THE ISSUE AND METHOD

The Problem

Transcendence constitutes one of the characteristic properties of our existence as this is revealed to our consciousness. Our consciousness is not closed in ourselves but constantly opens to reality beyond ourselves. We may say that we never are what we are because we are always beyond what we actualize in any one moment; we are more than what we are because the horizon of our existence extends beyond what we are at any one point.⁽¹⁾

In formulating the title "The Human Person from a Transcendental Perspective" and using the Capital "T" we raises the problem of relating the human person to a reality which completely transcends the world and which, in turn, constitutes the horizon for man as a being within the universe. If we identify this transcendent reality as God and if, in addition, we perceive the transcendent reality as the Person par excellence, then the problem can also be formulated as follows: does the human existent-- the human person-- of itself, relate to, or find itself open to, the reality of God the Person; or, to put it another way, is God the Person "inscribed in" the reality of the human person?

In order to better understand the problem formulated this way we must appreciate its specific origins in contemporary thought. This problem is marked by the contraposition: man-world. Man is no longer perceived as "microcosmos" or as the most perfect reality in the world, but as person man is contrasted radically to the world which is the totality.⁽²⁾ Hence, it is not a matter of contrasting the world together with man on the one hand, to God on the other, for this would reduce the being of man to a finite thing. Rather, the effort is to grasp the entire distinctive peculiarity of human existence, and on that basis to decide whether or not on that basis man relates and is open to transcendent reality. Or, is the transcendent nothing but a transposition of some worldly reality or value, for which reason that transposition must be rejected in the name of authenticity. To put it another way: what constitutes the extent or boundary of the transcendence by which our mode of life is specified?

There is no need to point out that the contemporary problematic, whether understood as theistic or atheistic, focuses on this problem. Marxism, the atheistic existentialism of J.P. Sartre and scientism all exclude the possibility of relations beyond being-in-the-world. L. Kolakowski's Religious Symbols and Humanistic Culture sums up the standpoints of these philosophers in the following way:

Twentieth century philosophy in its many forms is tied to demonstrating the purely human, temporal and historical character of all values. In a way, Marxism, as well as psychoanalysis, positivist philosophies and, in the end, existential philosophy have contributed in various ways to the spread of this humanistic interpretation of values. Simultaneously, they have removed all power from religious symbols as valued means for interpreting the hidden essence of the world. They spread the conviction that man has no reference but himself, that any integration with the Absolute is mystification.⁽³⁾ (Author's emphasis.)

Despite this, philosophical thought is constantly faced with the metaphysical dimension of man, which manifests itself through diverse signs. Not only does man raise the question of ultimate meaning, he himself is that question. This ultimate dimension reveals itself to us in the perception of mystery, of that which does not lend itself to being objectified: what the Greeks called theion. The experience of the other, according to Levinas, leads to the experience of one's own existence as the relation to the other, or "to an Other" (capital O) in the sense of the absolute Other, which is at once both immanent and transcendent.⁽⁴⁾ In this situation the problem which should be central to a Christian philosophical anthropology is the transcendence of the human person, one's openness and relation to the divine "Thou".

One should add that though this formulation of the problem: "the human person and transcendence" is contemporary, the problem itself is an old one in the history of European Christian thought. Based upon the revelation of man as created in the image and likeness of God, the greatest representatives of Christian thought sought what, in man, constitutes this likeness, which not only points to its origin but also puts one in relation thereto. E. Gilson wrote: "irrespective of the aspect which Christian philosophy considers, in the final conclusion it always relates and subordinates this to God. . . . This likeness to God, three times stated within a few lines in Gen I: 26-27, is inscribed in the very nature of man by the act of creation and determines the inner structure of one's being." Among others he cites St. Thomas: "God's likeness is in one's soul inasmuch as one is oriented to God or as one's nature enables this orientation" (S. Th., I, 93, 8, sed contra and resp.). Gilson points out that St. Bonaventure, approaching this problem more directly, identified God's likeness in man to the privilege one enjoys of being in direct relation to God through one's intelligence and will (cfr. II Sent., 16, I, 1, Concl., prob. 1; ed. Quaracchi, to II, p. 389).⁽⁵⁾

The Way Towards a Solution of the Problem

There are many forms of experience which unveil the structure of the personal being of man as manifested in human experience.⁽⁶⁾ Here we will not present or organize these, but will limit ourselves to a description of the structure of personal being which points to the corresponding forms of experience and of its understanding. In order to avoid certain misunderstandings as to the method chosen, we will refer to many earlier and more detailed studies⁽⁷⁾ regarding the concept of experience we are employing and the link between phenomenology or anthropology and metaphysics.

From what has been said about the route we will follow it is clear that the fundamental point of our analysis will be human experience. Here, we fully agree with R. Ingarden, who, together with the whole school of phenomenology, maintains that "such experiences not only make possible a knowledge of objects, but, beyond that, have a constitutive power which motivates our convictions, on the one hand, and, on the other, verifies the ideas and judgments regarding these objects."⁽⁸⁾

Experience is understood neither in a subjective manner nor within the framework of a transcendental philosophy of the subject, but in a realistic manner. The basis of this realism is not arbitrary principles, but the given experiences themselves in their immediateness. They point, on the one hand, to objects⁽⁹⁾ transcending our consciousness and, on the other hand, to the real concrete subject. R. Ingarden states with regard to the experience of responsibility:

all theories which reduce the person to a multiplicity of lived experiences are inadequate to explain the ontic foundations of responsibility. Rather, it is a matter of understanding man and especially his soul and his person, as a real substance enduring in time, with a special characteristic form. Only then can one take account of the postulates of responsibility.⁽¹⁰⁾

These principles make possible the construction, not only of a realistic anthropology, but also of metaphysics. On what grounds? With Albert Dondeyne we see the phenomenological explanation coming finally to a trans-phenomenological (metaphysical) question concerning the concrete being in all its concreteness, because in the end the phenomenological procedure of itself cannot provide the absolute foundation of that which is given in experience.⁽¹¹⁾ Rather, the concrete reality given in experience directs one towards another reality as its ultimate foundation.

Our procedure here, in its own way, follows the path suggested by Frederick Sontag according to whom the opening question should be that of Sartre: "What must man be in his internal psychological existence in order for metaphysical questions to continue to arise from him?" Sontag adds:

if the metaphysical questions arise directly from human nature then we should be able to find through the investigation of human nature an empirical foundation for the more abstract considerations. . . . We can find there a new foundation for metaphysics, different from that given by the exact sciences.⁽¹²⁾

After this justification of the method we have chosen, let us proceed to the resolution of the problem thus specified.

THE STRUCTURE OF PERSONAL BEING

With Guardini, we recognize several layers which constitute the concrete personal existence of man, namely, form, individuality, personality and person in the proper sense.⁽¹³⁾ Let us look one by one at these layers so that we may observe the gradual development of that which is truly decisive, namely, the person in the proper sense.

The lowest layer is form. Man is a form to the degree that he is something specific: a man, a unity or one thing among others. The next layer of the phenomenon of the person is individuality, the "the living being as a closed unity from the point of view of both structure and function." Thus, "the living thing is distinguishable from the set of mere things in general";⁽¹⁴⁾ "the individual being is determined by his centrum, which is not spatial but living and can be described as interiority." This interior sphere founds the individual living being in himself. Through it one distinguishes the individual from the world; indeed, it enables him to build his own world. By this interior sphere the individual distinguishes himself from the characteristic value of the species. "The interaction between the interiority of the living human being and the outside world which is related to him is realized through the perception of meaning and by spontaneous activity."⁽¹⁵⁾

The third dimension is that of personality. This concept is a product of contemporary thought; it is a living individual marked by spirit. Here, interiority becomes "self consciousness" with "depth of will" in acting and creating so that the human being differs basically from animals. Proper consciousness, as well as will, occur only in man. It "occurs only where our perception is spiritually recreated and leads to the perception of meaning, or where from the beginning it is directed toward that appreciation of meaning," writes Guardini. "It is the same for the deeper sense of willing, for which the subject must be affected by the value of the object. This must be understood as an objective value founded in itself. One is taken position in relation to that value and on its basis one moves into action."⁽¹⁶⁾

The third element which creates the interiority of a human being is the sphere of action and creation. Between this and any production by animals there exists a qualitative difference. Guardini sees the real character of creative action not in the effort to achieve a goal, but "in the project of bringing into reality a new reality in terms of its very existence and of manifesting a meaning. This is the case with a pure work of art and a symbol, where the creativity is determined by the meaning."

What then is signified by person in the proper sense of the term? A first response is negative: one cannot identify it either with form, individuality or personality. Nor can one escape the finitude of the person and conceive it as a personal absolute. It should be noted that ancient thought did not have the concept of person.

A person includes all the above mentioned layers, but does not identify with any of them. What is characteristic of the person is "that one lives oneself and decides about oneself."⁽¹⁷⁾ This was said also by Cardinal Jean Daniélou: "The concept of a person means nothing other than the perfection of being which in itself is possessed on all the levels of perfection this implies."⁽¹⁸⁾ Cardinal Karol Wojtyla emphasizes this second element of the description of the person: "belonging to oneself": one is a person because one decides about oneself: "a person is one who possesses oneself and cannot be possessed except by oneself". Only on the basis of self-possession "is self-determination possible. Each statement, `I want', is such a self-disposition. . . . As actual self-determination, `I want' assumes structural self-possession, for one can dispose only of that which one really possesses." By self-determination one "actualizes one's power over oneself, . . . for no one else can exercise or put this power to work. The medieval thinkers expressed this in the sentence: persona est alteri incommunicabilis."⁽¹⁹⁾ R. Guardini describes this as follows: "to be a person means that I cannot be used by any other, but that I am an end in myself. . . . I cannot be possessed by another, but as regards my own self I am alone with myself; I cannot be represented by any other, but must fill my own place."⁽²⁰⁾

Assuming that this is what constitutes the human person in its proper meaning we can ask, in turn, what constitutes the horizon of the relationships inscribed in its "nature".

THE VARIOUS RELATIONS OF THE HUMAN PERSON

The person is really and essentially related to the material world for its existence, but these are external dependencies;⁽²¹⁾ in itself and as such the person remains unaffected by these bonds.

When it comes to the world of the soul, of morality, the problem becomes more complex. If we assume the Augustinian definition of the soul deduced from the content of its operations, which embraces Truth, the Good and God, then we can deduce that the living center of the soul, the human person, is its essential relationship to Truth, the Good and to God.⁽²²⁾ This is the direction being taken by, among others, Gabriel Marcel, Karl Rahner, Ladislaus Boros, Joseph Möller, etc. Through analyzing different spiritual acts of a man, they attempt to discover, as their fundamental principle, their relationship to the absolutely transcendent reality.⁽²³⁾ However, to understand the relationship to the absolutely transcendental reality, understood in keeping with our initial position as God-Person, one has to begin by considering that in which interpersonal relationships consist. An inadequate interpretation of these relations and their transposition to God, as with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, results in God being negated in the name of man. Dostoyevski in Devils and Nietzsche reason: If I am to exist as a person having power over myself, then God cannot exist. But I must exist; therefore He cannot exist (Nietzsche).

When one turns to interpersonal relationships two questions arise:

1. What is the basis of the relationship of one person to another?

2. Is the possibility of the existence of a person dependent upon the existence apart from him of other persons? More precisely, "can a person exist without being an "I" ordered to another who constitutes a "thou"? Using the language of existential phenomenology, "is co-existence a constitutive aspect of the being of man" or is it only a consequence of the fact that, without knowing why, another man does exist?⁽²⁴⁾

The answers to the first question have been varied and even exclude one another, as with Sartre and Marcel. The description of inter-personal relationships given by Sartre is surely one-sided for he bases them on hatred. There are, however, other descriptions. The relationship to the other person does not mean the destruction of its subjectivity and its reduction to the category of an object. On the contrary, as a self I leave the other his existential space in which "he can attain his aim as that to which each person is destined."⁽²⁵⁾ In this way it becomes possible for the other to take the position of "thou" for me while I take the position of an interested and active subject and become truly an I or self.

By this relationship an internal change occurs in the "I" which opens itself and shows itself. The relation becomes complete when, from the other side, this type of opening is responded to in kind. According to Guardini, only then is the person fully realized and does one's destiny as a person begin.⁽²⁶⁾ On this basis Guardini maintains that a human being becomes a reality in the relation "I" and "Thou", and there attains its complete meaning, though it does not spring from this relationship.⁽²⁷⁾ This does not mean that such a meeting was necessary, but rather the "ontological fact that in principle the person does not exist by essence as a unique being."⁽²⁸⁾ This state of affairs can be expressed also in the following way: "man's constitutive attitude is one of dialogue. . . Spiritual life is realized essentially in speech," and "speech provides a preexisting outline, thanks to which person to person meetings are possible."⁽²⁹⁾

These views of Guardini coincide to a large extent with those of Heidegger, for whom the experience of solitude is possible only on the basis of a more primary being-together or relatedness. The possibility of solitude, of not meeting the other person depends upon my existence being one of relatedness; not meeting the other implies a more fundamental community.⁽³⁰⁾ It is difficult to question this, notes W.A. Luijpen, but the real problem is the mode or specific character of this co-existence-- an issue to which we have not yet come.

We can arrive at the same conclusion by: 1) a semantic analysis of the meaning of the Greek term "person", and 2) research into the genesis of the term "I". Cardinal J. Daniélou reminds us that the word "person" in Greek, prosopon, means that the person has its own form and is, at the same time, oriented towards the other.⁽³¹⁾ We can also ask whether it is possible to arrive at the proper meaning of the "I" without assuming a "thou". In regard to things we construct the notions of aliquid (something which assumes a counter-position in relation to the other: "dicitur enim aliquid quasi aluid quid", De Veritate, q. I, art. I), and of unity (unum, which is contraposed to plurality and means irreducibility by division). Similarly we arrive at proper meanings in the field of subject. I am an "I" (in a personal sense) not because I stand in opposition to the world, but because the other is a "thou".

We conclude then that it is an "ontological fact that the person cannot exist as a separate unit, but is dependant on the existence of other

persons"⁽³²⁾

THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN PERSON

TO THE ABSOLUTE THOU

Can we discover also in the human person the relationship to the transcendental Absolute "Thou", and if so what is peculiar to this relationship?

There are at least two ways in which one can establish the relationship of the human person to the transcendent and Absolute "Thou". The former is connected with the question of source of the being of a person, while the latter relies on an analysis of the experience of inter-human personal relationships.

(1) Describing the relationship of one person to another, the "I" to the other as "thou", we discover something characteristic, namely, all inter-personal relationships assume the existence of persons, but do not create them. We are conscious that the complete sense of being a person is fulfilled in the inter-personal relationship described above, but does not result therefrom. Just as the person is existent in itself and belongs to itself, as beyond itself it exists (exsistere), all in the sense of turning towards the other as a "thou"; it is constituted as something given, an original donation. This implies a basic question proper to human beings, the metaphysical question par excellence, namely, the source of the being of a person.

This source can be only God-person, the absolute "Thou". Thus, to constitute the person as a person, as being-in-itself open to the otherness of a "thou", is possible only through a reality which by itself exists in itself, and whose life is based on a relationship to the "thou". I could not be the "I" and relate to the other "thou", if the Absolute did not call me to be his "thou", thereby establishing me as an "I" and presenting himself as the "thou" of man. Thus, my personal existence as an "I" depends on the fact that God is my "thou". This is the basis of the creation of the person.⁽³³⁾

(2) The analysis of the experience of inter-personal relationships confirms this relation of the human person to the Absolute Thou. This happens first of all through the experience of the limitation of inter-personal relationships. The relationship to the other "you" has its limit which should not be transgressed; total penetration of the other is impossible. There is a primordial sphere of intimacy which cannot be attained by any inter-human relationship. Is man's experience of this sphere an experience of complete solitude and autonomy? Careful examination indicates that it is otherwise. The human person feels totally open and bound in a positive sense to the Absolute "Thou". "Lord, You pervade me and you know me" (Ps. 138) "before even I was conceived in the womb of my mother" (J 1.5).

Such a pervasion is not a negation of my personal "I", as Sartre would claim; rather it is its deepest confirmation. I experience myself as unique and irreplaceable, because at the basis of my being I experience the Absolute "Thou". Creation bears the mark of vocation; otherwise it would not be.

If person means to-be-oneself and to-be-in-relation, I would not be wholly myself if that relationship were not at the basis of my being. The reality of a personal being could not be explained otherwise. This becomes still more clear when we examine carefully, in accordance with Heidegger, the basis of the knowledge of the other. To know, states Heidegger, is to maintain an existent in being; Dondeyne adds that it is what "make one free in relation to me and vice versa."⁽³⁴⁾ If this is so, then in authentic interpersonal relationships, it assumes a new dimension with reference to God who founds the human person. The fact that God permeates me to my roots means that he must be the most profound foundation of my very being; this is the gift of my freedom as belonging to myself. It is not necessary to underline that such an approach goes beyond the atheism of Sartre or Merleau-Ponty which derives from Nietzsche and Dostoevski. The truth is quite different: if I am to exist as a personal "I", then God cannot but exist: God is the source of man's identity, not of his alienation.

Secondly, the relationship of the human person to the personal God appears to us par excellence in ethical experience, which takes place in meeting another "thou". As noted above, this was suggested by Levinas and its importance was underlined by Dondéyne. This is the "epiphany" of the countenance described by Levinas, that is, the appearance of the other as freedom which appeals to my goodness in the ethical sense of this term.

In this appeal or vocation my freedom in its spontaneity is called to question. I become aware that the autonomy of my freedom does not constitute the basis of the mystery of man and of his being in the world. My autonomy and freedom are brought out through the appearance of the other. In the meeting with the other there is a certain "metaphysical asymmetry": I can give my life for the other, but have no right to ask him to sacrifice his life for me. Everything seems to happen as if I were called "from above through the countenance of the other". The other, although my equal, appeals to my responsibility and obligates me as if he was invested with the authority and power of the Highest. Through the countenance the other I find myself before the countance of the completely Other, the Holy, the face of the invisible God who judges me in this appeal.

As we see, adds Dondeyne, this is the God of the Bible. It is not a magic power, but a Mystery of Word and Goodness which touches my depths (intimior intimo meo). God is the highest and definitive in being, and consequently is Transcendent par excellence; he is completely beyond all representation.⁽³⁵⁾

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Analyzing the structure of personal being as manifest in experience we find an essential relationship to the other, to the "thou". The human person is based on his "being in himself" and on his relation to the "thou". A more developed examination of this relationship would differentiate in the structure of the person being two different kinds of relationships of the human person to a "thou". On the one hand, it shows different "spheres" in the human person and, on the other hand, it points to essentially different "thous". There is a relationship to the "thou" in which the fullness of the sense of personal being is realized by its nature: the person is turned toward the other, a human "thou". Further, the origin of the being of man is experienced in the limitations of personal relationships and the finitude of the person manifested thereby. Finally, there is the experience of the other, which is the ethical experience par excellence. All these factors show the relationship of the personal "I" to the Transcendental "thou" to be the fundamental and constitutive relationship of my personal self. In its own way this confirms the traditional definition of man as a homo religiosus.

The categories which we use here are personalist ones: personal self, freedom and relationship to the "thou". With their help we discover neither "the God of the philosophers" to whom man can neither pray nor dance, nor the God of the religions expressed in objective categories. Rather, we find the metaphysical God of the Bible, the God of absolute Transcendence, of Mystery, the "Thou" to whom the human person is turned.

Thus, the personal categories constitute adequate tools for our theme of man and Transcendence, and therefore we have taken them as our starting point. As such, the human person and the personal categories enable us to move beyond the aporias put forward on those problems by Marxism, atheistic existentialism and scientism. Paraphrasing K. Rahner's point of view for whom Christology exemplifies the human being in its perfection and "pure" anthropology is an imperfect Christology, we can say that complete personalism is impossible without theism. The human person can be totally explained only by the divine "thou"; but the divine "thou" bespeaks the plenitude, fulfillment, and thus the perfection of the personal "I" of man.

Consequently, the way is open towards a personalist metaphysics, by which I mean a metaphysics centered on the human being as a personal being seeking its ultimate foundation, and thereby its comprehension. This metaphysics begins from the experience of personal being and culminates in absolute Transcendence which constitutes the "thou" toward which man is turned. This metaphysics overcomes both anthropocentrism and theocentrism, and indeed any philosophy in which divine and human autonomy are mutually exclusive. It is a metaphysics which lances no Promethean denial of the gods and where man not only finds himself, but also discovers the final confirmation of his being and thus of his freedom as self-possession.

The constitution of this kind of metaphysics is a most urgent and important matter. In contrast, to ascribe the character of objectivity exclusively to the metaphysics of the object or of things; to treat metaphysics as a science in the sense of the Greek theoria, rather than as the ultimate explanation of human experience (which is nothing other than the experience of my "immersion" in being, my participation in being in a human manner--Dondeyne); and finally consider such an approach as a subjectivism which abandons realism--all this does not correspond to the changes which have occurred in the concepts of science and philosophy and can only bring harm to Christian thought.

In a new form then let us return to the "noverim me, noverim te."

The Pontifical Theological Faculty

Krakow, Poland