Regardless of the term we choose for denoting collective identity — ideology, common values, communal solidarity, or "interpretive systems" — the question of the content of these creations may be posed. My intention in this paper is to answer the following question: can the contents of a democratic, action-producing identity be perceived in certain forms of collective action in Serbia? I have chosen to focus on three such forms of collective action: the state, the society and the nation. Although the first selected form — the state — might be denied capacities for establishing a collective identity, I think its action should be taken into account since, functionally speaking, the state is responsible for the normative aspect of social integration and for the prevention of the disintegration of society. By its decisions it sustains the normative identity of the society, and for these decisions it needs at least minimum legitimacy (Habermas, 1979: 180).

Another antecedent question that has to be settled refers to democratic content. In the public life of Serbia democracy is most often mentioned under the heading of "free and fair elections". Free and fair elections are understood as involving formally equal starting positions of the political parties taking part in the struggle for power, and the readiness of all the participants, principally of the ruling party, to recognize election results, i.e. the electoral replacement of the government. In other words, the notion refers to the efforts of the opposition parties to reach an agreement with the government concerning fair electoral conditions, including freedom of expression, especially in the form of free and accessible media. While the idea that universal franchise of all adult members of the society and fair elections comprise the basis of each and every democratic society is beyond doubt, democracy cannot be reduced to electoral conditions alone. As an author rightly remarks, if only these procedural criteria for electing parliament and the government were applied, most countries today could be classified as democratic (Zakaria, 1997). Zakaria notes that in recent times there has been a rising number of "illiberal democracies", with relatively free elections, but without the clear rules for limiting power that constitutional liberalism requires. Many current democracies have not accepted constitutional liberalism which essentially entails individual rights and dignity (the so-called "birthrights" of the individual) and excludes pressure and repression against the individual either by state, society or church. Other elements include the right to private property, the rule of law, division and mutual control of legislative, executive and juridical branches of power (the so-called checks and balances), and freedom of speech and association. In this view, the essential feature of the Western-type democracy is the constitutional limitation of power which prevents its abuse. Fair elections are just one of the criteria of a democratic society. The best example is provided by today’s Iran, where free elections are regularly held, but repression of individuals is immense. Such a government imposes a set of constraints upon citizens’ liberties and rights, including the way of dressing (Zakaria, 1997: 23). One could go as far as to say that autocratic liberal states, such as Austro-Hungary used to be, are more tolerable than illiberal democracies in which there are elections, but not constitutionally limited power (Zakaria, 1997: 27).

Therefore I will take into account both standards for "measuring" democratic identity: electoral rules or the existence of fair and free elections, and the constitutional limitation of power excluding authoritarian rule, even if it is democratically elected.

In Serbia the state has not established a democratic identity in any of these aspects. There are good reasons to claim that Serbia has not managed to pass the threshold of democratic constitution of power in free and fair elections ever since the multiparty system was introduced and the first elections held in December, 1990. That elections have not been free and fair is most clearly seen in the control over the media. Not only have the media favored the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia and its president during election campaigns, they do not perform even their basic function of providing citizens with "true and timely" information. The electoral process allows for electoral frauds. One such fraud was publicly exposed in the case of 1996 local elections. As a matter of fact, the 1996 electoral fraud and the refusal to recognize Djukanovic’s victory in the 1997 Montenegrin presidential elections both indicate that the government is simply unwilling to acknowledge election results, i.e., the replaceability of government. Although the opposition and civic associations have persistently called for a consensus on electoral legislation, freedom of the media and control of the electoral process — i.e., on the procedure for organizing and controlling the elections for state bodies — no agreement has been reached. In 1992 a round table was held where a compromise was found over the number of electoral districts in Serbia. However the agreement was annulled in 1997 by a one-sided move of the government. A law was proposed changing the number of electoral districts from 9 to 29. By breaching the Constitution and the procedural rules of the National Assembly of Serbia — driving MPs out of the Assembly — the law was adopted, almost on the eve of parliamentary elections in Serbia.

The circumstances forced a change, at least formally, in the single-party identity of the state. But the new institutions were emptied of any substantive content and genuine decision making. Along with the absence of democratic electoral conditions and constitutional limitation of power — primarily in the area of the protection of rights — this has resulted in a drastic reduction of the state’s integrative capacities. Serbia is thus characterized by an internal war along several lines (the government — the opposition, ethnic majority — ethnic minorities, federal state — the republics) which means it has not succeeded in solving the ancient Hobbesian problem of "internal peace" and order. The usual way of solving this problem in the modern world is consensus that all members of the society are equal, possessing equal rights and duties.

If the identity of the state is characterized by the monopoly of one party that keeps generating constant crises and instability and enhances disintegrative processes, a question necessarily arises. In the case of a postcommunist regime (by post-communism I mean the transition of East European countries to a democratic society) that externally sustains an appearance of democratic institutions, but without democratic content, transparent elections and ways of making political decisions, on what does its legitimacy rest? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyze what has been happening with the other two collective actors — the state and the nation. I assume that national identity, constructed by the government itself (though not exclusively by it) is the basis of the legitimacy of the autocratic identity of the state. Social identity, on the other hand, has been destroyed, or at the very least thoroughly weakened, becoming unable to take on the role of delegitimizing the current regime.

The other collective actor — the society — is here defined in classical terms as a system of functionally differentiated subsystems of action, connections and relations of diverse groups which through their action create the "social community" that meets the needs of the members of society. Although group dynamics in the Serbian society may seem quite intense (e.g. numerous strikes), it is largely unorganized. Combined with a low level of social structuration, this results in an inability to articulate basic and different social interests. Since the society has not really entered a normatively ordered transition, first of all in the economic sphere, the society is unable to differentiate itself, either horizontally, in functional terms, allowing for relatively autonomous action of economic, personal, political, and normative subsystems; or vertically, in terms of creating a stable system of social stratification. The absence of interest-bound organization that would provide social groups with well-defined and stable courses of action, and more importantly, establish links between the social structure and political action, the society is virtually incapable of articulating its needs, including political goals, values and normative order.

A clear manifestation of this is to be found in the confused action of labor unions. The "state union" still exists, controlling the articulation of social interests, along with a set of insufficiently powerful independent unions, and a large number of ad hoc union organizations emerging in strikes and disappearing with them. Other social groupings have the same tendency as well — to disappear or divide into a large number of organizations, where sheer numbers are less important than the impossibility of mutual cooperation in defining a common interest. For instance, the student movement of 1991 disappeared like a phantom, the student movement of 1992 lasted for two months and then vanished completely, while the student movement of 1996 at least left some trace, although it also broke into a host of organizations unable to cooperate with one another.

The low level of social articulation remains the gravest problem despite the continuous decline in the standard of living, pauperization and the reduction of life and professional opportunity. This problem stems from the permanent destruction of society itself — primarily from the destruction of social stratification which is the backbone of interest-bound action, as well as an instrument for "measuring" the economic dynamic and what the "politicians" promise and do. The existing social groups often achieve their immediate, short-term interests while at the same time lacking strength for effective long-term control over the government and for initiating changes in accord with their own interests.

The spontaneous and civic collective action of the society (here I mean mass demonstrations), which has been a frequent occurrence in Serbia over the past seven years (excluding here the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" of the 1980s, which was directed from above), has produced and expressed the democratic identity of the society. These events include: March 9, 1991 (mass demonstrations against the control of the regime over state television), the Vidovdan Meeting of 1992 (renewing the demand for free media and for the resignation of the President of the Republic of Serbia), and, finally, the three-month demonstrations of 1996-1997 against fraud in the local elections. In all these "rebellions" of society, almost as a rule, there emerged accompanying student movements that independently supported the democratization of the country. Although these mass demonstrations were headed by opposition parties, they had a spontaneous (popular or civic) character, reflected in the fact that they announced, indicated and created a "parallel" society, a new community with new rules. This is particularly true for the three-month demonstrations in 1996-97. The latter expressed democratic demands of the citizens all over Serbia so powerfully that the legitimacy of the regime was more than shaken. The demonstrations referred to respect for the popular will: fair and free electoral conditions, freedom of the media, and a set of essential items of liberal democracy: the rule of law, the dignity of the human person and their rights, and a freely elected, replaceable, accountable and controlled government.

What are the effects of such spontaneous expressions of democratic identity? The range of such forms of collective action, even when they obviously produce their own democratic identity, has proven to be limited in terms of delegitimizing the regime and forming democratic institutions and a certain normative order. The crucial question, however, is why the spontaneous energies of the society resemble underground streams: they surface, then sink down and disappear, only to resurge on some other occasion. The three-month demonstrations offer the best answer to this question. In order for the mass manifestation of democratic identity to produce certain institutional outcomes, i.e. to be efficient, it must either create its own infrastructure and its own political articulation, including leadership, or rely on the firm and politically articulated infrastructure of the existing opposition parties. Such movements have relied on the "democratic opposition" and were led by it until the moment when the "democratic opposition" itself fell apart, as happened with the coalition Zajedno ("Together"). This breakdown left behind rage, disappointment and pessimism among the demonstrators. On the political scene it created a wasteland where the very possibility of political articulation of democratic Serbia in the 1997 elections was canceled.

In the repeated presidential elections for the President of the Republic this rigged blockade became blatant. It is no exaggeration to say that an exploitative political class has come into being, consisting of both the government and a few "big," i.e. false, opposition parties. The government has allied itself with these parties in a "trio" with the aim of excluding any competition, as if the "trio" has no rivals. It is not surprising therefore that these "opposition" parties, just like the ruling one, do not possess their own, internal, democratic potential whereby they could legitimize themselves as democratic parties. Still less are they capable of expressing citizens’ democratic identity on a stable and long-term basis. For all these reasons, civic demonstrations, whose massive scale and long duration were without precedent in Serbian history, turned out to be a veritable "comedy of confusion".

On the other hand, the demonstrations themselves did not undertake straightforwardly to contest the ground for the legitimacy of the regime. This could have been done, since the regime invoked these grounds abundantly in qualifying the protests ("carrying foreign flags", "special war", "traitors", "spies", "fascists", "Serbia shall not be governed from the outside", etc.). Furthermore, the sharp contrast between what was really going on in the streets and the regime’s interpretation thereof could have been employed to this effect. Incidentally, the same interpretation of the protest was later taken over by the Serbian Radical Party leader V. Šešelj, who profited from it. This is one more proof that the legitimacy of the regime was not brought into question by the protest.

The phenomenon of generating national identity, i.e. the process of taking on the role of belonging to the nation, has been sufficiently studied so that we need not delve too deeply into this troublesome topic. Generally, many authors have distinguished between two such identities. There are not necessarily characteristic of particular nations; both may appear in one and the same nation depending on the concrete historical situation, although the "objectivist" identity in the form of ethno-national identity has been more characteristic of Eastern than Western Europe. The first type of identity refers to a subjective political feeling of belonging to the nation, involving the individual’s self-perception as a member of the nation with respect to language, common history, fate and culture. These are classified and distinguished from other people who perceive themselves as members of other nations, i.e. other cultures, histories and communities. The second type of national identity is objectivized through ethnic membership (blood ties) i.e. membership in a single unified organism that is in a permanent state of self-defense against threats from the outside. The latter type of identity is by definition exclusive, paranoic, intolerant to the point of hatred and war. The former type, on the contrary, is tolerant, inclusive and subjective.

Some authors call the objectivized ethno-identification compulsive, defensive or aggressive nationalism. It is not based on the appeal and advantages of group membership, but rather on solving internal conflicts and insecurity. This difference in national identity may be expressed in many different ways. Some writers cite Freud and his distinction between two sorts of identification: anaclitic and oedipal. The former rests on (material or emotional) benefit, while the latter is built on threat, i.e. defense (Bloom, 1990:51). The fact that the Serbian nation found itself in the process of regression from political nation to an ethno-biological one, i.e. in the frustrated state of threat and defense, is presumably the consequence of its unpreparedness for the breakdown of the state community (former Yugoslavia) which it had viewed as its permanent framework. Of all the former republics only Serbia failed to construct its character as a sovereign state. This has led it into resentment, revanchism and inflated ideological nationalism, incapable of solving problems of nation and state.

These differences in national identity may be quite interesting. They must be understood dynamically and relatively — the "sick", over-irritated national identity can shift into the "healthy", tolerant one, and vice-versa. But nevertheless, what is important here is to understand that the "oedipal" defensive-aggressive identity is indispensable for establishing and maintaining the authoritarian structure of power and preventing a democratic national identity. Through propaganda, secret police action, regime dramaturgy, but also with the help of objective circumstances in the present and in the past, an exclusive, absolutized type of identity has prevailed in Serbia. In it, the same pattern is renewed time and again, namely, that the defense of the nation always has priority over democracy, development, openness and cooperation. Constantly producing ever new enemies, separatists, Serb-haters, this regime has been a parasite on identity based on threat and defense. As long as this identity is not abandoned, democratic identity cannot take root either in state institutions, social action, or national identity itself. Hence permanent crises, turmoil, defeats, disorders. We must be vigilant all the time, because the enemy is always lurking. But such dictatorships, being a sort of organism themselves, consume themselves quite fast, because they are constantly in action to produce disorders and crises. It is impossible to live in parallel with such a regime, beside it, or by "bracketing" it.

But this still does not mean that its exhaustion opens ways for getting out of the "sickness" and for creating a "healthy" national identity asserted and confirmed in democratic institutions. There is a deeper cleavage in Serbia, referring also to the issue of restructuring and balancing national identity. Serbia is currently divided in two sharply opposed parts: those who see Serbia as modern, democratic, able, attractive and open, and those who see it as isolated, inferior, frightened and backward. This cleavage may also be expressed as the division between, on the one hand, those who wish Serbia to liberate itself from the anachronous ideologies of communism and nationalism, and their mixing (the cockade and the red star joined hand in hand in the struggle against democratic and economic reforms) and, on the other, those who feel comfortable in the embrace of ideological communities closing ways for rational solutions to state, national and economic problems. "Warm" ideological paradigms currently prevail — a mix of socialism and nationalism which is precisely viewed as something specifically "ours", Serbian.

I have described a vicious circle: the old regime resorted to ethno-nationalism in order to preserve itself, in part also because it was not ready to constitute the Serbian nation as a modern political community and set Serbia on democratic foundations. The resort to ethno-nationalism wrecked both the government and the opposition, along with the state and a major part of the society. In this vicious circle or chain of destruction, the spontaneous release of democratic identity cannot be molded into the identity of the state, nation or society. The existing democratic factors are not powerful enough to break the vicious circle, not only because they are the weaker side, but also because the government and the false opposition are deliberately undermining them by permanently denouncing them as "traitorous", "anational", "anti-national" or, simply, insufficiently "Serbian".

But is there still a way out of the Serbian quagmire? There are at least two possibilities. One is to reduce the regime’s space of maneuver by breaking the false confusions keeping Serbia in a state of hibernation. This breakthrough could be carried out by culture, independent media, democratic parties and civic associations. The other possibility is objective: a new and final explosion of the chronic crisis due to the exhaustion of the ruling organism. Something like that has already happened in Montenegro, why not in Serbia?

1. See Erikson, 1959. This socio-psychological interpretation of collective identity is summed up by Erikson in the following way: "Identity or ideology are two aspects of the same process. They both provide the necessary conditions for the maturing of the individual and, therefore, for the next, higher form of identification, i.e., for solidarity cementing the common identity" (Erikson, 1959), 157.

2. See Basta et al., 1977. In this study the authors stressed that in the transition period in East European states the central role has been played by constitution-making, which refers not only to creating an appropriate constitutional-institutional framework, but also to "an indispensable channel for substantive determination of basic democratic consensus of the new political community", p. 7. Constitutional changes in Serbia are necessary, but they will not achieve their goal unless "basic constitutional-systemic presuppositions are established for a democratic reconstruction of Serbia as a modern political community . . .", p. 8. According to the findings of the study, the current Constitution of Serbia was adopted "when the communist regime decided to renounce formally its identity, in order to postpone the question of its legitimacy. Consequently, the Constitution continues to be viewed as an instrument of power, rather than the legal basis for its limitation".

3. This phenomenon of the "ruling party in the opposition" has been referred to several times by Dr Vladimir Goati in his public discussions.

4. There is further evidence that internal reasons were the chief factor of "adding fuel to the fire" of the struggle for power in Serbia. At the outbreak of the pluralist era, it was precisely in Serbia that the old regime felt most uneasy, since here democratizing and dissident forces were the strongest of all the former Yugoslav republics. The old regime managed to avoid internal political conflict by externalizing it into an inflated ethnic conflict turned towards the outside, against other "threatening" nations. This hypothesis is confirmed by the profound indifference of the selfsame government to the fate of the Serbian people, and even to the fact that it has lost the war. For a more elaborate treatment of the transformation of internal conflicts among the elites into external, ethnic ones, without playing down the importance of ethnic and national problems at the practical and political level at the time of Yugoslavia’s breakdown, see works by V.P. Gagnon, Jr., especially Gagnon, 1994/95.