In the process of transition in postcommunist societies one crucial point is the ways and modes of collective and personal identities as a result of the discontinuity with traditional and authoritarian forms of identities, due to the collapse of so-called real socialism. The process of identification is particularly in need of analysis when one system disappears and another has not been clearly defined and outlined. The aim here is to discover how old models and forms of identities change, to what extent and in which direction. That is, what is the impact of the legacy of the old models and are they strong enough to negate any far-reaching transformation of the former system and of the behavior of the members of society. The breakdown of the state in Yugoslavia can illustrate the difficulties in a democratic transition and in searching for adequate models of identification.

This implies the following questions:

- To what extent has the change of global values already occurred, and how does it influence new forms of identification?

- What relations have been established between collective or group identities and personal identities, and whether the former still dominate over the latter?

- How does a new collective national identity influence the development of an open society with a plurality of identities: does it foster or hinder them?

- How far have postcommunist societies transformed themselves from a totalitarian/authoritarian type; are there tendencies towards renewing the mechanisms of authoritarian rule; how does this impact on the models of identities?

- How has the problem of identities and differences been approached in the postcommunist societies?

- How can different needs and interests in postcommunist pluralist societies be reconciled in view of the rise of nationalism?

- How are the constitution of the new state in terms of the rule of law, and the needs of new forms of identities in civil society to be taken into account?

- What has changed in political culture in societies of transition, and which models of identity require these changes?

This statement of the issue elicited a range of related studies whose drafts were presented for discussion in a conference held in Belgrade in the Fall of 1997. The completed chapters are included here in three sections. Part I describes the concrete problem of the achievement of a postcommunist identity, specifically in Serbia. Part II identifies some political factors which can serve as building blocks for such an identity. Part III looks more deeply for the foundation and direction of such a reconstruction. The three parts of this work reflect this division.

Part One describes the forces of destruction. It is a powerfully devastating picture combining a search for power at all costs, manipulation of authentic values, a pejorative assessment of essential foundations, and response to changing circumstances. This search is joined variously by those in power, those in opposition and those who would seek solutions. "Murphy’s law" — that whatever could go wrong does go wrong — is illustrated here. This has had the most dire effects not only upon the people of the former Yugoslavia, but upon the moral foundations of Europe as a whole. It depicts in term of political analysis what perhaps only "The cry" by Munch has succeeded in depicting in painting.

Discourse on identity is a modern phenomenon having its origin in the Western individualism, because it is in a pluralistic society that a multiplication of identities comes into being. Hence, there emerges the problem of how to reconcile the relation of self-identification with the existence of the "others" in order to answer the question "who am I" and "where do I belong".

Identity can be defined as an organization of the mental structure with both cognitive and affective characteristics which represents one’s individual self-perception as a distinct being in harmony with oneself and divided from others, and with a reasonable degree of coherence in behavior, needs, motivation and interests. That is, identity represents the entire consciousness of oneself which enables the integration of perception, sentiments and thoughts of one’s own personality (Krech and Crutschfield); it is also the maintenance of an inner sameness and continuity, i.e., it refers to permanence over time, to unity and to the ability to recognize and to be recognized.

The problem of identity becomes particularly accentuated in a time of social and civilizational crisis, when turbulence shakes all the existing values and principles and breaks down the established schemes of life without yet securing the new ones. This leaves individuals in a vacuum of social norms which results in increasing uncertainty and insecurity.

However, it is necessary to differentiate individual from collective identities, as well as the various forms of collective identity. A traditional society emphasizes collective identity, while modern society stresses the importance of achieving individual identity. In cultural terms this is an opposition between collectivism and individualism respectively; in political terms it is between communistarianism and liberalism. That is to say, one can speak of two sides of the formation of identity: the one consists in homogenization (linked with heteronomy) and the other with differentiation (leading to autonomy). One can distinguish the following forms of collective identity: cultural, religious, ideological-political, regional-ethnic, class, professional, and generational.

When one speaks of new models of identity appearing in postcommunist societies as a paradigm of identification this does not refer only to the question of whether a collectivist or individualistic orientation prevails, but also to the contents of that identification, i.e., whether it is totalitarian/authoritarian or democratic in nature. The former assumes the principle of heteronomy as indisputable loyalty to the leading (ruling) authority with the collectivity as the main source of identification and implies a weak individual identity. The latter fosters individuation as a form of authenticity from the standpoint of individual needs, rights and liberties, with a critical distance from collective demands. "Real socialism" was characterized by a totalitarian model of identification demanding subordination of individual creeds to a so-called social cause.

In this context the question should be posed: whether the present shift from ideological/political identity represents in itself a transformation of totalitarian/authoritarian models of identity into a democratic one? Except for the most advanced Central-East European societies (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) all the others suffer under the burden of the legacy of the old regimes with less democratic institutions. The old models of identity are still in action maintaining a collectivist style with little or no importance for the individual identities.

The fact that the former Yugoslavia was not an identical picture of the Soviet system influenced the formation of models of identity which gave a bit more space to the growth of individual identities, and also made the collectivist form of identity less rigid. Still, what prevailed over the large part of the population was an authoritarian model of identity as has been proved by the results of all sociological research. These indicate a high rate of authoritarianism, in particular among the middle-aged and the older persons, as well as within the groups of less educated individuals. However, what connects the models of identity in the former Yugoslavia with those in Central-Eastern Europe before the fall of communism is the same source of authority to which the population expresses its loyalty, i.e., the "party-state" as the main focus of authority and as the principle source of security in its paternalistic interpretation.

What happened with the models of identity after the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Yugoslav state? Did the transition of the former authoritarian regime generate a shift from the collectivist to the individualistic pattern of identity? The results of the analyses during the 1993-1995 in Serbia show that the picture has not much changed. A great number of the investigated persons still agreed with the statements which indicated authoritarianism. They express loyalty to the traditional cultural norms and values, constituting a model of "traditional collectivism". The most visible change occurred in the form and source of collective identification. Now national/ethnic identity prevails absolutely in the place of an ideological/political model of identity. Together with this comes a trend towards retraditionalization with the revival of the past historical myths.

Here, it is necessary to distinguish between national identity in terms of citizenship that implies equal rights of all the ethnic groups within the given political unit, and the conception of nation as ethnicity which tends to monopolize all the other forms of identity and become a "substantial identity". In this light it is necessary to define the border-line between a natural national feeling and nationalism which latter is closely linked with an ethnocentrism which overvaluates one’s own nation and undermines the others. The latter form of identity belongs to the communist authoritarian/collectivist model whose substance has not been substantially changed through changes in form.

How did it happen that nationalist identification became so prominent, so rapidly replacing ideological-political and class identifications? Was nationalism built into the structure of people’s mentality representing a strong but latent inner force? Or was it rejected out of disrespect by liberal theoreticians as not sufficiently in accord with their own reductionist sense of reason? In the latter case it would have been left to manipulation by political forces without help from those who could guide it in a more positive direction? The paper reflects sociological, cultural and psychological factors which may explain such a turn and thus points toward the need for some of the constructive elements found in parts II and III.

The conclusion may read: the collective identity in its monopolistic form (as national/ethnic identity) still predominates in the present-day Yugoslavia, with a weak expression of individual identities. Only the events in Serbia during the extended civic protest of 1996/97 showed a visible but slow change of an authoritarian into a democratic model of identity within one segment of the population, while the mentality of the majority remains unchanged. Subsequent events have reversed even this small beginning.

Chapter II by Mirjana Vasoviƒ, "Shifting Identity in Postcommunism" focuses on another way in which identity is undermined, namely the very mobility of a disintegrating situation and the need constantly to readjust. This paper examines the concept of shifting or floating social identity which characterizes Yugoslav postcommunist society. It is argued that the disintegration of society and unclear perceptions of the relative status of the basic social categories have entailed the loss of a stable and lasting basis for social identification. The social identities of the Yugoslav population, which are always foundational for the self-respect and self-definition of an individual, have been changing their character and intensity since the late 80s, constantly accommodating to changing social and political circumstances. While so doing, they lose their basic function of providing and maintaining a stabile and lasting foundation of social and political choices. Examples of shifting identities are provided from the ethnic, geopolitical, and socioeconomic realms.

What seems particularly important about this chapter is that it takes the issue far beyond the question of whether the notion of nation is open or closed, ontically founded or merely a formal structure for diversity. For it recognizes that the real issue is ontological and metaphysical, namely, who am I and how shall I exist as a human person. This, in turn, entails particularly how I am to exercise my freedom — toward what goals and in what manner — for to exist or to be for a living being is to live, and for a human person it is to exercise one’s freedom. This, as Professor Vasoviƒ points out, is precisely the choice of values and virtues which constitutes a culture. Sometimes described as an issue of psycho-social growth, it is in reality even more deep. This is what is at issue here.

Further and of equal importance is the tragic and totally destructive inadequacy of the communist ideology to reach this level of meaning, except to attack and undermine it at every turn. But this seems quite the same in Friedman’s totally pejorative interpretation of ethnic identity and the attack upon such identity in relation to nation building which played the central role in Chapter I. The two ideologies — communist and liberal — undertake the same destruction of objective social and geopolitical structures and blur the subjective social categorization, that is, the value laden differentiation between the main social groups which constitute the cumulative exercise of their freedom and mark out their societies. As a result, people cannot make nation building a part of their life commitments and projects, but find this systematically and ideologically attacked at every turn.

Chapter III by Vesna Pešiƒ, "Prospects for Democracy in Serbia: An Analysis of Collective Identities of State, Society and Nation". Each of these three is studied and in each case it is shown how what should provide the basis for an identity has been manipulated and perverted so that it has opposite effect. Thus, in the case of the state election manipulation and fraud have delegitimized the image of the state. The social unity too has been perverted. The notion of nation has been cast in the sense not of accepting and integrating diverse peoples, but in an oedipal sense marked by suspicion, hatred, conflict and death. In this light it would appear that "nation" is the true battle ground for the soul of the people. Will it be marked by love or hate; is its identity, as all human identity, one of openness and relation or one of closure and preemptive attack? The question was stated eloquently in terms of Milton’s "Paradise Lost". The tragedy here may be that those who could make the difference begin by reading "nation" and hence people so negatively that there is no one to make the alternate case.

Professor Pešiƒ has a suggestion at the end of this chapter, namely, that one turn from ethnicity understood as blood and an oedipal conflictive psychology to culture — which, as noted above, is a product of the exercise of freedom. But, of course, blood cannot be dispensed with while the human race perdures. It could be, as suggested here, that the game was too crude to enable access by rational political thought, in which case the theorists have no responsibility. But it could be also that modern political theory is too crude to handle the dynamics of identity that emerges in contemporary consciousness. The latter case would imply that at this turn of the millennium we have moved into a new era where modern scientific reason is no longer adequate and must be transcended by other, aesthetic, modes of human consciousness.

It would be necessary then to get beyond the ideological liberalism that separates the exercise of individual freedom from one’s physical, family origins because these are sociologically ascriptive and psychologically oedipal. This itself is the formula of modern anomie. Before we can begin nation building we need to reintroduce the human spirit of liberty to its home in the human body and hence to recognize its natural place and time. We need to build upon family and group relations the ability to relate to other persons and peoples in shared concerns and according to higher principles of mutual love and benevolence, and, of concern, for the common good (See, L. Dyczewski, Values in the Tradition of Polish Culture: Polish Philosophical Studies, III; Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1997).

One of the basic characteristics of mythical views is the absence of any kind of dispute and of critical distance in the attempt to reevaluate them in new perspectives. No doubt the democratic public intersection of different opinions is the basic condition for this reevaluation of myth, and also for the formation of an anti-authoritative individual and a democratic collective identity for a society or community. The subject matter of myth is mediated by forming public opinion, whose function is to reflect and reevaluate social norms. Here influence is not reserved to the governing political elite. The term "public" implies mutual space for a wide circle of people where they discuss themes of broad social importance, in an attempt to form mutual opinion, in other words, to articulate mutual interest. Under the circumstances, the public space can be of various forms: the public can be constituted either through the media or diverse circles, groups, and debating clubs. Ch. Taylor makes a distinction between the traditional opinion of pre-modern people and modern public opinion which: (a) is a product of reflexion, (b) originates in the midst of discussion, and (c) expresses a consensus of the participants. Individuals, who are distant from one another in space, culture and religion, are connected by the mutual space of dispute. A public debate, open to a large number of citizens, begins to form public opinion.

In communist countries there was no public opinion in this sense. Some important questions could be discussed only within strictly controlled limits, which in no way engaged the problems of the social system. Dissident group discussions, illegal books and journals that referred to important social problems were available only to a small number of people. With the break-down of the communist regime it was assumed that a modern public opinion would be created. However, in many countries that remained only an assumption. The formal change of authorities, a parliamentary system, the free organizing of citizens, political parties, a free market and disappearance of state censorship were often compromised and deceptive. This did not lead to the creation of independent public opinion in all post-communist countries. As a consequence dispute about many important matters has been avoided and the identity of these post-communist countries could only be regressive. In other words, it took the direction of a return to non-problematic, traditionally inherited, patterns of thinking and acting.

Yugoslavia — the Second one as well as the Third — is the best example of the development of these processes. The liberalization of the system and introduction of parliamentarism did not lead to the solution of the most urgent and important problems. In the Second Yugoslavia, the question of possible reshaping of inter-republic relationships, or in other words, the question of such mutual institutions as parliament was never discussed publicly and openly. The Second Yugoslavia never held democratic, multi-party federal elections, so that kind of elections was never discussed openly, nor was the question relevant. A considerable part of the difficulties and the break-down in present Yugoslavia are the consequences of avoiding such public discussion.

In the Third Yugoslavia, the relationships in the federation between the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro still are presented as between two tribes and nations, rather than of two Republics. The most important item, that of Kosovo, was not discussed. The silence about this question was in continuity with the previous silence. Even more, it seemed that everything was done at the end of eighties in order that this should be (violently) avoided; in other words, it was abandoned by conscious political will. The absurd result was that "the final solution of Kosovo question" was discussed mostly by those who did not want to solve it. (Normally, such questions could not be "answered" as chess problems are solved; social conflicts are to be overcome and settled). The revival of the Kosovo myth was used in order to avoid rational discourse, public dispute and specially formed commissions which should represent national interests. Yet the Kosovo knot could have been untied only through equal and public dialogue among all interested parties. Referring to mythical patterns by the governing elite only postponed the search for a solution.

Chapter V by Stjepan Gredelj, "Preconditions and Obstacles to Modernization of Serbian/Yugoslav Society", is a carefully crafted cry of despair. Despite more favorable preconditions for a painless process to postcommunism than most of the former East and Central European countries, current Serbia/Yugoslavia suffers retrograde trends in economic and political developments, blockade and war. How did it happen that structural and environmental advances in the course of the modernization of society turned into backwardness and underdevelopment?

In other countries the caving in (implosion) of real-socialist systems, as an introduction to the processes of transition in these systems, started from the top, as self-awareness by the ruling elites of an overall lose of legitimacy, and therefore as a loss of the "will to rule". This process took the opposite course in Serbia: in the process of its "revolutionary" self-legitimation, a self-appointed elite in a series of coups d’etats redefined the bases of its legitimacy. By focusing the "changes" on the establishment not of civil society and a political community of modern citizenry, but rather on a homogenous ethnically based community, the Serbian regime managed to eradicate "the will for transition" towards the modernization of society.

The effects of this switch — which did not happen without rather massive support "from below" — have been a disaster for the economy, the collapse of institutions, dissolution of the civil sphere of society and a broadly spread anomie within the population.

Doubts concerning the very possibility of a Serbian process of modernization are based on the following facts:

- A Huge "brain drain", mainly of young educated people, which did not accept the war as a solution of the Yugoslav crisis, nor the limited environment for professional and social promotion.

- The persistence of a high proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled employees, on the one hand, and conservative "elitism" (based on nepotism and corruption) in the structure of management, on the other.

- An increasing ossification of the social structure, indicating a decrease of social mobility and strata diversification based on the social division of labor. On the contrary, there has been ongoing "spontaneous" social differentiation of population, based not on structural changes in the economy, but mainly on the "war economy profits" and the impact of sanctions and inflation. These resulted in a split of the population in two groups: a thin stratum of nouveau riches (3-5 percent) and a huge majority of those who live on the edge of poverty. Another far-reaching consequence of this split is the rapid dissolution of the middle class which is the usual center for genuine modernization.

- The fiscal income of the state, as well as the salaries of employees and revenues from agriculture production, are too restricted to generate the economic surplus needed in order to run the process of (economic) modernization. On the other hand, a massive influx of fresh foreign capital and serious investments from abroad into exhausted Serbian/Yugoslav economy is only wishful thinking without fundamental changes in the political and economic systems — which are not to be expected in the new future.

- Political participation of citizens in "governing the society" is only apparent. In fact, all results of public opinion polls indicate an increasing trend of political self-isolation of ordinary people, boycott of elections (which are considered neither free nor fair) and a retention of the structure of personal (semi-dictator) rule and concentration of power in the narrow circles of the political elite.

- A basic social consensus about crucial social values and national interests does not exist (meaning here the common interest of a majority of the people, no matter whether they see themselves primordially in ethnic, cultural or religious terms).

- On the contrary, self-identification and integration into society and the political community is based mostly on those pre-modern traditional patterns (ethnicity and religion) together with suppression of a modern free, autonomous and tolerant citizenry.

- Social dynamics is based mostly on traditional open social conflicts (inter-ethnic and inter-religious), which are mainly violent and aggressive, without institutional mechanisms for their civilized and tolerant resolution through negotiations and mutual compromises.

From this S. Gredelj draws the disheartening but by no means arbitrary conclusion that there is no ground for moral, political and social renewal in Yugoslav society, which would need to be based on solidarity and empathy rather than selfish "individualism" (egoism) and "wild competition" for survival in relations among people.

Chapter VI by Ivana Spasic, "Identity Void: Structural Confusion and Everyday Life in Present-day Serbia," analyzes some aspects of the three-fold relationship in today’s Serbia between: (1) macro-structures/state, economy, social structure, symbolic universe, (2) everyday life, and (3) collective and individual identities. As a consequence of geopolitical developments, but more importantly, of willful action by those in power, there has been an ongoing destruction of the structural frameworks of people’s everyday life. The state itself — its name, borders, internal composition and institutional structure — is unclear and contested; the legal system is in chaos; the economy ruined and criminalized; social stratification decomposed; the symbolic universe disorganized. As a result, insecurity and confusion at both the "material" and "symbolic" levels, have become the basic features of everyday life in Serbia. It has been reduced to mere survival, to living from day to day, lacking orientation for forming any realistic expectations for even the near future. Thereby it has lost its usual function of providing grounds for the crystallization of a new social structure. By thwarting efforts at the articulation of meaning in the symbolic field — by deliberately sustaining a state of pervasive and prolonged confusion — the ruling groups have been blocking the emergence of viable identities for individuals, groups and society as a whole, to replace those irreparably lost. Confusion, rather than overt repression, has proven to be their most powerful weapon, not countered by adequate political or symbolic "bottom up" action on the part of the "people". Thus in Serbia one may perceive a gap between the absence of, and urgent need for, identities at all levels, and an incapacity and/or unwillingness to work on constructing them.

The paper brings this part to a veritable climax by going beyond the analysis of the political and economic breakdown of the country to an incisive description of what this has meant in the hearts and minds of the reflective strata of the population, namely, total confusion. This regards the state’s borders and institutional structure, the legal and economic systems, the social structure and perhaps above all the symbolic universe in which meaning should be established. So great indeed is the confusion that it is not clear whether it is all the result of confusion itself or an intentional cover for the establishment of criminal control over the whole country.

"The Cry" of Munch is then given words in the chapters of Part I. The voices are doubly haunting, for having failed to engage the terms of the existential issue has left them the victims of authoritarian political manipulation.

In sum, the chapters of Part I describe a process by which the expected liberal project of establishing the neutral and universal norms and practices of an individualistic ideology was early and easily subverted by redefining the question in terms of the cultural identity not of individuals, but of the community and nation. This had broad public appeal, but it marginalized automatically those who considered community considerations to be inherently anti-democratic and retrogressive. Public discussion was no longer formal but existential, no longer individual but communitarian. It was a matter not only of individual legal rights — indeed it had never been such — but of the values and cultures by which a people lived. Those who saw only individual values were not able to engage in the public discourse taking place for they would not admit or respect the new level of awareness at the turn of the millennia. Those who should have spoken of the ways in which community values could and should be pluralistic rather than monolithic were intent upon a model of identity built upon Anglo-Saxon individualist rights. As a result their voices could not be heard for they were indeed irrelevant to the situation. For reasons he details Plamen Makariev concludes that: "it is only natural that this approach . . . (which) recognizes only individual right, not collective right, creating a community’s cultural identity . . . is not taken seriously in the Balkans" "Promoting Inter-ethnic Dialogue in Bulgaria" in Creating Democratic Societies: Values and Norms (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999). As a result these questions were left to the politicians who subjected them to their own political concern for power. This assured that they would be manipulated, perverted and turned from concerns of comity to those of supremacy, suppression and in the end, atrocity.

Part II begins a search for the elements of which post communist identities can be built; a number are brought forward. How they can be effectively orchestrated will be the burden of Part III.

A social system is stable if it is able to generate its own support, that is, if it tends to restore equilibrium, particularly during periods of crisis when the community experiences radical disagreement which risks dividing or destroying it. In democratic regimes stabilizing tendencies are based on the citizens’ willingness to cooperate which generally, but not always, implies a commitment of individuals and groups to their own history, culture and identity. Even though this commitment is a permanent feature of social life, it is not always (especially in some particular forms) sufficiently democratic to allow for mismatched but reasonable forms of life. This problem is particularly important when questionable life forms are led by the minority group of different tribes or ethnic groups. Long established patterns of cooperation cannot be abruptly terminated but, on the other hand, partners are not bound to stay together forever, especially if the groups diverge in moral and political culture.

The most difficult problem of contemporary political philosophy is how to render compatible "the politics of authenticity" and those of "reconciliation through the public use of reason". The former provides the moral motivation necessary for the stability of the social system, but the later makes the corrections necessary for a just and reasonable social unity. This chapter contrasts these two in the light of recent changes in East European countries, especially the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia. Neither the communitarian account of the shared values of the particular community, nor the liberal explanation of the minimal but universal normative preconditions of a democratic polity seem able to provide a sufficient basis for establishing a just and stable political system in this area where democracy and stability often collide.

Chapter VIII by Milan Podunavac, "The Principle of Citizenship and Pluralism of Identity", considers the renewal of interest in the issue of citizenship. Once thought to be rendered obvious by the principles of justice and equal rights in a democracy, it now has returned to central focus in view of the resurgent interest in the diversity of cultures, interests and groups which constitute civil society. How are these to be related to the whole and to a universal equality of rights? Is diversity by essence conflictual or complementary in a society? Attention to these questions in terms of the citizen’s identity and at the same time his or her sharing in, and constituting, national identity is central to the issue of nation and the ability of peoples to live together. If, in other words, as was pointed out above, a benign conception of nation is that of a place in which many persons and peoples live together and share a common destiny, then, rather than this being dismissed, how a nation can be realized becomes central to the development of postcommunist identities.

Both Chapter VII and VIII are impressively insightful regarding the issues involved. Both are involved in the major debate between a neo-liberal individualism with its emphasis upon universal rights, on the one hand, and the more communitarian sense of social duties and cohesion, on the other. They point out the limitation of the former, especially noted in Eastern Europe and in the Southern hemisphere, namely, that it focuses upon the external forms of a rationalist liberal society, from which it would exclude — or more likely, which it would impose upon — those who would attend rather to the substantive free commitments and values of their cultures and societies. At the same time they note the limitations of the communitarian approach in assuring the rights of all and integrating a diversity of integrating visions. This directs attention to civil society as a new dimension of social growth.

M. Produnavac would seem quite right in suggesting that in this debate "the liberals have been outflanked on the issue of diversity". Yet their accomplishments regarding the recognition of the dignity of the person cannot be dispensed with. What this suggests is the need for a new dimension of human awareness, not only in the contents mentioned — minorities, cultures, environment, etc. — but even more in its the very mode of consciousness, moving beyond the analytic and dissociative scientific reason of the Enlightenment to an aesthetic awareness for the 3rd millennium. Like family life, society must ultimately be misconceived if it be treated as the result of a technology rather than of an art, as a matter of precise formulae of reason rather than of human creativity and love. If according to the famous phrase "War is too important to be left to the generals," then certainly our life with others in society is too important to be left to sociological theory or any other logos.

In this context the Chapter VIII is very insightful in turning to civil society and noting how the post communist perspective of the Central and Eastern European countries (C/EEC) sheds special light on this. But the author may be impeded from adequately mining that vein by interpreting the Polish experience — which led the way in the liberation of the region — in terms of the dissident thrusts of Michnik and Kuron. What made this successful in Poland, rather than in the other countries of the region, was that the Poles knew who they were and had always known this. Their identity had been vibrant for most of a millennium and had been asserted constantly and at great price through 150 years of the partitions. In the Communist times this was vibrantly and persistently expressed by Cardinals Wyzynski and Wojtyla and Father Tischner. There was never any question of who the people were or what they stood for.

Whereas the state was patently illegitimate and hardly capable of coping, the nation was the civil society based religiously in the Church. Founded in faith, the Polish identity was much deeper and more perduring than any political regimes imposed by foreign interlopers or even unjust kings. The Poles led the way because they had deeper roots, and hence higher expectations and broader concerns "for our freedom and yours" — as they always affirmed in their seemingly Quixotic protest through the ages (see the volume in this series by L. Dyczewski).

Chapter IX by J. Hroch and J. Zouhar, "National Identity, Tradition and the Czech Question in the contemporary World Context", looks for elements of a response in the Czech traditions of Masaryk, as well as in the hermeneutics of H.-G. Gadamer. Both look to the tradition, either of a people or of a country, for principles of continuity which can enable a people to face crises and develop new patterns of internal relationships.

Chapter XI by Oliva Blanchette, "The Problem of Human Identity in the Face of the Global Free Market Economy", is more of a cautionary tale. It points out ways in which the so-called "free market" is indeed controlled by a small number of very large companies and their interlocking boards of directors. If Part I showed the controlling influence of the political motive of power, this chapter matches it in its concern with the controlling effects of profit. Whether this is the end of the story or there are other and countervailing positive factors which can be summoned creatively to assist in the new processes of nation building will be the burden of Part III.

Part III does indeed take up another level of reflection to join the elements introduced in Part II: citizenship, stability, religion, tradition and market, and to bring them to bear on the present challenge. It does this perhaps most by deepening the analysis of the issue, suggesting that it has not been responded to precisely because it has been misconceived.

Chapter XII by Martin Palouš, "Beyond the Liberal Paradigm", takes the lead in this. He points out the way in which the challenge of R. Dahrendorf to develop liberal institutions was taken as the central task for the postcommunist era. Yet this had practically nothing to do with the peaceful transformation of Czechoslovakia into two nations or the conflictual transformation of Yugoslavia into a cluster of nations. Much more influential has been the development of a broader global horizon, not only in the economic terms described by O. Blanchette above, but also in the establishment of a broader field of human relations wherein the advancement of one people need not be demeaning or at the expense of another. In other words the route to a solution of the relations between peoples not, as in the past, in a single local, but in the broader horizons characteristic of the present and future. The title of the chapter suggests also that among the prime weaknesses may have been a liberal ideology incapable or unwilling to face the new issues of values and culture. These are and remain the real issues of building diverse peoples into a nation that is not merely defensive of its heritage, but able to employ it in constructing a peaceful and progressive society with others in the emerging global era. Concerns for cultural heritage can be dismissed as tribal only at one’s risk, which Part I has described in abundance.

Chapter XIV by Jelena Djuric, "The Concept of Models of Identity: Existence without Identity", begins by recalling the lament of Part I. In our times, marked by an intolerant coexistence of a plurality of various discourses, it is necessary to introduce a categorical distinction between identity and identification, which has psychological and substantial content. In analyzing the question of continuity vs. change in Yugoslav society, the significance of the old communist value models and ideology is reasserted and constitutes the background of apparent social change. Devaluation seems not to have completely destroyed the traditional value boundaries. Similar to revolution in former times, the present transition has the character of a radical systemic change with a constraining nihilistic shift. The dialectics of individual and collective identification, of anti-authoritarian and authoritarian tendencies in the Yugoslav case results an unstable social milieu and a political (non)culture. This hinders the establishment of values that would enable a reordering of the state as a prerequisite for opening up society. The irrational character of such political life oscillates diabolically between tragedy and parody, with the consequence that Yugoslav history/narrative ends up in a discourse of lament.

However, the chapter proceeds further to indicate important elements for reconstruction. The roots the earlier elements of stability and citizenship lie in the need for a sense of trust which Fukuyama makes the center piece of his constructive work on the development of democracy after the end of history and which, with Weber, he traces to culture. It may be that entrepreneurial individual virtues of diligence, rationality, innovation and risk-taking are required. But they, in turn, depend upon a set of social values — of honesty, reliability, cooperation and responsibility — which are rooted in the traditional religious and ethnic system of a culture. It is there that the social capital for a successful democratic life is rooted.

Chapter XV by Byaruhanga Rukooko Archangel, "Social Identity and Conflict: A Positive Approach" suggests that we need to begin with the notion of identity as implying conflict and then build toward reconciliation, especially on the basis of Paul Ricoeur’s view of "self" and "other" as appealing mutually to each other. His chapter is rich in examples of regional history and recent frightening conflict between peoples bound in a spiral of mutual fear.

Chapter XVI by Paul Peachey, "Human Identity in Postcommunism and High Modernity", provides reason for hope. He points out how modern social sciences have been consistently arrayed against the family as a situation of unfreedom even akin to slavery. Indeed, this can be traced back to Plato among the Greeks. Peachy not only counters with the dependence of society on the blood lines for generation, but relates this to the more fundamental conjugal bond of unity and fidelity between husband and wife. If this be correct, then the roots of the reconstruction of a postcommunist social identity may be not so difficult or distant, but as present and intimate as the conjugal bond itself. If reconstruction can be seen not as a utilitarian or manipulative pact, but as a religiously grounded bond of mutual trust, then the reconstruction of society may be less in the hands of remote politicians than the scenario of despair and inaction would depict.

Chapter XVII by George F. McLean, "Identity as Openness to Others", follows this lead to the freedom which lies at the core of the human being. But rather than being merely the ability to acquire and consume or even the ability to follow a universal and formal imperative, this freedom is rather the ability to relate to others and extend to them the gifts of life, knowledge and love which we have received and, indeed, which we are. Rather than valuing only the anarchy of the absolute individual, when this freedom is exercised in view of the range of human goods and over time there is generated a pattern of values and virtues which constitutes a cultural tradition.

But, in turn, just as exclusive self-concern becomes manifestly self-destructive, so also would the culture of a people were it to identify itself only in relations of contradiction, rather than of complementarily, with its neighbors. But such complementarity should not be so distant and difficult. For if it be universally evident that only by relating beyond oneself and beyond one’s physical welfare can one find peace and happiness, then the essential importance for an overarching spiritual or religious context should be equally evident. It is then not incidental that all the great cultural traditions are religiously based and specified. Moreover, all agree as the overriding truth that the divine principle of life is one and implies concern and love of neighbor.

A recent report is entitled: Religion, the Missing Element in Statecraft. If conflicts after the Cold War will be conflicts of cultures and civilizations and if, as Samuel Huntington states, these are rooted in religion, then that prejudice of modernity against religion and the attempt to ignore it in the public forum would make the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia not an echo of the past, but a harbinger of the future. On the contrary, if the present change of the millennia is characterized above all by a new openness to meaning beyond the Promethean rationalisms of modernity, then this void can be filled and a deep healing can be undertaken.

This, however, is a matter not merely of speculative reason, but of the total outlook of concrete peoples on life and on "the other". This evolves over centuries and can be motivated by trust or suspicion, fear or confidence, and oriented toward good or evil, love or hate. This orientation can come from national leaders and demagogues for personal or group power or from a religious sense of human dignity, harmony and peace. The issue overflows the arena of the mind and takes on the flesh and blood, the fancies and foibles, the desperate hopes and anxieties of peoples. It becomes in the end a matter of how a people chooses to direct its heart and hence its actions. Evil leaders appeal to this and depend upon it. It is not a matter of moralism, but of basic morality, that is, of the free and hence responsible self-determination to follow with others the path of friendship, concern and cooperation or to wallow in the snake pit of hatred, recrimination and revenge one creates. This is the concrete choice between good and evil with which humankind has ever been faced and in terms of which it shapes its own life. This choice between love and hate is in the end the forgotten, but perduring challenge of cultural formation and reformation. Patently, it is the task now to be faced.