THEORY

The extraordinary thing about historical changes is that they never happen according to expectations. A naive notion of an automatic acceptance of universal values and of patterns of modern civil society in Eastern Europe disappeared immediately after the euphoria that followed the break-down of communism. After all those changes, reforms and transformations, civil society, based on the principles of human rights, tolerance, and the recognition of others looks like a distant utopia from present perspective of at least some of post-communistic societies. On the contrary, there is a revival and reestablishment of old, above all national, myths in some societies.

On a preliminary basis we could consider the difference in political dialogue to be between the informal and the formal. Informal dialogue is characterized by spontaneity and is limited to a relatively small number of interested people. Formal dialogue is open to all persons in a "layman’s" way and available to everyone when the dispute is about themes that encroach on the interests of a society as a whole, or at least of the majority of relevant social groups. Undoubtedly this difference coincides partly with the difference between a public that directly influences political occurrences and discussions within a certain group of people which does not have influence upon the government policy of a country. But this is an incomplete analogy. For on the one hand, some political or historical analyses by a restricted group of experts could have a wider than academic influence, and even could become subject of public dispute not limited to a definite group of experts, but yet would still be called informal dialogue. On the other hand, the opinion of an opposition group in a totalitarian society cannot be presented in public (since it occurs in a social system that forbids that kind of possibility) and accordingly cannot influence official politics but a group of experts — say economists — in an open society could have considerable influence on the development of politics.

We could say then that beyond a coincidence in time of origination of public and formal dialogue in modern western democracies, there is also an obvious essential interdependence between them. It could be hastily also concluded that informal dialogue, through strengthening formal dialogue, looses its strength and influence. However, in civil society the public has multiple influence upon the creation of government policy which is not strictly limited to action through political institutions or forms. This provides the opportunity for informal dialogue to enlarge its originally restricted influence and enables it to act in an oppositional and critical way, while at the same time not being dependent on party bureaucracies. One can recognize social obstacles, but not be able to eliminate them, just as a fine arts critic can evaluate some work of art without being able to create art him or herself. An independent intellectual is in no way a political visionary. A certain autonomy vis a vis government makes possible informal dialogue without institutional pressure on the participants, which enables it to have greater spontaneity and achieve a higher level of criticism.

A formal dialogue also means institutionalization, i.e., the need for its participants to be representative of the group they represent. Moreover, their decisions, agreements, laws or proclamations should be socially relevant and the participants should be bound to their application and realization. But, within political groups and government institutions, we can hardly find an adequate model for undisturbed and open dispute. These instances are governed rather by authoritative principles that sometimes exclude this kind of dispute completely. Sometimes the dialogue is disrupted and there is an attempt to impose the will of either the party leadership, or the most influential person in power, or a certain overriding formal-legal influence. The exclusion of non-parliamentary initiatives, with an application of so-called "solutions within the scope of the system’s institutions" when all the levers of the system are in its hands, also manifest of government cynicism as a more or less hidden form of despotism.

Informal dialogue is not bound by state limits and could act beyond the sphere of politics. That is why, for an open society, with guaranteed openness of media and a high level of objectivity concerning formal dialogue, it is also indispensable that the dispute be conducted outside political circles in a strict sense, i.e., public disputes, discussions and panels. In that way there is created a counterweight to authoritative and hierarchically constituted governmental instances, which itself refuses to be institutionalized.

No doubt this way of presenting informal political dialogue is an ideal type. In fact, it often is subject to different direct or indirect influences from political power, propaganda, or the interests of this or that part. Often this is covered by the allegedly non-partial and trans-political position of those who take part in the dialogue. However, if it is an open dialogue, it is supposed that it is possible to unmask the ideological contents of the dispute, or at least it is possible to strive to minimize particular interests and political influences. In that kind of dialogue the participants in a dispute do not have to submit a report to the government, party or politically like-minded persons. That represents significant progress in relation to the functioning of so-called party responsibility (from which party criticism appeared) in the time of real socialism.

However, informal dialogue itself is not without its limitation. Its scope is narrower and its influence is smaller than formal dialogue. Informal dialogue, limited to a small group of people, no matter how important the themes with which it deals, does not have relevance and political weight, as we should expect; because of that it cannot be sufficient to itself. However, it can lead to opening a public, i.e., a formal dialogue among socially relevant groups. The possibility of a dialogue or a dispute in a liberal political system presupposes the existence of some kind of "institutional compulsion" through which the government is bound to a dialogue. This is the first and the most urgent step towards public presentation of its plans and the rendering of an account to the public.

As we speak about myth, it is obvious that we have in mind exclusively the forming of a collective, not an individual identity. It is not a matter of an individual subject, i.e., the actor in events and the speaker in discourses, simply because myths are collective discourses. As Levy Strauss says, in order to transfer a piece of work into the state of a myth, it must no longer be individual. Therefore, myths do not have subjects; they are the joint products of the collective spirit. This elimination of subjects is methodological and makes possible — according to Levy Strauss — objectivity in studying social and anthropological phenomena. The author does not appear as an individual; the events in the myth most often are conducted by fate and not by the conscious will of an individual. Whether it is a somewhat idealistic collective conscience or national spirit, the subject-author of a mythic discourse remains anonymous, and most often cannot be identified or named. On the other hand, public dialogue, disputes or discussions have a named, identified and designated subjects. We know who it is and it is understood that the subjects, i.e. the participants in the dispute or dialogue, keep their word and be responsible for the consequences of their words.

In communist countries there was no public opinion in this sense. Some important questions could be discussed only within strictly controlled limits, so that it in no way encroached on the problems of the social system itself. Dissident group discussions and illegal books and journals that referred to important social problems, were available to only a small number of people. With the break-down of the communist regime, there arose an assumption regarding the creation of a modern public opinion. However, in many countries a formal change in authorities, a parliamentary system, free organization by citizens, political parties, free market and the disappearance of state censorship remained only an assumption and hence could not lead to the creation of an independent public opinion in all post-communist countries. As a consequence, dispute about many important matters was avoided and these post-communist countries could take only one direction: regression. In other words, they returned to non-problematic and traditionally inherited patterns of thinking and acting.

Yugoslavia — the second, as well as the third — is the best example of the development of these processes. There was no system liberalization or introduction of parliamentary procedures for the solution of the most urgent and important problems. In the second Yugoslavia, the question was never asked publicly and openly of a possible reshaping or rearranging of the interrepublic relationship, in other words, the question about mutual institutions, such as the parliament. (The second Yugoslavia never came to democratic and multi-party federal elections, so that the kind of elections was never discussed openly; nor was that question raised as relevant.)

One of the features of limited information space and the ability for manipulation by the government in Yugoslavia is a continual obstruction of formal dialogue, restricting the dialogue between the government and the opposition to only the period of electorial campaign. In that sense, J. Bentham’s metaphor of reserving a free press only for the period before elections reflects well the state of the media. That kind of the press freedom is like an estate where eight months a year all the watchdogs are locked up and the sheep are entrusted to the wolves. Opposition in Serbia seems to be "phantasmagoric" rather than real. Some analysts call "phantasmagoric" parties produced by the regime, those with an insignificant number of members or parties which act only during pre-election race (and most often it is a matter of all three together). However, if we take as criteria the appearance of the parties in the state media which are under state control, all oppositional parties could be called "phantasmagoric" for they appear intensively only during pre-election campaigns. Round tables and meetings of government representatives and the opposition are organized exclusively during the two or three months campaign. This also is the only chance for some national minority parties, i.e., regional parties, to present their programmes in public, and to point out to the problems regarding the state and legal position of the minority are in other words, the region, they represent. At that time, there is noticeably more intensive "care" both by the government and media about their status, but after the elections this returns to being ignored.

The break-down of past structures and a considerable part of present Yugoslav difficulties are the consequences of avoiding such public discussion. Three cases of avoiding rational, open and public discussion come to mind.

First, we can say that democratic rules themselves and parliamentary forms are rather imposed under pressure than established on the basis of equal dialogue between the communist government and the opposition. The development of parliamentary forms in Yugoslavia during recent years has come slowly and encountered many obstacles. Yet after all those events and pressures, we still await that long-expected dialogue, in other words, for a round-table discussion between the government and the opposition in which the principles of democracy should be established. Even the democratic opposition leader themselves recognize that after a decade of multi-party system in Yugoslavia we must start from scratch, i.e., from an initial dialogue about the operation of democracy, the media, elections, even about the constitution.

Second, in the third Yugoslavia the relationships in the federation between the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro are still like a fellowship of two tribes and nations, rather than of two republics. These relations still remain non-reflective and non-discussed, as were the relationships between the republics in the former Yugoslavia.

Third, till 1997 the most essential state matter, the issue of Kosovo, was not discussed, which continued the earlier silence in Yugoslavia. Public debate on Kosovo among the Yugoslav public was not even opened. Moreover, everything was done at the end of eighties in order that it be (violently) avoided and eluded — in other words, it was abandoned consciously out of political will. This came to an absurd result: the so-called "final solution of the Kosovo question" was discussed mostly by those who did not even want to solve it. (Note, I do not think that such questions could be "answered" as chess problems are solved: social conflicts are to be overcome and settled.) The revival of the Kosovo myth, except for national homogenization, was used also for avoiding rational discourse, public dispute and open dialogue between all interested parties, which discourse should not be predetermined only by the leaders and specially the former commissions which represent national interests. The Kosovo knot could be untied only through equal and public formal dialogue among all interested parties, whereas referring to the mythical patterns used by the governing elite could only postpone a solution.

However, insisting on open debate and dialogue without extortion and ultimatum represents, at least for the local situation and present state, a rather optimistic project. Balkan statesmen consider exclusion of the public as an advantage rather than as a defect. In that way they show their arrogance in reference to their political opponents and other citizens: it is their discretional right to make decisions alone or, at least, in secret. But when dialogue is closed for the public, no matter what strategically important matter is in question it is not democratic dialogue at all. We have witnessed a lot of treaties, summits, agreements, etc., which did not reduce tensions but, as later became clear, only added fuel to the flames. This means that political dialogue eo ipso does not have to have a positive connotation; subjectively, the will of the agents could be that the consequences of their decisions imperil other people. Hence, the public perception is, if not sufficient, an indispensable condition: social order without disputes, as Warner says, threatens social conflict; in contrast a dispute which solves conflicts represents the ideal of democratic order. In the long run, the least that public dispute and democratic dialogue can achieve is to free the citizens from awkward expectations and permanent uncertainty. Besides that, public dispute and dialogue show interested citizens with whom they are dealing.

1. Ch. Taylor, "Liberal Policy and Public," in Liberální spolecnost, str. 21.

3. M. Warner, The Letters of Republic (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 46.