Originally Islam, in solving the unity of the physical and the metaphysical, proceeded from the problem of life and death, i.e. from the mythological ‘eternal’ and its logical prerequisites. Whatever its manifestation, this unity always remained a dilemma of the ‘beginning and end’ at whatever level it is acknowledged. Directly and indirectly it existed in the minds of the Muslim and in his/her use of Qur’anic images and symbols. The latter, as a rule, rotate around the opposites of dawn-sunset, knowledge-ignorance, day-night, sun-moon, light-dark, sky-earth, that disclose the inner and highest moments of being. In this sense, they turn into signs of a moderate worldview built from the opposites of soul and body, the celestial and the terrestrial.1  Oaths to Day and Night, stars and celestial bodies, Sun and Moon are vestiges of pagan symbols. But these set the boundaries of the physical and metaphysical as defined by reason and served in the formation of a monotheistic vision of the goals and meanings of history. The Qur’an swears:

And the dawn when it shineth forth",2  and also,

And the moon when she followeth",3  and

"Nay, I swear by the places of the stars",4 

Before (it) and what left behind.5 

However, this inevitability that accompanies the existence of things and man is not identical with the pagan understanding of fate that accompanies Time (Dahr). Rather, it is a bodily and spiritual transformation of the meaning of Eternity. The fact is that Arab paganism considered time as the unique force of the existence of things and man. Therefore, everything and everyone is but an instant of time, which reduces the beginning and end to an eternal transient instant. From this follows their fundamental principle of life and death which says: ". . . There is naught but our life of the world; we die and we live, and naught destroyeth us save time."6  In other words, the fundamental meaning of time is its capacity to destroy and create components of the universe.

Islam juxtaposed this cold and soulless understanding of time by the Jahiliyah to a heavenly time warmed by the human soul, stating: "A Day with God is as a thousand years of what ye [pagans] reckon."7  Thereby Islam attempted to unite the limited and the boundless in a human vision of life and death. If death for the Jahiliyah consciousness is the destiny of human beings and an inevitable action of time, then Islam gave this destiny a boundless measure by incorporating death into the serial meaning of human actions. Islam supported the conviction that "Flight will not avail you if ye flee from death."8  Islam incorporated this conviction into moral metaphysics by uniting destiny and death in the act of journeying to God, by declaring in the words of the Almighty: "Lo! It is We Who quicken and give death, and unto Us is the journeying,"9  "Every soul will taste of death. Then unto Us ye will be returned."10  This journeying to God is defined by "God’s leave", since "No soul can ever die except by God’s leave and at a term appointed."11  For "He keepeth that (soul) for which He hath ordained death and dismisseth the rest till an appointed term."12 

The Qur’anic world view is not burdened by polemical searches of boundless horizons for a final sense of the individuality of the soul; rather, it is concerned with the confirmation of its divine (God’s) choice, for it is said in the Qur’an that "Every soul is a pledge for its own deeds,"13  and "We verily created a man and we know what his soul whispereth to him and We are nearer to him than his jugular vein."14  This world view demonstrates the attempts to define and limit the time of human existence by the moral absolutes of life and death; it supposes that, irrespective of one’s aspirations, man will meet God. This worldview crowns life with death, and death with life by including them in an eternal circulation of God’s deeds.

If Jahiliyah considered life as an entertainment and game, and a competition in the amount of one’s property and children, then in early Islam the blessings of life are considered as "but a matter of illusion."15  "The life of the world is only as water which We send down from the sky. When the earth has taken on her ornaments and is embellished and her people deem that they are her masters, Our commandment cometh by night or by day and we make it as reaped corn as if it has not flourished yesterday."16  It is enough for the human being to pay a visit to the graves in order to understand the transient nature of earthly life.17 

These perceptions constitute a positive context for considering free deeds in relation to true life with God. For "This life of the world is but a pastime and a game. The home of the Hereafter—that is life."18  More than that, "Wealth and children are an ornament of the life of the world. But the good deeds which endure are better in thy Lord’s sight for reward, and better in respect of hope."19  It is underscored in the Qur’an that those "who love the life of the world more than the Hereafter, and debar (men) from the Way of God and would have it crooked: such are far astray."20  This warning is noted in the Qur’an in various forms—from soft criticism to threats of eternal punishment: "Let not the life of the world beguile you, nor let the deceiver beguile you, in regard to God."21  The conclusion is clear: these are attempts to unite the act of surmounting self-deception or pagan conviction in the worldly life with the principles and values of self-limitation in the absolute, proceeding from the fact that God is the Truth.

The last idea is the core of Islamic monotheism, since it reduces the various forms and levels of vision of the Uniform True. From here comes the Qur’an’s appeal to the pagans: "Cry unto God, or cry unto the Beneficent, unto whichosever ye cry (it is the same). His are the most beautiful names."22  God is the Lord of mankind, the King of mankind, the God of mankind.23  "Who in the heaven is God, and in the earth God."24  "All that is in the heavens and all that is in the earth glorifieth God."25  And "unto God falleth prostrate whatsoever is in the heavens and the earth, willingly or unwillingly."26  "Therefore glory to Him in Whose hand is the dominion over all things! Unto Him ye will be brought back."27  All the rest with the exception of Him are but names. "There is no God save Him."28  It is He "Who createth, then disposeth; Who measureth, then qudieth."29  "He, the beneficent, has created men, He has taught him utterance, And the sky He has uplifted; and He hath set the measure, But observe the measure strictly, nor short thereof".30  Those who can fly cannot do so, and will never attend to their thirst, and no fire can be ignited, and nobody may live or die without Him. He is the primary, the cause of everything, and everything will disappear, save Him. "There remaineth but the Countenance of thy Lord of Might and Glory."31 

Thus, Islamic monotheism transformed God into an absolute source of existence and action. Their purpose was to turn Him into the beginning and end of everything (32).32  "He is the Primary and the Last, and the Outward and the Inward"33  He is the "Light of the heavens and earth. . . . He is the Light of all Lights."34  He is a pure being, within Himself He supposes the meaning and value of every action, and the whole world is of equal worth to Him. If He "openeth unto mankind of mercy none can withhold it; and that which He withholdeth none can release thereafter."35  Reality and fate dissolve into this wholeness, and there is not a trace of indifference in this, since everything that He undertakes is undertaken with wisdom. He is closer to man than his jugular vein. "There is no secret conference of three but He is the fourth, nor of five He is the sixth, nor of less than that or more, but He is with them wheresoever they may be."36 

This monotheistic view has determined, in its turn, the substantiality of God in His actions and the acts of individuals and community; and precisely because of this, the substantiality of the Single. That is why every call, pray and appeal should be ascribed to Him only.37  "If there were therein gods beside God, then verily both (the heavens and the earth) had been disordered."38  "Unto God belong the East and the West, and whithersoever ye turn, there is God’s countenance."39  From this follows the identity of God and Truth, and the singularity of God means the singularity of Truth; He is the True, and "that which they invoke beside Him is the False."40  He is the King of Truth, and "There is no God save Him"41  "The decision is for God only. He telleth the truth and He is the best of Deciders"42  in existence and actions, since He is the source of universal wisdom of being whose sign is found in the body and soul until the Truth becomes manifest to all.43 

The ideal incarnation of God’s wisdom in the social and spiritual existence of humankind is society (Jama’) and the community (Umma). The practical manifestation of monotheism is the transformation of society and community into ideal samples of the socio-spiritual existence of humankind, which assumes the harmony of the monotheistic view in the specimen of the Muslim, and the community—as a community of believers. Their unity is confirmed and understood in the universal principles of Islam and its basic rules: prayers (five times), fast in the month of Ramadan, the Pilgrimage to Mecca, and alms-giving (Zakat). In its turn, this is only the minimum bounds of a wholeness of society and community. These bounds also reflect the spirit of moderation. Society is an integral wholeness which resembles Him, since if the Lord "had willed, He verily would have made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing."44  But "He sendeth whom He will astray and guideth whom He will, and ye will indeed be asked of what ye used to do."45 

Thus, Islam expresses in its basic principles the Truth and the Uniform in their quality as the highest ideal to be imitated in going along the path of Truth. This is by uniting with moderation the possibility of imitating through identifying society and community with truth. If the principle of monotheism is a principle of unity (of society) and the principle of spiritual unity (of the community), then their synthesis inevitably leads to the formation of an image and idea of middle community as a practical sample of monotheistic socio-spiritual spirit. From here follows the Qur’an’s appeal to the Muslims: "Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye be witnesses against mankind."46  Thereby, the middle character of the community is defined not by temporal and historical criteria, but by the demands of moral moderation. From this follows its rigorous imperative: "And there may spring from you a nation which invites to goodness, and enjoins right conduct and forbid indecency".47  The essence of the duty in the historical formation of the community is reflected in the verse which names it (community) "Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in God".48  This evaluation is based not on its exceptionality, but on the superiority of the middle community as an ideal community. In other words, the middle community is the realization of the ideal of middleness as a universal virtue, and that is why the middle community is the community of good, and vice versa.

The formation of cultural unity with its fundamentals (usul) has enabled the possibility of speeding up the multiform self-identification, whose ideal type is embodied in the so-called "rescued sect". The latter represented a self-renewing quantity of Islamic knowledge and action which tried to find the ideal moderation, enshrined in the following Hadith: "Jews were divided into 71 sects, Christians into 72, and Muslims into 73 of which only one was rescued—the one which followed the Sunnah and society.49  In other words, the struggle in the Islamic community which accompanied the formation of statehood, inevitably produced the worth and efficiency of the "rescued sect as an embodiment of the possibility of finding moderation and truth.50  Consequently, it facilitated the working out of the necessary bases of the paradigmatic moderation in society and vice versa.

Therefore, it is not accidental that religious fervor and the Qur’anic word captured the minds of the "first Kharijites" when they revolted against and assassinated the third Caliph (Uthman ibn Afan). They saw in his behaviour a deviation from justice (moderation and truth). The same motive guided their supporters (Al-Muhakims, or pure Kharijites) in their actions under the banner of "divine court". They tried to transform God into the single one who hands true justice, i.e. fair justice,51  thereby facilitating the working out of true values (just and moderate laws) and placing it on the foreground in the moral evaluation of socio-political practice. The outcome was an indiscriminate accusation of all those who did not share their understanding as apostates.

This fact is mainly connected with the place that politics holds in their attempts to incline God to their side in the struggle through the interpretation of that which is considered as true and sincere, false and unfounded in words and deeds—theirs and those of their opponents. However, this hindered the accumulation of objective judgments about the essence of extremism. On the contrary, these judgements developed within the first two centuries of Hijra through the determination of the essence of the Muslim, instead of the believer. Some considered that a Muslim is one who recognizes the prophecy of Muhammad, the truthfulness of his mission, irrespective of what he said later. Others considered a Muslim as anybody who pronounces the Islamic recognition: "There is God save God and Muhammad is His Messenger!", irrespective of whether one pronounces this recognition sincerely or not. Others considered as a Muslim the one who conducts the daily five prayers in the direction of Ka’ba. Others were stricter in defining who is a Muslim. They considered as a Muslim the one who recognizes the eternal existence of God, and that He is the creator of everything, and who recognizes all the fundamental rules of Islam, and clean him/herself from all innovations [Bida’] which lead to apostasy52  In this regard, the essence and definition of Islam and the Muslim were identified with external (exoteric) manifestations of faith as truth (moderate), and all that contradicts this understanding was regarded as extremism.

If this position opened the possibility of rebelliously deepening esoterism as something that does not deserve to be included in the pyramid of dogmas, at the same time it led to the substantiation of the necessary minimum of unity (in body, soul and language). That unity already permeated the feelings and consciousness of the community that was finding and substantiating its values and actions as conditions of moderation. Owing to this understanding, the primary agreement of the community (Ijma’), including its Shiite part, to recognize the Shiite Saba sect as extremist, i.e. as being outside the framework of Islam, was not accidental, since this sect propagated the divine nature and origin of the Shiite Imams, and identified truth (justice and law) with a Person, and the community with its separate members, thereby promoting an extremist psychology, which the moderate Islamic tradition called "the expectation of the deceased Imams". This conditioned the transformation of the idea that holds that everything is free and legal for those who knew the Imam,53  into the slogan of the infallibility of the trend itself.

The point is that esoteric extremism personified truth (justice, law) to such an extent that it praised its trends and emasculated the world in the name of a shadow, and was carried away with the idea of turning the bodies of their Imams into the history of the divine creation of Apparition (of shadows and bodies) and Souls (of a law and truth).54  Consequently, the idea of incarnation turns into a rational type of expressing perceptions of justice and truth. That is why some of these sects, for example, Al-Mansuria, could conclude that paradise is a man, the sovereign of time, which we are obliged to join it; and hell is a man, the enemy of the Imam, for whom one must to be in enmity. Consequently, one who found the Imam is free from all obligations of external faith,55  for rites, as the Jinahiya (an extremist Shi’ite sect) contends, are but allegories that solely indicate who has to be supported among the Prophet’s family (the Shi’ite house).56  The quintessence of these positions and ideas is reflected in the socio-political views (for example, of Al-Jarudia) that accused the community of apostasy and deviation from truth since it refused to support Imam Ali, the historical and spiritual father of Shi’ism, in his struggle for the Caliphate,57  or those who went further, such as Al-Mansuria that declared that God sent Muhammad with Revelation and Ali with Interpretation. From this follows the practical (political) conclusion of the possibility of the terrorist murder of one’s opponents as a secret (internal and true) duty in the name of the faith.58 

The personification of deity, the prohibition and prescriptions of religious and secular life (ad-din wa-dunya), the external and internal (az-zahir wal-batin) in the critical perception of tradition (ad-diraya) and its strict reproduction (ar-riwaya) enabled extremism to take deep root. The result of this was a strengthening of the inclination towards sobriety and deliberating the meaning and values in working out its own ideas of reason and faith,59  i.e. everything which facilitated finding in its own conduct reason and conscience of the moderate synthesis of the reasonable and just (reason and faith). This means the activation of the rational, realistic and moderate elements in extremism itself, since the latter, essentially, is the emotional manifestation of the principle of truth and justice. The moderate synthesis of the reasonable and the transmitted (Makul wa Mankul) organizes the rational realistic moderation within the limits of efforts sanctified by principles instead of persons, by metaphysics instead of history, by moral instead of politics, i.e. by social-moral and spiritual monotheism.

An example of this is Hassan Al-Basri, in whom the major principles of Islam were personified: in history the metaphysics of Islam, in politics the morals of Islam. He reproduced in his behaviour the lofty moral spirit of Islam. He turned his body into a pious mirror of fear of God and emotional speculation of being. He expressed these emotions by means of grief, as if he wanted to bemoan the world for its past, present and future, while wondering and feeling the discontinuity of its aspirations and the will’s weakness in attaining perfection. His behaviour and way of life caused him to be called "the adept of grief, who was accustomed to a life with diversion, distress and sleeplessness!" Others "never saw any other human being so filled with grief", and stated that "his heart was filled with grief."60  His grief found expression in the idea of the fear of God which dominated his speculation and behaviour. From here follows his idea that "one who knows that his life will end in death and will inevitably face God has to be in constant grief." "Constant grief facilitates undertaking good deeds;" "the true believer is in grief in the morning and in distress in the evening, and it can not otherwise, for his life is in between two griefs."61  Hassan Al-Basri overcame the narrowness of politics and the extremes of its creators.

In reality, the self-grief and distress embodied in him is nothing more than a personification of the socio-political protest against social and political vices. An obvious proof of this was his appearance and behaviour, body and soul, words and appeals, addressed to the community and to the authorities. His ideas of freedom of will, they were but a lofty aspect of freedom in understanding the substantial forms of truth (legality and justice). Thus, in his famous reply to the letter of the Caliph Abd al-Malik ibn Marawin (d. 704 A.D.) who asked Al-Basri whether his idea of the freedom of will corresponded with what is said in the Qur’an and Sunnah, he underlined (in his reply) that the most important thing in this problem is the proof of God’s existence (truth), and not one’s own desires, since the meaning of will and its essence is to follow truth and the truthful. Likewise, God’s direction is His command to observe good, justice and benefaction.62 

This sect did not forward the principle of the interaction of reason and dogmatic-legal prescriptions; however, it proposed the principle of moral prescriptions, considered from the practical and critical-rationalistic view. This explains the first courageous attempts by some sects, such as Kharijites-Atrafites, to pose the question of the correlation of reason and prescriptions of faith. As al-Shahrastani notes, this forgave those members from remote communities, having poor access to Islam, left the unknown Shari’a rules, if they did this on the basis of reason.63  At the same time, some of the Kharijites-Ibadities admitted the possibility that God can send prophets without any signs, who therefore were not obliged to demonstrate wonders.

However, this position was formulated fully only in the premises of the systematized theoretical thought of the Mutazilite school of Kalam. The major principles of Mutazilite thought predetermined the general tendency of their views and positions in the problem of the correlation of reason and prescriptions. At the hub of the general principles which the Mutazilites shared is the idea that humankind is capable of creating both virtue and evil. God creates only the good and the just, since His wisdom binds Him to observe the interests of His subjects. The basis of knowledge and gratitude for beneficence are mandatory, even before the appearance of Divine Scripture, and the good and evil have to be cognized through reason.64  For example, the Mutazilite al-Allaf (d. 849) proposed the idea of the mandatory knowledge of God for the mature believer not by reason, but by instruction; he has to know the blessing of the blessed, and the abominableness of the abominable, perform good deeds i.e. has to be honest and just, and avoid what is abominable, namely, injustice and falsehood.65  This idea was also shared by al-Nazzam who said that a thinking man, if he is reasonable and capable of intellectual pursuits, before the appearance of the Scripture, has to know God with the help of reason and logic. More than that, reason has to give evaluations to all conduct in terms of their blessing or abominableness.66  The other famous Mutazilites did not differ from him in the treatment of this idea. Sumama ibn Ashras (d. 828), for example, added to the above-mentioned thought what he called the possibility of excusing the non-believer of his ignorance of God. All knowledge is necessary, consequently knowledge about God is not among what is commanded, it is not compulsory. Man "as every animal was created for edification and labor".67  At the same time, the Mutazilite Isa ibn Sabih al-Mardar asserted that reason obliges man to know God with all His attributes and commands even before the appearance of prescriptions of faith.68  Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab al-Jubbai (d. 915), another leading Mutazilite and also his son Abu Hashim al-Salam al-Jubbai (d. 933), formulated the idea of the correlation of reason and prescriptions in the following way: Knowledge of God, gratitude to the Beneficiary, knowledge of blessings and the abominable is the responsibility of reason. This idea prompted them to talk about the "rationalized Shari’a"; at the same time that they reduced the "Shari’a of the Prophet" as "definite commands and authentic rituals" to which reason may not appeal, and which does not take thought as a guideline. By virtue of reason and wisdom God should remunerate the obedient and punish the disobedient, since sending codes and prophets to this world is but God’s grace.69 

In their ideological premises Mutazilites gave a precise formulation of the problem of the correlation of reason and prescriptions. Their solution of this problem outside the framework of the dogmatic-textual theology also differs from the judgments of the early Islamic thinkers. They developed rationalistic conceptions of this problem to such an extent that al-Ghazali later spoke about the "extremism" of the Mutalzilites, which contrasted reason with prescriptions.70 

Al-Ashari asserted "cognition of God by reason is admissible, but there must also be faith". In this sense, he created this duality, when the power and necessity of reason is recognized, while at the same time, the role of prescriptions is kept intact as the highest judge. This is not an attempt to subordinate reason to prescriptions, but an attempt to determine the functions of each with the recognition of the right that prescription has to be the last judge. Therefore, God’s forgiveness of his subject, according to al-Ashari, is beyond any rational judgment, since injustice is not part of God’s essence. Everything that is part of the obligations defined by prescriptions is not subject to the judgment of reason, since reason never obliges and never sorts conduct into blessings and abominables. Everything that belongs to the Hereafter, such as rewarding the obedient and punishing the disobedient has to be recognized as belonging to "faith", and not to reason. God never binds reason to goodness, nor softness, nor to any other obligation, since everything that is dictated to reason from the point of view of mandatory wisdom has its opposite side.71 

This aspect has, more graphically, revealed itself in the works of such famous representatives of Asharism as Al-Bakillani and al-Juweyni. Al-Juweyni, in engaging polemics with the views of "Brahmans" concerning prophecy, reason and prescription, often deviates from the views of al-Ashari, however, in general he keeps to his major position. As al-Ashari, he negates the capacity of reason to judge about blessed and abominable conduct, by asserting that only prescription may pass on them a lasting judgment.72 

In discussing the relation of reason to problems of faith, he directs reason along a path that obliges it constantly to search for justifications and affirmations for prescriptions. Prescription is necessary for reason, since it cannot grasp the blessings of justice and the evil of oppression and infringements. If that is the case, then all would have come to similar judgments; whereas, in real life some consider that this or that thing or conduct is abominable owing to these or other motives, while at the same time others consider the same conduct as a blessing. The final conclusion of Al-Bakillani is this: "Reason attains its perfection not by itself, but thanks to its subordination to Shari’a and in addition to it."73  Later, al-Juweyni shortly and sharply formulated this same idea in the following aphorism: "Prescription refutes reason and agrees with it; it refutes reason where it does not agree."74 

In its theoretical and practical alternative the esoterism of the Brethren of Purity was a historical answer to the theologically canonized form of dogmatism. Hence, its inability to overcome fully the exoteric tradition in a such way as to adapt it into a reasonable and acceptable system for the community (of course, within the framework of its tradition of reason and prescriptions of faith) and likewise its inability to draw exoterism into "total esoterism", as did the Sufis. This also explains its vacillations in the cultural wholeness of the world of Islam of those times. However, the Brethren of Purity, in their vacillations between consistent exoterism and esoterism, succeeded in overcoming the fragmentariness of the traditional binary of reason and prescriptions of faith by including it in the systematic outlook of their alternative. Having kept reason in unity with prescriptions of faith, they defined for each one of them its own rule within the framework of the correlation of philosophy and Shari’a as the widest and deepest forms of a community’s unity. They found a way to re-establish true monotheism (and consequently, unity) in the flexible unity of the rational and the moral, and thereby, the liquidation of political and world-outlook differences. Hence, their attempts to explain the causes of differences in general and also their concrete types. Simultaneously they studied the causes and levels of these differences. They reduced the causes of differences, mainly, to the construction of bodies, to the nature of Environment, to traditions, religion and also to the signs of the Zodiac and the disposition of the stars at the moment of birth.75  This natural-historical premise finds its reflection more in a cultural outlook, than in comprehending as such the essence of things. It determines the nature of the difference, rather than the quality of knowledge, since the latter has its own basis in levels of knowledge (sensory, rational and metaphysical).76  The quantitative aspect of these differences is determined, according to the Brethren of Purity, by the fineness of meaning, differences of paths that lead to knowledge, and also differences of people in intellectual capacities, i.e. they reduced to the unity of the object methods of knowledge and diversity of the intellectual capacities of the soul.77 

The quantity of differences related to the "fineness of meaning" and to the "diversity of the intellectual capacities of soul" are the object and subject of knowledge. Similarly the "different paths leading to knowledge" is the environment in which the nature and content of theoretical and practical differences are reflected,78  since it considers the dilemma of the essential and the secondary in sensual and rational knowledge in the form of the substantial and derivative methods of cognition. The Brethren of the Purity concentrated their attention on the problem of analogy as one of the major sources of ideological and religious differences, because it is, according to them, the most widespread method of attaining human knowledge. However, analogy is many-sided. It is a sum total of methods and of cognition and scales to which people take refuge in order to attain justice, truth, the good and unity.79  In other words, analogy unites in itself logical, social and moral truth, as well as justice. The Brethren of Purity considered analogy to be capable of attaining truth and of overcoming differences, if and only if it lacks deliberate deceit, mistakes, ignorance and non-observance of the rules of analogy.80  If deliberate deceit, mistakes and ignorance are an outcome of the "disordered" intellectual capacities of the soul in knowledge and action, then a deviation from the strict rules of analogy is a deviation from analogy as from the just scales of the truthfulness of knowledge. Hence, they gave especial attention to any "deviations from the just analogy in reasonable thought and beliefs".

They attempted to show that every representative of reason (rational theology, philosophy) and of faith (religion) aspired, in proportion to his possibilities, to attain truth. Hence, their judgments and conclusions are different depending on their proximity to, or remoteness from, truth. In this way, they attempted to substantiate the objectivity of truth in analogies and the possibility of differences of opinions in such a way that dualism in general (and Manicheism, in particular) ceases to be atheism and apostasy. An opinion formed as a result of absolutizing the diversity of causes is analogous to what is available in life (virtue and evil, light and darkness, etc.). The same is true in relation to the definition of reason, whereby opinion differs, mainly, on the occasion of the "attainability" of its aspect (historical and empirical), instead of reason as such.81  They applied the same approach to the epochal differences over fundamental world-outlook.82 

In other words, the exposition and analysis of the fundamental differences of the epoch for the Brethren of Purity contain an attempt to construct a system of the necessary conditions of authentic knowledge. They proceeded from the fact that premises of authentic knowledge are within the bases of the knowledge of every science. Any science, as any art, has, according to the Brethren of Purity, its own representatives and its own bases. They agree on the fundamentals of their science and differ on details.83  Such fundamentals, for example, in arithmetic is the digital number and the reproduction from one; in geometry the three dimensional space; in music understanding the harmony of sounds; in physics matter, form, space, time, movement, etc.84  They attempted to construct a more consistent system of sensual and rational knowledge through the identification of the substantial and accidental in them with the fundamentals and parts in methods and in cognition: that is to say, they aspired to justify the authenticity of the fundamentals of knowledge and their methods, and likewise the possibility of differences in the particulars of science. They saw in this not only the natural state of things,85  but also a guarantee of deepening and refining theoretical and practical reason. They also deliberated about the "usefulness of differences"—the aim being the further refinement of proofs, the search of fine and exact definitions, the reproduction of new analogies, the widening of knowledge, criticism and self-criticism of the soul for the sake of attaining further qualities of virtue.86 

In considering, the major ideological differences of that epoch, they gave special attention to the analysis of religious differences, since they saw in them the possibility of unity and dissociation. Having divided religious sciences into the rational and prophetical, they attempted to define rationally the essence of religion as an amalgam of convictions, conscience and secrets. This amalgam is regarded by them as the basis of religion, while language and actions (publicly and openly) were recognized by them as secondary additions.87  As for conviction, it divides into three types: one for the elite, another for the mass, and the third is general. The last is the best, since it embraces all. It synthesizes within itself the fundamentals and additions, or conviction and action, in order to serve the socio-spiritual wholeness of the community. Conviction, according to them, has two components: 1) "reasonable consideration" and "cordial authenticity, purified of all sins", based on an analysis of sensual data, on fine rational theorization, knowledge of mathematics, a good grasp of logic (similar to that of the ancient sages and their followers); 2) the obedience or subordination of those who are liable to be obedient.88 

The unity of conviction and obedience represents the theoretical form of a unity of "refinement of soul on a direct path" as the method for the realization of a conceptual—practical alternative. The Brethren of Purity reduced the last to necessity: to observe Shari’a norms, prophetical admonitions, the instructions of wise men; to reject dissociation, bad customs; to avoid bad doctrines; and to take possession of knowledge (rational, Shari’a, mathematical, physical, or divine).89  The concept "refinement of soul"—meant for them the necessity of the refined soul to return to its primary divine condition.90  The practical method of reaching this condition is the shortest and most precise path in which barriers are overcome by the diligence of a renewed heart, the support of individual inspirations and the heritage of the wise and holy elders.91 

The Brethren of Purity, thus, tried to construct a system of bases and paths, having realized it in the unity of the refinement of soul and direct path. They did not consider their approach as something new; on the contrary, they underlined its theoretical continuity with the traditions of wise men, virtuous Faqihs [law-makers], and, in a practical aspect, with the traditions of the prophets and their true followers.92  They wanted to achieve an integration of all cultures in the wholeness of their alternative system, expressed as follows: " We slept in the cave of our forefather. The times and events replaced each other, until the time to resurrect in the empire of the great Nomos has not come. And we saw spiritual hailstones, dwelling in the air".93  The continuation of this vision was their request to sit in Noah’s ark in order to rescue nature and matter’s waves from flood; to see God’s empire as Abraham has seen it; to come on God’s commandment and fulfill one’s duty as Moses had done; to execute this work so that God’s benevolence had touched you, and you would see the Rescuer sitting at the right side of our Lord; and to leave the darkness of Ariman, in order to behold Ahura-Mazda, shining above Avrikhon; to enter into a temple of Athens in order to see the celestial orbits woven by Plato; to fall asleep in the night of Power in order to see the Ascension at dawn.94 

Thus, they wanted to acquire a cultural wholeness by integrating into themselves the spiritual edges of the historical experience of mankind. They attempted to present the laws (Shari’a), the deeds of the prophets and reason, and the logic of wise men (i.e. reason and prescriptions of faith as the cumulative experience of humankind) as the necessary unity of a conceptual-practical alternative capable of restoring order and justice (i.e. creative moderation). They saw in the unity of religion and philosophy a more adequate, more ideal method of overcoming the traditional dilemma of reason and the prescriptions of faith, since such a unity would complete the task of mastering the cultural wholeness of mankind. Thus, they repeatedly asserted that the constant confrontation of ideas and expressions of philosophers, with the prophets showed the ignorance of those who are not versatile in philosophizing, but know only its general fundamentals, and those specialists on religion, who know only the external aspects of the true sacraments of faith. The consequences of this situation have been stupid confrontations, fruitless controversies, and the contrasting of philosophy to Shari’a and vice versa.95 

It is necessary to underline, that any attempt to construct a whole of the world cultures and not attempt to be consistent in its synthesis is not protected against the temptation of eclecticism. If the latter also represents one of the channels of tolerance and openness, then its proclaimed purpose—moderation—nevertheless remains an object of scepticism and controversy owing to the weakness of its realization within the criteria and values of its own culture. This weakness accompanied the ideological system of the Brethren of Purity in their effort to realize moderation, and because of this their system became an object of cruel doubt and humiliating criticism. So, àt-Tawhidi remarks in his book, Pleasures and Entertainment, that when he got into his hands the letters of the Brethren of Purity he was amazed by their incompetence. In aggregate, these letters are but a compilation of myths, fables, allegories, eclectics, joined together by cutting and pasting. When he transmitted these letters to his teacher Sheikh Abu Suleiman al-Sajitani, the Sheikh described them (after careful consideration) as follows: they carried water in a sieve, walked around the source, and could not even drink that water.96  Therefore, al-Sajitani saw in their aspiration "to clear Shari’a from ignorance with the help of philosophy" as no more than an illusion about the possibility of putting philosophy into Shari’a or subordinating Shari’a to philosophy. In other words, the critics of the Brethren of Purity saw in their attempt to unite philosophy and Shari’a, only an eclectic approach deprived of any hopes for success.97  The point is that, the assertions of the Brethren of Purity about the Shari’a as a medicine for the patients and a philosophy for his health98  were considered by these critics as deprived of any sense, for there is no one medicine for a patient and for health.

From the above-mentioned follows the conclusion that direct and indirect criticism of the eclecticism of the Brethren of Purity was directed to revealing the inconsistency of their attempts to synthesize philosophy and religion. This inconsistency was an inevitable outcome of the fact that all attempts at synthesis of world cultures were undertaken outside of a critical analysis of the cumulative achievements of Islamic culture. The idea of moderation is a unity of philosophy and religion was a brave act utopian in spirit. Despite their repeated assertions about the necessity and usefulness of a unification of philosophy and religion,99  they could not overcome the historical-cultural barrier between Islamic Shari’a and Greek philosophy. Their attempt to identify Shari’a with the faith of the masses, and philosophy with reason and an intellectual elite, compelled them constantly to feel their actual estrangement from the cumulative achievements of Islamic cultural wholeness. In other words, their theoretical and practical attempt to decide the problem of the unity of philosophy and religion remained captive to an intellectual haughtiness that is characteristic of the eclectic spirit. The parallelism of philosophy and Shari’a—the former as conclusive, authentic and spiritual, and the latter as imaginary, traditional and solid—remained an integral part of their approach to this problem.

Another attempt to solve this problem of moderation was undertaken by the well-known philosopher—Ibn Rushd. He considered the problem of philosophy and religion within the framework of the relation of wisdom and Shari’a, i.e. he included it in the language and logic of the culture (Islam), trying thereby to solve it in the traditions and criteria of Fiqh. Not incidentally, he put in the beginning of his study of the correlation of philosophy and religion the problem of whether the study of philosophical sciences and logic is allowable or prohibited.100  He tried to logicize and to legalize this problem in the Islamic vision, i.e. to take al-Farabi’s ideas to a logical conclusion. He shared with àl-Farabi the idea of joint efforts of philosophy and religion to look at the world reasonably. According to Ibn Rushd, if the operation of philosophy is no more than the rational consideration of things from the point of view of their focus on the existence of the Creator, then Shari’a is oriented in the same direction, but only from the standpoint of what is allowable and mandatory. Besides, there is a huge number of verses that call for the mandatory use of reason and rational consideration. Since Shari’a regards that as a must, and the rational consideration of things, writes Ibn Rushd, is nothing other than the deduction of the unknown (which, in turn, is nothing more than an analogy), we should consider things with the help of rational analogy.101  This analogy, in the last analysis, determines such purposes as wisdom (philosophy), and as Shari’a (religion). On this basis, he concludes to the identity of the purposes of prescriptions of faith (Shari’a, religion) and wisdom (philosophy). However, each one of them has its specificity. If Islamic Shari’a, writes Ibn Rushd, calls for the comprehension of truth, then rational proof (philosophy) should not lead to contradictions with the prescriptions of faith by recognizing that truth does not contradict faith; on the contrary, they correspond and support one another.102 

Ibn Rushd proceeded from the recognition of the fact that the purpose of religion is to teach the people true knowledge and true action. True knowledge is knowledge of God and all things as such, also happiness and misfortune. True action is deeds leading to happiness. If the teaching of true action is realized through moral and legal knowledge (science), the teaching of true knowledge is realized through rational perceptions and rational proofs. Since the means of rational perceptions are perceptions about the things or their similarity, then the means of proof are methods of rational cognition, i.e. authentic, dialectic and rhetorical. Philosophy (wisdom) assumes necessarily raising its rhetorical proof up to the level of authenticity, while the primary task of religion consists in teaching all. This implies that religion embraces all the means of rational perceptions and proofs,103  i.e. Ibn Rushd aspired to overcome the "logic" of opposition and alienation between philosophy and religion by including them in the means of logic. Therefore, he considered "wisdom as the girlfriend and dairy sister of Shari’a, irrespective of quarrels and disagreements between them, for they are, by nature, amicable and love one another as a matter of fact and instinctively".104 

 1. This moderation paved, for itself, the way, including in the phraseology of the Qur’an’s verses and Ayats. The latter, as a rule, is composed (in the original) of two or three rhythmetisized words. This is the form of the unity of the binary and contrast components of phrases and, because of this, influenced the formation of the psychological background. A proof of this may be hundreds of Ayats, especially the Meccan ones, about the different moral aspects of existence and metaphysics. For example, it is said in the Sura "The Night":

 21. Ibid., 31: v. 33.

 49. For detailed elaboration of this aspect see my work: Al-Janabi M.M. The Islamic Doxography (Damascus, 1995) (in Arabic).

66. Ibid., p. 58.

77. The Brethren of Purity stated the fact of the intellectual capacities of people depending on their social origin and professional qualifications: thus, their conclusion that differences in the intellectual capacity of people is directly related to the position this or that person holds in the religious or secular life. They classified these differences into nine categories: prophets, priests, sages, kings, peasants, craftsmen, traders, servants, the property-less. For details, see: Ar-Rassail, v. 3, p. 428.

 91. Ibid., v. 4, p. 9.

 96. At-Tawhidi. Al-Imta wa-l-Muaanasa (Beirut, no date), v. 2, p. 6.

 104. Ibid., p. 39.