Terms such as "Post-modernism," "Post-totalitarianism," or "Post-communism" are often used today to describe the most characteristic features of our societies. "Post-Cold-War" is perhaps a better term to use to gain an understanding of the situation in which we now find ourselves after the way intellectual and cultural life developed over at least the last 40 to 50 years.

The Cold War was an "internal war." The very visible face-off of military forces during the Cold War period was itself only a sign of a deeper division between the two opposing camps. The two hostile parties were so divided on basic social and cultural issues that they were concerned to do everything in their power to create a world which was "different" from that of the enemy. They were driven specifically not to integrate with each other, to resist the influence of the "enemy" other in every way possible, and especially to root out the "enemy influence" as it was perceived to exist "within."

This is particularly true in respect to philosophy, one of the principal combatants in the Cold War by virtue of its mission to secure the "front line" in the area of "ideological struggle."

Because of such divisions, neither society (in both camps of the Cold War), nor intellectual life as a whole, (and philosophy especially in Soviet-style society) developed primarily from their "internal" principles. They were driven rather by the spirit of conflict with the opposing camp. Society and thought on both sides of the hostile divide aimed first and foremost not to resemble the "enemy."

In such circumstances an examination of one of the most unique and yet typical aspects of Soviet-style Marxist philosophy, that is, its aesthetic theory, may make it possible to more clearly identify and better understand central ideas and tendencies in the theoretical foundations of Soviet-style society, particularly those concerning the formation of the sphere of the "taken-for-granted" that underlies meaningful perceptual thought and action. This, in turn, may help us better understand those basic values which formed the fabric of the perceptual and social reality that was Soviet-style society. If it is also noted how Soviet-style aesthetic thinking and activity developed in specific opposition to the "anti-Marxist" world, the former may provide a key to seeing how Soviet-style society as a whole developed as an "anti-anti-Marxist" world. Hopefully, this will serve to begin an accounting of the gains and losses suffered by both opposing camps of the Cold War so that the first steps can be taken in moving intellectual life, and especially philosophy, forward once again.

In fact, the loyalty and admiration of the population at large did not begin to waver to a dangerous degree until well into the Brezhnev years, when such factors as corruption on a growing scale and the perceived unfavorable comparison with the West, brought to light the vapidity of socialist values. It is almost as if the people there were living in a different reality from that which those on the outside could see, and it would thus seem to be obvious that their very perception of reality had to have been basically different in some sense from that which was accepted by outside, "objective" observers. Ideology is often described as a pair of glasses that people wear by which reality is seen in a particular, different way. With respect to the Soviet-style communist world, the question might then be what kind of glasses were prescribed and worn so that the actual quality of social life and of the human condition were seen to be other than what would be seen from the West?

Such facts of life in Soviet-style society as the absence of free political activity and an ubiquitous police apparatus were not the glue which held society together. It would certainly be a mistake to underestimate the mark that these factors left on society, but neither should we be overly zealous in taking them to be more than they were. They do not and cannot explain the unmistakable fact that the vast majority of the population of Soviet-style society for significant periods of time sought to be loyal citizens who were quite willing to "play by the rules" in forging their personal lives and public careers. If we wish to understand and explain the nature of Soviet-style society, we must search for those mechanisms by virtue of which the meanings and values perceived in social reality became more or less identical with those of the Bolshevik-led program to create a type of society and a type of human personality substantially different from Western democratic society.

The implementation of this program would have far-reaching consequences for the quality of life in Marxist society, or rather, in anti-anti-Marxist society. It undermined traditional standards of professionalism and creative endeavor, not least of all in intellectual life and in the scientific disciplines. It is my contention that the "standardization" of creative activity, along with the suppression of imaginative diversity that resulted from this on a broad scale in society, served to transform Soviet-style society from a society capable of innovation and creativity in public life to one capable of only reproduction of existing norms and standards. This severely restricted its ability to develop in an expected fashion and compete successfully in the international arena.

If the two blocks of the Cold War, viewed from the perspective of ideology did not share one and the same set of Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas," that is, conceptual knowledge, were they divided also in their perceptual knowledge? Is there any sense in which the peoples of especially the Soviet Union were educated to see the beautiful and the pleasurable where no one from the West would even consider that it might exist?

The point of discussion of most concern at the moment involves the perception of reality that defines an individual, along with the social group of which he is a member. In particular, it concerns the way in which this may be more or less deliberately chosen and implemented by the authority that has responsibility for the horizon of perception and consciousness. Of special interest are the basic ways in which art and aesthetic activity may play important roles in this process.

When speaking of authority over the horizon of perception and consciousness, I in no way have in mind the common place (and commonly abused) notions of propaganda and political indoctrination. I view these as relatively simple ideas that do not touch upon the actual process whereby the possibilities for perceiving and thinking become situated within a world horizon that defines the location of any possible consciousness. Not only do these notions not indicate this process, they are incapable of doing so. Because they take it for granted, they conceal it even as their own activity reveals it.

An agent is able to utilize the power structures in society to project with a high degree of efficiency his/her intentionality upon the world. Thus the world comes increasingly to be organized in accord with his/her intentional aims or those of the group he/she is the controlling, or at least representative and executive, member). This means that the agent in question comes to exercise control over the possibilities for perception and cognition. Human "subjects" normally have the experience of their relative independence (of the autonomy of their intentionality) in respect to the sensible world in which they dwell. Usually they do not thematize their dependence upon that which they perceive and experience. Of course, both autonomy and dependence work together in determining and identifying the essence of both subjectivity and objectivity, both at a particular moment, and also throughout the duration of "subjective" existence. But their roles are not constant, and they may indeed vary within a considerable range.

A "supreme agency" then can be in effective control of the possibilities of perception and cognition, including access to and egress from society. The ontological reciprocity of the embedded subject and sensible world can be oriented by social factors more or less beyond the control of the subject, in such a way that the "ontological dependency" of the subject upon the sensible world is maximized. This results in the subjugation of the subject’s possibilities for perception and cognition to the agency of force in society. This does not have to be a process of which the subject is aware in order for it to be effective and efficient. On the contrary, the impression of the perceptual and cognitive autonomy of the subject may not only easily accompany an increased subjugation to social and political power structures — as is readily suggested by the development of pop culture, mass marketing, mass media and mass advertisement in advanced Western countries — it may actually facilitate this.

The phenomenon of totalitarian society demonstrates a high degree of perfection in this process. A truly totalitarian society does not rely on force and violence as the glue which binds it together. These factors are present to some degree in any society, and totalitarian society is particularly efficient in maximizing them and using them with brutal efficiency against those elements of society which, for whatever reason, are judged to exist outside the para-meters of acceptability. However, force and violence do not command the loyalty and subservience to authority that are essential for the very functioning of totalitarian society as such.

The combination of fear and loathing which is a universal result of a brutal exercise of violence — not to speak of the lack of initiative and suppression of motivation which may accompanying it — does not satisfactorily to account for the agency of that violence itself.

For example, it may be assumed that fear of punishment was one element driving the behavior of the SS camp guard or NKVD executioner, but, perhaps more than anything else, the soldier who stood on the train platform at Birkenau and selected those arriving who would be sent to immediate death in the gas chambers was likely driven by a sense of "mission" and loyalty to a "higher cause." The NKVD officer who continued to execute Polish military prisoners in Katyn Forest even as the rumble of the approaching front grew loud did so because he believed he was following the course of history, not because he was afraid of what his superior might otherwise do.

And if those who commit such unspeakable acts of bestial violence on a mass scale are not motivated by something akin to belief in a higher moral or historical cause, then their actions are driven by an absence of belief in anything at all. The choice in this regard is not between action based on fear and action based on principle, but between action based on principle and action based on a lack of any principles whatsoever. However, the latter state of affairs is self-destructive to the highest degree and can in no way serve as a solid foundation for a stable society. Indeed, a widespread absence of belief in some sort of moral standards, however loosely defined, destroys the possibility that the social formation in question can long survive.

The point in this regard is that the extremes of brutality and violence in totalitarian society are of such a magnitude that those who carry them out cannot possibly be motivated solely by fear. Their active and willing commitment and participation is necessary for the system of terror and murder to operate. The question is whence does this commitment and choice arise.

It is not only the elite of dedicated extremists in totalitarian society but the ordinary citizens too must, at the very least, willingly cooperate with the structures of power and authority if society as a whole is to more or less efficiently function. Not even the smallest social units, such as the family, can long be held together if the only force for doing so is fear. A society can function in a normal and stable fashion only when its members implicitly believe in and accept the standards of behavior and, more importantly, the parameters of perception and consciousness which it demands of them. This is first and foremost a question of the horizons of possibility for percep-tion and cognition. In other words, totalitarian societies function efficiently to the extent that the horizons of perception and cognition which they mandate are internalized by their members such that they are implicitly accepted as the "normal" parameters of everyday existence. This transforms everyday existence into the glue which holds that society together.

It is the embeddedness of the subject in the sensible world which makes it possible for the "character" or "value" of the "object" to influence and determine to varying degrees the "character" or "value" of the subject. The autonomy of the subject within the process of ontological reciprocity cannot be reduced to zero, particularly in respect to the multiplicity of subjects. But, at any given moment within a given society, it can be significantly reduced in respect to forces which work for the ontological dependency of the subject on the object. The paramount example of this reduction of autonomy is totalitarian society.

The greatest possibilities for maximizing the reduction of the cognitive and perceptual autonomy of the embedded subject are to be found at the non-reflective or pre-reflective levels of conscious life. There is always an abyss between our fundamental reciprocity with the world as embedded subjects and our attempts to express that reciprocity explicitly at the level of reflective discourse or in theory. Consequently, theory cannot be the most effective "tool" in constructing the emergence of a particular, determinate relation to otherness involving other subjects because it is unable to bridge this abyss. Art and aesthetics have unique power in this regard.

This is a situation in which the "other/object" has to overcome the "resistance" of the "self/subject," which is the same thing as saying that the "truth" of the "other/object" has to overcome the "truth" of the "self/subject." What may be spoken of as the hermeneutic circle is thus made to function from the perspective of the "empowered object/other" that has become dominant in the "ontological reciprocity" between embodied subject/self and Otherness. The relative autonomy of the subject is thereby reduced to the sphere of ontological dependence. It is the "object/other," which now appears as both the mediation and the medium of the intentional power of the "Supreme Agent," that has become ontologically dominant and autonomous vis-à-vis the subject/self.

The semantic and conceptual energy with which the object has been endowed thereby works to entrap the subject in a world which has been more or less deliberately designed to serve the purposes of the agent of power. The power of the object does not enable the subject to be engaged in the bringing forth of truth. Rather it plunges the subject into a lifeworld in which submission is the paradigm for the relation of the subject to the object and, through the latter, to the agent of power. This binds the subject’s horizons of perception and consciousness to the power structures in a given society such that he/she internalizes those structures, becomes subject to them, and undergoes a marked reduction in the ability to experience acts of perception and consciousness at variance from them.

1. A number of examples immediately come to mind: McCarthyism, one major aim of which was to emasculate the power of left-dominated organized labor; the formation of the AFL-CIO; foreign aid in general and the Marshall Plan in particular; the fashion in which West Germany was created; the organization of the U.S. as a war economy, a still dominant if somewhat diminished orientation whereby important sectors of the economy and important areas of the country, such as Massachusetts and California, suffer greatly from the current restriction of military budgets.

Most important in respect to intellectual life was that in practice it became impossible to discuss a whole range of ideas that had become identified as "communist", such as social democracy or even national health care. This was a rather marked change even for intellectual life in the U.S., which had always been rather con-servative. A comparison with the 1930s and 1940s, when what could justifiably be called a working class ideology was a prominent element in the arts and certain other spheres of intellectual life, is revealing in this regard.

Western Europe was "anti-Marxist" too, only to a lesser degree. The fate of Italian governments (the aim being to exclude communists from national government) is one sign of this, as was the fact of "tolerable" fascism in Spain and Portugal. Another such indicator is the level of military production and the defense posture in a country like "neutral" Sweden, where a company such as SAAB (originally founded to guarantee the production of aircraft for the military) has become an important social and economic factor.

2. Even the value of specific foreign languages was determined by the political orientations of the respective countries in which they were spoken. English, for example, was singled out for special treatment in certain countries, being considered as the "language of the enemy" before being considered as the "language of Shakespeare."

3. A valuable work in this regard is Åman 1992, originally published as Arkitektur och ideologi i stalinstiden Östeuropa. Ur det kalla krigets historia (1987). This book is a well-documented and illustrated study of the application of Socialist Realism in architecture and of its overall significance in respect to the worlds of both politics and art. It addresses in detail key aspects both of Soviet-style aesthetics in general, and also of the history of its development. A recurrent theme concerns the way that Socialist Realism in architecture was defined in explicit opposition to the ideas and styles dominant in the "enemy camp" consisting of anti-Marxist states.

4. The undesired (from the Party’s viewpoint) effect of "de-Stalinization" on social and intellectual life is discussed in an insightful and accurate fashion by Kolalowski 1972, vol. 3.

5. It may be expected that philosophy will continue to have the honor of dealing with this "clear but confused" body of non-cognitive awareness as long as the latter escapes thorough conceptualization, thereby not being differentiated from philosophy as a separate science.

6. I do not wish to suggest that social reality is reducible to the way in which it is perceived. However, the meaning of social reality as it is actually lived cannot be grasped by an outside observer unless he/she is aware of the values and principles around which it is organized. He/she must grasp the sphere of the "taken-for-granted" that is the basis upon which all meaning and significance arise, including the sphere of deliberate, reflective thought and action. Some general awareness of cultural differences or of structural differences in society is not sufficient for this purpose. What is required is, among other things, a grasp of the aesthetic values, taken in a general sense, by virtue of which the perception of reality takes concrete shape. This is particularly true in respect to revolutionary programs to create a new type of society insofar as the possibility of success demands that people come to literally see and experience social reality in a revolutionary new kind of way. Changing the substance of social reality goes hand in hand with changing the perception of social reality.

This was recognized by both the Communists and the Fascists. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks placed primary importance on art and aesthetics, not on ideology, in educating the population in "communist" values from the earliest days of their regime. This is evidenced, for example, by Lenin’s decree on "Monumental Art." On the other hand, no less a figure than Mussolini maintained that ideology (conceptual thinking) is a "luxury, and for intellectuals only." He was explicitly aware that addressing people on the level of ideas could not strike to the heart of the matter in reorganizing society. Much the same is true of Goebbels, who often suppressed the release of motion pictures which he judged to be overtly political in content. Indeed, perhaps 90 percent of the films produced in Germany under Goebbels’s control were of an entertaining, rather than overtly propagandistic, nature.

7. Several general types of questions arise at this point in respect to Soviet-style, anti-anti-Marxist society and include the following: First, which of the values at the heart of Soviet-style society which served to determine its manner of functioning and its eventual fate are revealed through an examination of Soviet-style art and aesthetics? Second, what role did art and aesthetics play in establishing relations of power in society; can we find precedents in the history of aesthetics? Third, how did aesthetics and art serve to formulate and control the perception of social reality in Soviet-style society? Fourth, what role did Soviet-style aesthetics, especially Socialist Realism, play in the development of Soviet-style society as anti-anti-Marxist society?

The most useful way of proceeding in addressing these questions involves an examination of the role played by the Russian tradition of avant-garde aesthetics and art in the formulation and implementation of the most important Bolshevik-style cultural and social policies, including Socialist Realism. This avant-garde tradition not only developed the main concepts, values and views that later became dominant in the Soviet-style tradition of art and aesthetics, but also promoted the view that art plays a leading role, side by side with politics, in any process of social transformation by virtue of its unique power to educate the population in a new view of society and in new social and moral values. The views that later became typical of the Soviet-style tradition in this respect in fact incorporated the views, values and ideas of avant-garde aesthetics to such a degree that Soviet-style social reality cannot be adequately understood without addressing its aesthetic dimension. This point merits attention in and of itself as the main topic of a separate study.

8. The fact that Socialist Realism dominated the sphere of art and creative expression in the communist countries has led many Western commentators to ignore Soviet-style aesthetics in general. It was judged to be ambiguous, unsophisticated, significantly self-contradictory, overtly ideologically bound, and didactic. Examples of these undeniably negative traits are amply provided by such works Leizerov 1974, Dubrovin 1977, and Kulikova and Zis’ 1980. A valuable Soviet examination of an inherent theoretical ambiguity within Socialist Realism is Borev 1975.

However, precisely because Socialist Realism is so challenging for many views of aesthetic theory commonly accepted in the West, an unbiased examination of it may help define issues of central importance regarding the formation, functioning, decline and collapse of Soviet-style society. It could be argued that the otherwise vague principles of artistic creation and expression as related to creative thought and creative activity in general in Soviet-style society took final, clear shape in the process by which Socialist Realism became established as a dominant policy in Soviet social and cultural politics. This is particular of the ways in which it took up the Russian traditions of avant-garde aesthetics and art. For example, a discussion of how Marxist society was organized such that its reproductive potential was emphasized at the expense of its creative powers could easily take Socialist Realism as its legitimate point of analytical departure. This would make explicit reference to the way the ground for this was prepared by avant-garde aesthetics.

9. Konstantinov 1978 is a standard presentation, later prepared for an international audience, of the Soviet view concerning Marxist philosophy as a whole, including the general role of art in the creation of a new "socialist" human being.

10. The dominant opposing non-Marxist views in this regard are perhaps best expressed in Santayana’s hedonistic theory of aesthetic forms. See, for example, "The Sense of Beauty," first published in 1896.

11. A broad and uncritical discussion of these points typical of official views until virtually the end of the Soviet period, and which contains also numerous references to the literature, may be found in Bezklubenko 1982, chapters 1 and 2.

12. Because Bolshevik-style thinking presents the communist theory of history as expressing the absolute objective truth of social reality, the type of connection mentioned here between the empirical world and an ideal world, which is the source of aesthetic meaning and value, makes it possible to present the empirical standards of party ideology as supra-empirical aesthetic criteria. A representative Soviet-style discussion of how this issue lies at the center of the theory of reflection developed in Soviet philosophy, which aimed in part to develop the idea that it was possible to reflect that which did not yet exist in the real world, is found in Andreev 1981, pp. 15-35.

13. A degree of inspiration in this regard could be taken from Hegel’s "Lectures on Aesthetics". Its central theses is that beauty and truth can be understood only in terms of their systematic coherence by virtue of both being ideas. This implies that: (a) art itself really is both the Idea and a form of knowledge of the Idea, both Truth and a mode of knowing Truth, (b) art embodies the beliefs and morals of a given society in which the aesthetic judgements are rooted, and moreover, (c) art constitutes the subject’s identity (concepts which dominate Hegel’s aesthetic theory). Hence, there can be no more appropriate starting point for the discussion of Soviet-style society than art taken as the expression and knowledge of the highest governing principles of social reality and social life.

14. Nor was it by chance that a primary element in Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika was the relaxing of controls over artistic expression, especially insofar as these policies represent a program of "democratization from above." This relaxing of controls implicitly involves the recognition that the transformation of social views and social practices presumes the corresponding transformation in aesthetic views and artistic activity.

15. An analogous situation holds true for perception as well, although this issue will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say at this point that an object which is perceived emerges against the background of the taken-for-granted. It is perceivable only to the extent that a possible meaning can be ascribed to it. Even for it to emerge as a perceived object means that it has already been ascribed an "assumed" or "categorical" meaning.

16. Bernet 1988 provides a useful discussion of the complex relations between the concepts of intentionality and transcendence in respect to the work of Husserl and Heidegger.

17. These questions are focused upon and discussed in an insightful fashion in Crowther 1993. Pages 1-11, where the basic terms and framework for the study as a whole are presented, are immediately relevant to the theoretical outline of the present study. In respect to the transcendence of Otherness, Crowther notes that this may most simply be understood as indicating that not only are embodied beings finite, but that it is always possible to perceive more, discuss more and do more than is the case at any particular moment. Crowther states that the view he develops is substantially in the spirit of Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la Perception.

18. This view is articulated at the very beginning of the introduction to Crowther 1993.

19. Otherness may be spoken of in this context as the ontolo-gical environment or medium of subjectivity that enables consciousness to appear in a specific instance of historical space and time.

20. It is impossible for reflection, thought and knowledge to be effective means for exercising such force because they do not address the actual, unitary originality of the ontological reciprocity but instead take it for granted. They arise by virtue of the ontological reciprocity whereby conscious (perceptual) intentionality becomes bound with the sensible world in which it is embedded.

21. Crowther speaks of this fusion as the "concrete particular" and refers it to Hegel’s discussion of art as a mode of self-under-standing that lies "half-way between the concrete particularity of material phenomena and the abstract generality of pure thought." See Crowther 1993, 5. See also Chapter 7, especially pp. 122 ff. However, I would add here that art may be not only the expression of that which is fundamental in the human relationship with the world, but that its power can be utilized to drive the creation of that relationship. In the latter case it is as if the Spirit is driven to become self-conscious in a determinate way through the deliberate presentation (by the agent of power in a society) of an Otherness of a determinate type.

22. The ideas expressed here can be fruitfully discussed in relation to certain of the basic concepts in the dialectical philosophy of Sartre’s later period, such as practico-inerte, passivité and sérialité. For Sartre’s primary presentations of these concepts see Critique de la Raison dialectique, tome I, p. 363 ff. and p. 546 ff., and tome II, p. 300 ff. More suggestive for the present discussion, however, is his exploration of totalization in a given society through the agency of a single absolute sovereign. This may be found in tome II, livre III, section B, "La totalization d’enveloppement dans une société directoriale; rapports de la dialectique et de l’anti-dialectique." Of particular interest are Chapters 1-3, "Singularité et incarnation dans la praxis souveraine," "Incarnation du souveraine dans un individu," and "La totalization d’enveloppement, incarnations des incarnations."

The emphasis in the present study differs significantly from Sartre’s insofar as I wish to establish a theoretical framework for investigating how dialectical deviation, alienation and, especially, the power of the practico-inerte may deliberately be fostered and utilized on the ontological level by the agent of power, at least for specific periods of time. Here its purpose is to create a perceptual and cognitive realm of such character that the aesthetic elements of conscious existence come to subdue thought and reflection to the power of the Other which they embody.

23. This notion differs in an important fashion from the tone of Heidegger’s discussion in the Introduction to Being and Time of the significance of capturing the meaning of an object "when it reveals itself on its own as it reveals itself on its own." The case of subverted ontological reciprocity does not concern the emergence of the Truth, which is a constant theme throughout the body of Heidegger’s work in all of its various stages, not least of all in such essays as "The Essence of Truth" and "The Origin of the Work of Art." Quite the contrary, the aim of subverted ontological reciprocity is the forceful imposition upon the subject/self of what may be referred to as a determinate "truth substitute" through the action of an object/other which has been endowed with the aesthetic power of the agent of power. The concern of subverted ontological reciprocity is the "truth" of the object precisely as it may be forced upon the subject, not the Truth as it emerges through the ontological reciprocity between subject and Otherness. This ironically compares with Heidegger’s notion of the "thinking of Being" as it is first presented in "On the Essence of Truth" insofar as "Being" forces itself in the condition of subverted ontological reciprocity upon the subject in such a fashion that the possibility for the emergence of "opening" is itself subverted and the state of truth as concealment is maximized. Being now indeed assumes primacy over There-being, but not at all in the fashion for which Heidegger eventually calls.

24. When the object/other that has been empowered by the agent is considered as an art-work, then the aesthetic characteristics which Heidegger promulgates in "The Origin of a Work of Art" are seen to be lacking in social relevance. The case in question represents a type of creation in which truth is not at work and which originates neither Being nor truth, even though a world emerges. Richardson 1963 provides perhaps the best available examination of the relevant issues in Heidegger’s work as a background for the present discussion. See especially Part II, Chapter I; Part III, Section A, Chapter V; and Part III, Section B, Chapter 1.

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