GEORGE F. McLEAN

In this light the triumphs and tragedies of humankind in our lifetime are deeply — even metaphysically — instructive. The great celebrations of the last fifty years all reflect the explosive power of human freedom. They are instances of the liberation of the person and the emergence or reemergence of peoples old and new: the liberation from fascism in the ‘40s, the liberation from colonialism in the ‘50s and ‘60s, the breaking down in the ‘70s of structures oppressing minorities, and the bursting of the Iron Curtain in the ‘80s — all these landmarks of recent history are steps in the liberation of peoples.

However, these steps now appear to have opened new and equally threatening challenges for the future. In the most recent years and even months, we have found that authentic liberation is not merely a matter of establishing new economic systems — though that cannot be low on the long list of things to be done. More directly, it is the task of living freedom. This requires understanding the new sense of identity on the part of peoples, finding ways to promote this identity and relating it with other peoples in a new fusion of strengths, rather than of destructive confrontation.

Toward this end the present paper will first attempt to situate the social issue as a matter of the exercise of freedom and then to locate the proper mode of operation of the different levels at which freedom operates. Second, it will study the nature and formation of cultural traditions as works of a third level of human freedom. Finally, it will look to that level of freedom for the foundations not only of passive tolerance, but of positive cooperation between peoples of different cultures.

In the ideological context of the Cold War freedom was sought in strange places. On the one hand it was said to be the arbitrary self-affirmation of a supposed atomic individual without family or history, goal or values. On the other hand, it was considered to be the impersonal dialectic of economic forces in search of profit or of political forces in search of power.

With the collapse of this artificial and extreme polarization there now emerges anew a more natural pattern of association among peoples in unities which reflect real needs and especially the decisions of people as to which associations to form in order to respond to these needs and to implement civil society in our time. As the concretization of freedom in our day this reconstitutes a new locus philosophicus in full reality of human freedom. We will begin by looking to its earliest thematic articulation in Aristotle, and then move synchronically to its deepest reality. In these terms we will be able to consider cultural identity as the creation of human freedom as it emerges in and through relations to others. But these relations could still be pragmatic ones related to manipulating others. Hence a metaphysical reflection will be required in order to inquire regarding the basis of human freedom and consequently the manners in which it is properly exercised.

Civil society then has three elements. First there is governance: arché, the beginning of action or the taking of initiative toward an end; this is the exercise of human freedom. But as this pertains to persons in their various groups and subgroups there are two other elements, namely, communication or solidarity with other members of the groups and the participation or subsidiarity of these groups or communities within the whole. The key to understanding civil society lies then in the solidarity and subsidiarity of the community as its members participate in the governance of life toward the common good.

Solidarity and Community

Through time societies have manifested an increasing diversity of parts; this constitutes their proper richness and strength and brings quantitative advantage. It is important that the parts differ in kind so that each brings a distinctive concern and capability to the common task. Further, differing between themselves, one member is able to give and the other to receive in multiple and interrelated active and receptive modes. This means that the members of a society not only live alongside each other, but share the effort to realize the good life through mutual interaction.

In the human body, where there is but one substantial form, the many parts exist for the whole and the actions of the parts are actions of the whole (it is not my legs and feet which walk; I walk by my legs and feet). Society also has many parts whose differentiation and mutuality pertain to the good of the whole. But in contrast to the body, the members of a community have their own proper form, finality and operation. Hence, their unity is one of the order of their capabilities and actions to the perfection of the body politic or civil society and the realization of its common good.

But there is more than solidarity to the constitution of civil society. Community in general is constituted through the cooperation of many for the common goal or good, but the good or goal of a community can be extremely rich and textured. It can concern nourishment, health maintenance, environmental soundness; it includes education both informal and formal, basic and advanced, initial and retraining; it extends to nutrition, culture, recreation, etc. — all the endless manners in which human beings fulfill their needs and capacities and seek "the good life". As each of these can and must be sought and shared through the cooperation of many, each is the basis of a group or subgroup in a vastly varied community.

When, however, one adds the elements of freedom as governance (arché) determining what will be done and how the goal will be sought, subsidiarity emerges into view. Were we talking about things rather then people it would be possible to envisage a technology of mass production in a factory automatically moving and directing all toward the final product. Where, however, we are concerned with a community and hence with the composit exercise of the freedom of the persons who constitute its membership, then governance in the community initiating and directing action toward the common end must be exercised in a cumulative manner beginning from the primary group or family in relation to its common good, and moving up to the broader concerns or goals of more inclusive groups considered both quantitatively (neighborhood, city, nation, etc.), and qualitatively (education, health, religion) according to the hierarchy of goods which are their concerns.

The synergetic ordering of these groups, considered both quantitatively, and qualitatively and the realization of their varied needs and potentials is the stuff of the governance of civil society. The condition for success in this is that the freedom and hence responsible participation of all be actively present and promoted at each level. Thus, proper responsibility on the family level must not be taken away by the city, nor that of the city by the state. Rather the higher units either in the sense of larger numbers or more important order of goods must exercise their governance precisely in order to promote the full and self-responsible action of the lower units and in the process enable them to achieve goals which acting alone they could not realize. Throughout, the concern is to maximize the participation in governance or the exercise of freedom of the members of the community, thereby enabling them to live more fully as persons and groups so that the entire society flourishes. This is termed subsidiarity. Thus civil society is a realm of persons in solidarity who through a structure of subsidiarity participate in self-governance.

This manifests also the main axes of the unfolding of the social process in Greece, namely,

- (a) from the Platonic stress upon unity in relation to which the many are but repetitions, to the Aristotelian development of diversity as necessary for the unfolding and actualization of unity;

- (b) from emphasis upon governance by authority located at the highest and most remote levels, to participation in the exercise of governance by persons and groups at every level and in relation to matters with which they are engaged and responsible;

- (c) and from attention to one’s own interests, to attention to the common good of the whole.

Aristotle’s analysis says much about human freedom in society, but according to the glasses one wears — or, more properly, the epistemology one employs — his texts can be read diversely and yield a number of levels of insight and hence the number of levels of freedom outlined by Mortimer Adler and his team in The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectic Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958).

The restrictions implicit in this appear starkly in Rudolf Carnap’s "Vienna Manifesto" which shrinks the scope of meaningful knowledge and significant discourse to describing "some state of affairs" in terms of empirical "sets of facts." This excludes speech about wholes, God, the unconscious or entelechies; the grounds of meaning, indeed all that transcends the immediate content of sense experience are excluded.

For Kant the heteronomous, external and empiricist orientation character of the above disqualifies it from being moral at all, much less from constituting human freedom. In his first Critique of Pure Reason Kant had studied the role of mind in the scientific constitution of the universe. He reasoned that because our sense experience was always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from the human mind. This was an essential turning point for it directed attention to the role of the human spirit and especially to the reproductive imagination in constituting the universe in which we live and move.

But this is not the realm of freedom for if the forms and categories with which we work are from our mind, how we construct with them is not left to our discretion. The imagination must bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in a unity or order capable of being informed by the concepts or categories of the intellect with a view to constituting the necessary and universal judgments of science. The subject’s imagination here is active but not free, for it is ruled by the categories integral to the necessary and universal judgements of the sciences. In these terms the human mind remains merely an instrument of physical progress and a function of matter.

However, in his second Critique, that of Practical Reason, beyond the set of universal, necessary and ultimately material relations, Kant points to the reality of human responsibility. This is the reality of freedom and spirit which characterizes and distinguishes the person. In its terms he recasts the whole notion of physical law as moral rule. If freedom is not to be chaotic and randomly destructive, it must be ruled or under law. To be free is to be able to will as I ought, i.e., in conformity with moral law.

Yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous. Hence, my maxim must be something which as a moral agent I — and no other —give to myself. Finally though I am free because I am the lawmaker, my exercise of this power cannot be arbitrary, if the moral order must be universal.

On this basis, a new level of freedom emerges. It is not merely self-centered whimsy in response to circumstantial stimuli; nor is it a despotic exercise of power or the work of the clever self-serving eye of Plato’s rogue. Rather, it is the highest reality in all creation; to will as I ought is wise and caring power, open to all and bent upon the realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves". In sum, it is free men living together in righteous harmony. This is what we are really about; it is man’s glory — and his burden.

Unfortunately, for Kant this glorious ideal remained on the formal plane; it was a matter of essence rather than of existence. It was intended as a guiding principle, a critical norm to evaluate the success or failure of the human endeavor — but it was not the human endeavor itself. For failure to appreciate this, much work for human rights remains at a level of abstraction which provides only minimal requirements. It might found processes of legal redress, but stops short of, and may even distract from and thus impede, positive engagement in the real process of constructing the world in which we live: witness the paralysis of Europe and the world in the face of the Yugoslav dissolution of mankind’s moral and hence legal foundations for life in our times.

This second level of freedom makes an essential contribution to human life; we must not forget it nor must we ever do less. But it does not give us the way in which we as unique people in this unique time and space face our concrete problems. We need common guides, but our challenge is to act concretely. Can philosophy without becoming politics or other processes of social action consider and contribute to the actual process of human existence as we shape and implement our lives in freedom?

When the contemporary mind proceeds beyond objective and formal natures to become more deeply conscious of human subjectivity, and of existence precisely as emerging in and through human self-awareness, then the most profound changes must take place. The old order built on objective structures and norms would no longer be adequate; structures would crumble and a new era would dawn. This is indeed the juncture at which we now stand.

Progress in being human corresponds to the deepening of man’s sense of being, beyond Platonic forms and structures, essences and laws, to act as uncovered by Aristotle and especially to existence as it emerges in Christian philosophy through the Middle Ages. More recently this sensibility to existence has emerged anew through the phenomenological method for focusing upon intentionality and the self-awareness of the human person in time (dasein). This opens to the third task stated above, namely, that of deciding for oneself in virtue of the power "inherent in human nature to change one’s own character creatively and to determine what one shall be or shall become." This is the most radical freedom, namely, our natural freedom of self-determination.

This basically is self-affirmation in terms of our teleological orientation toward perfection or full realization which we will see to be the very root of the development of values, virtues and hence of cultural traditions. It implies seeking when that perfection is absent and enjoying or celebrating it when attained. In this sense, it is that stability in one’s orientation to the good which classically has been termed holiness and anchors such great traditions of the world as the Hindu and Taoist, Islamic and or the Judeo-Christian. One might say that this is life as practiced by the saints and holy men, but it would be more correct to say that it is because they lived in such a manner that they are called holy.

In his third Critique, Kant suggests an important insight regarding how this might form a creative force for confronting present problems and hence for passing on the tradition in a transforming manner. He sees that if the free person of the second Critique were to be surrounded by the necessitarian universe of the first Critique, then one’s freedom would be entrapped and entombed within one’s mind, while one’s external actions would be necessary and necessitated. If there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, indeed if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be understood as directed toward a goal and must manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, even in its necessary and universal laws, nature is no longer alien to freedom; rather it expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom.

This makes the exercise of freedom possible, but our issue is how this freedom is exercised in a way that creates diverse cultures, i.e., how can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating, but free and creative? In the "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," Kant points out that in working toward an integrating unity the imagination is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts as in the first Critique, or the regulating ideal of the second Critique. Returning to the order of essences would omit the uniqueness of the self and its freedom. Rather, the imagination ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see where relatedness and purposiveness can emerge. This ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities or patterns of actions and natures. Unrestricted by any a priori categories, it can integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and creative productions, and include scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This is the proper and creative work of the human person in this world.

In order for human freedom to be sensitive to the entirety of this all-encompassing harmony, in the final analysis our conscious attention must be directed not merely to universal and necessary physical or social structures, nor even to beauty and ugliness either in their concrete empirical realizations or in their Platonic selves. Rather, our focus must be upon the integrating images of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion, generated deep within our person by these images as we attempt to shape our world according to the relation of our will to the good and hence to realize the good for our times.

In this manner human freedom becomes at once the goal, the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is goal, namely to realize life as rational and free in this world; it is creative source for through the imagination freedom unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is manifestation because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is criterion because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is arbiter because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this mode of self-realization.

Thus, freedom in this third existential sense emerges as the dynamic center of our life. It is the spectroscope and kaleidoscope through which is processed the basic thrust toward perfection upon which we shall see culture as the pattern of public life to be based and by which its orders of preference are set. The philosophical and religious traditions it creates become the keys to the dynamics of human life. Hence the possibilities of peace and cooperation must depend fundamentally on the potentialities of creative freedom for overcoming the proclivities of the first level of freedom for confrontation and violent competition, for surmounting the minimal criteria of the second level of freedom, and for setting in motion positive processes of peaceful and harmonious collaboration.

Our next task is to uncover how human persons in exercising this third level of freedom emerge in the communities of family, neighborhood and people, and in so doing create their public life and its culture. This calls not merely for a sociological description of culture as the compilation of whatever humankind does or makes; it is rather the conscious weaving of the fabric of human symbols and interrelations through which a human group chooses to live its unique process of unveiling being in time. This requires attention to a number of specific issues:

1. the nature of values, culture and tradition;

2. the moral authority of a cultural tradition and its values for guiding life; and

3. the active role of every generation in creatively shaping and developing its tradition in response to the challenges of its times.

If being stands against nonbeing, then living things survive by seeking the good or that which perfects and promotes their life in the sense of Kant’s third Critique and its description of the work of the imagination. A basic exercise of this third level of human freedom therefore is to set an order of preferences among the many possible goods. Those are the "preferred" or "values" in the sense that they "weigh more heavily" in making decisions than do other possible goods. Gradually, one becomes practiced in the arts of realizing and/or achieving these values, which competencies are our moral strengths or "virtues". Cumulatively, our values and corresponding virtues set a style for our action. Together the values and virtues, artifacts and modes of human interaction constitute an integrated pattern of human life in which the creative freedom of a people is expressed and implemented. This is a "culture" taken synchronically as a context in which human life can be cultivated and perfected.

Through time there evolves a vision of actual life which transcends time and hence can provide guidance for our life-past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which points the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orients the life of a person. Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. But it is also normative because it provides a harmony and fullness which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating. For this reason it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged.

What then should we conclude regarding the values and culture in which we have been raised, which give us dominion over our actions and enable us to be free and creative? Do they come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? To this question Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

As an active process tradition transforms what is received, lives it in a creative manner and passes it on as a leaven for the future. Taken diachronically the process of tradition as receiving and passing on does not stop with Plato’s search for eternal and unchangeable ideals, with the work of techné in repeating exactly and exclusively a formal model, or with rationalism’s search for clear and distinct knowledge of immutable natures by which all might be controlled. Rather, in its application according to the radical distinctiveness of persons and their situations tradition is continually perfected and enriched. It manifests the sense of what is just and good which we have from our past by creating in original and distinctive ways more of what justice and goodness mean. J. Pelican said it well: "Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living."

Further, if one takes time and culture seriously one must recognize that he or she is situated in a particular culture and at a particular time; hence all that can be seen from this vantage point constitutes one’s horizon. This would be lifeless and dead, determined rather than free, if one’s vantage point were to be fixed by its circumstances and closed. This points to the necessity of meeting other minds and hearts, not simply to add information incrementally, but in order that one might be challenged in one’s basic assumptions and enabled thereby to delve more deeply into one’s tradition and to draw forth more pervasive truth.

This hermeneutic mode of openness does not consist in surveying others objectively, obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner, or even in simply juxtaposing their ideas and traditions to our own. Rather, it is directed primarily to ourselves, for our ability to listen to others is correlatively our ability to assimilate the implications of their answers in order to delve more deeply into the meaning of our own traditions and draw out new and ever more rich insights. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us and that we are the ones who can enable it to speak.

Here hermeneutic, democratic and critical attitudes converge. The attitude is not one of methodological sureness which imposes its views, nor is it a mere readiness for new compromises or new techniques of social organization — for these are subject to manipulation on the horizontal level. Instead, it is readiness to draw out in open dialogue new meaning from a common tradition. Seen in these terms our heritage of culture and values is not closed or dead; rather, democratic interchange can enable life to remain ever new by becoming more inclusive and more rich.

The previous sections have enabled us to locate the specific existential level of freedom at which we are able to create a culture and hence the origin, nature and content of a cultural tradition. We saw, as well, the essentially open and dialogic character of cultural progress. It remains now for us to look more closely at the open attitude toward other peoples and cultures to see whether this be a matter of self-enhancement in order to dominate and control others or of love and concern for others within an integrating horizon and, indeed, an integrating reality.

Kant himself could say only that to be authentically human life had to be lived "as if" all is teleological. But then its exercise would be restricted to the confines of the human imagination; freedom would be not only self-determining but self-constituting and self-limited. In contrast, if the human spirit strives deeply to realize the life of persons then the transcendent principle it requires must be the most real in heaven and earth; if freedom presents us with a limitless range of possibilities, then its principle must be the Infinite and Eternal, the Source and Goal of all possibility. This Transcendent is the key to real liberation: it not only gives absolute grounding to one’s reality and certifies one’s right to be respected, but evokes the creative powers of one’s heart, frees them from the confines of one’s own slow, halting and even partial creative activity, and plunges them into infinite possibility and power.

This can be approached through the steps of phenomenological reflection on the person as gift. First, our self-identity and interpersonal relatedness are not made by us, but are givens with which we work. Second, if we reflect on the character of a gift we note that it has a radical character: to attempt to pay for it in cash or in kind would destroy its nature as gift. As gratuitous, a gift is based primarily in the freedom of the giver, not in the merit of the one who receives.

There is here striking symmetry with the ‘given’ in the sense of hypothesis or evidence. In the line of hypothetical and evidential reasoning there is a first, namely, that which is not explained, but upon which explanation is founded. Here, there is also a first upon which the reality of the gift is founded and which is not to be traced to another reality. This symmetry illumines what is distinctive of the gift, namely, that the gift’s originating action is not traced back further, that it is precisely free or gratuitous. Once again, our reflections lead us in the direction of that which is Self-sufficient, Absolute and Transcendent as the sole adequately gratuitous source of the gift of being.

In a certain parallel to the antinomies of Kant which show when reason has strayed beyond its bounds, many from Plotinus to Leibniz and beyond have sought knowledge, not only of the gift and its origin, but of why it had to be given. The more they succeeded the less room was left for freedom on the part of the human person as a given or gift. Others attempted to understand freedom as a Fall, only to find that what was thus understood was bereft of value and meaning and a source of violence in human life and its cultures. Rather, the radical non-reciprocity of human freedom must be rooted in an equally radical generosity on the part of its origin. No reason, either on the part of the given or on the part of its origin, makes this gift necessary.

The African spirit, especially in its great reverence for family, community and culture — whence one derives one’s life, one’s ability to interpret one’s world, and one’s capacity to respond — may be uniquely positioned to grasp this more fully. In contrast to Aristotle’s classical ‘wonder,’ these philosophers do not situate the person over against the object of his or her concern, reducing both to objects for detached study and manipulation. They look rather to the source from which reality is derived and are especially sensitive to its implications for the mode and manner of life as essentially open, communicative, generous and sharing.

Seen in terms of gift, freedom at its third level has principles for peaceful cooperation, not only with my people whose well-being is in a sense my own, but with increasingly broader sectors, and potentially and in principle, with the whole of mankind. First, the good is not only what contributes to my perfection; being received, it is essentially out-going. The second principle is that of complementarity. As participants in the one, self-sufficient and purely spontaneous source, the many are not in principle antithetic or antipathetic one to another. Rather, as limited images they stand in a complementary relation to all other participants or images. This means that others and their cultures are to be respected simply because they too have been given or gifted by the one Transcendent source. This is the essential step which Gandhi, in calling outcasts by the name "harijans" or "children of God," urged us to take beyond the first sense of freedom which sees others only as contraries against whom we choose. Conversely, it means that as complementary we need each other.

Thirdly, as one does not first exist and then receive, but one’s very existence is a received existence or gift, to attempt to give back this gift, as in an exchange of presents, would be at once hopelessly too much and too little. On the one hand, to attempt to return in strict equivalence would be too much, for it is our very self that we have received as gift. On the other hand, to think merely in terms of reciprocity would be to fall essentially short of my nature as one that is given, for to make a merely equivalent return would be to remain centered upon myself where I would cleverly entrap, and then entomb the creative power of being.

Rather, looking back I can see the futility of giving back, and in this find the fundamental importance of passing on the gift in the spirit in which it has been given. One’s freedom as given calls for a creative generosity which reflects that of one’s source. This requires breaking out of oneself as the only center of one’s concern. It means becoming effectively concerned with the good of other persons and other groups, and for the promotion and vital growth of the next generation and of those to follow.

Will this indeed eventuate? Can we overcome the violent conflicts which the recent emergence of a sense of self-identity appears to have engendered? To attempt to do so through suppressing freedom at this third level would destroy life as human. The history of the last half century consists in a studied and consistent rejection of such attempts at social engineering at the cost of freedom. The most recent history in Eastern Europe shows that even the most extreme attempts at forced socialization did not resolve problems of peaceful cooperation between peoples, but merely covered them over, isolated them from the requirements and achievements of human progress, and left them to reemerge in ever more intractable modes.

The alternative is to refuse to allow freedom to be reduced to its first level as an isometrics of violent conflict and not to stop at the passive and universalist formalisms of the second level. Rather to be human is to take up the burden of freedom at its existential level and to search deeply into its source and nature for principles of unity and open cooperation. The truth of these principles will be manifest most of all in their call for ever more inclusive patterns of social equilibrium, and the progress of cultures will consist in their genius in responding creatively to this call.

1. George F. McLean, "A Dialectic of Liberation Through History: Paul Tillich," in G. McLean, Tradition and Contemporary Life: Hermeneutics of Perennial Wisdom and Social Change (Madras: Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1986), pp. 67-95.

2. Paul Seligman, The ‘Apeiron’ of Anaximander: A Study in the Origin and Function of Metaphysical Ideas (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), Ch. XIV & XV.

3. Dominique Dubarle, "Le poème de Parménide, doctrine du savoir et premier état d’une doctrine de l’être," Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 57 (1973), 3-34, 397-431.

4. Politics I, 1, 1252a22.

5. Ibid., III, 7.

6. Ibid., 8.

7. Nichomachean Ethics, IX, 6, 1167b13.

8. Politics I, 2, 1253a20-37.

9. John Mavone, "The Division of Parts of Society According to Plato and Aristotle," Philosophical Studies, 6 (1956), 113-122.

10. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under-standing (New York: Dover, 1959), Book, Chap. I, Vol. I, 121-124.

11. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Under-standing (Chicago: Regnery, 1960).

12. The Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971).

13. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under-standing, A.C. Fraser, ed. (New York: Dover, 1959), II, ch. 21, sec 27; vol. I, p. 329.

14. Ramayana (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1976), p. 312.

15. Kenneth L. Schmitz, The Gift: Creation (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982), pp. 44-56.

16. R.E. Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues" in his Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics (London: Routledge, Keegan Paul, 1965), pp. 43-60.

17. Juan Carlos Scannone, "Ein neuer Ansatz in der Philosophie Lateinamerikas," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 89 (1982), 99-116 and "La Racionalidad Cientifico-Technologica y la Racionalidad Sapiencial de la Cultura Latino Americana," Stromata (1982), 155-164.

18. William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 532-535.

19. Joseph Kockelmans, "Thanksgiving: The Completion of Thought," in Manfred S. Frings, ed., Heidegger and the Quest for Truth (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), pp. 175-179.

20. Schmitz, 84-86.