CHAPTER I

CIVIL SOCIETY AND REASON, CULTURE AND DISSENT

K. BAGCHI

This paper begins with a particular rationalist theory in order to bring out how individuality cannot be protected in an abstract rationalist system. This criticism will then be broadened to point out that because abstract rational considerations do not take note of the concrete contexts in which alone the liberty, way of life and culture of an individual or group of individuals make sense, individuals or minority groups have today come to be endangered in the overarching structure of society. I then refer, very briefly, to the rational considerations which are intended to preserve the status quo of civil society. These cliches have been `consensus', `balance of the claims of individuals or groups and society,' `rational spirit in which the conflict between individuals or groups and society may be settled,' and so on. All are rooted in reason as paradigm. It would be wholesome if civil society and its advocates eschewed the concept of monolithic reason which permeates their thinking in their dealings with individuals and be open to reasonable alternatives. Thinking in terms of a fixed structure, such as civil society, or of definitional terms, as when man is defined as a rational being, or of resolving disputes turns its back at the continual, dialectic of human development. This is not to call for `alternative' reason, but, given the dynamics of human development, no solution can be found for the conflict between society and individuals or groups in terms of the status quo. This paper proposes rather a dynamic, open-ended, contextual, historical and specific reason.

RATIONALIST THEORY

This theory is associated with the name of the philosopher Leibniz. In contrast to Spinoza's notion of substance -- a `lion's den to which all footprints go but none return, as Hegel described -- Leibniz's `Monads' were real, indivisible and individual units. His attempt was to see how far, within the over-arching concept of `reason' which had governed Rationalist thinking, a place could be found for individuals, i.e., `monads'. Each monad for Leibniz is oriented to the same world; yet this does not impair its individuality, as each monad represents the universe from its point of view. Monads are distinguished from the point of view of the `clarity' and `distinctness of their representations,' these being the criteria of the validity of a monad's representation. Monads could be arranged in a graded series from the point of view of the degree of their clarity and distinctness.

The question is Leibnitz's success or failure in according reality to individual monads within the overarching framework of rationalism; do they retain their distinctness? Have they ultimately, i.e., from the point of view of the maximally conceived degree of the clarity and the distinctness of their representations, any place in his system of individual spiritual atoms. Leibniz thought that he was departing from the Cartesian-Spinozistic thinking according to which reason was the determining criterion of reality, for such abstract reason takes away the individuality of the real spiritual units, i.e., `monads'. For Leibniz, the real is the individual as constituted by spirituality which has no materiality in it. Though not all forms of spiritualism eschew the reality of individuals, Leibniz does. This becomes manifest when he says that at the head of the graded series of monads stands God, the Monad of Monads, who has no materiality but is `pure act', i.e., pure spirituality. Now, if individuality is spirituality, and if God is pure spirit -- the only spirit -- then other Monads lower in the grade series are not pure spirit, and therefore are not individuals, Leibniz's argument is then: `What is individual must be spiritual, and what is spiritual must have absolutely clear and distinct representations; so God, the Monad of monads whose representations are absolutely clear is the only individual.

We are not, of course, interested in a Leibnizian exegesis. Engaged as we are in the question of the status of individuals or individual groups in a civil society, we find Leibniz interesting in so far as, at least initially, he attempted to accord a place to the individual spirit in the system.

Let us broaden our horizon to ask to what extent, if any, can a civil society make room for conflicts that may arise when a group within the society asserts itself against the societal structure? The question becomes crucial when civil society claims to model itself upon reason, and its rationalist supporters advise the conflicting group that the rational course for it would be to settle the conflict within the societal structure which, as rational, has to be preserved.

Locke is a representative of the advocates of civil society, conceived as a unity in rational terms. He holds that all men are naturally1 in a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature.2 This state has a law of nature

to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind . . . that, all being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. For men, being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker sharing in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another. . . . Everyone, as he is bound to preserve himself, so, by like reason, when his own preservation comes not in completion ought he to preserve the rest of mankind.3

On analysis of Locke's view, we derive the following points:

(1) Reason which is the law of the state of nature teaches that all mankind are equal.

(2) Men share in a community of nature.

(3) Everyone wants to preserve himself and so, `by like reason', everyone ought to preserve the rest of mankind.

This is a strange admixture of philosophical theory and prescription. The philosophical theory of man sharing `a community nature,' is made the ground of the prescription that everyone ought to preserve everyone else. The twin doctrine of `like reason' and `community of nature' is the ground of the prescription. Here in Locke lies the germ of that concept of regimented reason which has been extolled by the advocates of civil society whenever there has been the finest echo of dissent. It is conveniently forgotten that the dissenter may not share a `like reason' or that his reason is `unlike' the reason that maintains the status quo.

Besides, while it is undoubtedly a wholesome prescription that all humankind be treated as equal, such prescription does not follow from a metaphysical doctrine that men share a `community of nature' as it can be made even without the support of that doctrine, or the metaphysics doctrine itself is questionable. It derives all its strength from the concept of a `monolilhic reason'; but today it is no longer possible to sustain such a concept. With the founding of different logical systems, the advance of social science, the anthropological discoveries of primitive communities each having its distinctive pattern of thinking, the concept of monolithic reason has been abandoned. There can be no intertranslatibility', to use the Quinean terms, of different reasons.

A more adequate philosophy for these matters is that of John Stuart Mill rather than Locke. Tracing the history of the struggle between liberty and authority. Mill says that in former times, liberty meant "protection against the tyranny of the political rulers."4 "Rulers were conceived . . . as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. . . . Their power was regarded as necessary, but also highly dangerous, as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. . . . The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community: and this limitation was what they meant by liberty."5 But Mill was not content to trace the period of history when liberty as a concept emerged. Proceeding further, he writes, "In time . . . a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface . . . and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact."6

Even this does not satisfy Mill as far as the question of the guarantee of liberty is concerned. He writes, "It was now perceived that such phrases as `self-government' and the `power of the people over themselves' do not express the true state of the case. The `people' who exercise the power are not always the same people as those over whom it is exercised. . . . The will of the people . . . practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power . . . society requires to be on its guard."7 Discerning and acute as is Mill on the question of liberty, he pinpoints that part of man where his independence is absolute. As he says, "The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign."8

The only purpose for which power can be exercised over an individual is, according to Mill, "to prevent harm to others."9 If, as is done many a time by the advocates of civil society, appeal is made to the individual to reason that his own good may be preserved (by preserving the society), then Mill would say, "His own good . . . is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because . . . to do so would be wise. . . . These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him . . . but not for compelling him."10 But these good reasons are not justificatory reasons for visiting with any evil in case he does otherwise. "To illustrate that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else."11 That is to say, society or the majority cannot reason or remonstrate with the individual in this way. "Unless you do this and this, that and that would be the bad consequence for you." Society can only argue for itself thus: "If he does not do this and this, it would be bad for others." The point is that society's calculating reasons cannot be the individual's reasons for doing or not doing something.

The extent to which society has come to interfere "with every part of private conduct" has been alarmingly brought out by Mill: "The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practice the regulation of every part of private conduct. . . . In the modern world the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding."12 Mill then writes with the favor of a revolutionary: "Let us suppose . . . that the government is entirely at one with the people. . . . But I deny the right of the people to exercise . . . coercion. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exercised in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it."13

Mill wrote his essay "On Liberty" (from which the previous quotations are taken) in the 19th century. In the 20th century, society has become devious in its dealings with minority groups. Civil society today aims at influencing and altering individual behavior through what Skinner has called (and indeed advocates), "reinforcements;14 it aims at "engineering," as is sometimes said, human behavior. Again, simulated behavior to earn the favor of the powers that be has become the order of the day. Either you join the dominant majority in the society or you are nowhere. One twinkle in the eye of the Big Brother and the individual is finished. Stooges and lackeys abound in the society to act as watchdogs of the Big Brother. Regimentation is the order of the day.

But side by side with all these sordid features of civil society, there have been dissent, protests and questioning. The state ombudsman had failed in many situations. groups have come to be aware of their histories, traditions and cultures. Sovereignty of the state has come to be questioned. Self-conscious, conflicting groups have arisen which live on their cultural moorings. Their culture, which has long been suppressed, is too prized a thing to be relegated to oblivion. They can no longer be brought under the umbrella of unity: a unity is too petrified to be any substitute for the cultural identity of the group concerned. What gives content to this identity is the complex mosaic of mores, myth, art, religion and language -- better langue: in a word, whatever constitutes the meaning and the Weltanschauung of the group gives content to its cultural identity. The Weltanschauung is vital to the group; it is woven into the texture of its life, conduct and practices; any attempt to disturb it would give rise to reactions. It would be perverse to appeal to a common reason intended to bind the group to the dominant one. The vital reason such appeal cannot be made -- leaving aside the question of whether it should be made -- is that the cultural group has its own reason bound up with its Weltanschauung. For a common reason under which the group may be brought along with the majority, there has to be some convergence of its reason with that of the majority, which is just what is not possible. The culture-group's reason is bound up with its life style. And this is different from that of the majority. If the group finds its secure anchorage in its mores and myths, history, tradition and language, by what right or common reason can it be forced into a common civil structure? We have just seen that the concept of a "common reason" is inapplicable because it does not make any sense and cannot be grasped.

Then again, it is said by a softening of the stand on the part of the supporters of the structure of civil society that the conflicting group may be given the right to dissent, within the structure. But what maximum of dissent can satisfy the dissenting group so that it can accommodate itself within the structure? The majority group cannot appeal to the reason of the minority as if the "reason of the minority" is covertly contained within that of the majority. Reason is not the prerogative of the supporters of the structure, though, more often than not, the structure-group's reason has been taken to be the paradigm of reason. Nor is it an argument to say that man is after all rational and therefore a rational solution to the problem of a conflicting group in relation to society is a desideratum. This cannot be the basis of a solution because more often than not it does not take into consideration the concrete context in which alone contentious issues may be discussed. So-called common reason loses sight of the logistics of the situation or, rather, its problematic. Also, to say that man is rational is to give a petrified picture of man. The time has come to disabuse our minds of the "rational" -- "animal" (or "brute") disfunction. Man is rational, but also something more, which is not the animal in him, but still not reducible to reason. Man is as much psychological, historical and culture-bound as he is rational.

Moreover, what indeed is meant when it is said that man is rational? Is he abstractly rational? But reason, we have seen, is contextual, relative, historical and culture-bound. Human reason is not abstracted from its historical, religious, social, cultural and ethnic contexts. It is really the afflux of one or other of those contexts. If the conflicting group feels this to be so, then the wholesome course would be to live in sympathy with its culture and take an inward view of it as far as is possible for an outsider, for an outsider cannot understand the conflict group's reason unless he is wholly in it and lives it. If, then, it is the life of the culture-group, its Weltanschauung, that animates the group and constitutes the reason for what it expresses to an outsider, then the outsider -- here, the majority -- must eschew its concept of reason and generously welcome a reason alternative to its own.

The time has come when the advocates of the structure of civil society should extend the parameters of their thinking by conceiving civil society in dynamic terms and as open-textured. If the society can permit the conflicting group to live its life, it will not only serve the limited interest of conflict-resolution, but also make civil society a chapter in the big dynamics of man's non-societal development. Free as man is, he would resist any attempt to muffle his freedom through society, politics or whatever. It is strange that society, which was founded to preserve man's freedom, later came to spell danger thereto. There is a reason for this unwelcome twist of history, namely, that civil society has not been able to eschew its political overtones. Once it does that, it allows willingly a group to lead its own life, nurturing its tradition and culture. Thus allowed, freedom, the group's distinct development in whatever way -- culturally, religiously or ethically -- becomes an accretion to the repertoire of humanity at large. What is urgently needed today, when the societal structure has come to be challenged in many instances, is that a given society must cross its threshold and leave open the possibility of alternative forms of society, alternative forms of reason, alternative forms of culture. In this lies true freedom, namely, freedom that is not restricted to any group -- majority or minority -- but of which the sky is the only limit.

NOTES

1. John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government" in Man and the State: the Political Philosophers, ed. Commins and Linscott (New York: Random House, 1947), p. 59.

2. Ibid., p. 59.

3. Ibid., p. 60.

4. John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in Man and the State: The Political Philosophers (New York: Random House, c1947), p. 135.

5. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

6. Ibid., p. 138.

7. Ibid., p. 138-139.,

8. Ibid., p. pp. 144-145.

9. Ibid., p. 144.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 148.

13. Ibid., p. 151.

14. See B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1953).