Attempts to create a conflict between results of natural sciences and conclusions of theology reached the peak of popularity at the end of 19th century. At the beginning of this century such attempts underwent an incisive and many-sided critical assessment by P. Duhem who, in the Appendix to his La theorie physique; son objet et sa structure deemed absurd the efforts of the "cafe physicists and village scholars" aimed at demonstrating that certain theological propositions are confirmed or rendered false by scientific theories.

Duhem's arguments have not met with universal acceptance; thirty years later A. Eddington stated that religion has been possible for a reasonable scientific man since the formulation of the principle of uncertainty in 1927. In sporadic cases one may yet encounter traces of the old slogans about the conflict between science and religion. As a general rule, however, in the current attempts to contrast the cognitive methods of the theology and of natural science, stress is being laid, not on the conflict of conclusions but, rather, on the differences in methods and epistemological procedures. The old myth of the anti-scientific nature of the religious theses has been superseded by a new and more subtle myth of the ideal method existing solely in the realm of natural science. The myth has its roots in the concept of the development of science presented by logical positivists; such interpretation has led to a dichotomic division of statements into those pronounced by natural sciences which are meaningful and verifiable and those spelled out by other disciplines which are meaningless and purely intuitive. Though the verifiability criterion of meaning was given up shortly after it was formulated and many postulates of the Vienna Circle were recognized as unrealistic, one may find, the consequences of the obsolete, idealized interpretations in contemporary attempts to contrast the epistemological status of theology and that of natural sciences. The fundamental propositions of these interpretations may be summed up as follows:

I. In natural sciences the empirical data play a fundamental role whereas the theological theses are outside the scope of any experiment.

II. Science creates an harmonious and internally coherent system of statements whereas the theological speculations lead to internal contradictions.

III. Scientific statements can be verified, confirmed or falsified; such procedures are not possible in theology.

IV. Development, which proceeds rationally and in accordance with the principles determining the selection of the appropriate solution is a characteristic feature of science. Theology, on the other hand, is characterized by a dogmatic and authoritarian approach.

Statements, such as enumerated above, have been repeated very often by the contemporary "cafe methodologists" and consequently they should be confronted with conclusions of the contemporary philosophy of science.

Ad I. The concept of the fundamental character of the empirical data in science does not take into account the fact that bare, uninterpreted data do not exist and that, in reality, all data are theory-laden. The border line between the elements of observation and of the theory may be very difficult to draw in the concrete cases.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ In order to obtain a series of empirical data E which would confirm a theory T, it is necessary, to adopt previously another set of theories T₁, T₂, ... , T_k without which the interpretation of the data would not be possible. This `closed loop' nature of the argument is particularly evident in cosmology where e.g., on the one hand, the confirmation of the so-called cosmological principle is sought by reference to observation of the far-away parts of the universe and, on the other hand, in order to obtain the data about brightness or dispersion of distant objects, the cosmological principle has to be postulated.

Similarly, in the domain of the microcosm and of the related experiments, the mutual dependence between observation and prior theoretical postulates makes it necessary to reject, as uncritical, the notion of the so-called bare facts.

The simplistic and ultra-optimistic faith in empiricism is also inconsistent with the opinion of scientists according to which "everybody can look through a microscope but only a few are capable of evaluating correctly what they have seen.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

If, in fact, the empirical data had played such a fundamental role in the formulation of physical theories then, the theory of Copernicus could not have been conceived in the scientific setting of 16th century, since it was in manifest disagreement with the results of observations which were feasible at the time.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ Until the rise of the Newtonian physics and until the discovery of the laws of planetary motion by Kepler, the Copernican theory, in its theoretical foundations, was not better than the Ptolemaic astronomy.

In opposing the concept of the fundamental character of empirical results in the development of scientific theories, I. Lakatos states, in his analysis of the methodology of the research programs, that, given adequate financial resources, a team of enterprising scientists can defend, for an indefinitely long time, the most sophisticated pseudotheories and contrive to gather suitable experimental data in their support.

Also J. Agassi, invoicing a warning against the pitfalls of the Popperian theory of falsification, stresses that the situations in which the experimental results play a fundamental role in science are rather rare since intuition, aesthetic outlooks and inventive imagination are often more important for the progress of science than results of the experiments.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

In this context, a lofty yet unrealistic appearance is assumed by the postulates which were in vogue in the thirties promulgating that in natural science the highest value should be set on the reliability of the data described by observational sentences free of any theoretical assumptions.

Ad II. The differentiation between theological "speculation" and "sound" science could be justified only when the physics of the macrocosms is taken into consideration. However, at the present stage of development, notably in the branches of physics dealing with black holes or elementary particles, such differentiation becomes groundless, since the highly abstract and subtle problems being investigated by these disciplines are--according to scientists themselves--more speculative than the medieval scholastic questions about the number of angels which could be accommodated on the tip of a pin.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

The assertion about the ideal, internal consistency of physics does not take into account the historical realities of the development of scientific theories. Historiography reveals many examples of hypothetical solutions which, despite their internal contradictions, had long periods of popularity. As a particularly significant example one may quote the Rutherford-Bohr atom model. When its original version was presented in 1913, it was evident that the model was inconsistent with the well-corroborated Maxwell-Lorentz theory of electromagnetism. Nevertheless, the solution met a general recognition and underwent many modifications which, after a long time, led to the elimination of inconsistencies. Similarly in pre-relativistic physics, when it was generally known that the Newtonian theory could not be reconciled with the data concerning the orbit of Mercury, nevertheless the inconsistent interpretations were maintained in the belief that future discoveries would remove the inconsistencies. Many similar situations arise in modern physics: one encounters here inconsistencies between various theories as well as between theory and experimental evidence. In such instances it is hoped and anticipated that future modifications will bring desired consistency. However, it is hardly admissible to assert that all physical theories can be presented as consistent axiomatic systems. Of course, one may speak, about an elegance or formal beauty of these theories but it does not compensate for their simplifications and inherent imperfections.

Ad. III. The fact that the verifiability criterion cannot be treated as a fundamental scientific criterion of meaning was recognized as early as the thirties. On the one hand, certain verifiable statements cannot be classed as scientific (e.g., "Mr. Kowalski is bald") while, on the other hand, the fundamental laws of nature are not capable of being verified. Any attempts at confirmation of such fundamental laws cannot be decisive because it is impossible to derive an universal generalization from a finite set of particular observations. Far reaching hopes to find a fundamental solution are very often connected with the idea of falsification understood quite frequently, in a naive manner. In the attempts to treat falsification as a necessary condition of the scientific validity of theories, two important facts are being ignored:

1. Real falsification in science is a very rare phenomenon since the theories may be defended against such falsification for an indefinitely long time and may be justified by introducing ad hoc additional hypotheses.

2. There exist statements which are meaningful and important from the scientific point of view yet are not falsifiable.

The maximizing tendencies, in attempts to falsify a theory on the basis of a single experiment, are exemplified by efforts to discard the theory of relativity by invoking the experiments of W. Kauffman and D. C. Miller.⁽¹¹¹⁾ In both these cases the results of observations were inconsistent with the implications of the Einstein theory and for a long time (in the former instance ten years, and in the latter thirty years) no one could explain the discrepancies. Notwithstanding isolated views that a knock-out blow had been dealt to the theory of relativity,⁽¹¹²⁾ the majority of the scientists did not agree that the experiments in question contradicted the Einstein theory. Again, the passage of time has confirmed the validity of their attitude. The cases which have been quoted do not represent the exceptions, they illustrate a rule that a credible falsification usually requires a long time and meets with recognition only when there exists a competing theory which is superior to one which is being falsified. When such a theory is lacking, the hope that it will be introduced, proves stronger than the penchant for falsification. When such a theory is available, the theory being falsified may be defended by introducing ad hoc arbitrary hypotheses. In this context the so called crucial experiment (experimentum crucis), highly regarded in the tradition of scientific methodology, is being considered by the contemporary philosophers of science merely as an "honorific title"⁽¹¹³⁾.

The belief in the fundamental role of falsification in science has led some authors to question the value of theological statements which are not amenable to falsification⁽¹¹⁴⁾ whereas other authors have attempted to introduce falsification into theology.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Despite arguments for the latter attempts, it must be noted that there exist many types of statements which have a cognitive importance and are not falsifiable. In particular these should be mentioned:

1. Purely existential statements in the form 3 x : F (x) which confirm the existence of certain objects (atom, primeval man, electron) without defining the place and the time of their existence. The impossibility of falsification in such instances is the consequence of the indeterminacy in the space-time domain.

2. Statistical statements which do not exclude the possibility of a particular state that define only a probability of certain events. Many laws of science belong to this category.

3. So called "mixed" statements which involve introduction of both the particular and the general quantifiers. Some laws of science also belong to this category.

Ad IV. The analyses of the philosophy of science and historiography presented by P. Feyerabend, M. Polanyi and T. Kuhn destroy the myth according to which science was conceived as the opposite to an irrational approach marked by a dogmatic and authoritative attitude. According to these authors, in the process of selection of scientific theories the important role is played by irrational elements produced either by chance or by personal inclination, whereas the process of discovery implies "neither logic nor observation nor common sense."⁽¹¹⁶⁾ The idealized vision of science in tireless pursuit of the truth is opposed by a less optimistic interpretation in which "most scientists accept basic value judgments on trust; they do not examine them, they simply bow to the authority of their specialist colleagues . . . Common scientific wisdom is not very common and it certainly is not very wise."⁽¹¹⁷⁾

Some generalized conclusions above have met with fundamental criticism. One may also question the metaphors in which the authors treat the scientific community as a religious one and science as the scientists religion. Nevertheless, it is not possible to question a whole series of concrete historical examples which illustrate the influence of extra-scientific factors on progress of science.

The recognition of their role and acceptance of Feyerabend's "anything goes" methodology resulted in new metascientific scheme in which the process of the growth of science is regarded as being ruled by the laws of mob psychology.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ The transition from the positivist vision of ideal science to the metascientific anarchism of Fayerabend's adherents brought a radical revision in epistemological patterns. The very progress of science disclosed the unsubstantiated character of these positivist dogmas in which both theology and metaphysics were discredited whereas unified all-embracing science was to replace all former types of knowledge. Fifty years after famous declarations of the Vienna Circle, one discovers mainly a sophisticated metascientific poetry in lofty assurances that proclaim "that science is a unity, that empirical statements can be expressed in a single language, all states of affairs are of one kind and are known by the same method.⁽¹¹⁹⁾

Scientific discoveries initiated by the Einstein-Planck revolution in physics led to profound revisions both in science and in our theory of knowledge. Multifarious illusions underlying earlier metascientific postulates were detected after the discovery of important limitations both in physical and logical analyses. The limitative theorems proven in metalogic, and the cosmological principle of ignorance, Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty and the randomicity principle in the physics of black holes point out only some of the limitations imposed on us by nature. The questioning of these limitations and maintaining the optimistic epistemology of the 19th century would be just as uncritical as longing for the perfect world of Aristotelian physics.

The significance of epistemological changes is acknowledged particularly by contemporary physicists who admit that present science cannot be subordinated to the dogmatic normative principles of bygone epistemology. In new research on the foundations of quantum mechanics, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, the Bell inequalities, etc., new proposals dealing with future epistemological revisions are developed. The situation is different in the disciplines which are not so theoretically developed as physics. In biology as well as in social sciences the outdated programme of logical positivism can still provides an attractive cognitive framework.

In the context of contemporary critiques of former epistemological simplifications, one should note a new form of anti-intellectualism which seems to be the result of exaggerated social reactions to the breakdown of metascientific rationalism. The supporters of the new approach treat science merely as an "ideology"--one of many cultural phenomena dependent on social factors which are completely to determine the context of scientific theories. In this framework both scientific objectivity and the objective value of science are called into question, the growth of knowledge is to be based on social agreement and the very notion of science is considered a result of ideological camouflage in which the rationalist illusions seem more important than the courage of radical demystification.

The anti-intellectual component of similar programmes seems to threaten the conception of objective truth even more than did the positivistic idealizations. In intestable theses of the allegedly demystifying interpretations, the existence of hidden universal determinants is a priori decreed. The explanative power of these psycho-social determinants resembles in many respects the power of the philosophers' stone. The latter, when appropriately used by medieval alchemists, was able to convert all substances into genuine gold. The demystifying sociobiological and psychoanalytical theories are also to convert the alleged illusions of earlier science into the purest gold of the"only true" explanations. In such a context, the defense of the rational heritage of the past appears as a primordial task both for scientists and theologians.

In the new critical vision of the relationship between science and theology, many former misjudgments are eliminated. The elusive unimaginable world of quantum phenomena, described in modern science, appears conceptually and psychologically closer to the theological vision of reality than the image of nature proposed by 19th century mechanism. In the history of mutual relationships between theology and science there occurred substantial conflicts, epistemological prejudices and psychological distrust. When many former simplifications are avoided in the new metascientific framework, the concern for objective truth appears as the basic value discovered in the two disciplines.⁽¹²⁰⁾ When absolute relativism is treated as the only absolute value by new supporters of breakthrough demystifications, the continuation of the objective intellectual inheritance of the past remains the particularly important goal both in scientific and in theological investigations. The recent works by I.G. Barbour, A.R. Peacocke, J.C. Polkinghorne and E. McMullin indicate that this goal attracts appropriate attention in scholarly research practice.

The Pontifical Academy of Theology

Krakow, Poland