1. All of today’s liberal or so-called developed democracies claim to guarantee each of their members the possibility of a healthy and happy, free, yet moral and religious life. There is nothing surprising in this fact since the problem of human rights is clearly defined as the very root of the drive of humankind for a happy society. The Magna Charta of 1215, which was forced upon King John by the English nobility, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the United States Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the United States Constitution of 1787, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, and the European democratic revolutions of 1848 are but a few of the more prominent examples of this fact. Not the least of such examples are the democratic political structures of the 20th century and the respective, internationally acknowledged documents (such as those of the UN) that have provided a basis for efforts to build and maintain, all over the world, democratic societies based on the principles of happiness and freedom for everyone. All democratic ideologies maintain the principle that, limited as it may be, the individual’s self-assertion is, in John Stuart Mill’s terms, one of the elements of both society’s and the individual’s welfare, happiness and humanism.

2. "Totality versus Individuality," "Law versus Accident," "Necessity versus Arbitrariness," "Unquestioning Obedience versus Free Decision," "One Party’s (or the One Leader’s) Commands versus Free Will and Creative Activity," "Terror and Fear versus Mutual Trust and Tolerance," and so forth. All of these now seem natural. It has become commonplace in all types of anti-totalitarian ideologies that the values and norms of individualism are both necessary preconditions for and the results of a genuinely humane and truly democratic society. It could hardly be otherwise since all types of totalitarianism share an immanent feature, namely, the either implicit or, which is the usual case, explicit suppression of the major possibilities for a free development of the components of a society from institutions through particular individuals. The goal is the creation of socially utilizable and completely "functional" persons lacking all individuality whatsoever. The type of personality that most conveniently fits a totalitarian regime has always been the one described by Theodor W. Adorno’s team in the 1950s, the so-called authoritarian personality. This type of person is obediently submissive in regard to those who are "superior" and cruelly oppressive in regard to those who are "inferior."

3. But as Hannah Arendt has cogently shown, if one would speak in general of a totalitarian personality or mentality, one should keep in mind that one of its outstanding characteristics is its extraordinary ability to adapt and its absence of continuity. That is why a people’s "forgetfulness" and inconstancy does not at all mean that they are "cured of the totalitarian delusion . . . the opposite might well be true." This is of extreme importance in regard to the building of an optimal model of democracy, since people could hardly attain genuine liberty but for historical memory (both social and individual). History lives through memory since, from a phenomenological point of view, memory is reality. A proverb says that those who strive to forget simply prolong their exile, and that the key to salvation is memory.

4. However, it is obvious that, in spite of the crucial role of freedom, freedom alone is not sufficient for progress in post-totalitarian liberation. First and foremost, unlimited freedom for everyone would prevent freedom for all. The so-called "free individuals" of the developed (liberal) democracies have been "formatted" by a long-term process of mutual agreements of various kinds (political, economic, social) that has placed limitations on each individual’s freedom. To put it in Moses’s words, there is no liberty without law. Every law, formal as it is, places limits upon individualism lest it turn into dangerous arbitrariness; it prevents individuals from breaking loose from all restraint. The latter would be a sure road to anarchy that would destroy all social institutions as well as the very freedom of the individual.

5. One should add to the above-mentioned controversies certain new types which pervade developed (liberal) democracies and have recently become quite clearly visible, such as "Discipline versus Self-expression and willfulness," "Limitation versus Emancipation," "Social Justice versus Effectiveness," "Compromise versus Success," "Tolerance versus Prejudice," and so forth. The old problem of values and norms, of free activity and motivation, has thus taken a new form in the post-totalitarian situation. The problem here concerns the price individuals must pay to reach a way of being that would correspond to human dignity, to build their own conditions humaines and, by the virtue of this alone, to be deserving of them. The ideologies current in the post-totalitarian countries concerning modernization (liberalization, industrialization and so forth) have a "backward-looking" orientation in respect to "Western" patterns. In fact, they present models of yesterday rather than of today’s Western developments (cf. G. Schoepflin). Because of this orientation, the current "modernization," "liberalization" and "Westernization" of East European countries faces the problem of avoiding certain shortcomings found in the historical evolution of Western (liberal democratic) values, ideas, ideals, motivational structures, institutions and so forth. Above all, as certain thinkers maintain, the human condition itself may well be characterized by an "incurable ignorance," leading to a lack of substantial progress in knowledge and thereby leaving always open "the road to serfdom" (Hayek). Moreover, late 20th century democracies, both old and young, ought to keep in mind the infernal experiences of both the Bolshevik and National-socialist types of totalitarian regimes, along with all the other dictatorships of our century. The latter have proven that individuality and freedom are quite fragile values. Stated otherwise, pluralism as it now exists may not provide a guarantee of individual freedom and civil liberties, and neither may democracy as such. It was quite clear even in the times of Plato and Aristotle that democracy, however it was understood, was but one of the many possible, and not one of the most stable, ways of governing society. Tragic witness to this truth is provided by this century’s social-political transitions, both illegal (the Bolshevik overthrow of Kerensky’s provisional government) and legal (the Nazi replacement of the Weimar Republic).

6. A new type of critique of ideology (Ideologiekritik) is indispensable. The too popular and too-pompous-to-be-true funerals of ideology have been products of wishful thinking which themselves comprise another ideology. Even followers of visions of the end of ideology, not to mention visions of the end of history, have to admit that ideology may start up again just as readily as it ended. Moreover, new ideologies, both anti-totalitarian and anti-anarchistic, may present alternative ways of building and maintaining democratic societies, and may also help in organizing normal, truly liberal politics. Without ideologies there would be no effective connection between, on the one hand, professionally elaborated ideas and revealed ideals however admirable and wise they may be, and, on the other, the mass consciousness that is the motivational sphere of the activities of individuals. Democracy and liberty "from above," artificial as they are, may well be a new kind of authoritarianism and dictatorship.

7. Insofar as individualism may be regarded as a leitmotif of liberal democratic discussion, it is crucial to place it once again in the limelight so that its metaphysical and ontological grounds can be elucidated theoretically. The notion of the autonomous and self-sufficient individual, which provides the horizon of liberal thought and shapes the core of political, moral, economic and cultural existence in a truly democratic society, implies that each person has equal value. In liberal literature, however, it is almost a commonplace that there are different types of individualism. Examples are John Dewey’s distinction between the early 19th century’s "abstract individual" and the individual of a "communal type," Hayek’s "rationalistic individualism," which is seemingly false, and "true individualism," which fits well with the framework of market society. The point here is that the classical notion of the individual does not work today.

8. The modern individual has proven to be far from the classical ideals because the progress of modern society has made obsolete the values that were supposed to have provided the grounds for individual motivation. Reduction to the merely individual level of absolute sovereignty, full autonomy, desires, passions, responsibilities and personal good contradict the notion of public goods and the very institutions that are designed to introduce and maintain the liberal forms of social life. Moreover, it also contradicts certain basic norms of property values and the market economy. Along with the freedoms of speech, association and access to information as necessary preconditions for an individual’s self-aware involvement in communal decision making, the right to welfare could well be regarded as a basic "civil liberty." However, no individualist, classical or otherwise, would ever agree to include this right into the realm of the "genuine universal rights" of the individual, since its satisfaction may, more often than not, entail the abrogation of other rights of the individuals. At this point, the problem of human rights expands into a more metaphysical realm or, to be more specific, an axiological one.

9. Value is a form in which human inter-relations in any society crystallize. The notions of values usually comprise visions of a moral, aesthetic and cognitive character, such as the place of human beings in the universe, the meaning of the world, the sense of human life, and conceptions of dignity, honor, beauty and truth. The realm of values also includes phenomena of moral consciousness, including concepts of good and evil, right and wrong, moral and immoral, justice and injustice, happiness and so forth. A given action has a moral meaning to the extent that it impacts, in one way or another, the social and cultural environment of a person, his or her community’s activities and life. People regard actions that are in accordance with their moral principles as good and those which contradict them as evil. That is why moral actions may imply either functional or dysfunctional changes in the life of the person, all the way up to community on the broadest scale, and hence have social meaning. From this perspective, values play a normative role.

10. Norms may function either as social frameworks, that is, as paradigms for people’s activity, or as principles, that is, as the goals or ideals of their activity. The former are necessary in regard to organizing social life, thus subsuming the private to the social; the latter act as inner drives, orientations and milestones for an individual’s activities. Taken in their paradigmatic meaning, norms ensure the normal order, limitations, expectations and life of society. All types of institutions and so-called public opinion give it their sanction, by virtue of which they function as norms of an officious morality. Insofar as this normative paradigm is always of an external character, insofar as it always intends to interiorize norms from without, all types of "ethicization" of social, political and economic spheres have proven unsuccessful. Two pertinent examples of such failures are the utopian ethical-socialist project of the Marburg neo-Kantians and the disastrous later attempts to "humanize" communism. The most radical post-Modernistic deconstruction of, along with everything else, the very notion of normality reveals only the relative content of the latter, which depends on the historical situation, traditions, mores, the stage of civilization and so forth. But it can never eliminate the ideal of normality as such. That is why the relativity which is thus revealed does not necessarily mean value relativism, moral nihilism or anything of the kind.

11. From an individualistic point of view, the Whole (the state or the collective, for example) is an intrinsic danger to a person’s individuality. Despite the constant pressure of the former upon the latter (through an interiorization process), normative frameworks always face an inner resistance on the side of a person’s sphere of values. Here lay the roots of the incessant, unabating tension between the individual and society. One may regard the respective conflicts as immanently tragic insofar as there is no individual beyond society, nor society beyond individuals. Marx’s attempt to insert "sociality" into the very essence of human being turned out to be unsatisfactory and reductionist. See the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, in which Marx states: "Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations." This approach was a complete failure in light of both the evolution and the involution of post-Marxian mankind. In the long run, individuality is a permanent danger to totalitarianism, which is why the latter hates the former so much.

12. Positive approaches to values comprise the following aspects:

a) Ontological: only those values can be labeled as genuine which are reducible to concrete persons, who are the only ones who act and choose in concrete situations, and whose acts and choices can be exactly measured and verified.

b) Methodological: the only genuine values are the ones that can be, in principle, reduced to scientifically meaningful propositions, that is, "logically reducible to actions, dispositions and volitions," either those of individuals (methodological individualism), or collective entities (a sort of "conceptual realism," regarded by some thinkers as a grave error from a strictly scientific point of view).

c) Political: genuine liberal democracy is only possible on the ground that individuals are to determine by themselves, and only by themselves, their own choices in practical, moral and economic activities. No external factors should interfere. Regardless of whether this aspect has a naturalistic (natural rights, common humanity, and other similar concepts) or utilitarian (common good, harmony of interests, happiness for each and for all, solidarity or pleasures of a "higher" order, etc.) foundation, in all cases one encounters evaluative judgments that have no empirical referents (such as justice, happiness, good, dignity and honor, as well as their respective antonyms). That is why it is quite reasonable to ask how consensus and communal (from a small group to the whole of society) coherence could emerge out of purely personal judgments, or whether there is any way out of the dogmas of ethical subjectivism. It seems at least suspicious, if not altogether dangerous, to identify the political aspect with a moral one. Such were Hegel’s examples of the State regarded as: the highest principle of Morality, the unquestionable Good, both the political and moral embodiment of the Totality of the Absolute Idea. The totalitarian implications of such an equation, which lately have been explicated in practice, are known too well to be dwelt upon here. In any case, if right (Recht) was morality, the formal character of law should be eliminated, which would transform judges into executors, to use Franz Neumann’s terms.

13. Regardless of the unquestionable importance of the natural, methodological and political aspects of the post-totalitarian problem of individuality, the aspect which is usually labeled as ontological deserves more attention. By this, however, I am far from indicating any common meaning of the term, which has usually been linked to some "non-controversial metaphysical doctrine" of the primal "substance" (individual or collectivistic) of any social reality; nor do I here mean some specific ontos of the latter. It is rather an axiological ontology which I am trying to reach within a philosophical (metaphysical) analysis of values as highlighting norms which are to be satisfied by every individual willing to contribute to the normal life of a normal society, that is, to a kind of society which is most adequate to the human dignity of each and all. It is much easier to stress, in abstracto, the need for individuals to develop a more communal perspective upon their everyday, social, economical, political and theoretical lives than to outline, in concreto, the meaning-giving field of values.

14. A philosophical approach to values/norms: the mutual ground where the philosophical and moral levels of consciousness meet is the layer of so-called ultimate problems, that is, problems concerning the place of humans in the world. Such problems are usually answered by means of considerations, or by theory in the widest sense of the term. In the case of morality, however, theory takes an explicitly practical, concrete stance, while in the case of philosophy it is of a much more speculative, abstract and even aloof character. In both cases, nevertheless, there is above all an intention, which is the active attitude of the individual towards the Whole (of the world and his or her socium). The ancient Sofos may be a good sample in this respect, whose way of living and behavior was identical to doctrine, for whom philosophy was a genuine modus vivendi.

But what is the nature of the Whole? It would be more instructive to formulate the question in another way, namely, what ought the nature of the Whole be in order to maintain the constant intention in human actions, within a transcendent horizon, for a genuinely humane co-existence — with nature, with other beings, with self?

15. K. Wojtyla emphasizes living-with-others as an aspect of human being that is both a natural (anthropological) and a social feature of a person’s existence. The empirical reality of this co-existive aspect of human nature may be discovered in the phenomenon of participation. Only through the prism of participation may a human being be regarded as a person, as a true individual, who has a social, cultural and historical meaning from one’s own and from others’ points of view. Through participation, a human being acquires a profound significance; individuality is acquired only by sharing-life-with-others. Both individualism and totalism alike impede participation, thereby hindering a person’s "formatting" as an individual.

An organic unity of the traditional metaphysical (in Wojtyla’s case, Thomist) and the phenomenological-existential types of anthropology is needed in order to outline the topos where values as principles and values as norms coincide, that is, the "location" where human beings experience reality even before knowing and/or evaluating it. The former is the necessary, transcendental precondition of the latter. In philosophy, world-view is not just an aspect or type of perspective, but rather an active orientation on the side of the subject. In the long run, philosophy taken from a practical perspective coincides with morality and just being (cf. Aristotle’s practical philosophy). In contemporary philosophical thought, this intrinsic unity between idea and activity has been cogently re-discovered by thinkers like Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Thus, the socio-cultural function of morality can now be traced back to general world-view (philosophical, in a post-classical sense) paradigms as an active factor of the general picture of the human world, not only in its ideal ultima, but also as a trans-historical dynamic of the is, where all the tensions between good and evil are merely means for an approximate progress towards the ought to.

16. The Baden neo-Kantians (Windelband, Rickert, Lask) attempted to outline and overcome the duality of Naturwissens-chaften and Geisteswissenschaften, thereby making a genuine philosophy of values and philosophical axiology not only possible but real. This failed in the final analysis, in spite of all their brilliant intellectual achievements and those of all under their influence in this respect (Dilthey, Simmel, Weber, et al.) The reason for this failure was, to use Husserl’s words, their traditional (modern) naturalistic, that is, non-transcendental, attitude. Thereby they forgot or simply were blind to the fact that even natural science "is a culture" which belongs within the cultural world of the civilization "which has developed this culture and within which, for the individual, possible ways of understanding this culture are present." In other words, the neo-Kantians remained caught up, like many others before and after them, in a limited naturalistic objectivism. For Husserl, an objective science of the spirit, an objective science of the soul, has never existed and will never exist. This is because the belief in an objective or positive knowledge, "in the sense that it attributes to souls, to personal communities, inexistence in the forms of space-time," is the grave mistake of Modernity.

17. What is the practical point of all these seemingly too abstract metaphysical and phenomenological speculations? Briefly stated, it is impossible to build and maintain a genuinely democratic society beyond the individuality principle. It is hardly possible, however, to follow this principle in traditional ways. A certain post-modernist emphasis on difference, on otherness as an aspect of human existence worthy of respect, is of some importance inasmuch as it may help reveal the field of mutual tolerance and forgiveness. In my view, the post-modern attitude, with its accent upon a sort of radical plurality and unlimited tolerance, may be of good service to contemporary mankind (regardless of its past and present) in getting rid of the original human (or even Satanic) sin of hubris, which is the root of all the dangerous self-deceptions of humanity. In a certain respect, we here are facing a typically Modern vision of human dignity: individuals who are autonomous and free in their actions, the human person as the active subject of his or her own destiny.

18. It is just on this point that the other side of the coin has been hidden throughout the history of humanity. I here mean what is perhaps the most dangerous of all human errors, the one which has constantly pushed people in the direction of feeling themselves to be creating history and society, whereby they also feel themselves to be the genuine creators of the world. This is an over-extension of everything that is "human, all too human" into the sphere of the Divine. Stated otherwise, this is a case of what is all-too-human deifying itself, that is, a dangerous substitution of an anthropocentric picture of the world for the theocentric, which has been only too typical since the European Renaissance. It is a conceit that Hayek promptly labeled as fatal, in which all the errors of socialism (and, one may add, of every kind of totalitarianism whatsoever) have been deeply rooted. This does not mean that either liberal or conservative thought, whether classical or contemporary, would embrace a post-modern idea of individualism. In their view, a total adoption of the post-modern stance would lead to a disaster, and they might well be correct. I wish only to say that one specific aspect of post-modern experience, namely, a commitment to treat others as ends in themselves, might be quite helpful in the making of new democracies.

19. The post-modernist hushing of the individual’s specific voice, despite its noble (radically tolerant) intentions, is still unsatisfactory and dangerous in that it can easily lead to a kind of personality who is deprived both of his or her actual rights and of the legitimate claims to rights. On the other hand, regulating human relationships and attachments by impartial moral principles may cause a sense of loss, tension and conflict within the individual rather than a sense of community and participation. In this way, too, individuals may again be susceptible to the cunning force of totalization. An effective way out may perhaps be described as activity-with-and-for-others. The only horizon that could give meaning to this kind of activity would be of a transcendent rather than merely transcendental (which is the case with Karl-Otto Appel’s and Habermas’s communicative ethics) nature. This means that a type of horizon capable of providing not only an individualistic, but a humane meaning to an individual’s existence must be of an essential nature. Such is the perspective of the Divine; hence, the role of religion in the making of democratic society.

It is certainly no coincidence that the Orthodox Bulgarian Church became a target of purely political interest, especially on the side of the former communist (now self-renamed "socialist") rulers. One of the most serious results of this intervention is the deep crisis and schism which the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has faced since the fall of the overtly communist dictatorship in November, 1989. There is an apparent paradox in this respect, namely, the institution of the Catholic Church, typically opposed to the existing secular rule, preserved its independence (even if only in a relative and comparative sense) throughout the totalitarian period in countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary and especially Poland. Moreover, it played a significant role in all the movements of dissent and opposition in those countries. With some rare exceptions, this has never been the case with the Eastern Orthodox Church, which has always avoided open conflict with the powers that be. In spite of this fact, the latter have more often than not been destructively hostile to the former.

20. In conclusion, a philosophical attitude organically combined with religious insight may help overcome the shortcomings of both modern and post-modern individualisms. As Nikolai Berdyaev put it, Spirit is freedom, and freedom by nature is always Becoming, never Being, insofar as genuine freedom, as well as the human spirit itself, are emanations of the Divine Spirit. That is why only the spiritual is genuinely creative. Furthermore, any objectivistic explanation of the spirit is a contradictio in adjecto. Berdyaev says that, "Nature comes from without, but Spirit emerges from within. So, one can understand God in man through the spirit only." The next step, however, would be from I to you, and then to they. Since this was a step that Berdyaev himself was not confident enough to make, the Spirit remained a rather lonely life for him. The Church as a nexus of spiritual community may provide the post-totalitarian individual with the right direction and the step to make. The kind of Church and the kind of religion (whether "traditional" Orthodoxy, Catholicism or Protestant Christianity) the individual might choose are theological and dogmatic rather than philosophical questions. Not least of all, such questions are a matter of free personal choice and decision, which is why I will not dwell upon them here. Suffice it to say that here lies the corrective which is needed to impede the rise of new waves of totalizing, authoritarian, partoctratic, nationalistic or other such movements. It contains the corrective that is to keep people vigilant against the constant dangers of Totalitarianism, whether it be old, new, pre-modern, modern, post-modern or whatever else in nature.

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