Changes in values and the social change taking place in the last decade of the 20th century bring to the fore the complex problems of identity. Discussions on identity are particularly frequent and widespread in the social sciences, but in these debates the rich and diverse philosophical heritage of this issue usually is not accorded adequate attention. Thus it remains unclear what the concept of identity, so much talked about, actually means in our times. Sometimes it seems to be a sort of magic word, a key able to open each and any door: identity and community, the identity of a society, cultural identity, postcommunist identity, identity crisis — these are some expressions announcing the numerous dilemmas which, however, in spite of so much discussion remain without appropriate solutions.

First of all, the concept of identity itself is not particularly clear: this may be the case because the concept, like other fundamental ones, is difficult to catch in an unambiguous and precise categorial web, or because of a multiplicity of various, sometimes parallel, discourses reflecting certain aspects of this intricate problem. Yet, it seems that some higher order ought to be looked for in this mutually exclusive world of theories. The quest could start, for instance, from an attempt to distinguish the concept of identity from the concept of identification, which is related to the former in various ways and contexts. Their confusion and mutual substitution only results in making the knot of misunderstandings increasingly entangled.

There are at least two completely different meanings of the concept of identification. The first is a formal logical one, exact but also deprived of substance, while the other is psychological, substantial and inexact. When in the first case, for instance, identification means the process of establishing identity, as identifying something, the identity established in this way is completely formal, i.e. bereft of internal content and sense. Such identification of phenomena, objects, or beings, does not tell us much about their real identity. In other words, identity established by formal identification, being devoid of substance and empty, is not an identity in the sense we are interested in here. It functions at an abstract or mathematical plane, as well as in external mechanical observation, but such a meaning of the concept is completely inadequate where the philosophical-anthropological and socio-cultural issue is concerned.

In the second case, when we talk about internal, psychological identification, the matter is completely different. Psychology has shown that during the process of growth, learning and personality development, for example, various identifications take place both with "significant others" and with various characters of the cultural and artistic horizon whose dramas the individual experiences and whose values he/she adopts. These identifications, however, provide no guarantee that the individual will find him/herself, i.e., that one will realize one’s identity. If it were not so, there would not be cases of misplaced identification in the individuals’ personal, intellectual and social lives — identifications that lead to destruction, among other things, even of one’s own identity. In this sense the individual, to reach his/her identity, must liberate the self from the negative influences of other people’s identities, that is, from wrong identifications which constrain one’s own authenticity.

Bearing in mind these two different meanings of "identification" we could conclude that the relation of "identification" to "identity" is either external or opposed. Nevertheless, the conclusion would not be final, since the problem that seems to have ended here resurfaces at another place. Namely, when we deconstruct the word identity, we see that it consists of the words: identical and entity. If entity denotes a being, i.e., the essence of a being, and "to be identical" means "to be the same with this essence" (in the Serbian language, the words for "sameness" — "istost" — and "truth" — "istinitost" are etymologically related), then we may conclude that the concept of identity involves the meaning of identification (sameness with the essence). We should be aware, though, that this is a very special case of identification referring to a being’s own essence; in practice this is rather the exception than the rule, as is the convergence of an existence to the essence.

However, this case of coincidence between the concepts of identity and identification evidently does not imply necessarily that the concepts are identical. Identification denotes a state of identity, i.e., a process of substantive establishing of identity, only in special conditions which are not immediately given to the so-called common sense. They are difficult to determine since they refer to the metaphysical identification with one’s own identity. Without going into the metaphysics of the essence of being, we can say that essence is given primarily as a potential (and as an ideal); the dialectic of identity denotes simultaneously something that is unchangeable in changes, and something that changes constantly. Just as the river from which Siddharta in old age is learning about himself is the self-same river he watched in his youth, yet it is never regains the same but is ever-new in its continuous flow.

The problem of personal identity is solved in psychology through attempts to integrate various aspects of personality. Etymologically, a person denotes a mask (persona), the face of unity above various intertwined forms. As individual identity becomes the meeting-point between the particular and the universal, or a concrete individual and its universal essence, so the problems of collective identity could be solved analogously through an integration into a higher-order unity which allows for, and encompasses, a plurality of different worlds. What principally unites different individuals is their identification with common values. Values give a meaning to the collective, through the mediation of which individual existence is made more complete. The feeling of belonging to, and trust in, the collective as a whole motivates individuals voluntarily to work on asserting collective identity. But this commitment presupposes that the value order be the genuine reality of everyday life experience, since mere ideological proclamation of values sooner or later leads to a loss of trust, with the meaning of the collective and its identity being also lost along the way. An illusory identity corresponds to illusory values.

The assumption that the identity of the Yugoslav society was not completely as spurious as a sort of "king’s new suit" is justified particularly in the domain of culture. Unfortunately, this area of social life lacked the real economic and political power, which — enabling and determining a society’s survival — usually comprise the axis of its identity. In the former Yugoslav society the political and economic aspects of identity were a communist, farce, even though the points reached by the Yugoslav culture, marked by essential features of interculturality, testify beyond doubt to the great potential of that society. Because of Yugoslavia’s role as a buffer-state between opposed global blocs, and because of its leading role in the Nonaligned movement, for the external world the identity of the Yugoslav society seemed authentic and convincing. But actually, it coincided with President Tito’s "image and deed", which pushed into the shadow the entire internal stage of the society. Tito was the symbol of the Yugoslav society’s identity. The communist myth enabled the absolutist vision of Louis XIVth, expressed in the statement "The state — it is I," to reassert itself, though this time in a hidden manner, adjusted to the changed circumstances of several elapsed centuries. With Tito’s death, the simulacrum of the Yugoslav society’s identity was lost, and its implosion, which finished in the destruction of war, was actually a consequence of the previously accepted premises on which the whole system had been built.

Within the projected reality of a monopoly by the communist ideology, the authoritarian will to power had broad license to subject social actors. The destruction of all potential opponents within society was supported by its miserable tradition of national and religious conflicts. The communist ideological strategy of "intensifying class struggle", having completely erased the structure of civil society, was subsequently turned into an "intensification of interethnic oppositions" and, finally, into the idea of "national liberation" of particular SFRY republics. Hence the flair-up of ethnic anarchisms may be understood as a lack of political will, but primarily as the personal will of the mighty President to implement the universalistic principle of creating a modern political nation-state on the model of most European countries at all structural levels of Yugoslav society.

On the one hand, the ideology of the "brotherhood, unity and equality of all Yugoslav peoples" precluded the possibility for any one ethnic group imposing itself and assimilating the others after the principle of nineteenth-century conquering nationalism. Also, none of the ethnic groups was sufficiently superior for such an undertaking. On the other hand, the process of the neutral political creation of a nation of Yugoslavs was never initiated, although there were good reasons for such an identity. SFRY was thus transformed into an unreal, ideological creation within which the interests of preserving ethnic particularisms apparently have proven to be the only existent reality. If the potential of the community had not been systematically undermined from within, Yugoslavia would perhaps have become the unique historical example of forming a state on a different basis from the usual modern principles of political domination of one nation over others.

Numerous delusions brought about by socialism made all this seem to be not so strange. The hypocrisy of the totality of political life veiled what was actually going on behind the scene, preventing the creation of a "critical mass" of people aware of potential dangers and capable of countering them. After all, nowadays — when the causes of the problems are so much talked about — the feeling that as a society we are much worse off is difficult to avoid. The "critical mass", so significant for quantum leaps, may even have diminished. On the social plane, this refers to people, individuals who are aware that to have lost one’s illusions does not mean necessarily to know the way to establish social identity, or to be ready to look for these ways and implement them.

While in most other societies state, politico-economic and cultural identities are being reshaped and perfected more or less successfully and persistently, a positive identity for our society is still lost somewhere far away. If it were not so, would people continue to work "against themselves", and go on destroying mercilessly all potential sources of social renewal, both material and those that are more subtler? Would not space open for action by those who do not take the "common good" as an empty platitude for shielding personal greed. Would they not be allowed to restore trust in human and community values, either through personal example or social engagement? Would those enthusiastic — albeit, unfortunately, poorly channeled — energies shown during the winter demonstrations of 1996 and 1997 against electoral fraud be so abruptly covered with fear and apathy stemming from powerlessness? Among various options for responding to the power controlled by negative forces, a large number of our co-citizens chooses to ally with it; others choose to distance themselves from it; but there are very few who have the vision and courage to struggle for the establishment of values which would restore trust and a sense of the collective.

Relations of trust in a society are crucial for the ability to associate all of its groups. Between the smallest social group — family — and the largest — nation — in every developed society there extends the wide space of civil society, whose destruction was probably the most devastating consequence of socialism. Having destroyed everything that was in the way of the power of state rulers (be it in the economy, entrepreneurship, labor unions, the Church, the press, voluntary associations, and the family itself), socialism prevented the development of vital elements of culture: market economy and stable democracy.

However, cultures built on a communist ideology have a low level of cultural capital, reflected in lack of social trust. According to Fukuyama, the fierce irony of communist ideology is its failure to eliminate human selfishness. In the situation of scarcity and continuous pressure of being deprived of something, people have generally become more selfish, more materialistically oriented, and less permeated by the spirit of community, while their relation towards public affairs has become cynical. Besides, communism engendered bad habits, such as passivity and dependence on the state, while it constrained entrepreneurial energies. The ideological imposition of collectivism made people shrink from the collective. In Yugoslav society, instead of real development, ideologically proclaimed "self-management" values were perverted, and the spirit of agreement, together with the culture of voluntary cooperation within such groups as business companies and political parties was destroyed. Misused values have taken roots in the cultures of former communist societies whence they continue to block the process of the consolidation of democracy and market economy. Since habits built into culture are slow in changing, this lack of social habits prevents intellectual consent to democracy and capitalism, which is evident in most postcommunist societies, and keeps popular support for the reforms from functioning smoothly (ibid., p. 50).

On the basis of the cultural changes which are taking place all around us, we can see that cultures do change, after all, and that it is possible to influence them by political means. However, here is a danger, such as the one brought by communist ideology, that the traditionally rooted identity of a society be eradicated. But at the same time, here is the hope, perhaps, that in Yugoslav society some positive change may also take place, leading to the establishment of a social identity. To work on these changes means to work on the creation of a moral community that will provide its members with a certain level of trust. The level of a culture varies in proportion with ethical codes emphasizing the imperatives of honesty, charity and well-meaning to the community, and determining the degree of social trust. In some societies, traditional religious or ethical systems comprise the chief institutional sources of culturally determined behavior. For other, less successful societies, the lesson to be learned is to establish such systems.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia the so-called "national identity" has been promoted in the rhetoric of media propaganda as the most important form of collective identification. No wonder, after all, when we now see that nationalism is an all-present global principle. Modern societies have hypostatized the nation as an incontestable value. The modern ideal of the unitary nation-state, exported into the less developed societies, has contributed to the process whereby nationalism has become immensely popular all over the world, demonstrating its explosive power. Although "national revivals" and numerous ethnic protests have their roots back in the long tradition of ethnic values — much older than the modern world — with the emergence of modern bureaucratized state systems of the secular era, national identification has gained monstrous impetus, taking so many lives in various wars. In the political order of the world, the nation is the basic principle of government and the focus of social and economic activity; it is the criterion of culture and "identity". Ever since Durkheim identified society with the nation, and nation with the ideals of the collective, all aspects of social life have been integrated as collective participation in the shared destiny of the nation. This explains the fear that the disintegration of the myth of society-as-nation would result in the disintegration of society itself, because it would leave it with no national identity.

Since social virtues and sociability do not emerge spontaneously, but rather depend on former habits transferred by the tradition of social values and norms, the postcommunist Yugoslav society needs above all else to start establishing these habits. In this way, they may perhaps turn into a tradition, and contribute to a recognition of the telos of history reflected, according to Fukuyama, in the success of a market-based and democratic politics. The prerequisite for success is social capital, i.e. trust as the basis of organization, cooperation and everything else that comprises the healthy economy of a society. This is the real necessary foundation of its identity.

Even if along these lines we draw the consequences of Fukuyama’s interpretations of Weber and Hegel, and if we call the time of established identities the "end of history", this nevertheless would not be the end of the "story". For, though every identity should rest on the integration of universal values, each one of them must remain a particular and distinct essence. As such, each identity is a unique expression of the diverse forms of the spirit manifesting itself in the world. This is the reason why it is not plausible to use the concept of the models of identities. What is more appropriate from this perspective are models of identifications implemented as values we tend to accept and incorporate in our identities. This is achieved with more or less success — and unfortunately often merely apparently — because adverse powers exert their influence on losing identity at both the individual and the collective levels. What can help to transform these powers is a continuous awareness of identity and the values it presupposes. We should bear in mind, however, that identity is not a property acquired once and for all. On the contrary, as soon as we start to take it for granted it is likely to disappear. That is why it, like trust itself, must be perpetually reaffirmed.

1. G. V. F. Hegel, 1979. Fenomenologija duha (Belgrade: BIGZ).

2. Richard J. Bernstein, 1992. The New Constellation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), p. 295.

4. Slobodan Samardzic, 1994. Prinudna zajednica i demokratija (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije).

6. Immediately after the disintegration of the state, this "Muslim nation" was renamed "Bosniak", probably because the religious criterion for promoting a national identity seemed misplaced, even "grotesque", in both the metaphorical and original meanings of the word, conjuring the strange pictures from the ruins of the palace of Titus in Rome. See Milan Vujaklija, 1966. Leksikon stranih reci i izraza (Belgrade: Prosveta).

7. In an earlier paper, I commented that "in former Yugoslavia . . . it was precisely those who felt Yugoslav, and only them among all its peoples, who did not have their representatives in the federal assembly". See the collection of papers Interculturality, ed. by Bozidar Jaksic (Belgrade, 1995), p. 423.

8. Serbian translation of Francis Fukuyama, 1997. Sudar kultura (Poverenje. Drustvene vrline i stvaranje prosperiteta) (Belgrade: Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva), p. 41.

9. "Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism", in: Max Weber, 1946, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press). See Fukuyama, 1997: 55.