Problems connected with the subject and goals of any specific body of systematic knowledge are related to the nature of that knowledge. They are fundamental problems regarding its theory for they refer to what the object of that knowledge and the goals to which the research is directed or serves. Issues of this kind which occur within the framework of Christian philosophy are fundamental in the sense that, similar to other branches of cognition, their concrete solutions indicate further developments of that philosophy and at undergird its various versions.

Here the subject and goals will be discussed in a slightly different way, however; the subject of our considerations will be, not so much the subject as such of classical Thomist philosophy, as the subject in relation to problems characteristic of Christian philosophy. The problem of the goals of philosophy seems similar, but here we shall attempt not so much the enumeration and characteristics of these goals, as their presents in connection with the subject of Christian philosophy and its nature. As the term "Christian philosophy" is open to question here, we shall focus upon its meaning.

THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

"The problem of Christian philosophy" has been discussed quite broadly in the past. The questions in which this problem was finally formulated can be reduced to the following two: First, "Does any historical reality correspond to the term `Christian philosophy'; in other words: "Is Christian philosophy an historical reality?" Second, "Is Christian philosophy possible at all?" In the first question, the problem of Christian philosophy is formulated on an objective historical plane; in the second, the same problem appears on the theoretical, abstract plane. In the discussions that developed over this problem in the 30s and 50s, these two planes can be clearly delineated.

The problem of Christian philosophy, formulated on the historical plane was solved either in the negative in the sense that some attempted to prove that in historical reality there was nothing that might be called "Christian philosophy," or in the positive according to the thesis that within Christian thought are to be found doctrines which can be called Christian philosophy. In both cases concrete examples from history are presented as the justifying grounds.

The advocates of the negative attitude towards the existence of Christian philosophy can be divided into two groups. One thinks that Christian writers, beginning from the first ages of Christianity, did not in fact develop anything like a Christian philosophy, some feeling that the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas does not deserve the name: Christian philosophy. Others, though they may consider St. Thomas Aquinas' doctrine itself to being "Christian philosophy," regard what appears before St. Thomas Aquinas as no philosophy at all, but rather scraps of Greek doctrines more or less deftly attached to specific theological views. In this spirit, such medieval Catholic writers as St. Augustine, Anselm or Bonaventure are assessed as having developed theological, rather than philosophical, systems.

Others take positive attitudes towards the problems of Christian philosophy on the historical plane, stating that the term Christian philosophy has its sense because there really did exist philosophies that may be defined by this term. E. Gilson is a decided advocate of such an attitude. In the first page of his book entitled "History of Christian Philosophy" he writes:

It is a historical fact that there have existed philosophical systems that owe their nature to the Christian faith. All these taken together constitute an explicitly compact group, markedly different from other groups of philosophic systems, e.g., Greek, Latin, Chinese or Muslin philosophies. It is true that within our group there often occur considerable differences, and even discrepancies, its fundamental unity, however, remains preserved. This group is a class covering philosophical systems from the apostolic times till our days, called . . . in terms of the meaning of the term `Christian philosophy.'

Similarly, different views are encountered when the problem is considered on the theoretical plane, i.e., independently of historical data, regardless of the circumstances in which this philosophy arises and develops. Then, the question occurs: "Is Christian philosophy possible?"; in other words "Does philosophy by its internally abstract structure give reasons for ascribing it a Christian character?" Thus formulated the problem is answered first in the negative, for if any philosophical system is to take on a Christian character some theses, it is held, ought to be added to its system whose cognitive value is connected exclusively with the Christian faith or religion. Such theses would be known only from Christian Revelation and not be verified by reason, that is, they would be termed mysteries of faith. But if the structure of philosophy is to correspond to the requirements of the concept of a rational science, points of belief cannot be included among the system of theses of philosophy, as this would result in mixing knowledge with faith, and the natural order with the supernatural one. When the problem is thus formulated, the conviction is reached that philosophy can have no reason for being Christian because its structure and formal object must correspond to the requirements of the rational concept of science. There is no difficulty in finding many texts of St. Thomas Aquinas which support such a view.

There are opinions however, according to which the problem of Christian philosophy can be solved positively on the theoretical plane. In other words, it is held that the term Christian philosophy can have a sense such that, without losing its rational nature, it is at the same time Christian. According to this opinion, every true philosophy will be a Christian philosophy.

The above opinion, as a criterion of the Christian character of any philosophy, assumes the convergence of its conclusions with the conclusions proper to a given philosophy. Here, the matter is not so much one utilizing theological theses in order to draw philosophical conclusions as in the former case, but rather of achieving the usual coherence of basic solutions in philosophy and theology. This coherence can be obtained either owing to the explicitly rational development of fundamental primary philosophical principles without taking into consideration the data of Revelation, or as a result of a special effort aimed at making decisions in the direction pointed by the data of the Revelation. These are two different situations, but the authors do not strive to explain them more exactly. Having assumed the first case, a paradoxical situation could ensue where a non-Christian would cultivate Christian philosophy though the connection of such a philosophy with Christianity would be clearly external, and sometimes even accidental.

In the second case, on the other hand, the problem is how to interpret the role of Revelation, in other words the role of faith, in directing philosophical decisions. Generally, it should be said that understanding the relation of philosophy to Christianity as that which finally determines the Christian nature of a philosophy warrants its rational character. Nevertheless, the terminology in which this relation is expressed is markedly diverse in meaning. Thus, e.g., the relation of dependence between philosophy and Christianity, or, if you prefer, religious belief, is expressed by the term "openness to the supernatural." This means that any philosophy would be considered Christian when it is open to the supernatural, but the meaning of this term is not explained. What is more, nothing indicates that this term contains in it any methodological dependence of philosophy upon faith or theology. Pure philosophy can be considered Christian when, in developing its own contents with full freedom, it states that it does need to reject any ability or "supernatural power." There the term "openness to the supernatural" can be interpreted in the sense of an attitude of the cognitive subject in the course of constructing philosophy.

Another term expressing the relation of Revelation to philosophy (the basic feature of a Christian philosophy) is the term "aid" for reason from Revelation, or, in other words, "faith coexisting with the cognitive subject and the wisdom of the Holy Spirit." Such a criterion for Christian philosophy is set, e.g., by J. Maritain. In his opinion, the term "Christian philosophy" ought to define wisdom in the sense of perfect work of mind which, due to the natural weakness of the human mind, could not otherwise be achieved. That is why the cognitive subject in striving to reach perfect knowledge of the highest truths, and thus "wisdom", needs aid from above, consisting in the coexistence in the cognitive subject of faith as well as of the wisdom of the Holy Spirit. In consequence, faith and the wisdom of the Holy Spirit coexisting with the subject do not constitute for philosophy any positive criterion of the cognitive value of its theses, nor do they enter the structure of philosophical cognition; then fulfill only the function of an external regulating factor, "Vetuli stella rectrix".

It is hard to estimate how far this regulation would reach. From what was said above it cannot influence the rationality of philosophy itself, for that would be to methodologically mix philosophy with theology. Faith, as well as the wisdom of the Holy Spirit, would be structural elements of the work of the thinker.

To a certain degree, a similar attitude is taken in this matter by E. Gilson. In his opinion, Christian philosophy is the philosophy created by believers, by Christians, who distinguished the order of faith and natural knowledge. Justifying his theses with natural arguments, he sees in Christian Revelation an aid of great value, and to a certain degree even morally necessary, the human mind or the only way, however, in which it would be possible to indicate this action or help from Revelation to the mind in developing a Christian philosophy is by comparing philosophy developed without Revelation with that elaborated under its influence. Using precisely this historical method, E. Gilson determined the role of understating in Christian philosophy.

In the system of St. Thomas Aquinas the theory of theology is based upon a marked differentiation of the order of faith from that of natural knowledge, and upon the conviction that knowledge on the basis of faith does not annihilate, but perfects the cognitive work of the mind. An analogous situation exists as far as theology is concerned. In its own order, philosophy is completely different from theology and the area of faith. This does not mean, however, that in his opinion religious faith has no impact whatsoever upon philosophy, but that it would be rather an indirect influence through the action of the faith upon the cognitive power of the subject in cultivating philosophy. Grace does not annihilate nature, but heals it, stimulates its growth and makes it more perfect. In the same way faith, through its influence from above on the exercise of the mind makes possible more fruitful and reliable mental activity. It is no wonder that even E. Gilson saw only the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as a truly Christian philosophy, for only in it are realized, on one hand, a methodological independence or Revelation, and on the other, that which affects its Christian character, namely, its psychological dependence. It is also in this sense that the term "Christian philosophy" will be used in the consequent sections of this study.

PROBLEMS OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY AND ITS SUBJECT

When we speak about the subject of any scientific knowledge, we ought always to distinguish its starting point from the completed system, for the two differ one from the other. In the first case, the subject of a study is the area observation or consideration in general. The subject is specified more precisely by indicating one aspect of reality within the general area of study. Traditional epistemology speaks here of the material and the formal subjects. The first is understood as the general field of knowledge, the second is the point of view according to which the reality studied in a given science. In a scientific system, the subject would be constituted by everything denoted by the constant term and would be represented by the variable in the theses of the system. Scientific cognition does not take the world as spontaneously given as its subject, but concerns rather certain elements or aspects of reality to which the world is as it is, or as it appears in our experience. This is the source of the need to distinguish the object of science in its starting point and in its developed state with its material and formal subject. On this basis there arise in science both questions about what is empirically given and a search for what explains the data.

There is considerable difficulties in attempting to determine the subject of Christian philosophy. These difficulties flow first of all from the various conceptions of its nature and development, from determining what leads to the total or at least partial uniformities of the philosophical disciplines constituting Christian philosophy, and from the ambiguous understanding of the relations that occur among these disciplines.

Regarding the first, it can be observed that in recent decades Christian philosophy has undergone certain modifications. The following phenomena have served as modifying factors: an attempt to connect Christian philosophy with the natural sciences, an attempt to enrich or even re-interpret it by means of the achievements of other philosophic systems, and the tendency to search out authentic philosophical thoughts in the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas.

In the first case, the effort is to connect classical philosophy with the data of the detailed sciences. Most probably, at the base of this tendency is an at least partial identification of rational with scientific cognition and, by implication, a rejection of the possibility of developing fundamentally different methods of knowledge and of ensuring their rationality.

The second case concerns the enrichment of Christian philosophy by such new philosophical attitudes as, e.g., Kant, phenomenology or existentialism. The phenomenological attitude to Christian philosophy has been particularly fashionable and varied. Greater attention is deserved also to understanding Christian philosophy as a return to the authentic or so-called existential version of Thomism.

In the attempt to utilize detailed sciences in cultivating Christian philosophy in almost all its versions the differences in understanding the subject must be taken into account. Thus, e.g., those who make Christian philosophy more scientific want to use methods not fundamentally different from scientific methods for attaining results and/or to use the results of these sciences as the starting point of philosophy. Conclusions reached either by way of far-reaching extrapolation or irrational intuition will contain terms whose meaning is only seemingly the same as similar terms in classical Christian philosophy. The language of individual branches of theoretical knowledge is determined specifically, most often in dependence upon its epistemology and ontology. For this reason the subject of the point of initiation of a Christian philosophy which has been made more scientific will differ from the subject of the point of initiation of a traditionally "unscientific" Christian philosophy. An analogous situation exists in making Christian philosophy scientific by the way of utilizing simultaneously the traditional method and scientific theories or facts as given. Both cases have to do with a difference in subject in the starting point of philosophy, and consequently, also in its attainment. In turn, taking into consideration the genesis of scientific theories or scientific acts, it may be said also that philosophy cultivated in such a way will differ from traditional philosophy which has not been made scientific by its material and formal subject. Scientific theories and facts are built upon observations different from Christian philosophy and take into consideration aspects other than philosophy. As Christian philosophy deals with everything that exists it is interested in every being, whereas the detailed sciences from which the above-mentioned scientific facts and theories are derived are interested only in certain kinds of beings: they concern not the universal as does philosophy, but partial aspects. Philosophy cultivated in such a way may only simply extend scientific knowledge.

The matter is somewhat different, though similar, when Christian philosophy is considered to be enriched or even re-interpreted on the basis of the achievements of modern philosophical systems. Changes in the range of the subject may be observed depending as on what is understood in this case by the terms "achievements," as well as upon how extensive this enrichment proves to be.

The second moment which makes determination of the subject of Christian philosophy in the above sense more difficult is constituted by the ambiguity in understanding relations between individual philosophical disciplines constituting a Christian philosophy that can be called a Christian theory of existence, or more briefly here, the theory of existence.

Thus, in Christian philosophy understood in this way, various areas of cognition can be distinguished and classified in various ways, but there is no uniform opinion among Christian philosophers on these branches of cognition, in particular on metaphysics as "first philosophy." Thus, at times because of the character of its branches, the theory of existence is understood as an organic whole, in which view it is only for pedagogical or social reasons that the parts are treated autonomously, and by an analogy of attribution are called a theory of existence. At other times, it is understood as an indivisible unity in its formal subject and method of explanation; or the term "theory of existence" might be understood to denominate a series of disciplines, distinguished at least by their formal subjects.

Similarly, there are different understandings of the relations between these disciplines. Generally speaking, two basic opinions can be distinguished here: one, according to which the dependence among the disciplines passes from special to general metaphysics, and the second, according to which the relation passes from general to special metaphysics in at least two modes. In all these case there is a fundamental difference of view as regards the subject of the theory of existence. Thus, e.g., both in the case of the theory of existence as an organic whole consisting of various philosophical disciplines, or as one science indivisible at least as regards its formal subject, and in the case of the theory of existence as a science consisting of independent philosophical disciplines, fundamental differences may be found in the understanding especially of the formal subject. In the first two concepts of the theory of existence a unity of the formal subject in all component disciplines is assumed, while the possibility of various material subjects is admitted. In the third concept, disciplines constituting the theory of existence owe their proper autonomy and independence also to different formal subjects.

In order to determine the subject of Christian philosophy it will be necessary to consider the version related historically to the efforts to determine the authentic thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, generally termed today "the existential interpretation of Thomism." Within this interpretation, the problem of the subject of Christian philosophy will be limited to its theory of existence understood in the above sense, which is one indivisible insight from the point of view of both the formal or proper subject and the method of explanation. At the starting point certain disciplines situated within it are only partly autonomous because of their particular subject. The object of philosophy thus understood is the existential character of the goal rather than a purely formal moment of reality. In other words, this aspect is called transcendental. In the above sense philosophy allows us to explain the whole of reality in a manner that is both solid and informative. It covers all that exists and is necessary, for it covers intra-existential relations that cannot take place in the proportional unfoldings grasped through the notion of being. By this formal subject Christian philosophy is distinguished from all branches of cognition that treat the universal concept of existence, for it treats only the necessary aspects of the content of existence, rather than existence in itself. Moreover, it concerns only one class of existence, from which and for which it was abstracted.

The above-mentioned relations may be also the basis for necessary inter-existential relations so far as a sufficient analogy occurs, e.g., the relations of metaphysical causality. All relations of this kind belong to the existential order as they are based on the relation of the creature to the existence expressed in things. The laws of philosophy so understood are absolutely universal as they are based finally upon relations of constitutive elements of existence as such, and thus include everything that exists. The reason for their universal character is existence, i.e., the aspect under which what exists is examined, and not one or another qualification characteristic of objects in the universe.

The choice of this approach to Christian philosophy is not accidental: it is guided by a number of convictions; (a) that its problems concerning the world, God and man in many cases appear also within Christian Revelation and its rationalization, i.e., theology; (b) that in this version of Christian philosophy this occurrence is more explicitly related genetically to the concept of its subject; and (c) that the direction of solutions of these problems in philosophy regardless of their close connection with the subject, does not differ fundamentally from those based upon the data of Christian Revelation. In Christian philosophy thus interpreted, the Absolute appears, not as a mystery to be described, the creation of mysticism or the subject of Revelation, but rather as the reason explaining the existential aspect given in the experience of existence. This aspect determines the direction of philosophical analyses and leads to the formulation of a series of fundamental questions. In order to answer some of these the analysis leads in the end to stating the existence of the Absolute. As the problem of God in this concept of Christian philosophy appears within the process of philosophically explaining reality, it is internal to the problem of this explanation.

In this version of Christian philosophy also the problem of the existence of the human soul appears clearly. It appears in the discipline belonging to the theory of existence called philosophical psychology. True, in extra-philosophical fields, something analogous to the concept of soul is spoken about; in the proper sense, however, the human soul may be stated only in the classical philosophy of man. The field of knowledge is not neutral as regards the treatment of this problem any more than it is for the problem of the Absolute. Many sciences deal with man--natural sciences and the humanities, the philosophical and even the theological sciences--but the problem of the soul appears only when certain conditions are fulfilled.

When the analysis of man is undertaken in the area, e.g., of psychology or of humanistic natural science, the problem of the human soul does not occur because this is not allowed by their formal subject. The sciences, through analyses conducted upon man, reach only the constant structures of the biological components of man that preserve his dynamic balance. Others instead of the soul, speaks about personality or the subject of psychic phenomena. In both cases the decisions are dictated principally by their appropriate subjects, and as such they solve problems which arise precisely at their research areas. In theology the problem of the soul appears in the analysis of man so far as it makes use of classical philosophy to explain revealed texts or in building theological anthropology.

In philosophical psychology as a partly autonomous discipline belonging to the theory of existence or reality, however, the problem of the existence of the human soul results from the analysis of human psychic life. This kind of psychology has as its goal the final explanation of the structure of man in the order of existence. The soul appears there as the reason for what is given in the experience, namely, for the acts constituting the whole of the psychic life. While explaining the unity and plurality of acts, in the human subject the soul is assumed to be the substantial form of the body, and to be self-existing only as an incomplete substance. In a general sense, it can be said that the human soul appears here as one of the explanatory principles of the existential structure of man.

For philosophy of man thus understood the subject in its starting point contains the data of experience concerning the psychic life of man. Its starting point is not the existence of the human soul, nor does this constitute the object of study at the beginning of the analyses, and in this specification of the subject the philosophy of man differs from metaphysics. They do not differ, however, in their formal subject which for both is the existential aspect of being: in psychology it is the existential aspect of human being, while in metaphysics it is everything inasmuch as it exists. It is precisely this existential aspect of human existence which allows it, on one hand, to raise the problem of the existence of the human soul in a natural rather than an artificial way, and, on the other hand, to solve it in such manner that the meaning of the term "human soul" may be treated as the philosophical equivalent of the religious concept of the human soul.

The above seems to prove that the problems of Christian philosophy constituted by the fundamental issues of human's religious life--namely, the problems of the existence of the Absolute God, with the problem of man and, in particular, of his soul--constitute problems internal to this philosophy. They owe this status precisely to its subject, and in particular to its formal subject as the existential aspect of reality. This is due also to the fact that in general the solution to these problems does not differ from the data of Christian Revelation, though they belong to completely different orders.

GOALS OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

The expression "goals of science," does not always have the same meaning. Hence before we discuss goals of Christian philosophy it is important to comment on the term "goals of science" itself.

This scientific cognition in its functional or subject aspect is a cultural creation of man, and like any cultural creation it takes its character from its purpose. Thus, it owes this property to man its creator, for it is man who sets the specific goals for scientific knowledge. To a certain degree, the goal is the cause of the initiation of science, of its development and its cultivation. For this reason we can say that the goals scientific knowledge can achieve are transcendental, for as the work of man these goals depend upon man. In many cases the goals influence the nature of a science, above all its subject and method. Thus, science as an ordered system of statements, and thus taken in its subject aspect, can not always fulfill the goals man designs it. Generally, the possibilities of implementing the appropriate goals of a science as a constituted system are dictated by its nature, which, along with its goals, includes both its subject and method.

In speaking of the meanings of "the goal of scientific knowledge," the following should be distinguished: 1. the motives or stimuli for cultivating science, 2. the science itself as the objective result to which the science-creating behavior leads; and 3. the functions to be fulfilled in human life broadly understood. In all three, the term "scientific cognition" is taken to designate science in its functional aspect, and thus as a certain set of operations creating science, rather than as the constituted system of sentences referring to any given branch of subjects. The motives for the cultivation of science can be highly varied, but in general terms can be grouped into two types: theoretical and practical. In the first type of motives we should include purely cognitive on theoretical interests and in the other practical interests and tendencies. The subject of intellectual or theoretical interests in knowledge or in understanding reality can be achieved by cultivating science through practical steps resulting from understanding human life. The subject of practical interests becomes the conscious striving to master reality and direct it so as to implement previously intended goals, generally those dictated by the concrete situations in life. In this case the cultivation of science is corrected. In both cases it is a matter of satisfying needs the only difference being that in the first case they are of an intellectual, and in the second of a practical nature. This two-dimensional satisfaction of human needs constitutes one type of goal of scientific knowledge.

In the second meaning of the term "the goal of the scientific cognition," the goal of science is to constitute a system of statements: thus the subject results from operations directed by man in creating knowledge. When someone wants to build a scientific theory, it may be said that the scientific work is for knowledge itself, and thus disinterested. This does not mean that such a scientific theory does not contain in itself data from one branch or another. It means only that the moment of utilization of this theory is pushed to a later place in the sense that it may occur at a further stage, e.g., after it has been constructed. In the initial stages of constructing it no practical goals are sets; in general, it is disinterested and free, i.e., not aimed directly at any other goal than enriching and ordering knowledge.

Last of all, in the third sense, the term "the goal of the scientific cognition" is taken to denominate what scientific knowledge is to serve, or to determine the functions it is to perform. In this sense, the term "goal" is to be taken very broadly. Scientific cognition can serve by satisfying all human intellectual interests; this is a purely theoretical function. It may serve also as a tool for restructuring any area of reality, or to help to build a rational world outlook. These goals may be treated also as motives, especially when the term "science" is considered functionally. It should be stressed, however, that the theoretical and practical functions of scientific knowledge do not exclude each other, and may occur simultaneously. If we do not reduce them to one common denominator, it is because they are not to be compared in the same categories. The choice of the first kind of goals at one stage of cultivating science does not prevent undertaking the other kind of goals at later stages.

Like all scientific knowledge, Christian philosophy understood in the above sense fulfills tasks of a cognitive, theoretical and practical character. The first concerns satisfying the deepest intellectual and moral needs of man, the second can be reduced practically to the functions Christian philosophy performs in human life broadly understood as an organizing factor for the individual and social life of man. Christian philosophy implements both goals by supplying basic solutions and stimulating thought on fundamental issues. There is a series of questions which man has set and is still asking regarding both himself and reality surrounding him. These questions can be expressed in the following formulas: "What does it mean that objects exist?"; "In what way do they exist?"; "Does there exist or can there exist other categories of objects than those that surround us?"; "Is the totality of existing objects something rational; does it have any sense or aim?", "Can we (and if yes, in what sense) speak about the essence, i.e., about what is essential in objects?"; "Is any existing thing necessary?", etc. In the case of man, we can ask also a series of analogous questions, e.g., "What is the position of man among other beings?"; "Does he really constitute a new category of existence?", "Do his life and activities, such as art, science and religion, have any sense or goal, and if so of what kind?"; "What is the final goal of man's fundamental tendencies, man's search for happiness, his striving or possessing certain goods; what is the final reason of his existence?".

Raising such questions and working on them generally is considered characteristic of man. Many of these questions regarding both man and the surrounding world can be found in various forms in the history of the development of human thought. One who stated sought answers and depending on the historical period, referred either to common experience or to scientific knowledge. Today, we know that neither one nor the other is able to supply the answer to such problems. Not common experience because as a rule, it serves practical purposes and as such is a conglomerate of concepts from various points of view. This simply combines aspects which are accentuated according to extra cognitive needs, circumstances and attitudes of the moment. Not science because, being conscious, systematized and methodical, and eliminating extra-cognitive, emotional moments, it undertakes research within whose range the above-mentioned problems cannot be solved. Detailed sciences examine various categories of objects from the quantitative or qualitative aspect, taking into consideration their features, qualifies, structure or relations in a broad sense. Within these sciences, therefore, the above problems are not found in the sense that they cannot be formulated by means of the terminological apparatus and methods of these sciences. The problems we are speaking about, if they are to be undertaken and solved, require a branch of knowledge separate from the detailed sciences. It ought to be able to reach what is fundamental and final in the subject examined. Questions man asks himself, which cannot be solved by the detailed sciences, are of this sort. This range of questions is rightly treated in philosophy, whose concept, at least in general outline, was formulated already in Antiquity by Aristotle and fully realized in the tradition of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and its later continuation, called here Christian philosophy. The possibilities of answers to questions asked in such a way are closely connected with its subject as constituted by the existential aspect of what exists, and not, as was the case in Antiquity, the essential aspect.

If we assume that answers to the above and similar questions compose what is termed a "world outlook", and if this can be realized so as to express convictions, attitudes, statements, assessments and norms determining the picture of oneself and one's surroundings, it can be said that Christian philosophy constitutes the basis for the rationality of such an outlook in the full sense of this word. As a consequence, it influences the organization of human life both in its individual and in its social dimension. Nevertheless, Christian philosophy fulfills the latter task in a totally different way from other philosophical systems. In spite of the utilitarianism of European thought, the role of Christian philosophy cannot be reduced to performing the function of simply supporting the social and individual order already in place. If it is sometimes given the term of "magistra vitae", it is not because it gives individuals and societies practical prescriptions of behavior, but because its primary task is to achieve the truth, and in that it creates science. Thus, rationalization of the world outlook is one of practical functions of Christian philosophy. This is a secondary goal, however, in the sense that Christian philosophy does not exist to justify the human world outlook and then to shape individual and social life, but rather to achieve the truth about the world and man.

The possibilities for utilizing philosophical solutions to rationalize the world outlook exists on the basis of the convergence between of the subject matter of the questions of Christian philosophy and those man asks himself in looking for a global understanding both of himself and of the world. What brings the world outlook and the above mentioned philosophy closer to each other is the similarity in the subject of the questions. Nevertheless, they are two different branches. A world outlook is something quite different from the scientific cultivation of philosophy. Man is interested in his existence and that of the world surrounding it. Philosophy analyses being under the aspect of existence--it treats an analogous subject matter--but it does so for totally different motives than in the working out of a world outlook. Man himself and his interests, sometimes justified by motives of a psychological nature, are the basic source of the problems of world outlook. In contrast, the problems of Christian philosophy are genetically embedded in the subject itself as subject. These two moments decide finally the way problems such as those above will be understood and resolved in principle.

In an analogous sense we can speak about another practical goal of Christian philosophy, namely, its utilization of religious belief in the process of reasoning. This function has been assigned to philosophy since the most remote times. In the first ages of Christianity the term "theology" designated a broadly understood rational interpretation of the Revelation. Because of such a goal philosophy was given the name "ancilla" and carried with elements of platonic or neoplatonic philosophy. Adapting this type of philosophy was motivated by the fact that its language was the closest to the language and the contents of Revelation. In this way, the first apologists and St. Augustine often mixed the philosophical and theological orders.

Later philosophers continued along this line and in St. Thomas Aquinas' cultivation of theology, philosophy was fully utilized, preserving its distinct character from theology. St. Thomas Aquinas' thought was situated in an extrascientific order. Although he defined theology by the term "supreme" in comparison to other sciences, still he always understood this "supremacy" to be situated in an order different from that of the sciences. That is why, in Thomas' opinion, the relation of theology to other sciences, including philosophy, is not between equal knowledge, e.g., the relation of one science to another. This tradition of utilizing theology in philosophy has survived in our day.

Similarly, in our times as in the earlier ages, connecting the natural and the supernatural sciences in theology is most frequently reduced to a rational elaboration of supernatural events. In the Middle Ages it was the philosophical rationalization of Revelation, in later times, particularly in the XIXth century, the rationalization was of a natural scientistic type; at present it is called humanistic or philosophical rationalization--all of which have many variations. In humanistic rationalization the following variations can be distinguished: historism, sociologism and psychologism; while philosophical rationalization, on the other hand, can be in terms of existentialism, structuralism, semiologism and praxism.

In such a situation, the question is not whether philosophy ought to be made use of in theology, but rather what philosophy ought to be made use of. The issue here is first of all that of the adequacy of philosophy for theology. In other words, the question concerns the service that ought to be performed by philosophy for theology. Often, a criterion suggested is the facility of the philosophical language for use by contemporary man as the recipient. Such a criterion does not seem, however, to be sufficient, because as a result of utilizing philosophy theology is very deeply permeated by philosophy. It is made use of by theology in creating the conceptual apparatus, reaching theological conclusions, and even the systematizing theological enunciations. Thus, the criterion of adequacy ought to be, not so much the ease of language or in other words the regard for the recipient, but the "content" of the philosophy, because utilization is, to a certain degree, adaptation of one discipline by another. That is why the criterion of choice should be the agreement of a philosophy in its solutions with the Bible as regards its vision of the reality; also it should not collide with it as regards the nature of cognition. The first postulate requires that the philosophy of which theology would make use not be atheistic of relativistic. The other requires the philosophy not be irrationalist. Christian philosophy is exactly such a philosophy.

Similar to the relation of Christian philosophy to a world view, the principle of serving as a relationalizing factor relates Christian philosophy to religious faith or theology. The possibility of making use of philosophy in theology is rooted also in the analogous convergence of the subject matter of Christian philosophy with the problem of religious belief and theology. The sources of these problems are totally autonomous and genetically independent of one another. In the case of Christian philosophy, its problems appear as a result of the philosophical analysis of reality as such and in a proportionate manner. Genetically, it is connected with the nature of this philosophy itself. On the other hand, in the case of the religious belief, its problems are genetically connected with Christian Revelation and, in the case of theology, with the nature of that knowledge. Thus the role of Christian philosophy in serving theology finally is justified by the nature of this philosophy itself, i.e., its subject and method of analysis. The nature and focus of the subject determine that this philosophy not be of an atheist or relativist character, as well as the manner of its analysis. That is why it may be justified both in theology and in the process of rationalizing religious belief. All this, in turn, indicates unambiguously that the service role of Christian philosophy in relation to theology is not its initial goal, nor is it an apologetics of faith, nor was it constituted as a result of needs of religious belief or theology. These do not constitute a philosophical system. Rather, it was chosen by Christians for these or other reasons from among many philosophical directions they had at their disposal, because it constitutes a specific note of understanding reality. Only because of the proximity of its solutions can it be utilized, to some degree, in Christian philosophy.

It seems then that the basic problems in the version of Christian philosophy discussed here are most closely connected with its subject. In philosophy no problems are externally related, or imposed for some alien reasons. Its tasks, in agreement with its theoretical or practical nature, are finally dictated by its subject and the type of knowledge which depends upon that.

The Academy of Catholic Theology,

Warsaw, Poland