it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for it: Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is on the way.32 

 

Thus, it is clear that the published portion of Being and Time has failed to achieve its original aim. The reason for the failure of Being and Time was that, though Heidegger wanted to break with the metaphysical tradition and subjectivistic thinking, he was not able to completely escape it at that time.33 So in Being and Time, he raises the question of Being from the subjectivistic perspective, even though he did not want to do so. Thus, in Being and Time, Heidegger has each leg in a different boat. On the one side, he wants to extricate himself from the metaphysical-subjectivistic thinking and on the other side, he is unable to pull himself out of the very thinking he detests. "Throughout Being and Time there is a tension owing to the fact that the work lies half-way between metaphysical thinking and the new way of thinking."34 For example, Heidegger speaks of Dasein’s essence as existence in the sense of transcendence, and yet limits himself by saying that every existence is one’s own, i.e., an owned selfhood. Again, the authenticity of Dasein is reached by the call of conscience, which cannot be controlled by Dasein: But authenticity is attained only when Dasein resolutely owns the call in anticipation of his own death. These examples from Being and Time indicate that it was bound to fail, as it was attempting a new way of thinking without fully escaping metaphysical thinking.35 To quote Heidegger:

 

The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity [Heidegger II] is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of Being and Time, the third division of the first part ‘Time and Being’ was held back. . . . The section in question was held back because thinking [Heidegger I] failed in the adequate saying of this turning [shift] and did not succeed with the help of the language of Metaphysics.36 

 

Besides the failure of Being and Time, Heidegger’s political involvement may possibly be another event that influenced Heidegger to make the shift in his thinking. Martin Heidegger actively supported, especially in his public addresses at the University of Freiburg and to many workers’ groups, the cause of Hitler and his National Socialist Party,37 besides being an active member of the party for ten months between 1933 to 1934. One might wonder why such an outstanding thinker of the time, who was supposed to be the spiritual leader of the academic community and the nation,38 could fall in line with the thinking of Hitler and the Nazi Party.

One reason was Heidegger’s belief in himself as the philosopher-prophet who was called to guide the German nation in that troubled period of the 1930s, just as Fichte did in the early 1800s. Besides, he also believed that with his national and international reputation as a philosopher he could do something to alter the destiny of Germany for the better. It would have been wrong for any person of Heidegger’s standing to remain unmoved when his nation went through such turmoil. As an authentic patriotic citizen of Germany, he may have felt within himself that he should give spiritual direction to the German nation. This was probably what the nation expected of an outstanding thinker like Heidegger.39 Just as Plato attempted to bring about a philosopher-king at Syracuse by genuine support and education, Heidegger felt that the particular political situation of Germany in 1933 called him to guide the political leader of Germany.40 This may have led to Heidegger’s support Hitler and his National Socialist Party, the dominant political force in the 1930s.

Another possible reason was his belief that Adolf Hitler was a practical, wise man and an efficient leader of the German nation, in whose hands the Germans must place their destiny. The 1930s was a period of general political confusion. There were some 22 political parties in Germany, quite divergent in their views regarding national policies.41 As none of these parties was able to solve the nation’s problems, a strong leader and a national party was the need of the time. Heidegger saw in Adolf Hitler and in the National Socialist Party an answer to this need. So he spoke in favor of Hitler.42 Even though the initial impression of Heidegger was negative, during the early months of his tenure as the Rector of the Freiburg University he realized that he needed to make some compromises with the officials of the party to get a wider audience for his views.43 Heidegger differed with the Party, especially on its racist tendencies, but believed that the movement could be guided by the presence of intellectuals like him from within.44 

Heidegger’s belief in himself as a philosopher-king to guide the German destiny, his belief in Hitter and his party as the salvation of German nation, and belief in his and other intellectuals’ ability to direct the course of the National Socialist Party, all came to a standstill when circumstances forced him to resign from his office of Rector in spring 1934.45 After his resignation, the intellectuals of the Nazi Party attacked Heidegger personally in their writings.46 He was constantly watched, especially during his lectures.47 In 1934, he was prevented from participating in the International Philosophical Congress in Prague, and in 1937 was excluded from the German delegation for the International Descartes Congress in Paris.48 Heidegger was declared the most expendable professor and sent to the Rhine to build fortifications.49 From these happenings after his resignation as Rector, Heidegger realized that he was unrealistic in believing that he could change the course of National Socialism, which was a racist social Darwinism, an active subjectivism and a philosophy of will-to-power. It also dawned on him that besides having no control over this type of world view, he himself was in its hold as long as he was an ardent supporter of the National Socialism of Hitler. This awareness made Heidegger undertake a study on Nietzsche’s philosophy of will-to-power from 1936-1944. He gave lectures on Nietzsche in which he criticized the National Socialist world view which accepted Nietzsche’s philosophy as its basis.50 Heidegger’s involvement with the political situation in Germany between 1933-1934 enabled him to understand experientially the danger of subjectivistic thinking, characterized by the will-to-power that was active in Hitler’s Nazi ideology and which he himself was attempting in Being and Time. This led him to shift his thinking, enabling him to raise the question of Being from a new perspective.

As early as the 1920s, Heidegger was aware of the fact that he had to break with metaphysical-subjectivistic thinking and pose the question of Being in a non-metaphysical way. But he was neither certain of the exact method of approach, nor did he have, at that time, the right conceptual frame-work. Heidegger began to grasp the full implications of the shift and the direction he needed to take in order to raise the question of Being only after the foundering of Being and Time and his political involvement in 1933. This enabled him to realize the inability of metaphysical language to understand Being and the danger of subjectivistic metaphysical thinking, respectively. In his letter to William Richardson Heidegger notes: ". . . the matter thought in the term reversal [shift] was already in my thinking ten years prior to 1947."51 This clearly points to the fact that before, during and after his political involvement, Heidegger began to reflect seriously on the shift. Thus, the completion of the shift happened in Heidegger’s thinking during the decade before 1947, even though Heidegger was aware of the shift as early as the 1920s.

The shift from Heidegger I to Heidegger II is then not something abrupt or sudden. It not only is related to Heidegger’s intellectual development, but is conditioned by his political involvement. Basically it is a shift in perspective rather than a reversal in Heidegger’s thinking. Heidegger I is a movement from Dasein to Being, while Heidegger II is a movement from Being to Dasein. Firstly, this involves a change of perspective in which the emphasis moves from Dasein to Being as the horizon of Dasein. Secondly there is a change in the relationship between Being and Dasein, in which the role of Being is appreciated as ontologically prior to that of Dasein.52 In both of these phases Dasein plays a significant role: while Heidegger I encounters Being in and through his involvement with the world of his concern, for Heidegger II Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being.

 

1.2.3. Consequences of the Shift in Heidegger’s Thought

 

The shift in Heidegger’s thought has brought about significant changes in his perception of the philosophical quest, the task of philosophy and his use of language. Firstly, there is a change in Heidegger’s attitude towards his philosophical quest. Heidegger I is characterized by an attitude that is aggressive in which Dasein thinks of himself as destined to understand the truth of Being.53 It continues in his writings and lectures until 1934. Heidegger II gives up will and self-assertion in the face of Being. In other words, the aim of his entire quest becomes a complete unconditional surrender to the voice of Being. Thus, Heidegger moves from the assertive will of Dasein to that of tranquil detachment.54 

Secondly, there comes about a change in Heidegger’s view of the task of philosophy. Metaphysics, as the core of philosophy, is abandoned; even the fundamental ontology of Being and Time comes to a standstill. The thinking that is characteristic of Heidegger I gives way to a poetic type of thinking. This is much deeper than metaphysics and, according to him, it is no longer, strictly speaking, philosophy.55 Such thinking is not centered on Dasein and moving toward Being, but rather is claimed and favored by Being.56 Dasein is the lighting place of the truth of Being.57 Such thinking is experiential, non-subjective and non-logical in the strict sense. It is a docile meditative questioning filled with the sense of wonder and marvel. It is an attendance to the mystery of Being manifested in history.58 

Thirdly, the shift effected a considerable change in Heidegger’s language. As the thinking of Heidegger II becomes more poetical, he drops the metaphysical and technical terminology and introduces a terminology that is expressive, poetic and symbolic. ‘Fourfold’, ‘dwelling in the neighborhood of Being’, ‘seeing the truth of Being’ and writing the term ‘Being’ with the cross mark are a few examples of such language. Besides, the language of Heidegger II is characterized by imagery. Dasein as the shepherd of Being, language as the house of Being and referring to the state of Dasein as homelessness are some illustrations of the rich imagery present in later Heideggerian writings.

 

2. PLAN OF THE WORK

 

So far we have looked into the life, background and thought of Martin Heidegger. Now, we would spell out the plan in terms of the theme which this book is going to develop.

The first chapter clarifies the nature, characteristics and manifestation of Being, elaborating besides the realm in which this experience of Being takes place and Dasein in the state of Being-experience. The nature of Dasein is studied in terms of the notion of the fourfold relationship of belonging-together between Being and Dasein, and the ontological difference between Being and beings. Then the various characteristics Heidegger attributes to Being are highlighted. The manifestation of Being is a self-gifting of Being, which takes place in the mode of time-space play. Dasein can experience the manifestation of Being only in the realm of Ereignis, which is different from the realm of metaphysical thinking, science and technology. In experiencing Being in the realm of Ereignis, Dasein becomes the lighting-up-place of Being, the shepherd of Being and the seer of the truth of Being. Thus, Being, the goal of Dasein, is clarified in its different aspects.

In the second chapter, we explore the notion of Dasein in the state of care. In this state Dasein leads a life of threefold involvements, viz., epistemological, relational and existential. In the epistemological level, Dasein experiences himself as a state-of-being, understanding and discourse. As relational Dasein has a relationship of pre-occupation with the environing world of entities and a relationship of solicitude with other Daseins. The network of these twofold relationships constitutes Dasein’s world. As existential, Dasein is fallen, called to be authentic and finds himself in time and history. These threefold involvements confuse Dasein about his existence and lead to a life centered on himself. Moving away from this state of care is an essential condition for the attainment of the experience of Being. Thus, in expounding Dasein in the state of care, we would like to highlight the need of Dasein to transcend this state in order to ascend towards the experience of Being.

The third chapter speaks of the occurrence of the experience of Being. Having clarified the notion of Being and the condition to be removed for experiencing Being, we are in a position to speak of its occurrence. The first section deals with the path to the experience of Being. Heidegger proposes an ascending path that involves three stages, viz., essential thinking of Being, dwelling in the neighborhood of Being and seeing the truth of Being. The second section treats the attainment of the experience of Being with the help of the threefold stages of the path. Essential thinking of Being is attained by release. Dwelling in the neighborhood of Being is experienced in the poetic presencing of Being in the original homecoming, in which Dasein dwells by the poetic dwelling in the three ecstases of time. Seeing the truth of Being is attained by the revealing-concealing process of aletheia and Dasein’s being in language, the house of Being. When Dasein moves in these ascending stages, he is able to break the clutches of the state of care and to experience Being. In the process of this movement from the state of care to the state of Being, Dasein attains his total authentic existence. Dasein’s experiencing of Being and attaining total authentic existence are the topics of the third section of the third chapter.

In the fourth chapter we attempt critically to evaluate Heidegger’s philosophy of the experience of Being and related issues. Our critique will include a negative and a positive appraisal. The negative appraisal will focus on the inadequacies and discrepancies of Heideggerian thought, while the positive appraisal will highlight Heidegger’s contributions and the new perspective that is present in his philosophy. The conclusion attempts to bring to light the purpose of Heidegger’s philosophy of Being. Heidegger wanted persons to experience integration and wholeness in every sphere of their existence, which is lacking today. They have lost it because they have forgotten to think of Being for many centuries. Caught in a life of care and dominated by technicity, people have given themselves to fragmentation, which expresses itself in their personal life and in interpersonal relationships at the communitarian, social and national levels. Attempts to achieve unity often fails, because such unities are quite peripheral. For Heidegger, genuine unity is achieved by opening oneself to the realm of Being, using the path he proposed. In his openness to Being, one experiences unity within oneself, unity with others at the interpersonal level and the absolute unity of all in Being. When such a vision takes hold, the person is able to uphold the unity of everything, without losing one’s identity in this unity.

 

NOTES

 

1. Thomas Sheehan, ed., Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981), p. 3.

2. Cf. ibid., p. v.

3. Cf. ibid., p. 3.

4. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Course of My Life", in Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy, by J.J. Kockelmans (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), pp. 1-2. This small ‘sketch,’ written in 1914, contains biographical details that accompanied Heidegger’s doctoral dissertation.

5. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, pp. 21-22.

6. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "My Way to phenomenology", Existentialism: from Dostoevski to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, 1975), pp. 234-241.

7. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, pp. 27-30.

8. Cf. ibid., pp. 69-72.

9. Cf. ibid., p. 28.

10. Cf. ibid., pp. 45-67.

11. Cf. ibid., p. 52.

12. ibid., p. 73.

13. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger (New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1981), p. x.

14. Cf. Vincent Vycinas, Earths and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). Vincent Vycinas speaks of the phase of Dasein, the phase of Being and the phase of earth and gods, as three phases in Heidegger’s way. Cf. also James M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 183-186. Demske speaks of the first, the middle and the final stages of Heidegger’s thinking.

15. Heidegger himself explicitly accepted that there was a shift in his thought. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Brief ueber den Humanismus", Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 325 (Hereafter: BH, Wegmarken). Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: From ‘Being and Time’ (1927) to ‘The Task of Thinking’ (1964), ed. D. F. Krell ( London: Routledge and Kegen Paul Ltd., 1978), pp. 207-208. Cf. also William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 3rd ed. ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. xvi, xviii, xx. The shift has taken place in five books Heidegger has written after Sein und Zeit, viz., Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1928), Vom Wesen des Grundes (1928), Was ist Metaphysik? (1929), Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (1930) and Einfuehrung in die Metaphysik (1935). The first two books continue the theme of Being and Time, while in the next two already the tone is set for the transition and Being gains prominence over Dasein. In the last book, especially in its later part, the shift is inaugurated.

16. Cf. J.L. Mehta, Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii, 1978), PP. 350-351. Cf. also A. Borgmann, "The Transformation of Heidegger’s Thought", Personalist, 47 (1966): 485-486. Thinking in the line of the second type of thinkers, Johnson J. Puthenpurackal speaks of the relation between Heidegger I and Heidegger II as ‘unity of thinking and difference in perspective’. Thus, for him, the way of Heidegger is a movement from the hermeneutical circle (Dasein) to an alethological circle (Being). Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to Total Authenticity (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), pp. 229-254.

17. BH, Wegmarken, p. 325.; BW, p. 208.

18. Cf. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation", trans. R.H. Grimm, Philosophy Today, 19 (1975): 164.

19. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 12th ed. (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972) p. 357 (Hereafter: SZ).; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), pp. 408-409 (Hereafter: BT).

20. Cf. SZ, p. 230.; BT, pp. 272-273.

21. Cf. SZ, p. 349.; BT, pp. 400-401.

22. William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. xxii.

23. SZ, p. vii.; BT, p. 17. It is an interpolation made by Heidegger in the 7th edition of Being and Time, in 1953.

24. Cf. J.L. Mehta, Heidegger: The Way and the Vision, p. 344.

25. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation", pp. 165-166.

26. Martin Heidegger uses two German terms "Sein’ and ‘Seiende’. The former is translated in English as ‘Being’, while the latter is rendered as ‘being’. For Heidegger, there is a fundamental difference in the meaning of these two terms. The former is referred to as the ‘Being of beings’ (Sein des Seiendes). Being itself is not a being, but the ultimate condition, which allows all beings to exist. It is a process, which gives being passage from nothingness to existence and by which beings remain in existence. It is often referred to in Heidegger’s writings as the Ground or the Source, as it sustains beings in itself. Cf. Rudolph J. Gerber, "Heidegger: Thinking and Thanking of Being", Modern Schoolman, XLIV (1967): 205-206. Cf. also SZ, pp. 2-8.; BT, pp. 21-28.

27. Cf. SZ, p. 1.; BT, p. 19.

28. The term ‘Dasein’ has been translated in various ways. William J. Richardson renders it as ‘There-Being’. R.J. Gerber translates it as ‘Being’s-place’. It derives from the German term ‘Da’ (there) and ‘Sein’ (Being). For Heidegger of Being and Time, Dasein does not equal man: while man is a being, Dasein is a process. It is a process of being a ‘self’, as Dasein’s nature is such that it is an ability to be. Dasein’s selfhood lies in its ability to resolve upon being itself. This process comes to pass only in man. So Heidegger speaks of Dasein ‘in’ man. It provides the horizon in which the inner-worldly things are rendered manifest. The entire self-structure, i.e., Dasein, is neither masculine nor feminine, but neuter, as Dasein may come to pass in an ‘I’ or in a ‘thou’; in a male or in a female. But Dasein is not an impersonal process, but pre-personal in the sense that it is an a priori, which renders individual selves possible. That is why often the neuter pronoun ‘it’ is used to refer to it. Cf. John D. Caputo, "Heidegger’s Original Ethics", New Scholasticism, 45 (1971): 128. Cf. also SZ, p. 11.; BT, p. 32. But Heidegger does not follow this distinction.

29. Cf. SZ, pp. 13-15.; BT, pp. 34 -35.

30. Cf. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation", pp. 164-165.

31. Cf. ibid., p. 165. For the design of Being and Time as planned originally cf. SZ, pp. 39-40.; BT, pp. 63-64.

32. SZ, pp. 436-437.; BT, pp. 487-488.

33. Cf. Michael E. Zimmermann, "The Foundering of Being and Time", Philosophy Today, 19 (1975), 102.

34. Ibid.

35. Cf. ibid., p. 106. Cf. also Otto Poegeller, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 2. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), p. 180.

36. BH, Wegmarken, p. 325.; BW, pp. 207-208.

37. Martin Heidegger, German Existentialism, trans. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), pp. 19-20, 42 (Hereafter: GE).

38. Cf. ibid., p. 18.

39. Cf. ibid., p. 15.