This paper deals with the notion of social identity as it concerns the problems of individual self-definition in the social context of postcommunist societies. It is based mainly on the core postulates of social identity theory according to which an individual continuously strives to achieve a satisfactory concept of his or her own image. This is achieved not only in the process of inter-individual comparisons, but also, and first of all, through member-ship in numerous groups which contributes, positively or negatively, to the image an individual has of himself. Namely, the fact that one is a member of various social groups is a very important contributing aspect of an individual’s self-definition. In that sense, "group" has not only objective, social, but also psychological, meaning.

As Tajfel explained, this cannot be understood merely as a face-to-face relation between a number of people, but is also a cognitive entity meaningful to the individual at a particular point in time. The meaning of a "group" is achieved by a process of "social categorization". This is a process of bringing together social objects or events in groups with regard to an individuals actions, intentions and system of values and beliefs. Social categorization, thus, represents a system of orientation which helps to create and define the individual’s place in society (Tajfel, 1981)

Social identity can be seen as a quite certain consequence of group membership: it is defined as the part of an individuals self-concept which derives from knowledge of one’s membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1981, 255). The acquisition of value and emotional differentials between one’s own and other groups is part of the general processes of socialization. So, every society consists of the social identity, the library of scripts "which is created out of social realities, changes with them, and always includes views about ‘others’ without which the scripts would lose both their meaning and their function" (Bruner, acc. Tajfel, 1981, p. 226). Although an individual’s view of himself is much more complex, some aspects of that view, are undoubtedly contributed by one’s membership in certain social groups and categories. Some memberships are more prominent and more important for an individual than others; and both their importance and their salience may vary as a function of time and a variety of social situations.

Social identity theory claims that there are several possible consequences of the "recognition of identity in socially defined terms". An individual will tend to remain a member of a group and seek membership in new groups if these groups have some contribution to make to the positive aspects of his social identity. But, If a group does not satisfy this requirement, if possible the individual will tend to leave it, literally or symbolically, if this does not conflict with some of his own important values. In the latter case, the common solution is to reinterpret the negative attributes of the group in order to make them acceptable, or to engage in social action which would change the unfavorable group position in society (p. 256).

What is important for social analysis, however, is the fact that models of accepted social identities, that is, the kinds and level of values and of emotional investments in specific group memberships are relevant to certain aspects of socio-political behaviour. The interaction between socially-derived value differentials, on the one hand, and the cognitive "mechanics" of categorization on the other is particularly important in all social divisions between "us" and "them". It then becomes one of the cognitive and behavioral supports of various kinds of intergroup relations and socio-political choices and actions.

The problem of prevailing models of social identity in the political milieu of present day postcommunist societies is closely connected with background and patterns of expression of relevant group identifications from the period of communism (socialism). The difference between communist and so-called democratic societies is usually perceived to consist in the basic paradigm of identity — the prevalence of collectivistic over individualistic, authoritarian over self-actualizing, or heteronomous over autonomous types of identities. The difference, however, is not only (or primarily) in certain realized choices, but in the range of the possibilities they offer, namely, communist, as well as all the others. The revolutions have brought a sudden decomposition of the old social structure, followed by efforts toward its reconstruction along the line of a specific ideological projection of a "desirable" systematization of the social world. Along with this "social categorization" implied by the communist, as any other orthodox ideology, identity is based on the few already given, preordained, and unquestionable criteria as to what is important and what is not, what is desirable what is not, in an otherwise complex and interwoven matrix of social categories. Consequently, in the process of a strong ideologization of all social relations, communist regimes (of totalitarian/authoritarian type) tried to induce into the social consciousness of their citizens a certain image of the social system.

This sharply underlined the differences between the social categories, even where they were irrelevant before; most of all, it blurred the differences where they "naturally" or traditionally existed. On the base of an ideologically constructed picture of the social world, members of society were arbitrarily categorized in a limited number of predetermined social value categories. In the context of an ideological paradigm of "classless and pacified society" differences between classes were erased, and the importance of confessional and ethnic belonging were denied. At the same time, new social categories ("working people", "nation of proletariat"), supranational affiliations ("Yugoslav", "Soviet man"), as well as new elements of social structure ("kulak", as a pejorative name for rich peasant, "honest intelligentsia", "social parasites", and so on) were established.

This limited, ascriptive and static paradigm of identities made communist society similar to a traditional one, and at the same time differentiated it from the modern and democratic one. However, in traditional as well as in modern democratic society, the established social consensus about the criteria of membership to certain groups was the product of social, political, cultural, and economic evolution. In contrast, in communist society, social categorization was not created out of social reality, but imposed from above and ideologically prescribed. That is, the social consensus in regard who was "in" and who was "out" of a certain group was replaced by ideological differentiation or homogenization which were normative in character. Thus, the limited and prescribed scheme of social structure narrows an individual’s perspectives and the available repertories of group identification. This provides the basis for a limited, directive and nonauthentic choice of identity models.

An ideologically deduced definition of group affiliation, in the sense of imposed divisions or unifications, produces a low and changeable level of consensus when individuals categorize themselves as members of certain groups, or when they are categorized by the others as such. That produces a confusion of social identities, making group affiliation a quite uncertain criterium of social status, as well as personal value and self-respect. Forced "intervention" in the given social reality and existing social categorization in the postrevolutionary period, caused individuals and whole social groups "overnight" to be left without not only their social, but also their psychological grounds. The new categorization which was beyond any social experience, constituted an uncertain basis for an individual’s self-image. It was also unclear ground for recognizing and articulating differentiated common group interests and therefore for acceptance of a shared interpretation of the social situation. So, it represented a poor guideline for independent social choices and actions.

Obstacles in establishing social identities — not only as a measure of self-evaluation, but also as valid orientations of behaviour in the social world — manifested themselves in the previous Yugoslav society in different ways. The most striking examples are found in the class, ethnic and confessional group identifications. The following illustrations are at the same time descriptions of the most characteristic ways of solving the problem of such "empty identities".

Studies of the image of social structure in ex-Yugoslav society showed that, for the majority of the population, it was to a great extent uncrystallized or completely ideologized. Ideologization of this aspect of social consciousness was relatively even more prominent among strata whose real position in society was favorable. So the official image of society as classless was relatively more widely accepted among political and economic leaders and among the humanistic intelligentsia (as well as among more qualified industrial workers), i.e., those groups which profited most from the so-called "instrumental hypocrisy". Namely, those groups widely accepted the offered interpretations of present society as the means of their social promotion.

In fact, relatively greater willingness to identify with the working class was expressed by the non-manual strata who were by status and occupational further away from workers. This kind of "aspirative identification", however, was not only a matter of conforming to ideological norms or system repression, but also a matter of the social climate in general, that is, of social appropriateness and desirability. This was the psychological attempt of a partly ideologically stigmatized social group (the humanistic intelligentsia) to assimilate itself to the ideologically and socially approved majority (working people) in order to reestablish and preserve their disturbed positive self-evaluation. In such a blurred picture of society, identification with a fictive social category such as "working people" was ideologically and socially more desirable and therefore represented a reliable means for providing positive social identity. But in that way this social group to a great extent had lost any connection with its real place in the social hierarchy and, respectively, with its real social aspirations and interests.

The second example of empty identities is related to the fate of the national/ethnic identification in multiethnic former Yugoslavia. This kind of identity reaches the very core of an individual’s self-identification and self-respect, because it is formed early in an individual’s life cycle and has a strong emotional charge. The Communist regime in former Yugoslavia, however, offered as a solution for past interethnic conflicts, suppression and denial of the importance of any kind of ethnic identity. In the name of so called "brotherhood and unity" it introduced the supranational concept of "yugoslav identity".

This period in general was characterized by a quite contradictory and inconsistent process of socialization of the national consciousness and ethnic identity with respect not only to various periods of the communist reign, but also to various regions and ethnic groups. In general, national identity was first completely denied in the name of monolithic communist ideology, then the difference between "dangerous" and "less dangerous" nationalisms was established, and finally (after the Constitution from 1974) the right for national self-determination, and the principle of ethnic group identification, were more or less openly pronounced (at least for minority nations and ethnically homogeneous regions). In accord with this change, there were some indirect signs that the dominant bases for group identification in the population also had been gradually and unevenly changed. But, inquiries into group affiliation indicated that, overall, until the very moment of the country’s disintegration, the affiliation with the Yugoslavia (the federal state), that is, "Yugoslav identity", was the most prominent.

Although the turbulent social and political milieu of postcommunist countries is quite different from the stable, but ideologically normed, social life in the period of socialism, inhabitants of present day "systems in transition" are confronted with similar difficulties in a process of achieving satisfactory self-realization. In the absence of systematic investigations in this field, we can speculate about possible, and analyze some actual, effects of vague social categorization on collective and individual social identities. This vagueness is the evident consequence of the destruction of the social/political structure and the changed frame of reference in those societies. What is the impact of this permanently changing social and political situation that is characteristic of the process of "transition" during which one system of objective social categories is disappearing and a new one has not yet been clearly defined and outlined?

The destruction of the "objective" social and geopolitical structures blurred the subjective social categorization, that is, the value-laden differentiation between the main social groups in and between societies. Two processes have been in play: on the one hand, the disintegration of some ex-socialistic countries and the establishment of new national states (after the secession of various ethnic groups and minorities from previous federal states); on the other hand, the decay of social structures which followed the changes of their previous socio-economic systems. Together they have produced great difficulties for individuals, as well as for some groups, in getting a clear cognitive map of the social world in general, as well as of their own position within it. Redefinitions of citizenship, changed and often replaced positions of majorities and minorities, nondifferentiated and completely vague (even unrecognizable) relative positions of socioeconomic strata — all these recent phenomena make subjective social categorization an uneasy task. The evident crisis of value systems in those societies ruins the individual’s ability to develop valid criteria for value differentiations and comparisons between the main social groups, and also one’s ability to determine the subjective importance of one’s membership in some of those groups. This removes all clear systematization of the social world in the sense of selection of valid criteria for estimating which among the group memberships is really important, valuable and desirable, and which is not; and consequently of gaining a common, shared interpretation of social reality.

All that confusion interferes with already existing cultural images, perspectives and interpretations concerning the social system and its organization. This makes autonomous choices between various available "scripts" of identities almost impossible. Consequently, establishing stable, authentic and positive social identities is highly improbable. In the search to gain and regain adequate social identity, people in postcommunist societies apply several possible "solutions". Some of them are particularly characteristic for inhabitants of the third Yugoslavia, who are forced to live under ghetto conditions, with the social experience of constant accusation and stigmatization by the rest of the world.

The first solution is escape to tradition, in the sense of stressing a separate cultural identity, unique tradition and "roots". That is to search in the past of the group for some of it’s old traditional values, or separate group attributes and identities, and to revitalize them by giving them new and positive significance. Return to the tradition — to a traditional culture that is "superior", to the past history of the group whose glory is "approved", and to orthodox group values that are unquestionable — is expressed through predominant identification with ethnic and/or confessional groups to whom one belongs by birth. Many of the empirical studies have indicated this "Copernican turn" in the social consciousness of the Yugoslav public in the past few years, indeed, especially when the characteristics of the group identifications are considered. Analyses of the social attitudes of the Yugoslav population which refer to the relative importance of some of the most important social groups (ethnic, confessional, socioeconomic, professional, etc) confirm that, in the period after 1990, a nation or ethnic group has suddenly become the most popular form of group affiliation.

Another model of identity can be designated as "forced" or "coercive" identity. These are various social identities created or enhanced in order to receive certain attitudes and treatments from the "outside" groups. For instance, so called "Balcanism", or the notion of a "heavenly people", as well as various kinds of parochial identities, may be accepted as a reaction to "ostracism", isolation and rejection by the "rest of the world". This is the case with the Yugoslav (Serb) population after the economic and political sanctions introduced by the UN. The main psychological mechanism here is "withdrawal from comparisons with others which is made possible by the development of separate and socially powerful criteria of personal worth" (see Tajfel, p. 328). An inquiry into the width of the group affiliations, in the sense of identification with global — geographically and territorially (politically) defined — wholes, indicated that until the very moment of the country’s disintegration the priority affiliation of former Yugoslav citizens (as already mentioned) was "Yugoslav". This was followed by European, republic (Serbia), province, mondial and at the bottom of hierarchy, parochial (local) affiliation.

Only a few years latter empirical data indicated that the local, parochial affiliation had become the dominant choice of the citizens of present day Yugoslavia: the feeling of belonging to the most narrow, local community — the place of living — is now characteristic of more than one third of the Yugoslav population, and represents the basic framework of the geo-political identity. Affiliation with Yugoslavia as the state community is second in importance, followed by affiliation with republic (Serbia) while identification with broader geo-political entities (Europe, the world in general), beyond the level of the national state, is much less widespread. The shift to parochial identities has been noted in all social categories and is proven to be relatively independent from internalized social values. Withdrawal into local boundaries (or shift to parochial identity) should legitimately be interpreted as a consequence of the idiosyncratic experience of the nation which for many years has been excluded from the global international community, labeled and treated as a "pariah".

A no less unusual solution of the identity problem is some strategy of social mimicry and/or conformism. That means acceptance (but not necessarily internalization) of "imported" value criteria of separateness and self-estimation, or those criteria that are the most frequent at a particular point of time in the particular social frame. In this case, the point is not in the ideologically imposed models of identification, but in conforming to the "spirit of the time", or acceptance of "outer" definitions of personal worth. So, the models of identity from different (political) cultures are uncritically taken over, or the identity preferences are shifted toward some objects of identification which are not in the scope of the real individual’s experiences and perspectives (for instance, some declarative forms of "European identity", "democratic" political identity, "Westernization", etc.). In a way, the mechanism of psychological assimilation is in charge here. These "identifications by declarations" occur in the absence of real values behind those determinations as well as a clear sense of group separateness or personal worth. Phenomena of self-hatred and devaluation of one’s own or similar groups often precede this kind of identification. Rejection of some other kinds of identities is, sometimes, the only meaning of these "negative" models of identity. Leaders of some of the former Yugoslav federal units, for instance, in their urge to separate from ex-Yugoslavia, often denied connections of their people with "Balkanism", "barbarism", "byzantine civilization", etc. In this "solution" to a problem of identity, instead of the choice of an autonomous model of identification, the choice is to behave appropriately according to imported standards. Widespread conformist attitudes and behaviour in postcommunist societies, in general, proves that the principal reaction to anomia is actually — conformism. But the same kind of identity model has its aspirative connotation,and therefore also could have positive socialization effects.

All those "exits" represent some kind of socio-psychological adaptation, in order to bring back the sense of predictability and safety in an unpredictable and shaking social context. The point, as our analysis suggests, is that there are not always authentic or adequate values beyond these identity models. So, they do not always represent adequate self-definitions and probably are not the "right" and long lasting solutions.Tradition often offers models of identification incompatible with the urges of modern society. Uncritical conformism with "imported models" of identification sometimes leads to cultural and personal alienation. "Nostalgic identities" come into conflict with reality. And "coercive" identity is, by its very nature an unsatisfactory solution. The basic condition of having some contribution to the positive aspects of an individual’s or groups self-respect is not satisfied.

The turbulent social context of "transition" in postcommunist Yugoslav society is not a safe basis for the creation of adequate social identities that can match the demands of democratic transformation. We can speak, sometimes, about the regressive and non authentic nature of emerging identities in postcommunist countries in general. Those identities are in transition, too. Therefore, they have not changed yet, or still are not changing, but rather are shifting or floating from one "solution" of the identity problem to another. This is because of the lack of a common and stable system of cognitive and value orientations which can help to create and define the individual’s (and the groups) place in the society. These are not new models of identification, but the heritage from the uncritically adopted traditional past value system, or also someone else’s identity uncritically accepted. Shifting identity is produced by instantaneous and capricious social and political situations and fluctuates with them in kind, scope and intensity. So we can witness in a relative short period of time sudden shifts or withdrawals from more modern forms of group identifications to traditional ones; from wider geo-political identifications to local (parochial) identities; from minority identities (that demonstrate the psychological effects of minority membership) to majority identity, and vice versa; from identification with former and no longer existing models to new unrealistic models of identification (beyond actual social experience), etc.

It seems that the turbulent social and political context of some postcommunist societies — which blurs the diversity of existing social groups, changes borders between social categories overnight, brings confusion into the process of value differentiation between them, and consequently, disables social comparison and ruins the sense of positively valued separateness — produces not some new models of identity, but rather social identities that are adapted but not adopted. So-called shifting identity is continuously adapting to variable, constantly changing and vague social situations. As long as it lasts, such social context will not lead to a plurality of identities that is characteristic of a democratic and open society, but to some kind of schizophrenic identity — contradictory, unstable, and based on uncertain value criteria.Thus, it will represent a poor basis for individual and group self-definition and self-respect, and, as a consequence, a poor basis for the articulation of group interests, social and political choices, and meaningful social actions.