Practically all Islamic political theories are based on the principal that historically Islam is the basis of the first Arabic state. From the first days of its existence, the state had no conflict with religion, but religion played its integral part: Religion is the essence of the state, and the state is the essence of religion. The Islamic political doctrine does not see any difference between the temporal and secular purposes of the state and the higher, "eternal" goals of religion. The purposes of the state and Islam, as a religion, are uniform and indivisible. There is no antithesis between a historically developing society and religion as the keeper of the general values of the human being’s existence. The state is the "given" object, and is not limited in its existence. By itself it suppresses evil and shows the way to religious piety.

Islamic socio-political doctrine has no accurate boundaries between moral, religious, political ,and legislative norms, that is, between secular and sacral matters. In reality, the secular authorities on behalf of a Sultan or Emir frequently usurped power, which actually certified the existence of differences between the secular and the religious. However, this difference did not mean an ideological separation of the state and religion. In the history of Islamic thought, no governor or theorist of the law would recognize this difference de jure and deny the universal significance of the Islamic doctrine on the unity of temporal and spiritual matters. According to Lambton, the absence of any formal doctrine justifying the separation of the secular from religious had an important result in understanding the individual freedom of a person (18, p. XVI). Any freedom that approved the law of force and led to despotism was limited by religious responsibility. Islam has become an all-permeating ideological system, which has determined the main attitudes to state and society, politics and culture, consciousness and norm based on the confessional principle of solidarity. The idea of political legitimacy and the status quo in the society was connected with Islam. The content of religious traditions was not subject to discussion, and the events that they transmitted and interpreted were accepted as conclusive. Therefore, the social order, which was confirmed by religion, was perceived in the same way.

Islam confirmed the idea of the Islamic state as a religious community, members of which are simultaneously both believers and citizens. Therefore, the concept of political legitimacy was based on the fact that an individual does not have any natural rights and responsibilities conditioned by the relations of civil society. In the Islamic state the only "right" of a person is his/her responsibility to follow the norms of religious law, violation of which assumes possible compulsion of the person from the side of the authorities, that is, all actions by a person are regulated by the "political-legal" code of Islam. In Islam there is no antithesis between the individual and the state or authorities, and consequently, there is no necessity to reconcile or to disconnect this antithesis. Islam does not differentiate between the state and religion. Actually, no distinction existed between state and "church" within the first two to three centuries of the Arabic state’s existence. Later, as the history of the Caliphate shows, "on one side there were Islamic jurists and theologians, on the other the Caliph" (7, p. 107). Both the theoretical and acting law were always considered as the subject of activity and control by representatives of the religious law (Fiqh). The religious law, that is, certain forms of power and the state.

In the socio-political theories of Islam, the initial item of all doctrines on the state was Shari’a, that is, the divine law, which existed to adjust all the spheres of the human being’s activity. Theoretically, Shari’a was considered eternal, preceding both society and state, and as an absolute virtue. Therefore, Islam was represented not simply as a faith, but also as a political doctrine, a way of life and action.

Thus, the basic principles of Islamic political theory are connected to the idea of the inseparability of religion from politics, law, and morals. The problems, referring to the nature of state, state sovereignty and authority, took a rather minor place in the history of Islamic political thought because political science was an integral part of the religious sciences. The Islamic political doctrine recognized only one distinction: the believer or nonbeliever. A human being cannot change the divine law; he/she has to know or not to know it, follow it or not follow it. Fulfillment or defiance of the law is a matter of not only social or moral order, but also a religious one, because the fulfillment of laws is Islam’s sphere of control. Shari’a confers a legal status on the rules of personal life and considers them as acting in all times, in any historical conditions and on any territory.

In Islam, the concept of law was based on a religious dogma, which says that the only source of sovereignty and authority is God. The community of believers (Umma) considers God as its unique and absolute leader. The will of God, handed over to the Prophet through a revelation, is also a divine law (Shari’a). Thus, God is the unique bearer of sovereignty. Therefore, in Islamic political theory, the problem of the nature of sovereignty is not posed at all. The law precedes the state and is eternal and constant at all times and in all conditions. The state acts as a conductor of the divine law.

The first characteristic feature of Islamic law is the law of revelation. The second feature of Shari’a, as a rule, is bound up with its broad sphere of distribution and application. Many Islamic jurists considered that the fundamental law was freedom. But human nature is weak and greedy, and God’s wisdom, love, and kindness inevitably leads to the limitation of the human being’s freedom. These limitations consist of two spheres in accordance with the dual character of human nature (soul and body). The first sphere is connected with the principles of faith and religious practice and determines the responsibilities of a person before God; the second determines the relations among people, the methods of human beings and society and the relations between states. The third distinctive feature of Shari’a is the form of its instructions as: necessary (wajib), recommended (mustahabb), neutral (mubah), undesirable (makruh), or prohibited (haram) type.

The above-mentioned features of Shari’a show that it is not a code of laws, but more a code of responsibilities of the Muslims. Though the Prophet Muhammad became in the last years of his life the governor of the state founded by himself, the creation of a new system of law was not the goal of his activity. It is hardly possible to consider Muhammad as responsible for the system of law that was finally developed (18, p. 5).

After his death, "the Righteous Caliphs" had considerably more opportunities to be considered as founders of the theoretical and acting law, to which the Omayyad governors adhered. Therefore, the end of the first century of Hijra is considered the beginning of Islamic jurisprudence and the formation of political theory.

In the first half of the 8th century, Fiqh was being actively developed by the Ulama and Faqihs of early schools of the law in Kufa, Medina, and Syria. Only in the end of the Umayyad period was the legal practice of the various regions of the Caliphate systematized and codified in Islamic law (Fiqh).

The knowledge of the religious roots (usul ad-din) and their determined sources became the prerequisite for the cognition of Shari’a as the unique and absolute law of state. The classical theory on Islamic legal principles (usul al-Fiqh) was developed by ash-Shafi’i (d. 820) and accepted by many followers from other schools. In 9th century, the following major law schools (mazhabs) were defined: Shafiism, Malikism, Hanifism, and Hanbalism. On the whole the Islamic law is characterized as "knowledge of the practical rules of religion."

Usul al-Fiqh has at least five meanings:

1. Sometimes the roots of Islam are considered as authoritative sources of Fiqh, on which legal practice is based. First of all these are the Qur’an and Sunnah. Sunnah is understood as the traditions (Hadith), which contain the expressions, descriptions of solutions, and deeds of Muhammad and his nearest associates, regarding various problems of religion, law, morals, etc. Sunnah, as well as the Qur’an, are considered to have a divine character and, theoretically, indisputable authority. Of all the hadiths collected only some are considered as asl (plural usul) (24, p. 262).

2. These two sources of the law are usually supplemented by a unanimous opinion (Ijma’) and analogy (Qiyas), which are designated by the term usul as well.

3. As a rule, the Islamic jurists understood asl" as the legal systems of the founders of the main law schools. They are considered a basis for establishing an analogy between them and the so-called derivative solutions (furu). But sometimes furu corresponds with all cases and court decisions, which are established by means of Ijma’ or Qiyas. In this case usul includes the limited amount of cases and court decisions based on Qur’an, tradition and some authority of the religious law (22, p. 29

4. Sometimes they understand usul al-Fiqh as the fixed or postulated methodological principle.

5. Usul al-Fiqh also means the sphere of the theoretical law or legal consciousness; first of all, the established legal texts and the means by which they are applicable in legal practice.

In recent years, researches in Islamic studies have begun to exhibit much interest in Fiqh. And it is no wonder, as the religious law and its doctrines are the key to Islamic political theory (23, p. 14), and the study of Shari’a is important for the understanding of Islamic political ideas (18, p. 9). It is not accidental that in the fundamental two-volume work by Cairo scholars, Fath Nabrawi and Mahmud Nasr Mihna, about the history of political thought in Islam, the basic concepts of Shari’a and Fiqh are given almost 100 pages (3, p. 110-199).

Previously, relatively little attention was given to Fiqh and its role in the spiritual life of the medieval Islamic world. Probably this is related to the Fiqh’s complexity, the subject of which includes not only the problems of law, but also the problems of politics, philosophy, religion and morals, logic and linguistics. It is an underestimation of the role of Islamic law in the political life of the Arabic Caliphate; of its influence on philosophical and political, religious, and ethical concepts and theories; and consideration of it only as a practical regulator of the legal problems; and also an underestimation of the theory of the Islamic law (usul al-Fiqh).

In fact, the analysis of Fiqh and its doctrines permits tracing the formation and the development of the main problems and methods of substantiating various concepts, which in many respects have determined both the problematic of Islamic politics and the methods for the solution of these problems. First of all, it is related to the clarification of Ijma’ and the understanding of Qiyas and their use. The attitude to these sources or roots of Islamic law allows one to determine the main contradictory directions in the interpretation of the main problems of Fiqh and political theory. Namely, Ijma’ and Qiyas as the indisputable authoritative sources of the Islamic law have turned into arenas of fierce disputes and discussions, in particular because of their being the products of human intellect, whereas theoretically law should have divinely revealed character.

In the theory of law and politics, theology and Arab-Islamic philosophy, Qiyas was considered as the method of analogy:

1. On the basis of a similarity between the case under consideration and a similar one, the description of which is present in the Qur’an and Sunnah;.

2. Through the study of a motive (Illa), which is the basis of a case described in the Qur’an or Sunnah, and its application to the considered example.

 

The argument against analogy or similarity has formed the basis of the literalist (Zahirist) school of law, founded by Abu Daud ibn Jalaf (d. 884). He denied the possibility of an independent legal opinion (Rayi) and rejected the analogy based on Illa. Also Abu Daud rejected Taqlid, the blind following and imitating of a lawyer or any law school opinion. This view complied with the motives of ordinary Muslims who were not familiar with the law. Direct reference to the most authoritative legal sources was preferable before asking the religious instructor (Imam) for help. (22, p. 30). Abu Daud wholly denied the possibility of rational proof. This position of the literalists has been especially obvious in the discussion of the problem of the Qur’an’s creation. Ibn Hanbal, for example, categorically rejected the statement on the Qur’an’s creation without any proofs. According to another Zahirist, Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), the Qur’an is a divine speech, and each phrase of this book should be perceived in its spontaneity (zahir) without any attempts at interpretation. The authors of the book The Development of Political Thought in Islam state that the Qur’an has no name symbols, and hence, it is impossible to assert that behind its text any secret religious sense is hidden (3, p. 229).

The founder of one of the schools of the Islamic law, ash-Shafi’I, considered that there were two kinds of knowledge. The first one is certain knowledge, established by God, the Prophet, and tradition, based on the Qur’an and Sunnah. The second kind of knowledge is determined on the basis of Ijtihad, the result of a personal opinion of the lawyer, expressed with caution and prudence. In the second case, an analogy has been applied, which can come from either a direct similarity of the given case in legal practice and described in the Qur’an or Sunnah, or from the study of motives, defining the possibility of this similarity. Thus, for ash-Shafi’i and his followers, Ijtihad is also Qiyas (1, pp. 242-248).

The supporters of an active use of rational methods, which are based on analogy, tried to expand the boundaries of Qiyas by means of Illa. They used such methods as Istihbab (preferability), Istislah (aspiration for the best), and Istihshan (more pertinent). These methods, which have an external sound, were used by Islamic jurists, when the basis of the decision was personal, the independent opinion of the lawyer (Rayi), taking into account both time and conditions (15, pp. 347-352).

It is considered, that Malik ibn Anas, the founder of the Malik law school, was the first to use Istislah. The basis for using Istislah is related to the religious tradition, according to which "in Islam the premeditated offense or damage does not exist" (lya darar wa lya dirar fi-l-islam) (2, pp. 200-234; 18, p. 4). Istislah was considered an allowable method in the doctrines of ash-Shafi’i, al-Juweyni and al-Ghazali.

Thus, Qiyas has become a basis for the rationalistic development of Fiqh, which allowed legal and political theories to emerge from the strict limits of the religious tradition.

In correspondence with the Islamic tradition, the Qur’an and Sunnah are accepted as the first two fundamentals of Fiqh, and Qiyas as the third; the fourth basis, Ijma’ (unanimous opinion), guarantees an authenticity and regularity in the interpretation of the Qur’an, Sunnah, and the juridical application of Qiyas. The use of Ijma’ is based on the tradition according to which Muhammad asserted: "My people will never agree with an error." It is accepted that there can be two types of Ijma’: the unanimous opinion of all Muslims and the unanimous opinion of Ulama.

For the majority of Islamic schools of law, Ijma’ meant originally the unanimous opinion of the Prophet’s associates and their direct followers. Later, Ijma’ got the meaning of the unanimous opinion of orthodox theologians (Ulama). Afterwards, the original meaning returned (18, p. 10). The majority of Islamic jurists denied Ijma’ as the unanimous opinion of all Muslims (nazhma al-awamm). However some of the thinkers, for example Ibn Kutaiba (d. 889), recognized the value of the unanimous opinion of Muslims from Medina, Kufa, and Basra towns (Ijma ammàtam’-àmsar). According to Ibn Taymii, only Ijma’ was an infallible (maasum) source.

At first glance, Ijma’ represented the possibility of not ccepting or rejecting various solutions as agreeing or not agreeing with the Qur’an and Sunnah, but also proceeding from time and place to further develop a basis of Islam through the innovations’ (biaa), approval and acceptance. According to Lambton, it is paradoxical, that the jurists transforming the simple idea of the unanimous opinion of the society into a theoretical-systematic concept of unanimous opinions of Ulama, made of it their weapon, rejecting any opinion which is represented as an opinion distinguished from the conventional one (18, p. 12). In the last analysis, Ijma’ has become a direct way to Taqlid, a random following of the essential principles of religion, which were established by the Qur’an and Sunnah. This has added to Fiqh a certain narrowness and rigidity, which guaranteed for the Islamic law a sufficient stability and steadiness irrespective of the changing historical realities. Hence, the absolute and infallible authority of Ijma’ has not only determined the key position of Fiqh for religious disciplines, but also has as a stable authority. This remained even without political support and has allowed the Islamic law, in many respects, to determine the character of theoretical legal consciousness and legal practice during the period of decline of the Islamic socio-political institutes. Ijma’ has become a bastion of conservatism and dogmatism in all areas of the Islamic thought, in particular the socio-political.

Most researchers in Islamic studies emphasize that the basis of the Islamic state is its religious-ideological integration, but not a political, ethnic, or territorial one (18, p. 61; 23, p. 14; 8, p. 1). Therefore, it is considered that the core of Islamic political theory is, as a rule, the doctrine of Umma, the Islamic community. Internally, Umma means a people’s association on the basis of faith in the one God (Allah) and his Messenger, Muhammad, and is considered an indivisible organization that accepts Shari’a implicitly and explicitly. External Umma meant originally "dar al-Islam," the world of Islam, which was opposed to "dar al-Har,b, the world of war. Thus, political and territorial boundaries were determined on the basis of religion. However, later in the period of aggressive wars, they began to include in "dar al-Islam" non-Muslims as well, who were under the patronage of Islam as a political institution. Nevertheless, the political significance of Umma has remained the same. It has determined socio-political inequality in the Islamic state because of religious inequality. Therefore, the adherents of a different faith (zimii) had to pay a pole tax (jizya) established for non-Muslims.

The initial principle of Umma is equality of all before God, without any dependence on social status. According to Umma, it was assumed that equality of all believers before God meant also the equality of the citizens in the state. The main functions of Umma follow: strengthening the unity of believers, orientation to being good, rejection of harmful deeds, mutual help, prohibition of usury, establishment of eternal peace among the members of a community, protection of the faith (jihad) as a way of strengthening the faith, and protecting "the world of war" from adherents of a different faith. The doctrine of Umma has also determined the Islamic concept of personality. According to Ì. Boisard, in Islam the person with "its individual witnessing," interiorization of will and personal aims is integrated in an egalitarian collective as a believing individual (5, p. 131).

The security and strengthening of the unity of believers in the doctrine of Umma relates to the strict following of the Shari’a laws and subordination to the community’s secular chief authority; the Imamat and Caliphate were considered only as symbols of the absolute authority of Shari’a. Thus, in the political doctrine of Islam there is no idea of a human being’s "sovereign will" that would dominate over the will of all other people. The Imam or Caliph is the Prophet’s deputy and follower, subjected to Shari’a; according to the divine law, he is not an Imam, but a simple believer. Theoretically, the believer should not obey an order that results in violation of the Shari’a laws. This important concept of the doctrine of Umma was based on the Hadith: "There is no responsibility to obey a sin," and "There is no obedience to a creature against God." In Islamic political doctrine, the civil wars of the first two centuries of the Arabic state’s existence, political disputes with the Umayyad governors, and fierce attacks on their adherents are considered as an example of the strict fulfillment of these positions (10, p. 14).

The secular head of the community had the title of Caliph as the Prophet’s deputy and Imam as the leader of all true believers (Amir al-Muminin). In the medieval literature on Fiqh, "the terms Imam and Imamat" have been used more often than "Caliph and Caliphate" (18, p. 15). The Caliph’s authority was based on the Qur’an and Hadith, according to which obedience to the Prophet means obedience to God, and the obedience to Imam means obedience to the Prophet. If harm comes from the governors, they should be punished, but in that a person does not take any responsibility. In other words, the Caliph’s authority has a divine character, and the problem of the justice of his ruling is the matter of "God and his serf." The simple believer should not interfere in the relations of the governor with God.

From the 10th century to the present time, almost all Islamic Ulama and jurists have asserted that their doctrine of Imamat was based on the practice of the first Islamic state. In reality, as is noted by some researchers of oriental studies, the general Sunnite political theory of Imamat developed gradually during the 4th and 5th centuries after the death of Muhammad (11, p. 16).

The contradictions of Imamat were first exhibited during the first civil war, in the development of Shi’ism and Kharijism, in the Abbasid’s opposition to the Umayyad, and in the Mutazilites and Asharites movement. Faith in the divine nature of society and the absence of any separation between the religious (or the church) and the state had an important consequence, as there were civil wars and disorders of all kinds. It had the name Fitna (plural-"Fitan") and in principle was considered as a revolt against the divine law, that is, civil war and similar kinds of disorder were considered as a rebellion against Shari’a.

A number of events, including the murder of Uthman, Ali’s appointment as Imam, and Muawiya’s coming to power were involved in the political determination of the Imam’s legitimacy and were simultaneously important for faith. This was often called "the first Fitna" or "the great Fitna." Later the term "Fitna" was applied to the periods of disturbances and anxieties caused by schools or trends that differed from the majority of believers (9, pp. 930-931). Every human being who allows innovations (bida’) was considered as a potential instigator of Fitna. The first civil war was supposed to answer the question: "What is the Caliph?" The end of the war, initiated by Muawiya, as the governor de facto, caused a deep disunity among believers in respect to the problem of the religious and political legitimacy of Imamat. The Kharijit movement was related to the problems: "Who is a Muslim?" or "Who is a Muslim, and Who is a non-believer, Who will be saved, and Who will be damned?" The Umayyad’s fall and the assertion of Abbasid’s strength were related to the solution of the problem: "What is the nature of an Islamic state?"

It is rather remarkable, remarks Lambton, that almost all major Islamic legal theories have appeared, if not during crises, then, at least, when there were a lot of problems facing the Islamic society (18, p. 16).

There was a certain contradiction between the existing principles of political theory and the new historical circumstances. However, the Islamic doctrine of authority has always been based on the principles of Shari’a and, hence, on an invariance of its fundamentals in all times and in all societies. The tradition attributes to the Prophet the expression that after him the Caliphate will exist for 300 years, and then an empire of God will come. It did not become the conventional doctrine, but later Sunnite jurists emphasized the difference between the Medina Caliphate of "the righteous Caliphs" and the later Caliphates that had the character of a world empire. The Medina Caliphate is sometimes known as the "an-Nubuwwa Caliphate," which, according to other tradition, also would exist for 300 years (both traditions are based on "Musnad" by Ibn Hanbal). But this Caliphate is considered adequate to all requirements of the true Imamat. In the 10th century, the legitimacy of governing by "the righteous Caliphs" and the justice of their actions became a conclusive Sunnite doctrine. It was an integral part of the doctrine on authority, which was protected from any kind of criticism. Also during that period, the doctrine on the Caliphs’ hierarchy or superiority (tafdil) appeared and was developed. So, Ibn Hanbal considered that "the righteous Caliphs" had superiority in accordance with their principles of life and activity in the Caliphate.

Therefore, all discussions on the problem of the institutions of power (authority) in Islamic political thought are concentrated mainly around the Caliph, who is the unique holder of authority, and recognize that the state is only a transmitter of Shari’a. The existence of the state implies the availability of a secular authority. However, the state itself has no authority of its own.

The majority of Sunnite jurists consider, that it was possible and necessary to elect the Imam, and tried to substantiate the difference of the procedure of electing a ruler in the spirit of the Medina Caliphate. According to the majority of them Abu Bakr and Uthman had been elected by unanimous opinion (Ijma’). The difference in points of view was only in the procedure of electing voters. There was a conventional opinion that they should be from the Ulama.

Muhammad functioned as the judge, secular governor and religious leader of the community in a broad sense. However, according to the jurists his followers should not have the last function. In other words, the Imam has no power to give a new interpretation of religious matters; his function is simply to maintain existing doctrines.

Shari’a speaks about two forms of the law (Haqq): the law of God and the law of human beings. The first law comprises the idea of absolute obedience to Shari’a. The second one is considered as an absence of laws in the regular sense. Shari’a, which is the absolute authority, precedes the state, and is the law for the state. An individual has only the right to expect Shari’a observance by the head of the community, the Caliph, and to act within the framework of the divine law.

In the literature on Fiqh behind juridical discussions on the problem of the Imamat there was a struggle of various trends in Islam. Historiographic works also show that the difference among sects is based mainly on a different understanding of who is an Imam and what are his functions. Sunnite political doctrine developed as a feedback to the position and counter-position of the opposition, in particular the Shiites and Kharijites, and this has led them to formulate the concept of Imamat. Researchers characterize the tendencies of early opposition movements, as follows:

The Kharijites and Shi’ites represent two extremely contrasting tendencies in interpreting the problem of power in Islam. The first were the most radical group and called for the separation of religion and politics; in their doctrine the religious element was dominant. But the Zeydit branch of Shi’ism began to act against such a tendency. It had features similar to the Kharijites and all Shi’ites and Sunnites, but differed from the rest of the Shi’ites by denying the theory of divine light and refused the Imam the right to appoint his successor. Zeydites and in particular Kharijites, whose movement had forced Sunnite jurists to think deeply about who is a Muslim, and who is a non-believer, played a large part in the development of Sunnite theory during the early centuries of Islam. With unshakable insistence, they posed the problem of the Imam’s personal characteristics and the responsibility of believers "to uphold virtue and to prohibit harm". The Kharijites, who had become a serious opposition party in early Islam, were named in this way, because they "deviated" from the Caliph Ali in protest against his position in the battle of Siffina in 657 (by following the arbitration court’s decisions, while asserting the legitimacy of his claims on the Caliph’s throne after the death of Uthman). The first civil war between Ali and Muawiya was a direct outcome of the struggle for power. The Kharijites asserted that Ali’s consent to hold arbitration was a sin against God, because he had replaced the divine instructions with a court of human beings. In the battle of Siffina they proclaimed the slogan: "Solution by God only".

They denied Ali’s claims to the Caliphate, condemned Uthman’s behaviour, rejected any attempt to avenge his murder and began to stamp everyone a non-believer who did not accept their tendencies to deny Ali and Uthman. They committed many murders, not sparing even women.

The Kharijites had been crushed by Ali in the battle of Mahrawana in 658, but a series of local revolts took place from 659 to 661. Also there were a number of disturbances under the Muawiya rule (661-680), all of which had been suppressed. During the civil war which started after the death of Yazid I (683), the disturbances of the Kharijites recommenced.

The doctrine of the Kharijites had great similarity to the Sunnite one, but differed from the latter in three items. First, they asserted that in Sunnism the limitation of the Imam to within the Qureish clan was not legal. According to their point of view there was no necessity for Imam to belong to any certain family or tribe. The only condition was that he should be a devout Muslim and a good governor. They accepted the Sunnite (and partially Shi’ite) doctrine on "a less preferable" (al-mafdul) Caliph. The Kharijites considered, that the Imam should be the commander, judge and religious leader of the society. He should govern in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet. The Caliph has no right to change the doctrines, and can only apply them. Secondly, the Kharijites considered that the religious leader should not at all attend to problems of political management. Thirdly, they insisted on preserving the believer’s responsibilities for "upholding virtues and prohibiting evil."

It has been agreed that the doctrines of authoritative Sunnite Faqih are to be taken as the classical theories of the state in Islamic political thought, where the main principles of Islamic doctrine on authority were advanced. There the main problematic was the determination of the circle of the sources by which many subsequent generations of the Islamic jurists, historians and political figures were to be guided. The classical theories of the state were aimed to add special significance to the religious ideal of the Islamic state. They were guided by the Qur’an and Sunnah traditions and the practice by the Islamic community of the Golden period of Islam, Umma and Ijma’ doctrines.

The author of the first classical theory of state was Faqih-shafiite al-Mawardi (d. 1058) whose main work is Al-Ahkam às-Sultaniya. As a Kadi (judge) he served in various towns of the Caliphate and eventually moved to Baghdad, where he received the title of supreme judge. Al-Mawardi was one of the main advisers of the Caliphs al-Êhadir (991-1031) and al-Êàim (1031-1075) and actively participated in the negotiations of the Caliphs with the Buid Emirs and the Seljuq Sultan Tugrul-bek.

According to Gibb, the treatise Al-Ahkam às-Sultaniya was written with the purpose of strengthening the authority of the Abbasid Caliphs and limiting claims of absolute authority by the Buid Emirs (12, pp. 151-152). As Ì.À. Faksh remarks, al-Mawardi lived in the period of the decline of the Caliphate power and a significant reduction of the actual role of the Caliph. He was legally the monarch, but actual authority was in the hands of other persons (8, p. 2). In some respects the publication of this work by al-Mawardi had been promoted by a historically favorable moment connected with the reduction of Buid Emirs’ authority and the increasing power of Sultan Mahmud Gaznewid. The latter in every possible way demonstrated his loyalty to the Abbasids and in many respects promoted the prestige of the Baghdad Caliph.

It can be asked if the actual authority of the Emirs and Sultans was so strong, why did they finally recognize the higher spiritual and secular authority of the Abbasid Caliph, concluding agreements with him and ordering his name to be mentioned during Friday prayers. The fact is that the state was not thought of distinctly as an Islamic state, but as the religious-political unity. If a Sultan or Emir wished to maintain his authority, he could not ignore the fundamental law of Islam, according to which the absolute authority of the Caliph was based on the Qur’an. The legitimacy of the rank of Caliph was connected with the Ijma’ of the Ulama. Only a legal Caliph had the authority that did not depend on the actual secular authority of an Emir or Sultan, but was based on the divine law. This was a fulfillment of religious responsibility and required absolute obedience. Thus, civil loyalty meant loyalty to Shari’a, but not to a secular governor. Theoretically at least, a call for disobedience to the Caliph’s authority could not be executed (23, p. 15).

However, in Islamic law there are no strictly determined procedures and canonized institutions for defining the legitimacy of the election or governing of the various Caliphs. That is why the key role began to belong to the Faqihs and the Ulama corresponding to the fact that Ijma’ was considered an infallible source of Fiqh. Since the times of the Umayyad dynasty, the governors had ceased to be elected and attained their recognition either by force or by inheriting the authority. Therefore, further development of the political theory was related to the choice by jurists of one of the two ways: either to correct the basic foundations of the Islamic doctrine on authority in correspondence with the actual historical practice of the Caliphate and thus to consecrate the legitimacy and authority of Sultans or Emirs, or to insist on adherence to Shari’a and condemn "illegal governors," calling Muslims to disobedience to the secular governors.

Al-Mawardi was one of the first to understand the need to bring the norms of Shari’a and the existing historical-political situation into the compliance. The main idea of the Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya had been also directed to the theoretical justification of the differentiation of the spheres of authority and power between the Caliph in the area of religious matters and the Emir in the field of civil management on the basis of mutual agreement.

As a Sunnite Faqih, Al-Mawardi developed his concepts on the basis of an ideal Islamic state in the period of the Prophet and the four "righteous Caliphs," which was considered by traditionalists (Salafit) as a unique legal and fair state. Therefore, he considered the Imamat or the Caliphate as a divine institution, based not on reason but on revelation. Hence, the importance for the Islamic state of the definition of the Caliph or Imam as deputies of the Prophet and holders of secular authority. Though the Caliphate, as a form of governing and a type of Islamic state, is not based on any concrete Qur’anic concept, nevertheless it has been recognized by the Islamic jurists as a canonical religious institution. Even Ibn Khaldun, the famous historian and social thinker of 14th century, believed that the Caliphate was a canonical necessity, and the Muslims considered its establishment as a religious responsibility. Accentuating the divine character of the Caliphate and the Caliph was important for Al-Mawardi, namely, because in the 11th century the Caliphate had lost its past power. The need to strengthen the Caliphate was considered by him a religious imperative. The obvious contradiction with historical reality was al-Mawardi’s statement that it is possible to recognize only one Caliph legally, while for more than 100 years Caliphates had already existed in Egypt, Baghdad, and Spain. Probably his statement was connected to the real threat to the Abbasids from the side of Fatimid Egypt. Al-Mawardi considered that the Sunnite concept of Imamat could resist Shi’ite claims on its authority. He categorically rejected the Shi’ite concept on the appointment of the Imam. Therefore, al-Mawardi agreed to recognize as legal the election of the Caliph even by one voter (25, p. 7).

Al-Mawardi was one of the first who precisely determined the required characteristics which a Caliph should have: justice, knowledge of the Islamic law, absence of physical and mental defects, wisdom, bravery, and origin from a Qureish family. This last requirement contradicted the fundamental principle of the equality of believers in Islam. He, as well as many other Sunnite jurists, considered that it adhered to the practice of the first Arabic state in the period of the Prophet and his associates. However, it is obvious that the last requirement was directed against the Kharijites.

According to al-Mawardi, the main functions of the Imam are: strengthening and protecting Islam and the Islamic state, the establishment of justice, monitoring the strict following of the norms of Shari’a, collection of taxes, personal responsibility for governing the state, and fulfilling the resolutions. The responsibility of believers was reduced to absolute obedience to the Caliph and helping him to realize his functions. Thus the Imam’s authority and the defense of this authority are in accord with Shari’a, in contrast to those who achieve authority by force.

However, al-Mawardi limits the functions of Imam to the religious, judicial, and executive spheres. In accordance with the basic foundations of the Islamic doctrine on authority, the Imam has no right to issue laws. The legislative function was considered as an integral law of Ijma’ of the Umma, which actually was always Ijma’ of the Ulama.

The understanding of the large role of Faqihs and Ulama in the Islamic state was exhibited in the statement of al-Mawardi that if the Imam appears to be unable to execute his responsibilities and functions, then the voters can elect a new Imam. At the same time, he considered that a Caliph’s displacement could be only for extreme cases and circumstances connected with the possibility of a threat to the state’s existence (25, p. 7-11).

The political theory of al- Ìàwardi greatly influenced the concepts on the state of his contemporary Asharites, such as al-Baqillani (d. 1031) and al-Baghdadi (d. 1037). The most original political theory among Asharites was created by the Faqih-Shafiite al-Juweyni (d. 1085), with the name of whom the legalization of Ashrism under Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) is bound.

While studying the political concepts of al-Juweyni, as a rule researchers face two difficulties: at first, in practically all modern works devoted to the political thought of medieval Islam, the role and significance of al-Juweyni are ignored or underestimated; secondly, there was a mistaken tradition considering him as a follower of al-Mawardi.

By studying closely al-Juweyni’s biography it is possible to identify a number of factors which influenced the formation of his political outlook. There is no doubt that his attitude to the Abbasid regime was influenced by the persecution of the Asharites, including al-Juweyni, by Vizier Tugrul-bek al-Kunduri, and also his assignment to a position as head of the Nizamia University in Nashpur by Vizir al- Arslan Nizam al-Mulk. The period connected in particular with Nizam al-Mulk is marked by prevalence of Seljuq authority over the lands of the declining Caliphate and their aspiration for substantiation of "the greater legitimacy’’ of their rule in comparison with their predecessors. Tugrul-bek, the first Seljuq governor, who settled down in Baghdad, was proclaimed a Shahinshah of the East and the West. But being unsatisfied with this title, he announced himself the Renovator of Islam and even the head of all true believers (13. p. 28). Though Emirs and Sultans were the representatives of real power, they always needed the support and consecration of their government by the Caliph. The latter was always considered as the higher religious authority, with whom the legitimacy of governing by the Sultan or Emir was bound. Therefore, the political activity of Nizam al-Mulk was directed to drawing together the Seljuq dynasty and Abbasid religious authority.

In this political situation al-Juweyni wrote a treatise, which justified the Seljuq authority’s legitimacy. But he understood well that the political-legal theory of his time, especially the doctrine by al-Mawardi, could not justify the high claims of the Seljuq dynasty. The theory of al-Mawardi was directed to the support and protection of a uniform state by means of strengthening the Caliphate as an institution. Therefore al-Mawardi was interested in returning to the Caliph his power under the Buids.

In contrast al-Juweyni seems to have lost hope for revival of the Caliphate and tried to support the idea of a uniform state by such different and more effective means as depending on the Sultan, who was the actual authority and then supporting the declining Abbasid regime.

This is the main difference between al-Juweyni and al-Mawardi. While the latter considered the Caliph as the higher bearer of sovereignty and religious authority and underestimated the significance of the actual military authority of the Sultans, the former based his principals on the idea that the authority of the Sultan was quite legal for all those who wished and were capable of supporting peace and unity.

The political theory by al-Juweyni was based on the separation of spheres of influence between Imam and Sultan. The activity of the first in his point of view is related to the responsibility for the "prosperity of religion’’; the activity of the second is related to the uniform state. Al-Juweyni created his own theory on the ideal Imamat, in which he considered matters connected to the existence of the institution of Imamat based on Shari’a, but he attends to existing political realities and takes into consideration the prospects of political development. He criticized the actual practice of the Imamat of his time in his doctrine on incomplete Imam, proved the Abbasid Caliph’s incompetence and attributed to him responsibility for weakening the religious-political unity and power of the Arabic state. Al-Juweyni had come to the conclusion that the Caliph was not capable of preserving the Caliphate unity and wholeness. The justification of the powerful central authority of the Seljuq Sultans is the burden of his work. With this, al-Juweyni understood that strengthening and protecting the legal character of Seljuq governance was simultaneously a strengthening of both Islam and Shari’a.

Much attention in the theory about the ideal Imam was given to the consideration of representatives of the Imam authority and their hierarchy, the Imam’s functions and the duties to be carried out by the Imam. The requirement for the Imam always to consult with the Faqihs and Ulama on all state and religious problems was reaffirmed. Al-Juweyni made the Caliph responsible for strengthening the unity of the contradictory elements of Sunnite doctrine. But at the same time he should not try to unify the existing four schools of the law (mazhab) or prefer one of them. The main feature of the Imam, according to al-Juweyni, was the power and authority to preserve a powerful central state. Therefore Ijma’ should make a decision on the election of a Caliph, proceeding first of all from his ability to preserve and strengthen the Islamic state, because the main purpose of the Imamat is a preservation of the unity of Umma. Probably, proceeding from the need to strengthen a powerful central authority, al-Juweyni allowed for the possibility of electing an Imam from outside the Qureish family.

The significance of that fact is that since al-Juweyni some authoritative Sunnite Faqihs began in human respects to recede from the basic foundations of the Islamic doctrine on authority. They tried to adjust the Shari’a norms to changing historical circumstances by analyzing of the theories on state, and paying attention to a lesser extent to the legal-institutional aspect of authority and to a greater extent to the effectiveness and efficiency of state governance. This was the work of thinkers on the so-called "theory of kingship", in which Islamic political doctrines and the Sassanid tradition of state systems have been synthesized. Among these works one must first of all mention Siyasat-nameh (29), written by the patron and protector of al-Juweyni, Vizir Nizam al-Mulk, who was the actual governor of the Seljuq empire in the period from 1072 to 1092.

Nizam al-Mulk’s reliance on Shafiite Faqihs was also for the purpose of limiting claims on power on the part of the governors of Fatimid Egypt and the Alamut state of Ismailites. It is no wonder that al-Juweyni defended the basic foundations of the Sunnite political doctrine quite in the spirit of al-Mawardi, but, contrary to al-Mawardi, eager to justify the legitimacy of a Sultan’s governing. The statement of the Shi’ite Imams, that the Prophet secretly nominated Ali as his deputy was categorically rejected by al-Juweyni. He considered that there was nothing about that in the religious tradition and moreover Ijma’ always supported the opposite point of view, i.e. the Caliph should be elected, but not be nominated. According to al-Juweyni, no educated person (Alim) could deny the fact that election had been a unique practice of the Caliph selection for a long period of Caliphate history. However, taking into consideration the actual practice of Caliph assignments since the Umayyad period, he, as well as al-Mawardi, allowed a possibility of Imam election even by one elector from the number of the Ulama. But at the same time al-Juweyni, in contrast to al-Mawardi, pursued another purpose, which becomes obvious when he asserted the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two Caliphs under the stipulation that they be far apart territorially.

The lack of confidence of al-Juweyni in the ability of the Caliph to save the uniform, powerful and centralized state was already visible in Irshad and Luma. In these works he allowed the possibility of displacing a ruling Imam in the case when he sins or the governing by the Caliph is unfair. He sharply objected to the Shi’ite doctrine of an Imam’s infallibility.

After the death of al-Juweyni in 1085 his ideas were further developed in the works of another Faqih-Shafiite, al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali, as well as his instructor al-Juweyni, had become a supporter of the Seljuq Sultans, but at a disturbed time. During this period there was a real threat from the side of Fatimid Egypt. Political murders of the supporters of the ruling regime by the Ismailites of Alamut had become frequent. There were three plots organized against Nizam al-Mulk, and soon the Grand Vizir of Sultan Malik-shah was killed, and then, under unknown circumstances, the Sultan died as well.

As a rule the works by al-Ghazali in the sphere of Fiqh, religion and ethics performed the task of theoretical justification of the need for a powerful central authority. In these works there was a large-scale criticism of political claims of the Fatimid and theoretical research in Arabic-Islamic philosophers on the improvement of society.

For al-Ghazali, politics was a necessary component of religion and morals. It was considered as the art of behavior, according to the specific circumstances of a human being’s life and weighting one’s deeds with the existing state order. Politics as a science, according to al-Ghazali, leaned on theology (usul ad-din), Islamic law (usul al-Fiqh) and the theory of the human being as a social animal. On the basis of all these disciplines there was an eschatological idea of human destiny; this world was considered only as a basis for the other world, and politics was a preparation for maximum happiness in the future life.

In his political theory al-Ghazali actively used the experience of the Sasanid state. According to the Sassanid tradition of the state system, religion and power were considered as "twins" (30, p. 95). So according to al-Ghazali, religion is the basis, and state authority is the guardian, ensuring its protection and guaranteeing its firmness. People need a powerful authority on behalf of the Sultan, which, with the help of laws, keeps and strengthens the state order. These laws form the subject of the Islamic law (Fiqh). Therefore Islamic jurists play a large role in the life of the state, and their activity should be considered as the major function of the state; order and justice cannot be provided without them. In addition to laws, according to al-Ghazali, there are religious rules and norms, which are a basis for the true faith. Accordingly "dogmatic theology" (ilm al-kalam) takes the central place in the hierarchy of sciences.

First of all the political doctrine of al-Ghazali should be considered in the light of his fears of civil war (Fitna) and various disturbances (fasad), which could cause anarchy and disorder. That is why major attention has been given by him to the problem of the mutual relation of Caliph and Sultan. But his criticism of political claims on authority by Shi’ites (Batin followers) can be considered only as an associated criticism, which helps to expose the main problem. Thus, even the request of the Tripoli Kadi Fakhruddin Abu Obeyd ibn Ali in 1107 for help in the struggle against the crusaders remained without a proper political evaluation by al-Ghazali.

The significance of an adequate understanding of the political doctrine of al-Ghazali is evident in the analysis of his works from the point of view of their chronology, starting from "Mustazhiri" and finishing with "Mustasfa". Al-Ghazali considers two aspects of the problem of "Caliph and Sultan": first, the relation of sovereignty (hukm) and secular authority (Sultan); second, the relation of religion (din) and state (mulk).

In Mustazhiri, which was written in 1094-1095 and was devoted to the Caliph al-Mustazhiri, al-Ghazali considered the problem of the legitimacy of Imam rule and proved the bankruptcy of claims of legal authority by Batinite followers. In this work, quite in the spirit of al-Mawardi, he uncovered features of the Islamic Sunnite political doctrine and described characteristics which the Caliph should have and the procedure of his election.

In Iqtisad fi-l-itikad al-Ghazali was more realistic in the evaluation of the Caliph’s role in strengthening the Islamic state and introduced the problem of correlating the Caliphate and the Sultanate. Carefully analyzing the basic foundations of the Islamic political doctrine and the historical practice of the Caliphate, he conceived the idea of the necessity of a union of Imam and Sultan.

The theory of Imamat by al-Ghazali was based on three key positions: 1) authority is required for maintaining order in the state, 2) Imamat symbolizes the unity of the Islamic community (Umma) and its historical practice: the Sultanate becomes a constituent of the Caliphate; and 3) the functional and institutional authority of the Imamat is based on Shari’a.

Al-Ghazali considered the Imam to be the higher authority and hence able to be appointed by either the Prophet, or a ruling Caliph, or a person who has authority. At that time the Sultan usually appointed the Imam, and only then was the Caliph formally elected by Ulama. Al-Ghazali tried to fix this situation. He considered that the procedure of Caliph election fully met the norms of Shari’a, and actually the Sultan became a constitutional authority. Imam did not symbolize the unity of Imamat anymore, and was its constituent only. The Imam’s authority was based on the authority of the Sultan, and the power of the latter was consecrated by the Imam’s authority. The Sultan, as the constitutional authority, recognized the institutional authority of the Caliph. Thus, the Sultan as a secular governor ensured the unity and power of the Islamic state. According to al-Ghazali Faqihs and Ulama should act as a link between Sultan and Imam. Their political functions were: interpretation of Shari’a in correspondence with historical realities, justification of the legitimacy of the Caliph appointed by the Sultan, and issuing religious-legal acts (fetwa), personifying a functional authority of Shari’a.

The late works by al-Ghazali show that as a whole he adhered to the point of view, stated in Iqtisad fi-l-itikad. In these works he discussed in detail the practical requirements for observing the religious rules and norms of Shari’a, which ensured the order and prosperity of the Islamic state. "Nowhere else was it more obvious, than in his work, Ihya ulum ad-din (Revival of Religious Sciences) that politics for the Muslims was not an independent science, but was the constituent of theology" (18, p. 115).

Besides that, regarding the Sultan as a unique force, capable of saving the uniform Islamic state, al-Ghazali supposed a possibility of absolute obedience to the secular governor even when the Sultan violated the norms of Shari’a and exercised unfair authority. He considered that the main thing was that the secular governor recognized the authority of the Imam. In Ihya ulum ad-din al-Ghazali repeatedly warned about the pernicious consequences of civil war (Fitna), disturbances and revolts of any sort. If order could be ensured by the Sultan only, people should submit to him and support him under any conditions.

In his work Nasihat al-muluk, he considered the main responsibilities of the governors as mastering the art of effective state ruling. Taking into consideration that this book was addressed not to Faqihs, not to Caliphs, but exclusively to the Sultans, he underlined the large responsibility of the latter before God and the citizens, showing in every possible way that their authority is from Allah. The first responsibility of the Sultan, according to al-Ghazali, is strengthening his own faith (jihad); his responsibilities toward the citizen are to exercise a just or fair authority. In numerous examples from religious tradition, the history of the Sassanid state and the Caliphate, he demonstrated how an unjust authority resulted in tyranny, which in turn caused unjust authority. Al-Ghazali called upon the Sultans to listen to the opinion of the Faqihs and Ulama on religious matters and the Vizirs’ advice on state matters. He noted the importance of the post of Vizir (and, in particular, of a first Vizir) in the state hierarchy.

In Al-Mustasfa min ilm al-usul, written in 1109, he reviewed the problem of society and state from the point of view of Islamic law (usul al-Fiqh). This treatise begins with an explanation of the fundamental Islamic doctrine that God is the unique sovereign. Reviewing the Fiqh sources, he underscored that the Qur’an was the unique absolute source. But Sunnah is valuable only at the level at which it specifies and proves the existence of the order established by God. Accordingly, Ijma’ is valuable, as it specifies Sunnah’s existence. Considering Ijma’, al-Ghazali asserted that it meant the unanimous opinion of all members of the Umma. However, considering the laws of those who can be included in Ijma’ and those who should be excluded from it, Laoust notes that Ijma’ was the unanimous opinion of Faqihs and the Ulama, who had the right to issue a fatwa (19, p. 58).

Concerning the problem of Taqlid a blind following of authority, and Ijtihad a creative development of the Islamic law theory, al-Ghazali asserted the need for the broad public (amma) to follow Taqlid. He justified this concept by the fact, that even associates of the Prophet followed the way outlined in advance by Muhammad. Moreover, al-Ghazali considered that original and independent search for truth, justice, and happiness could lead to social instability.

Considering the correlation of religion and state, spiritual and secular matters, he asserted their continuity and mutual conditioning. Umma, uniting people on the basis of faith, has as its goal the achievement of happiness in the next world. Taking into consideration that God is the unique sovereign, the human being is strictly obliged to follow Shari’a. Politics, theology, law, and ethics are inseparably linked sciences, which specify the methods of reaching happiness. Finally, according to al-Ghazali, political reforms are moral reforms: Everyone who wishes to improve the life of others should begin with himself.

Al-Ghazali had always remained a sober-minded Sunnite Faqih and politician, who did not doubt that in the long run the Imamat would cease to be the basis of the political structure of the Islamic state, and in due course, the Sultans and Emirs would establish, both theoretically and practically, independent authority in all regions of the Caliphate. The Imamat would symbolize political unity and, in the last analysis, would reflect only the religious and cultural unity. Al-Ghazali could only hope that the Sultans would recognize Shari’a as a functional authority of the Islamic state. Political wit did not deceive al-Ghazali, since long before the Mongolian invasion in 1258 the Caliphate actually had ceased to exist as a political institution. Many theorists of legal and political thought were not able to avoid this fact.

In political theory, Ibn Jamaa did not make a distinction between Imam and Sultan. For him, the Caliph is actually the Sultan, and the Sultan is the Imam. If for al-Ghazali, Sultan and Sultanate were the key positions in the theory on the Imamat, for Ibn Jamaa Imamat already meant Sultanate. The latter in his political theory recorded the transformation of the Caliphate into a Sultanate. Ibn Jamaa hoped for a revival of the past power of the Islamic state and, consequently, tried to present the Sultan as a powerful new Caliph, capable of providing political unity for the state.

Adaptation of the Shari’a norms to the changing historical conditions and, accordingly, modification of the direction of the Islamic political doctrine on authority caused extreme discontent among the Salafi (traditionalists) and in particular, of Faqih Hanbal’s followers. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) was one of them. He justified the need to return to the basic foundations of the Sunnite political theory within the doctrine of Hanbalah followers. At the basis of his doctrine is the idea that God created the world that should serve Him. Therefore, religion and authority, according to Ibn Taymiyya, are inseparable. Their separation from each other is the main source of instability and disorders in the state (8, p. 5). The political ideas of Ibn Taymiyya represent a return to the idea that Islam should act as a governor of personal and state life, and the main responsibility of the governor is implementing the Shari’a norms. He does not see any need to discuss the characteristics that the Imam should have. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the real unity of society, which existed during the time of the Prophet and his associates, should lean on religious solidarity. He underlined the importance of strictly following the rule of the Caliph’s election and signing an agreement between him and the Islamic community (Jamaa). The agreement allows the realization of an effective control over the Imam’s activity and guarantees peace and prosperity to the Caliphate. On the one hand, the primary function of the Imam is to establish justice on the basis of Shari’a; therefore, according to Ibn Taymiyya, he is the deputy of God. On the other hand, not obeying the Imam is allowable if his deeds contradict the Qur’an, Sunnah and the tradition of the first devout Muslims (al-salaf al-salihun). In all other cases, disobedience to the Caliph is equivalent to revolt (Fitna), which is a heinous, inexcusable sin.

As a rule, the name of Ibn Taymiyya is bound up with establishing the so-called "salaf method." Ibn Khaldun in "Muqaddima", al-Makrizi in "Hithat", and al-Sabuni in "Akidat al-salaf" mark out the following principles: first,, complete rejection of searching for an internal sense of the sacred texts from their allegorical interpretation, and strict following to the letter of the Qur’an and Sunnah; secondl support for the Hadith; third, prohibiting the comparison of God and human beings in any sense; fourth, justifying faith (nakl) with the help of reason (akl), based on the fact that there are no contradictions between them and cannot be, because the sole work of reason is to understand the text, but not to evaluate it; fifth, the prohibition of innovations. All innovations (bida’), according to Ibn Taymiyya, should be attributed to Satan; they lead to a religious and political split (3, p. 254). The political doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya shows that only the first Arabic state was considered by all traditionalists as the sole legal and just one, and the whole further history of Islamic state was a deviation.

Making a general evaluation of the political doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya, J. Makdisi underscores that he was a Hanbalist—a Sufi. According to the opinion of the American and al-Jilani (d. 1166) were Hanbalists. The common point, which integrated Hanbalism and Sufism is reliance on Hadith. This is the reason for naming all of them ahl al-Hadith (traditionalists) (21, p. 62-63). For all of them, the Medina state of the Prophet was their social ideal; their main theoretical and practical activity was in calling-up to salaf with the call to return to the religious cleanliness and justice characteristic of the first Islamic state. Probably, the spread of Sufism from the Indus to Gibraltar and the active and passive aversion to political regimes in the numerous Islamic states by the Sufi orders have been the reasons for the sharp opposition from Ibn Taymiyya and the traditional opponents of Sufism and Hanbalism: Mutazilites, Asharites, Shi’ite and Arab-Islamic philosophers. Ibn Taymiyya criticized some Sunnite Faqihs (4, p. 37-51) and considered the element of compromise in the political theories of his predecessors to be dangerous both for Islam and for the existence of the Islamic state. He not only participated in the military expedition of the Mamluk Sultan al-Malik al-Mansur Lajin in 1297-1299 in Armenia as an expert Faqih, but also often entered into conflict with the governors, calling for strict observance of Shari’a and for reforms in the spirit of the Imamat the period of the Prophet and the four "righteous Caliphs."

According to Ibn Taymiyya, the state has not existed as an ideal Caliphate for a long time. The political unity of the Islamic state in due course had been transformed into the political pluralism of numerous independent Emirates. However, political pluralism developed because of religious monism, as all these Emirs or Sultans justified the legitimacy of their authority on the basis of the Shari’a. They had only one goal, which is the triumph of Islam and the service of God. However, their basis was not a myth about a divine appointment or the Prophet’s choice, but the will of governors relying on Shari’a and on their ability and skill to adjust Shari’a to this will. That is why Ibn Taymiyya proceeds from the fact that absolute sovereignty belongs to God, and that after the Prophet’s death it is also assisted by all those, who by means of knowledge and virtue could give an authoritative interpretation of Shari’a. Hence, they are responsible for the adaptation of the Shari’a to the new conditions of time and place. No doubt Ibn Taymiyya added himself to "people of knowledge and virtue," and also some others, who tried to find a new solution for old problems on the basis of a revaluation and appropriate interpretation of the Caliphate history in the framework of Hanbalism.

Ibn Taymiyya did not accept the idea of al-Ghazali that religion and state are "twin brothers"; he returned to a traditional dogma of the inseparability of religion and authority. However, he gave a new justification of this position quite in the spirit of Ibn Jamaa, when the latter justified the necessity of obedience even to a Caliph-Sultan who violates the Shari’a. With reference to Ibn Hanballah, he asserted that any leader needs authoritative power, even an unfair governor, as the power of the latter to perform the laws, ensure safety, protect the state from enemies, and distribute military trophies—and in the end the blessings for religion and all world—depend on it. Thus, the need of authority is justified by the religious laws of Shari’a. The idea of the indivisibility of religion and state brought Ibn Taymiyya to the assertion that 60 years of ruling by an unfair Imam are better than one night without his authority. He separated the personal behavior of the governor from his state functions, which are not dependent on the moral image of the Imam. He criticized the Kharijite idea of insubordination to an unfair Caliph by asserting that the Muslim should not raise weapons against his brother in faith or breach public order and by that commit an inexcusable sin.

He justified the idea of the unity of religion and state not only by the feeling of religious solidarity, but also by the necessity for mutual help among people because the human being in his nature is a political being. So faith and reason as well urgently require a uniform governor.

The political doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya differs from the doctrines of his predecessors in three basic elements:

- the Caliphate is not a mandatory political institution;

- several Imams can simultaneously exist;

- the election of the Caliph and the conclusion of an agreement with him are not limited to the Ulama, but assume the equivalent participation of all authoritative members of the community (Jamaa).

Ibn Taymiyya rejected the traditional Sunnite dogmas that the Imam should come only from the Qureish family, and that he should have many worthy qualities. What is important is that the Imam and the rulers (Umara) should always consult the the Ulama and Faqihs.

As had other jurists before him, Ibn Taymiyya was compelled to take into consideration the realities of history. However, as a traditionalist, he was irreconcilable to deviations from the foundations of Islamic political doctrine and called for a return to the orders prevailing in the ‘‘state of the Prophet," while at the same time preserving the right of free judgment.

The force of tradition and religion has appeared so great that any call to Salaf, the demand to return to justice and purity, to the orders of the first Islamic state was embodied in one of the most militant Islamic reforming movements of the 18th century—Wahhabism. Obviously, the Salafists played a major role even among the pan-Islamist reform movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, connected with the names of al-Afghani, Rashid Rida, Muhammad abrahamu, and al-Kawakabi.

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