It would be an exaggeration to claim that philosophy has contributed much to the transition from the totalitarian to a basically democratic order in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Its role has been different in the various cases, of course, but especially in Bulgaria the events do not seem to have followed a rational design at all — though surely there have been certain "calculations" behind the actions of the people who started the process. What the philosophers can do now is to help rationalize this social movement. Almost ten years after its start, there is still much confusion and disorientation in the intentions and activities of its agents. There is still considerable risk that the changes which ought to establish harmonious social relations and an efficient economy, might bring instead corruption, moral decay and political violence. Philosophy can do much to clarify the relations between means and ends among actions in the economy and politics, and also provide for the moral regulation of world views. In a word, philosophy can contribute to greater self-consistency in the undertakings needed to bridge the gap between post-communist reality and democratic ideals.

This volume has the combined efforts of philosophers from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the USA to find new reference points which could provide better opportunities for orienting the efforts toward building a democratic society. Certain notions from the early stages of the changes have already proven to be too simplistic or utopian. Some have turned out to be mere "mirror images" of well-known conceptual "instruments" from the arsenal of totalitarianism. There is, however, a unanimous rejection of the paradigm of ideological confrontation.

A common feature of the papers in the present volume is an approach to philosophically relevant social issues which is centered around an pluralistic notion of culture and pays tribute to the multi-dimensional depth of human existence. It is to be hoped that this change of fundamental theoretical dispositions is not merely a next philosophical "fashion", or a conformist turn in accord with the new social constellation — i.e., a servile post factum justification of the political victory of some. We

believe the text offered in this publication to exemplify a serious philosophical reflection on human rights, social values and norms, religion, cultural identity, intercultural relations, etc.

What do we mean here by a philosophically enlightened, pluralistic attitude towards culture as an alternative to ideology? Can it be asserted that there is a paradigmatic difference between ideology and

culture? Is not ideology itself a kind of culture, and can not culture in its turn be an ideology (to borrow a formulation from Z. Baumann’s "Intimations of Post-modernity")?

First of all, "ideology" here is meant in the narrow sense - as a means of representing a private interest as universal. This has been the general practice in Marxist social science. The interests of the proletariat were considered to coincide, in the long run, with the interests of humanity. The working class can emancipate itself only by constructing, in the final account, a perfect social order to the benefit of everybody. The realization of this holistic project presupposes a profound knowledge of the social relationships on behalf of Marxist theory. It justifies any manipulation of groups and individuals, which is indispensable for the achievement of the final goal. Human beings are treated as theoretically transparent, predictable entities, which are to be arranged in an optimal way by the competent "hand" of a party, acting in accordance with the social pattern.

On the contrary, the philosophical reflection on culture typical for the papers in this volume takes into account the complexity of the human reality, and the autonomy and creativity of the individual. The behaviour of the Other can never be ultimately explained. However, this careful attitude towards the human being does not exclude social activity. This is not in the form of moving people around, but rather as interaction between equal partners, respecting mutually each other’s interests.

Part I studies the "starting point" of the transition from totalita-rianism to democracy. It is important to study the inconsistencies within the intellectual sources of the former social system in order to avoid repeating mistakes. According to S. Gerdzhikov in Chapter I, "Communism and Its Explosion in the European Life-world," one of the main fallacies of communism was the assumption that the social world can be constructed and reconstructed like a machine. The author regards communism as a "grand experiment of Western reason". It was based on the rationalistic notion that the same logos rules both human thoughts and social regularities. Gerdzhikov applies phenomenological methods to substantiate his thesis that the order of human reality is rather of the type of the "logic" of life. The human life-world should not be treated as an artefact, lest the outcome would be quite different from that planned by the "demiurge".

The paper of A. Blasko in Chapter II, "The Power of Perception: the Case of Soviet-style Aesthetics," deals with the ideological function of Soviet-style art and aesthetics. The research is guided by the belief of the author that an examination of the aesthetic dimension of social life may reveal those values and principles which organize the perception of social life. These relations of power appear as implicit, taken for granted, and generally unquestioned elements of daily life. Consequently, aesthetics may be used as a social science in order to uncover the ways in which non-cognitive types of knowledge serve to ascribe a desired meaning to the social processes. An especially interesting mechanism of ideological influence through art, discussed by the author, is the manipulation of the relationship between subject and Otherness. Controlling this relation, the "supreme agent" can project his or her intentional organization upon the behavior of a mass of human subjects much more efficiently than by means of direct, vulgar propaganda.

Part II of the study is devoted to the complexities of the transition to democracy. The authors are aware of the risk that old stereotypes, especially ideological attitudes, relapse under the appearance of well meant undertakings. For one reason or another even some of the classical requisites of Western social order may turn out to be inappropriate to the political and economic systems taking shape in the "new democracies". What can be done on behalf of philosophy in this situation is to work for the clarification of the categorical dimensions of the recent events.

J. Margolis in Chapter IV, "Liberalism and Liberal Democracy: Paradox and Puzzles," goes even further with his critical analysis of liberalism. He sees a danger that liberalism may become just another ideology by pretending to become an absolute world order. We should not forget that liberalism, in all of its modifications, is rooted in a historical tradition, just as are its alternative political models. Whatever arguments may be presented to legitimize liberalism’s influence, they do not suffice to justify the direct imposition of Western standards on other cultures.

The universal value of democracy as such can be argued more successfully. The latter has different historical sources and forms. It is not committed to individualism or collectivism - e.g. apart from liberal democracies there exist also "Confucian" ones. Without professing some kind of communitarianism or post-modernism, Margolis recommends greater sensitivity towards the "sittlich" (in the Hegelian meaning) element in political life, especially as far as the reforms in the "new democracies" are concerned.

A. Davidov in Chapter V, "Values, Norms, Individuals: Modern and/or Post-modern (Twenty Theses on Post-totalitarian Individualism)," is concerned mainly with the possibility that the transition from totalitarian collectivism to the apparently democratic individualism might "run aground" the traditional difficulties of the latter and thus revive ideological attitudes. The author demonstrates that neither post-modernist methodological innovations nor the communicative ethics of Apel and Habermas can be of particular help in this situation. What is needed is more spirituality in the form of philosophical and religious insight.

G. McLean in Chapter VI, "Identity as Openness to Others," reinforces this view by studying the notion of identity on the basis of freedom to see if this is a process of the self assertion of one against the other or rather a matter of the transcendence which characterizes the human person. In the later case, love rather than hate or even competition should characterize the relation between peoples. It is a lesson experienced in family and neighborhood, but so surprisingly difficult for social theory and practice that philosophers must share responsibility for the present problems and correspondingly are needed in working out future paths.

T. Rockmore in Chapter VII, in "Social Values in a Time of Change: An Hegelian Approach," raises the issue of the dynamics of social values in times of change. On the one hand, the "stability" of values is an important condition for their legitimacy. On the other, each significant social change is a transition towards an unprece-dented state of affairs, i.e. it involves considerable novelty. Can static, traditional values regulate such processes? Rockmore argues in favor of a pluralistic and consensual approach to values.

Part III outlines some specific features of the democratization processes in Bulgaria. This manifests the cultural sensitivity, characteristic of the philosophical approach to social change, and expressed by the authors in this collection.

Quite typical here is the interpretation by V. Misheva, in Chapter VIII, "Beyond Modernity," of the marginal position of Balkan societies with respect to European culture. What is generally assessed to be a shortcoming — isolation from mainstream cultural tendencies, lack of clear collective identity, etc. — is represented by the author as a potential advantage. It is argued that living at the intersection of two civilizations gives unique capacities to contribute to the process of self-reflection within each of them. What Misheva calls the "in-side — out-side position" is a necessary condition to distance oneself from one’s own culture, without ceasing to belong to it. It is impossible to exercise self-reflection from within. In this respect the Bulgarian viewpoint is superior that of any of the "great powers" in European cultural life.

A. Krasteva in Chapter IX, "Bulgarian Cultural Identity," analyzes the intellectual discourse on Bulgarian cultural identity. She reflects on a wide range of texts: from the first decades of our century to our day; from poetry to school textbooks. It emerges that several themes predominate and thus exhibit their importance for Bulgarian culture: the Bulgarian tongue, Eastern Orthodoxy, the Balkan Range, the people as a family, the communal man. All these themes are characterized by Krasteva as referring to "the own" as a basic constituent of cultural identity. Another such component (according to the author) is "the alien". The concrete themes which represent it in the texts are: the "own" as "alien" (i.e. texts which deal with the alienation within the Bulgarian people, e.g. of the intelligentsia and of the political class); the deconstructed "own" (post-modernist deconstructions of national identity and of national pride); the "alien" as Crown (the interiorization of influences from world culture); the "alien" as other (as model or as antipode). Krasteva concludes that what cultural identity needs most of all is a dialogical relationship between "the own" and "the alien".

A more concrete approach towards Bulgarian culture is that of G. Kapriev in Chapter X, "Christian Values and Modern Bulgarian Culture," whose paper deals with Eastern Orthodoxy in Bulgaria. Kapriev points out some culturally important features of this form of Christianity. One of them is the greater autonomy and responsibility of the human being. This explains why there is no centralized Orthodox church. The head of the Church is considered to be Christ himself and no earthly person can substitute for Him. Hence, there are several autonomous Orthodox churches, among which there is no hierarchy. For the same reason the ecclesiastical hierarchy has only a liturgical role. The characteristics of the persons who belong to it are not substantial for the quality of the Church as such. Also in this vein it is possible to understand the incommen-surability between the activities of the Orthodox Church and political life. It is contrary to the spirit of Orthodoxy to compete for political influence. And (ideally) this Church should not allow interference into its affairs by the political powers.

The last chapter, Chapter XI, by P. Makariev, "Promoting Inter-ethnic Dialogue in Bulgaria," examines the potential of several political theories to serve as conceptual bases for resolving the ethnocultural contradictions in Bulgaria. The ethnic issue is represented as a competition between cultural communities, each striving to preserve and consolidate its identity. The paper tests the applicability of liberalism, communitarianism and discourse ethics to this competition of cultures. Special attention is paid to the unique features of the Balkan social and cultural "constellation". The conclusion of the author is that the ethical theory of Habermas and Apel offers a synthesis of Right and Good (which is conceptually impossible within either liberalism and communitarianism), but it cannot be directly implemented in the relations between cultures. Even if we ignore the generally utopian nature of discourse ethics, we should take into account the discrepancy between its rationalism and the traditional traits in cultural identities (especially in the Balkans). However, the author has tried to trace possible ways of modifying the methods of discourse ethics so that they become more relevant to this task.

It has been the endeavor of the authors of this collection to escape the convenient groove of simplistic ideological interpretations, and to direct their research to the whole complexity of the democratization process. It is to be hoped that this will not sound a discouraging message to the reader for it is much more difficult to interact with human beings in the rich context of their cultural "environment", than with objectified abstractions. However, the actual events have shown that there is no alternative to engaging the concrete culturally specified life. Philosophy can be of real help by contributing to the rationalization of these interactions, rather than by offering miraculous solutions.