The formation of an ethics of the environment has taken place within the past twenty years, even though the problems of judging human dealings with respect to the environment and in terms of morality have been known for a longer time. The past twenty years, however, have seen the recognition of the ethics of the environment as a scientific discipline, an institutionalization. Most of all this meant an intensive development, especially in the area of its categorical apparatus and the formation of its philosophical and methodological alternatives.

In our context the mode of forming and processing problems of environmental ethics begins rather late. This has a bearing mainly on our past political development, when the ethics of the protection of the environment were subordinated to the aims and intentions of the ruling power. The protection of the environment was pushed to the edge of interests while other values, especially those of social concerns, were focused upon. Emphasis was placed on the construction of mass settlements, the building of factories and the like, but without much consideration being given to the impact of such decisions upon the environment. The problematic of the environment consequently remained rather in the mind of the political opposition and found its theoretic expression in private thinking and literature. Undoubtedly the information barrier played a significant role in that as well.

Today’s opinions concerning environmental ethics are pluralistic and broadly spread. Every author inclines to some type of ecological ethics, depending on his own psychologic background, education and professional direction. The separate concepts of environmental ethics differ in their issues, the justification of moral norms, and in the consequences which emerge from these alternative principles.

The majority of environmental ethics strives to justify the inevitability of the protection of the environment by reworking the theory of values in a direction which would take note of the value of the environment not only as an economic value, but as a value in its own right and independently of human consciousness. They tend to criticize contemporary axiologic concepts as acknowledging values only as part of the human intrinsic essence, seeing natural beings only as instrumental values, that is, nature itself is practically valueless and acquires value only in connection with the consciousness of man and for man. Within the frame of such understanding the values of natural objects are tied merely to the needs, interests and yearnings of people; this however is not a sufficient basis for the protection of the environment. Therefore they demand an acknowledgment of intrinsic values also for the other natural forms, and not only for human.

By the concept of "intrinsic value" they commonly understand the value of an object, which exists objectively or independently of the evaluating subject. That means, that the planet has an intrinsic value regardless of whether a person as a perceiving subject exists. Value in that sense exists independently, directly in nature as the qualities of the single developmental process of nature which existed before man and independently of him. They are not the creation of man; between values and man there is no inevitable connection. Value has thus been interpreted as something which is good in itself, and has its own rank independently of human perception and evaluation.

The question remains, which of the natural objects in the environment may be described as having intrinsic values. Some authors acknowledge only individual members of non-human species as having intrinsic values and that means either animals or plants (the so-called axiologic individualism); others acknowledge only species or the ecosystem (the so-called axiologic holism).

Axiologic individualism is convinced that only individual organisms could be considered to have intrinsic values. This intrinsic value of non-human individualism guarantees them "the natural right for existence and development", and man must respect this right. Representatives of the concept of "rights of animals", or also "rights of plants", inspired by the work of T. Regan, P. Singer and J.B. Callicott, represent one of the main streams of environmental ethics in our country.

The concept of a "natural right" has been adapted from personal ethics and is related to the other natural forms, not only to the human. In the interpretation of above-mentioned concepts the point is the protective right against human intervention, which ought to guarantee space for the "free development" of plants, animals . . . or the right for undisturbed existence. The use of the concept right in this connection is ethically significant, since it morally equalizes all natural species, including humankind. Our acceptance of the right for other natural forms ought to oblige us not only to respect their rights, but also to support and protect them. Were that way of understanding the concept of "natural right," and from it the ensuing principle of moral equality of species, to be thought out to its conclusion it would be impossible to live at all. K. Goodpaster in that connection wrote "the clearest and most decisive contradiction of the principle of life is, that it is impossible to live by it. . . . We have to eat (and) protect ourselves from carnivorous animals. . . . If we were to take such a criterion seriously, all these things would have to be considered as being wrong." ([1], 352)

If however the concept "natural right" is understood purely naturalistically as a biologically-vital process operating in nature, it would lead us to completely other "natural-legal conclusions". Representatives of the "rights of animals" start from the assertion that all animals, plants, etc. have the natural right for their existence and development and man must respect it. But let us ask on which natural laws does nature operate? If we begin with the basis of ecology then nature achieves the diversity of species and optimum population thanks to the "carnivorous law" and immense losses. The ecological balance rests, namely, on the food chain and the main principle of life in the biotic community is "to eat and be eaten." When ecologists speak of systemic balance, they address a system, whose integrity rests on mechanisms which from a human point of view are absolutely merciless.

From that it follows that as regards the "natural rights" of animals, plants, etc., the concept of rights remains uncertain and hence also ambivalent. It could mark the real, biologically underscored "naturality" of animal and plant life with its unevenness and struggle to survive, as much as, on the other end of the spectrum, a postulated ideal naturality thanks to which all natural forms acquire the same dignity and hence also rights. We think that appealing to concepts of right or interest has no other function but subjectively to appeal to moral convictions.

Axiologic holism, as the second influential tendency of environmental ethics in our country and inspired in essence by the work of A. Naessa, credits intrinsic value only to biological species and respectively to the ecosystem. It starts with the assumption, that the basic characteristics of the natural system such as biologic diversity and complexity are good by itself and therefore order, harmony, complexity and variety are objective natural values. It follows that only ecosystems do have intrinsic values, rather than individuals. The natural system by itself and some of its subsystems — biomy, biocaenozoics, species and their populations are considered as objectively good and therefore of value. Values are here identified with objective processes of nature. Human culture, with its economy, transportation, distribution and communication networks is a process of exhaustion of biologic wealth and consequently objectively wrong. ([2], 89-95)

The above-mentioned concepts are built on a subjective axiology. But is it at all possible to build environmental ethics on an axiology thus understood? Who and how can one distinguish values representing natural objects? For whom do natural objects and the environment have value of any sort? Is it at all possible to consider values without a perceiving subject? What does the value of the environment, the value of nature and natural objects actually consist of?

By value we understand that which awakens a certain attitude, something which attracts, which is preferred; in other words, something which becomes the object of our interest, need and the like. Values are tied to human preferences; they include that which is given a meaning. What significance therefore do natural objects and even nature have for us? Why do we have to protect them? J. Urbánek understands the value of nature as its significance for the preservation of life on Earth. ([3], 145-147) It expresses relations of nature, respectively the environment, for maintaining life on Earth.

If values were merely the characteristics or the qualities of nature by itself, then man, as one of the results of the natural developmental process, would actually be a disturber of values. With his activities of changing things he would in essence deprive them of their values, which they had a priori by themselves. A natural object therefore cannot merge with value, it could only carry or acquire values. The reason why natural objects and the environment acquire value is the interest and need of man to survive. If man were not threatened by changes of the environment, he would hardly have any interest in protecting it. Only in consequence of the threat to his continual existence on this Earth does he evaluate relations between the environment and his own interests.

Natural objects are of value not only because they exist objectively as such, but mainly because they form a mutually interconnected and functioning system which proves capable of producing and maintaining life. From that point of view the environment is the basic value in the sense that it has existential importance for the maintenance and functioning of life on Earth. Thus, every natural layer — inorganic, organic, human — has its value and every value of the individual natural object is interwoven with the values of other objects into a functioning entity. Hence, it makes no sense to separate instrumental from intrinsic values. A natural object has intrinsic as well as instrumental value; a natural object, which has instrumental value in relation to an organism may have intrinsic value in relation to another organism. It depends on the position of this natural object in relation to other systems in the ecosystem.

In considerations of the holistic functioning of systems on earth the problem of individual values remains open-ended. What is actually primary — the defence of individual values or values of species or those of the ecosystems? The individual death of an animal debases its individual value but on the other end that same death contributes to the maintenance of other species. It appears that an individual value stands in direct opposition to the value of species. Just as the strata of nature are arranged pyramidically, according to H. Rolston, so the instrumental and individual values are similarly not homogenically spread throughout ecosystem. Nature has developed continually over millions of years and even a series of values becomes a spiral history, according to H. Rolston. First there were simple things; then they became more and more complicated. The perception and complexity of natural objects increases. The later in the developmental scale of nature a natural object is placed, the higher its natural value but also the lower its instrumental value. That means, that non-biotic natural objects (rivers, minerals, mountains) have a fundamental (existentially significant) value, but in their class association they do have a higher instrumental value. Flora and the non-perceiving fauna (grasses, amoebae) still have a weak individual value. The perceiving fauna (animals) have a higher individual value and weaker instrumental value. Man has the highest individual value ([5], 223-2245).

The protection of the environment is therefore closely connected to the consciousness of values, which is mediated through perception, interests and human preferences. On the basis of perceiving the functioning of natural processes and their evaluation one may come up with criteria of desired actions and values — in other words, of that which should be.

As we previously pointed out, our perception of values of the environment is formed by our interactions with the environment. People have to recognize "the functioning of nature as a whole entity", unveil the ability of nature to sustain life and for that ability people have to respect and act responsibly towards it as a whole. This means toward the universe, earth, soil, rivers, minerals, mountains, air, plants, animals and also toward people, because we deal with a mutually interdependent system - where every part has its value which is simultaneously tied to other values. The evaluation of separate natural objects has to be perceived as a contextual event. This means that one has to perceive the role and place of a natural object in the community, in the whole mosaic of its functions and mutual interrelations with other objects, not only its taxonomy.

This means that environmental ethics has to avoid value-absolutization, possibly value-extremization of one value at the expense of other values. That way the neglect as well as the absolutization of one or another value could lead to absurdities. It could have serious social consequences, if protection of the environment, natural species, ecosystems or the protection of animals and plants received absolute priority. Respecting natural (ecologic) laws of the functioning of the environment cannot become the only consideration and certainly not the determining one, if we address the actual fact of acting. We are concerned, that absolutization of natural values could lead to an excuse for ecological dictatorship or fascism. To elevate natural values above human interests excuses any meddling with the human species. Every value applied extremely or absolutely, no matter how authorized or needed, will create problems.

The problem of values in environmental ethics has always been open to discussion. Precisely in the connection of understanding values of environmental ethics arises the question of whether for effective protection of the environment a change in values would be sufficient?

The aim of environmental ethics, oriented merely on axiology, is the formation of a minor collection of first principles complete in the sense, that they may offer the right answer for every moral dilemma and offer a uniform concept for our moral obligations. The acceptance of such a type of environmental ethics leads in our opinion to a certain kind of reductionalism, because the solution of all specific moral dilemmas is being solved with a message for a unified theory of values.

We do not dispute the importance of developing a theory of values in regard to problems for the protection of the environment. However, we cannot envision a further development of environmental ethics in the direction of a consensus on the sense of what are intrinsic values of nature and natural objects, which objects do have intrinsic values or what it means to have such values. Such a type of ethics is not capable of offering useful and practical advice for a practical judgement and solutions in regard to controversial problems of environment protection. Controversial is also the question of whether environmental ethics may be developed without a connection to economics, social politics and problems of public life.

We perceive environmental ethics as being a problem-oriented practical discipline, contrary to ethics perceived merely as an application of common philosophic concepts to problems of the environment. We doubt that theoretic problems (contestable points) may be solved in isolation of real problems. In our opinion it is the aim of environmental ethics to formulate rather less common rules, which may be acceptable in a particular context. Environmental ethics ought to participate in solving concrete environmental problems in the context of real practice and not concentrate merely on metaphysic discussion about who and why it may have intrinsic value. The realistic problem of environmental ethics as a practical discipline ought to be the achievement of such policies, which in accord with human interests will protect the environment. Thus understood environmental ethics has to be in observance of respecting functioning laws of the environment and the appropriateness of moral norms from a human point of view. Hence it has to explore whether that or another concept will function and will be effective in protecting the environment but also, what will happen after its realization with the quality of human life. It demands a responsible conduct with foresight and resolve in relation to the environment on political, social, economic and technological standards. In the region of economic development it does not mean the stoppage of economic growth but of its coming into harmony with effective protection of the environment. Both economic growth and protection of the environment cannot be understood as two independent and at times themselves opposing activities. In such events economic growth is often viewed as something positive, while protection of the environment is a factor slowing down such development. We cannot merely strive for maximalization of gains because it is impossible to strive for maximizing the care of the environment.

The concept "growth" ought to be viewed as growth of the quality of life in its entire complexity, not only as growth of production and consumption. During the process of deciding it is necessary to join economic and environmental views by balancing all possible technological solutions, trying to bring them into harmony and seeking optimal solutions. Hence not to choose from consumption viewpoint as the most imposing, but to choose a variant that ecologically is most sensitive. This would change the entire goal of economics from maximalization to optimalization; in practical terms this would mean a retreat from preferring the greatest possible volume of consumption to a deliberate choice of the optimal which means ecologically the most parsimonious and humanly the most satisfying solutions. The compatibility of economic and environmental goals is often achieved in practice. A more effective use of energy and of raw materials is not only suitable to environmental targets, but at the same time also lowers economic expenses.

In this sense environmental ethics pays less attention to ontological problems in the sense of building a theory of values, even though it does not deny the importance of a theory of values in relation to the environment. It shifts attention to epistemological problems and mainly to how we can build durable models of a multigenerational society. This is a society which would assure satisfaction of needs of contemporary society without threatening or limiting possibilities of future generations to satisfy their own needs. The central idea in environmental ethics thus understood is intergenerational and interregional justice.

1. The Slovak Commission for the Environment, established in 1990. During the first 30 months of its existence it worked out 32 laws and executive regulations. See Drgonec below.

2. For problems of the limits of human activity in relation to the environment see in greater detail J. Urbánek and I. Míchal in their works below.