NOTES
1. An idea of my village life style could be had from the website:
www.uzhavoor.com.
2. As a concrete case more than 5,000 people were killed in the notorious
incidents leading to the demolition of the Ayodhya mosque beginning about five
years ago. There is hardly any year in India
where there are no fatal
incidents of communal tension between the different religious communities. It is
unfortunate that even now this controversy is not solved, but is being
aggravated.
3. It is noteworthy that there are about equal or more Muslims in India
than in Pakistan. It is
estimated that the number of Muslims in India is more than that in Pakistan,
India's closest neighbor and "rival". According to 1991 census about
12 percent of India's population are Muslims (that is, about 120 million Muslims
in India). In Pakistan 96.68 percent of the population are Muslims.
4. For those uninitiated in hermeneutics some notes on understanding are
developed here
.
5. Cf. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik: ein philosophischer Beitrag. Wien: 1969. 8f.
6. Cf. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 8.
7. For an elaborate justification and articulation of the philosophical
and historical background of
hermeneutics
see Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 9-10.
8. The actual philosophical
problem could be traced from
Friedreich Schleiermacher, K.J. Droysen, Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert,
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emilio Betti, Paul Ricoeur etc. For a
summary, see Coreth
, Hermeneutik, 26-34.
9. For instance, one bibliography for hermeneutics
(edition 1, November 1992)
compiled by Douglas Raymond from University of Ottawa consists of more then
fifty pages. It was made available by internet in 1994 and could be got by the
node from pandal.uottawa.ca.
10. Cf. E. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 55. See also K.O. Apel, Das Verstehen (eine
Problemgeschichte als Begriffsgeschichte): Archiev für Begriffsgeschichte
I, Bonn: 1955, 142-199. An example for this would be the activity of a lawyer
where he tries to understand and defend his client.
11. We prefer to keep the German terms Verstand and Vernunft
as it is. The English equivalents are rather ambiguous. The exact relation
between `intellect', `mind', `reason' and `brain' is not clear. In normal usage
they may even be interchangeable causing confusion to a strict theological
discussion.
12. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 56.
13. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 56.
14. This whole theme of divisible and indivisible, one and many form
the basic pillar of our book
as well as that of advaita
. For
our later purpose it is also useful to see what Aquinas
thinks of intellect knowing
the divisible and the indivisible. He writes in Summa Theologica I, 85,
8.
Q.8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the
divisible?
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible
before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. I, 1) that "we
understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But
principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore the
indivisible is known to us before the divisible.
Objection 2. Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known
previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more known,"
as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the
divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid says,
"a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are
points" ; also unity comes into the definition of number, for "number
is multitude measured by one," as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore
our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible.
Objection 3. Further, "Like is known by like." But the
indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because
"the intellect is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect
first knows the indivisible.
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible
is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily. Therefore
likewise is the indivisible.
I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the
quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as above
stated (84, 7). And since that which is known first and of itself by our
cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship
to that quiddity in order to
discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is
threefold, as is said De Anima iii, 6.
First, the continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided,
although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its
division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to
distinct knowledge, as we have said above (3).
Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's
reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood
before its division into logical parts, as we have said above (De Anima iii, 6);
and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation.
The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the
intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of indivisible
is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided
either actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily,
through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of
privation "as that which has no parts" ; and in like manner the notion
of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated in Metaph. x,
Did. ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain
opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper
object of the intellect.
But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate
indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that a like
indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is
first is first participated by things.
Reply to Objection 1. In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and
elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects we
arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect
knowledge, the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of
principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage:
"Then do we consider that we know, when we can resolve principles into
their causes."
Reply to Objection 2. A point is not included in the definition of a line
in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and in a
circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite
straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in the definition, as the limit
in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the measure of number:
wherefore it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not
included in the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.
Reply to Objection 3. The likeness through which we understand is the
species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on
account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the
power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather
than color. (Hypertext Version Copyright © 1995 Kevin Knight)
15. B. Pascal, Pansées, no. 1. Cited in Coreth
, Grundfragen, 57.
16. B. Pascal, Pansées, no. 277. Cited in Coreth
, Grundfragen, 57.
17. "Vermittlung der Unmittelbarkeit"
18. "Vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit." Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 58.
19. Cf. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 59.
20. Compare with a similar concept in Panikkar as we shall see in
2.3.2.1.
21. Cf. It may be noted Griffiths vehemently opposes all reductionist
tendencies.
22. Cf. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 63.
23. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 115.
24. We have tried to indicate that all these four structures are involved
also in the process of a living encounter
with another religion. So it
was our attempt to show that in the larger hermeneutical context of encounter
with world religions, these four circles are imperative. We indicated how
Griffiths himself had, even unconsciously, moved along these four structures of
understanding
and of encounter.
25. Cf. Coreth
, Grundriß, 2.3.1.
26. Cf. Grundfragen der Hermeneutik, 116. See also Coreth
, "From Hermeneutics to
Metaphysics," 250-253.
27. Cf. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 116. "Um es bereichern und berichtigen zu lassen."
28. Coreth
, Grundfragen der
Hermeneutik, 118.
29. In connection to the interpretation
of texts Ricoeur says:
"The purpose of all interpretation is to conquer a remoteness, a distance,
between the past cultural epoch to which the texts belong and the interpreter
himself. By overcoming this distance, by making himself contemporary with the
text, the exegete can appropriate its meaning to himself. . . . that is, he
makes it his own." "Existence and Hermeneutics" D.E. Klemm, Hermeneutical
Inquiry, Vol. 11, Scholars Press, Atlanta: 1981, 196.
30. Cf. Kathryn Spink. A Sense of the Sacred: A Biography of Bede
Griffiths. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1989. See also the other two
autobiographical books of Griffiths: GS and MEW. For the
elaboration of abbreviations see the page before Table of Contents. See also
Bibliography.
31. Cf. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie:
Husserliane III, Haag 1950. 202. He has brought in this word in the
phenomenological context and related "meiner Welt" with the "Lebenswelt
."
32. J.B. Trapnell
, Bede Griffiths' Theory of
Religious Symbol and Practice of Dialogue: Toward Inter-religious Understanding.
Ph. D. Diss., Washington, D.C,. 1992, 17-149. He analyses the life of Griffiths
as a culture
bearer. He subdivides his
life into two sections with the main stress on: a. Discerning the path of
surrender (1906-1954); and b. Bearing Western Christian culture to the East
(1955-1990s). Further, he divides his life in terms of dialogues as: a. The
Emerging Conflict between Rational and Non-rational Forces (1906-1931); b.
Living the Dialogue between Rational and Non-Rational Forces (1931-1968); and c.
The Integration of Rational and Non-Rational Forces Within (1968-1990s). We
shall be following this second division but from the perspective of his advaitic
experience
. We are grateful for
significant contribution this has made to our study. See also his forthcoming
book, J.B. Trapnell, Bede Griffiths: a Life in Dialogue, SUNY Press.
33. It is actually pronounced as Kuri_umala __ram. For the
phonetic symbols
of Sanskrit terms please see
the appendix. __ram is also popularly written as Ashram. For the sake of
consistency, we stick to __ram in all the cases, including quotations.
34. GS, 21.
35. I. Hirudayam, "The Mental and Mystical Journey of Father Bede
Griffiths." Ashram Aikiya Newsletter 28 (September 1993), 4.
36. GS, 24.
37. GS, 26.
38. Cf. Hirudayam, "Mental Journey," 5.
39. GS, 9.
40. GS, 9. In this context that he cites William Blake
's poem, "I give you the
end of a golden string;/ Only wind it into a ball,/ It will lead you in at
heaven's gate,/ Built in Jerusalem's wall." GS, 9. It is from here
that he has borrowed the title for his autobiography. It is unfortunate that he
does not give an elaborate account of his first mystical experience
.
41. GS, 33. Reference to Wordsworth
is not given.
42. GS, 31.
43. Cf. GS, 37.
44. This is another theme which would remain with him till the very end
of his life. He would remain critical of the whole Western civilization and pose
an alternative solutions, which would be holistic
and integral, as against the
dichotomised growth of the Western capitalistic system.
45. As cited in Hirudayam, "The Mental Journey," 5. Later this
poetic imagination
will give rise to the
intuitive (as opposed to the discursive) elements in knowledge.
46. A more detailed account could be found in GS, 38.
47. GS, 40. Further, the kind of trance
which Wordsworth
experienced
in the presence
of nature is quoted by
Griffiths as reflecting his own inner feelings: (GS, 34.)
No less trust
To them I may have owed another gift
Of aspect more sublime; that blessed mood,
In which the burthen of the mystery
,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lightened: that serene and blessed mood,
In which the affections gently lead us on
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet with the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.
48. GS, 41.
49. GS, 42.
50. GS, 43.
51. GS, 44.
52. GS, 45.
53. It may be mentioned that for him, science is the lowest form
of knowledge. He sees a
linear growth in knowledge (or better, `wisdom') when one goes from science to
philosophy
to theology
. "Science is the lowest
form of human knowledge – the knowledge of the material world through
discursive reason. Philosophy is above science, because it goes beyond the
material world and explores the world of thought, but it is still confined to
discursive reason. Theology is above philosophy, because it is open to the world
of transcendent reality
, but its methods are still
those of science and philosophy
. Only wisdom can transcend
reason and know the Truth
, not discursively but
intuitively, not by its reflection in the world of senses but in its Ground,
where knowing is also being." RC, 18-19. Note the identification
between knowing and being in the last sentence quoted. See also UC, 51.
It is interesting to compare this with the three stages of the positivistic
thinker Augustus Comte who divided the whole human history into mythical,
religious and scientific stages.
54. GS, 48.
55. GS, 48. The actual parting of the ways is nowhere elaborated.
56. GS, 52.
57. GS, 53. The reference is evidently to his own experience
of the divine in nature
during his school life.
58. GS, 53.
59. GS, 53.
60. GS, 56. This reconciliation of reason and imagination will
lead him later to the advaitic
concept of reality
. At the later stage he would
strive to reconcile, integrate and transcend the bodily, the psychological and
spiritual dimension
s of the human being. He would
also seek integration between the intuitive and rational modes of knowing.
61. GS, 57.
62. GS, 58.
63. GS, 59.
64. GS, 59.
65. GS, 62-63.
66. GS, 63. The same echo of the impending end of Western
civilization and the Renaissance
as the beginning of the decay
of European culture
would remain with him till
the end. It may be recalled that he writes his biography, GS, in 1954
some 25 years after the actual experiences
.
67. In retrospection, one can see the profound influences these books
have on him. He read Buddha's Way of Virtue from a version of his Dhammap_da.
The sayings of Lao Tzu
is from a version of Tao
Te Ching. Cf. GS, 64.
68. GS, 64.
69. GS, 77.
70. Cf. GS, 78.
71. Griffiths' own critique of Western capitalism is in the same line of
rejection of the spiritual values and ultimately of God.
72. GS, 83.
73. Mk 14:62.
74. GS, 85.
75. GS, 87.
76. GS, 88. This is another insight which would accompany him till
the very end, both in its critique of immorality and in the integral approach
for a solution.
77. GS, 89.
78. 1 Cor 15:22.
79. Griffiths will hold on to an organic view of the world and of
humanity till the very end. He would have a developed and refined view where an
organic and integral view of the cosmos will replace the mechanistic and
dualistic vision of today's world. See Chapter Six.
80. Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church
, No.
789-791.
81. We have already mentioned of Aquinas
in 2.1.3.3.
82. GS, 95.
83. GS, 96.
84. GS, 97.
85. GS, 100.
86. Cf. GS, 102.
87. GS, 102. Cf. Hirudayam, "The Mental Journey," 12.
88. GS, 103.
89. GS, 103.
90. GS, 103-105.
91. GS, 105.
92. GS, 106.
93. GS, 106.
94. GS, 106.
95. GS, 107.
96. GS, 107.
97. 1Joh 4:10.
98. GS, 107-108.
99. GS, 109.
100. GS, 109. He adds: "I was still terrified of doing
anything that might be thought unbalanced, and I feared the exhaustion which
would follow on a long night's vigil. If I did not lie down, then I felt that I
ought to lie on the floor, and I had a sense of guilt lying in bed." GS,
109.
101. GS, 110. This power or providence would be accompanying him
all through his life.
102. GS, 111.
103. It is important that we fully grasp the significance of "person
" in Christianity
and in classical philosophy
to understand the
significance of person for humanity and particularly for Christianity. This
aspect of God being personal or impersonal is very significant in dealing with
Hinduism
. Even though a bit long, it
is useful then to cite the classical author Aquinas
: Summa Theologica
(I, 29, 1) Aquinas' definition of "person" is given in totality
:
Objection 1. It would seem that the definition of person
given by Boethius (De Duab.
Nat.) is insufficient–-that is, "a person is an individual substance of a
rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But
"person" signifies something singular. Therefore person is improperly
defined.
Objection 2. Further, substance as placed above in the definition of
person
, is either first substance,
or second substance. If it is the former, the word "individual" is
superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for
second substance, the word "individual" is false, for there is
contradiction of terms; since second substances are the "genera" or
"species." Therefore this definition is incorrect.
Objection 3. Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and
"species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person
is the name of a thing (for
it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word "individual"
which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition.
Objection 4. Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest,
in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as
Aristotle
says (Phys. ii). But person
exists in things immovable,
as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to
enter into the definition of person
, but the word should rather
be "essence."
Objection 5. Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of
the rational nature; but it is not a person
. Therefore person is not
properly defined as above.
I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the
genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the
accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this
particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this
particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus
substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called
"hypostases," or first substances.
Further, still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the
individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their
own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act
of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals
of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this
name is "person
."
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the
definition of person
, as signifying the singular
in the genus of substance; and the term "rational nature" is added, as
signifying the singular in rational substances.
Reply to Objection 1. Although this or that singular may not be
definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined;
and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a
definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines person
.
Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some, the term
"substance" in the definition of person
stands for first substance,
which is the hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously
added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of
universality and of part is excluded.
For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand
is since it is only a part. But where "individual" is added, the idea
of assumptibility is excluded from person
; for the human nature in
Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater–-that is, by the Word
of God. It is, however,
better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into
first and second, and when "individual" is added, it is restricted to
first substance.
Reply to Objection 3. Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at
least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in
the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple,
hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms,
and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in
defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term
"individual" is placed in the definition of person
to signify the mode of
subsistence which belongs to particular substances.
Reply to Objection 4. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the
word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living
things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from
an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle
of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines "nature" (Phys. ii,
3). And since this kind of principle is either formal or material, both matter
and form
are commonly called nature.
And as the essence of anything is completed by the form
; so the essence of anything,
signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken
in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the
specif
ic difference giving its form
to each thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and
is derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of
"person
," which means the
singular in a determined "genus," it is more correct to use the term
"nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from
being, which is most common.
Reply to Objection 5. The soul is a part of the human species; and so,
although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature
of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the
hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of
man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person
belongs to it.
104. GS, 111.
105. GS, 114.
106. GS, 114-116.
107. GS, 116.There is another similar symbol
of the cave of the heart,
which Griffiths mentions. "Today many aspects of Hinduism
are becoming well known in
the West. More and more young people are visiting India
and discovering what they
recognize as a `mystical religion', and which speaks to their longing to `know
God'. So there is an increasing desire in the West to understand the religion of
the Hindus. . . . it is only when one comes to the level of interior experience
that a real unity takes
place. Father
Le Saux
. . . describes this sharing
of a common experience. . . . We have to live in the Hindu experience of God and
learn to live it from the depths of our experience of God's revelation in
Christ." This is to meet in `the cave of the heart.'" UC, 55.
108. GS, 116-117.
109. GS, 126.
110. Lk 14:26.
111. GS, 129.
112. GS, 130.
113 GS, 146-147.
114. Cited in Hirudayam, "The Mental Journey," 16.
115. GS, 189. The actual citation from Dostoyevsky is not given.
116. CI, 21. He further laments the loss of this sense of the
sacred in Western science
: "For the last three
centuries we have tried to reduce everything from the sphere of the sacred, the
sphere of God. Science tries to eliminate the sacred; the moon is not something
sacred. It has become simply a chemical formation about which we seek to learn
all we can. The same is true of the earth and the other planets. So we have
eliminated two dimensions of reality
, the psychological and the
spiritual. We begin to think that the world is one-dimensional, that is only
material. We forget the sacred character of the whole creation. The incarnation
of Christ is the great
historical affirmation that all matter
is sacred." UC,
58. Again the importance Griffiths attaches to this "sense of the
Sacred" in nature could be gauged by the fact that his biography (by Spink)
is itself titled, `Sense of the Sacred.'
117. MEW, 10. One can trace this feeling in all the stages of
Griffiths' life. It has been his enduring concern to return to the mystical or
to the inner dimension of our life. He is concerned that the capitalistic and
materialistic philosophy
of the West is a serious
threat to this spiritual dimension,
and that it is affecting also
Eastern culture
. His efforts at religious
dialogue stem from this concern.
118. MEW, 15. This all-pervading spirit is the basis for advaita
.
119. Father Robert De Nobili
was
a French Jesuit and a pioneer in inculturation in India
. See Vincent Cronin, A
Pearl to India: The Life of Roberto de Nobili (New York: Dutton, 1959) and
D. Ferroli, S.J. The Jesuits
of Malabar
(Bangalore: Bangalore Press, 1939)
120. Brahmabandhab Upadhyay (1861-1907) was a Brahmin convert to Catholicism and was quite influential in the freedom struggle in India . His adaptation of Christian monastic life to the Indian sannyasa has been much influential. He was also a prolific writer whose essays contain some of the key ideas, which are later taken up and developed by Monchanin and Le Saux as well as by Griffiths.Some of these key insights include the comparison of the Trinity with the Hindu Saccid_nanda , the value of Ved_nta philosophy