Discourse on identity is a modern phenomenon having its origin in the Western individualism, because only in a pluralistic society does a multiplication of identities come into being. Hence, the problem emerges of how to reconcile the relation of self-identification and the existence of the "others" in order to answer the questions "who am I" and "where do I belong." The identity problem did not exist in a traditional society due to the fact that in such a kinship society the social status of individuals is strictly fixed. In contrast, modern people are confronted with a variety of choices, as a result of which there is an instability of identity because the principle of ascription, characteristic of a traditional society, is replaced by the principle of achievement.

Ambivalence, heterogeneity, multiplicity and openness of perspectives in modern times imply a plurality of interpretations and choices in the light of concrete, particular and changeable circumstances, so that people face fragmentation and the contradictions of both collective and personal existence. Such fragmentation comes from the aspiration to comprehend where we come from and where we are going, as Jonathan Friedman wrote ( J. Friedman, 1994, 144). Therefore it becomes important to study the arising tensions between singular and plural identities on both the individual and the collective level (C. Calhoun, 1994). One has to understand that modernity breaks down the protective framework of the small community and of tradition, replacing it with much larger impersonal organizations. Therefore, writes Anthony Giddens, individuals feel bereft and alien in a world in which they lack the psychological supports and the sense of security provided by more traditional settings (A. Giddens, 1993, 33-39).

It is impossible to reply to the question: "who am I" without answering another one: "where do I belong" (Lynd), which Anderson points to as "the quest for belonging" (Thomas Scheff, 1994, 278 ), for one’s own security is established in relation with the others (W. Connolly,1991).

Identity can be defined as an organization of the mental structure with both cognitive and affective characteristics which represent one’s individual perception about oneself as a distinct being, in harmony with oneself and divided from the others, and with a reasonable degree of coherence in behavior, needs, motivation and interests (P. Massen, 1986, 13). That is, identity represents the entire consciousness of oneself which enables the integration of perception, sentiments and thoughts of one’s own personality (Krech and Crutschfield); it is also the maintenance of an inner sameness and continuity (Erikson). Identity refers to the permanence over time, to the notion of unity, to the ability to recognize and be recognized (A. Melucci, 1995, 45). Maslow defines identity as a growth of natural capacities: to perceive reality, to recognize oneself, others and nature; a feeling of spontaneity as well as of separation and personal life, of autonomy and original reasoning, a sense of emotional richness, an increase of one’s own creativity, mobility of the value systems, and a vision of oneself in the future (in A. Muchielli, 1983, 106). Jürgen Habermas writes that ego-identity is achieved when a person becomes capable of making a distinction between heteronomy and autonomy, i.e. when he is capable of seeing the difference between traditional norms and those which are justified by principles (J. Habermas, 1979, 87).

The problem of identity becomes particularly accentuated in a time of social and civilizational crisis, when the turbulence shakes all the existing values and principles, and breaks down the established life schemes without yet ensuring new ones. This leaves individuals in a vacuum of social norms and their increasing uncertainty and insecurity. Such a turn will be the subject-matter of the analysis of the societies in transition in Central-Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia.

However, it is necessary to differentiate individual from collective identities as well as the various forms of collective identity. A collective identity is formed when the members of a group accept the common, collective norms and demands as the historical and cultural frame of reference which determines their place in a community. Individual identity comes about when a person learns to differentiate oneself from the environment and consciously to reevaluate tradition, becoming thereby an independent and autonomous individual. But both collective and individual identification go through a process of socialization which has two phases: adaptation to socio-cultural norms (identification), and separation and critical evaluation of the given standards (constitution of identity). Only when both phases are reached may one speak of the formation of a mature personality with a distinct identity (which is more than a mere identification with some authorities).

A traditional society emphasizes collective identity, while modern society stresses the importance of achieving individual identity (in cultural terms this is the opposition of collectivism and individualism; in political terms it is between liberalism and communitarianism). That is to say, one can speak about two sides of the formation of identity: one consists of homogenization (that is linked with heteronomy) and another with differentiation (that leads to autonomy). A complete achievement of identity is reached when both of these sides are reconciled and a balance attained which enables individuals to realize both personal and social integration. When these dimensions are in collision, the results are either collectivist or individualist extremes.

Since the process of socialization that stimulates identification is under the strong impact of culture (from the primary institutions to the more complex social institutions), the social and cultural settings should be analyzed in order to understand why certain forms of identification prevail.

When collective identity is in question one may distinguish the following forms: cultural identity which expresses individual and group identification with the basic values and patterns of behavior and attitudes; religious identity that relates to identification with given beliefs and confessional belonging; ideological/political identity that expresses the acceptance of the particular political demands of given political groups (or states); regional/ethnic identity that relies upon a recognition of ethnicity as a focus of identification; class identity in which the recognition of a given class is the primary group identification; professional identity which refers to an adherence to a particular vocation, and generational identity that links individuals with the same generation (e.g. the generation of the sixties).

Which of these forms prevail in the modern society, in particular in those in transition, I shall try to analyze in this paper.

To speak of new models of identity appearing in postcommunist societies as a paradigm of identification refers not only to the question of whether a collectivist or individualistic orientation prevails, but also to the contents of that identification, i.e., whether it is totalitarian/authoritarian or democratic in nature. The former assumes the principle of heteronomy, that is, an indisputable loyalty to the leading (ruling) authority with collectivity as the main source of identification, implying a weak individual identity. The contrary holds true when the principle of autonomy prevails; it fosters individuation as a form of authenticity assuming a critical distance from collective demands which it evaluates through a prism of individual needs, rights and liberties.

"Real socialism" characterized a totalitarian model of identification demanding subordination of individual creeds to a so-called social cause, which in fact relied on the party/state commands. It was a sociologistic interpretation of society that accepted Stalin’s maxim: "Society is everything — the individual is nothing." Therefore, ideological/political and class identity were dominant forms of a collective identification, and the sole officially recognized form of identity, while individual identities were repressed into the closed circle of private, family life. The state was the only acceptable source of belonging; all the other forms, in particular religious, ethnic and professional, were marginalized. This was the reason why they emerged as the main focus after the fall of the totalitarian regimes.

However, the question should be posed: whether a shift from ideological/political identity represents in itself a removal of totalitarian/authoritarian models of identity into a democratic one?

Many of the empirical analyses and observations of the societies in transition lead to the conclusion that the process of changing the models of identity is more complex. It opens a problem of the changing structural and social-political reality in these societies, i.e., the question of the extent to which these changes have penetrated into the very foundation of the totalitarian system, in particular into the mechanisms of power as well as into the mental structure of the power elites and the great part of the population.

Except for the most advanced Central-East European societies (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) all the others suffer under the burden of the legacy of the ancient regimes, which gives the new institutions (parliament, multiparty system, public opinion, mass media) a quasi-democratic connotation. Instead of having a plurality of choices, the majority of the population in these countries is still under pressure to surrender to the policy of the ruling "party-state", or to the authority of one’s own nation (or ethnic group), or to the dominant religion in the given region. "Differences" are still taken with suspicion, and the desire of homogenization is stronger than the need for differentiation. Which is to say that the power structure has not been essentially changed albeit the subject of power has been located in postcommunist societies in the newly established nation-state as a single representative of a supreme authority. As the supreme authority concentrated the entire power in its hands instead of democratically distributing it, the foundation had been laid for the revival of an authoritarian order, despite the declarations of new political elites concerning the democratization of their societies. Authoritarian rule goes hand in hand with the primacy of an absolutized collectivity that makes a strong emphasis on group rather than individual identities.

Thus people become accustomed to suppress their own needs and interests in the name of collective demands (of a group, or the party/state, or their own nation), and to form an authoritarian/non-democratic frame of mind. The integration of society’s members became more important than self-integration within personality structures which liberate individuals from their own contradictions and ambiguities, enabling them to grow as mature personalities. Hence, it is understandable why similarities (or unification) with group membership plays the most significant role in producing the sense of belonging for the given community. This explains also why the differences are taken with suspicion, because the desire towards homogenization is there much stronger than the need for differentiation is self-formation. Therefore, what prevails in postcommunist societies is a process of identification which arrests the formation of self-identity, which is reduced to the adjustment of individuals to group norms and demands without the necessary critical distance in the process of socialization, from the viewpoint of their own consciously created criteria.

Thus the old models of identity are still in operation. There is an accent on different forms, but a collective style is maintained with little or no importance for the individual identities that constitute the basis of modern civil society in which the citizens are free personalities. This latter has penetrated only small circles, primarily intellectuals, except in Poland where "Solidarity" was a mass movement from the eighties on. An individualist orientation still is either suppressed by the superiority of a collective will (e.g. "patriotism", or "higher social interests"), or is turned into egoistic drives which completely isolate individuals from their society’s problems. Thereby the concept of "citizen" — as the embodiment of a free personality in political terms — although often used in the debates and political programs, is still more a fiction than a reality because people liberate themselves with a great difficulty from the authoritarian mentality.

However, the existing social, political and cultural conditions do not affect merely the level of individual identity, but concern the models of collective identity as well. Any society needs established collective identities because its members live in different social groups and have to come to terms with those collective bodies. But one should differentiate between totalitarian and democratic models of collective identities. While the former rests upon an imposed collective authority to which individuals have unquestionably to submit, disregarding their own needs and interests, the latter takes into account both social and individual needs and interests in order to reconcile them and make of the collective body a real community of its members. Keeping this in mind in any attempt to determine the nature of collective models of identity in postcommunist societies, one may recognize the remnants of the old times, even going back further than the regime of "real socialism", i.e., to the traditionally-oriented concept of collective identity, or a parochial one that is closed within local, mostly ethnic, groups and cuts off ties with the universal values of a broader community, or civilization. In that way, the borders of a "closed society" have not yet been broken, and heteronomy as an orientation has not been overcome.

Judging from this observation one may conclude that the old models of identity have not been lost, but merely changed in form. In the transition period one can notice a shift to religious and regional/ethnic identities. Though the latter is formulated in terms of self-determination, in certain cases (in the former USSR and Yugoslavia) it simply meant separation of the nation-states from a federal state. Hence, the process of transcending the totalitarian model of identity and constituting a new democratic one has not yet achieved satisfactory results.

In the case of Yugoslavia I shall elaborate a bit more the above-mentioned assumptions.

The former Yugoslavia was not identical with Soviet type socialism, but was called a "self-governing socialism". The main points of difference were: (a) a softening of the command economy within certain economic reforms for the development of a limited market; (b) decentralization of certain aspects of power on regional and enterprise levels; and (c) a more open society with regard to both communication with the outer world and the expression of different opinions in internal policy. These facts certainly influenced the formation of identity models in Yugoslavia giving a bit more space to the growth of individual identities and making the collectivist form of identity less rigid. Still, what prevailed over the large part of the population was an authoritarian model of identity as proved by the data from all the sociological research. These indicated a high rate of authoritarianism in particular among the middle-aged and older persons, as well as within groups of less educated individuals.

This is closely connected with a traditional type of identification in which the concept of the leader (pater familiae) is of the utmost importance, affirming the link through obedience to the authority. This was measured by agreement with the statements: "Obedience and the respect of authority are the most important virtues that children have to learn," and "Without a leader every nation is like a man without a head".

The highest percentage of authoritarianism is recorded in the least developed parts of the former Yugoslavia, i.e., in Kosovo, then in Macedonia and Montenegro; it was significantly less pronounced in Bosnia and Hercdegovina; and the smallest percentage was seen in the most developed region, i.e., in Slovenia (with the ratio between underdeveloped and the most developed parts of 7l:29 percent — these are the results from the 1990’s). The difference between Kosovo and Slovenia is particularly evident when the presence of authoritarianism is compared between the highly educated young persons and the older ones which is expressed in ratio of 9:64 percent. More than a half of the investigated population expressed adherence to the traditional model of identity (according to the results from 1981).

However, what connects the models of identity in the former Yugoslavia with those in Central-Eastern Europe before the fall of communism is the source of authority to which the population expresses its loyalty. In the former Yugoslavia the "party-state" was the main focus of authority and as this was the principal source of security it was interpreted paternalistically.

What happened with the models of identity after the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Yugoslav state? Did the transition of the former authoritarian regime generate a shift from the collectivist to the individualistic pattern of identity?

The most visible change occurred in the form and the source of the collectivist identification, not in democratic orientation. Unlike Poland where the religious form became dominant during the Solidarity resistance and afterwards, in the states of the former Yugoslav republics national/ethnic identity absolutely prevailed. This absolutization of ethnicity is accompanied by a trend towards retraditionalization in terms of a revival of the past history from time immemorial with its historical myths so as to confirm a "glorious past" of one’s own nation.

There is also a quite noticeable decline of class identity, because with the emphasis on the nation people become homogenized and class differences seem to disappear. The other forms of identification are also marginalized, e.g., the professional, with the exception of a new and very prominent profession of managers and businessmen; as well as generational identity that has only recently become more important within the segment of the student population.

As far as Serbia is concerned one can notice a very modest increase of religious identification, which is conceived more in terms of the traditional customs than as pure belief.

As national identity is the dominant new collectivist form, what are the motives of the renewal of nationalism in the 1990’s in the states of former Yugoslavia? This may be explained by the words of Jonathan Friedman that a time of crisis produces a desire for roots and security by a return to stable traditional values with an increase in primitive cults (ibid., 243). This new form of the collectivist identity enables mobilization of the population when it becomes disillusioned with regard to the old ideologies, and when anxiety and fear are the responses to the actual threats (A. Giddens, ibid., 44). Confronted with the dilemma of authority vs. uncertainty, writes Giddens, people choose a new form of authority which seems to be biologically rooted (in terms of "blood and soil"). This seems more original and becomes more attractive to a population which has lost the old forms of identity which fostered a feeling of belonging.

But nationality can be conceived in two ways: one as a political and cultural entity, the other in term of ethnicity. National identity as representing loyalty to the nation as a political and cultural entity does not necessarily assume the assimilation and annihilation of differences, but simply indicates one collective framework. This provides a feeling of belonging and a sense of community without being comprehended as a single unified model. Nationality in these terms identifies with citizenship that implies equal rights of all the ethnic groups within the given political unit. In contrast, when the nation is conceived in terms of ethnicity which tends to monopolize all the other forms of identity, i.e. to become a sole "ontological identity", or a "substantial identity" (J. Friedman), it stimulates an exclusive nationalism that ignores all the differences in its tendency to homogenize the population ethnically. Then the nation identifies with the nation-state as a center which determines the division between "external" and "internal", "us" and "them", "domestic" and "alien".

The transition from a political concept of the nation to an ethnically conceived nation comes into being in multinational states in times of crisis of the common political and cultural patterns. There emerges then a national/ethnic pattern that necessarily leads to the dissolution of multinationality. That is precisely what happened in the former Yugoslavia, and did not stop there but turned into an inter-ethnic war.

Bogdan Denitch writes about magnetism of nationalism which provides a needed collective identity when the old universalism has failed (B. Denitch, 1994). Being primarily defined in confrontation to "others", nationalism excludes a number of the subjects of the new nation-states and deprives them of their full status of citizens because the latter is limited to the ethnically dominant community. Hence, the subjects of the other nationalities become "second-class citizens". In that case one may speak of a "nationalist fundamentalism" as the trend of the new collectivist identity in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

However, in parallel with such an extreme collectivist/national identity, another extreme must not be ignored, i.e., an exclusive individualism which is characterized by an egoistic turn to oneself and one’s own well-being, abandoning any care for the others and any solidarity, which is given a negative connotation. This trend is only the other side of the coin of the sentiments of people who feel powerless and helpless, and try to escape from it into the protection of the "powerful nation", or retreat into oneself as the center of an isolated universum.

As far as nationalism as a main source of collective identity is concerned, the following questions should be raised: (1) how did national identification become so prominent, changing so rapidly the political/ideological and class identifications; and (2) was nationalism in-built into the structure of people’s mentality representing a strong but latent inner force, or it was induced by external forces?

It is especially evident that a need for collective identity becomes stronger in war time, and it is then that the conflict between ethnic and non-ethnic identity in a nation-state is generated. Thereby the notion of the citizen is replaced by the notion of nation and what happens then is an ethnification of national identity when the "primary loyalty" is to an ethnic group (J. Friedman). From the absolutization of national/ethnic identity to the idea of "ethnic cleansing" is not too far, because the national identification is constituted on the principle of a dominant nation which feels secure only if it has a clear ethnic territory.

However, national identity in present-day Yugoslavia is not of this kind if it is borne in mind that FR Yugoslavia is a multinational community. This holds true both for Serbia and Montenegro, because 1/3 of the former is non-Serb; in the latter there are not only "pure" Montenegrines but also those who identify themselves as Serbs, and no small number of Albanians as well. Extreme nationalism thus entails not merely a confrontation with the peoples from the other states of the former Yugoslavia, but also an internal national conflict which expresses itself more or less openly and depends on the exclusiveness of national identities emphasized in the relationship between Serbs and Albanians. The xenophobia that arises from such an internal confrontation makes difficult the construction of a modern nation as a political community, because the existing ethnic groups oppose, or even exclude, one another (e.g. Albanians in Kosovo reject the state of Serbia, and do not see themselves as a part of it). Such a plurality of ethnically conceived national identities militates against the constitution of a modern democratic state and fosters fragmentation of FR Yugoslavia.

In conclusion, collective identity in its monopolistic and monolithic form (national/ethnic identity) predominates in the present-day Yugoslavia, with a weak expression of individual identities. Only the long-lasting civic protest in Serbia in 1996/97 showed a visible, but slow change of an authoritarian into a democratic model of identity. Citizens participated in the protest as personalities by their free will and choice, and not as an anonymous mass. Therefore one may say that this protest was the birth-place of a new civic identity But the events that followed showed that this transformation would not go without difficulties, because it referred to a change of people’s mentality which requires a rather long time.

1. In the autumn 1996 the opposition parties won the local election in Serbia, but the central government was not willing to accept this fact, and the results of the election were forged. After that mass civic and student protests took place in the streets of Belgrade and in cities all over Serbia, which lasted without cease for three months - an event previously unknown in present-day Yugoslavia. They demanded from the authorities the recognition of the real results, and after long riots and the intervention of OSCE they finally succeeded. It seemed then that a civic consciousness was awakening and that a new model of collective identity and action was born. However, studies amongst those participating in the protests still affirmed a high rate of authoritarianism.