CHAPTER VII
THE HUMANISTIC IDEALS OF THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE AGES
ARTUR SAGADEEV
"Man has become a problem for man"
(ashkala-l-insan’ala-l-insan)
Abu Hayan at-Taukhidi, 1010
A stereotype of the Middle Ages as dark came to us from the epoch of the Enlightenment, but it first appeared among the scholars of the Renaissance whose self-image required a contrasting image of the preceding era. To create such an image was not at all difficult, for the scholarship of the Renaissance revealed ancient literary texts, whereas in the heritage of the Middle Ages, it found only a dry and sterile scholasticism. The intellectual life of the Middle Ages, like a cloud, showed them only its dark side, and the Renaissance scholars simply did not have enough information to evaluate its lighter side. As a well-known Russian investigator of the Middle Ages, N.A. Sidorova, underlined, the difficulty in studying the unofficial Medieval culture "consisted in the absence of sources of information, from which one could appreciate the bulk and the character of this culture in its genuine state."
1But as one English proverb says, every cloud must have its silver lining, and so medievalists sooner or later began investigating "the other side" of the spiritual life of the Middle Ages in order to grasp this life in the unity of the diverse forms of its objective reality. Thus began the dismantling of the one-dimensional image of the Middle Ages.
But the self-image of the humanists was also a stereotype, though with a positive aspect, and accordingly, it also needed correction. Perhaps, it was for such a correction, that some time ago A.F. Losev touched on the problem "of the dark side of titanism."
2 This illumination (no matter that sometimes it was deliberately grotesque and subjective) factually revived, widened, and enriched the traditional, pompous, lacquered image one has of the Renaissance. The idea of the "dark side of titanism" was not approved by some well-known specialists of the Renaissance, who saw in it the request "to search out the dark sides of the Renaissance or to attribute to it the terrors of the inquisition and the counter-reformation."3 But such an interpretation of the problem would mean regarding the terrors of the Inquisition as unknown in the "epoch of titans" or as something alien to it (as "birthmarks" of the Middle Ages) and a negating of the progressive character of the Renaissance as affirmed by F. Engels in his Dialectics of Nature. Of course, the work also contains strong criticism of "the other side of titanism," for example, Engels statement concerning the founder of Calvinism burning Servet for discovering the circulation of the blood,4 Protestants who "surpassed Catholics in persecuting the free study of nature,"5 and Luther, as well as other humanists of his time, who protested against the Middle Ages for introducing ancient philosophical notions into Christian theology and thus staining the purity of Gospel traditions.But in the present context, this is of interest more in its methodological aspect: It is based on the idea of an "essence" that is not clearly understood. "The essence is the inner content of a subject, expressed in the unity of all diverse and contradictory forms of its existence."
6 But concentration of attention on the light side of the Renaissance means accentuating only the advanced aspects of this culture, (which, in turn, actually is reduced to the culture of the Italian Renaissance as the classical expression of Renaissance culture). This is one of the main reasons for the phenomenon, condemned by Renaissance figures, of attempting to see a process of "world Resurrection"7 which would be an anti-historical and an arbitrary collage of items taken out of context.8 The Renaissance was a period not only of bright and flourishing culture, but also of complex, dramatic conflicts that need objective analysis, showing both its bright and dark sides.
RENAISSANCE
The temptation to declare the Medieval Islamic, Iranian, Central Asiatic culture to be a Renaissance is especially great, because its creators, like the figures of the (European) Renaissance, "revived" ancient science (‘ulum al-awail). Besides, this culture not only anticipated some features of the culture of Renaissance, but also directly participated in its creation and development.
The discussion of what A. Mets called The Islamic Renaissance (Die Renaissance des Islam") began soon after the publication of his book (in 1922) with the same title. At first, it concentrated on the problem of what the author meant when he gave such a title to his book. (A. Mets died in 1917, without finishing his work). Rekkendorf, who wrote a preface to the book, noted that the author was not satisfied by this title, and the word "Renaissance" was used by him alternately to (a) denote the transition of the ancient learning to the Islamic world, and (b) the transformation of Islam in the 9th-10th centuries as a result of the resurrection of the Hellenistic-Christian heritage in the form of a new religious ideal – Ma’rifa, meaning ancient Gnosis. It was also suggested that under the word Renaissance, A. Mets understood first of all the resurrection of classical ancient learning, in the sense in which one speaks of a Carolingian, Byzantine, German, and so on Renaissance.
Scholars agreed that a parallel between the European Renaissance and the rise of Medieval Islamic culture had no objective basis. In particular, V.V. Bartold agreed with K. Bekker that it would be a real misfortune if, under the influence of the Mets’s book, the understanding of a flourishing Islamic culture was taken as a Renaissance. Such a parallel was unwarranted because in the history of the Islamic world there was no centuries-old supremacy of barbarity, the enthusiasm for antiquity never reached as high a level as in Europe, and there was no such contempt toward the remote past, called in Europe "vandalism."
9During the following decade, Eastern scholarship discovered nothing to justify rejection of the negative attitude of the former orientalists towards the idea of the Eastern Islamic, Iranian, Central Asiatic and other Renaissances. The investigation was broad in scale, in the former Soviet Union, particularly in the states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia.
As bases for the proclamation of the concept of an Eastern Renaissance, they sought parallels with the European Renaissance in a number of cases: first, the idea of philanthropy (jen) as interpreted by Han Juy, a Chinese thinker; second, the neoplatonism of the Areopagites, whose Georgian propagandists became pioneers of the neoplatonic Renaissance not only in Georgia, but also in Europe; third, the different manifestations of the Medieval Armenian culture whose flourishing was interrupted by the rise of the feudalism and the Mongolian, Turkish, and Persian conquerors; fourth, the diverse realms of the culture of the Medieval Islamic East that developed under the Iranian, Turkish, and Arab rulers before and after the Mongolian conquest.
As a rule, the authors of these concepts depended upon the interpretation of the Renaissance of. Engels in his "Dialectics of Nature," according to which the Cinquencento, Renaissance, and Reformation are used to denote one and the same great epoch, though the content of the epoch is not exhausted by any of these terms.
10 Clearly, however, what is common to the two great phenomena of the Renaissance (resurrection, in its culturological meaning) and Reformation must be essential for the whole epoch. Namely, it was their socio-economic sources, the destruction of feudal and the origin of capitalist relations, the strengthening the role of bourgeois strata of the society and of the bourgeois ideology as well.11 It is equally obvious that in the Medieval Islamic world, there was nothing like the formation of capitalist relations against the background of the decay of feudal relations, nor was there any other accompanying processes like a decay of feudal classes or corporate relations, no city communes, no struggle of citizen against feudalism—in a word, there was nothing that made the epoch of the Renaissance a great epoch, rather than simply a period of unusual development in humanistic culture.As D.E. Bertels noted quite correctly, studying the Eastern Renaissance "in the context of the history of culture, excluding the socio-economic conditions of the development of a society, is doomed to failure."
12 But what must one do if the analysis of the socio-economic conditions of the development of the Medieval Islamic society manifests radical differences in comparison with the corresponding conditions of West European society in the age of Renaissance? One cannot agree with the opinion of those few orientalists (S.D. Goitein, E. Ashto, etc.), who affirm that the whole economic sector had a capitalistic character an, obviously, formed a bourgeois stratum and even a "bourgeois revolution" in the East.The alternative solution to the problem is found in the idea that the Renaissance took place in the history of all the people of the world at their transition "from the village and castle-estate culture to a city-type culture."
13 The essence of this idea is the negation of the connection between Renaissance and the formation of bourgeois relations and the bourgeoisie, for otherwise, this phenomenon cannot spread to all the people of the world: "The age of Renaissance is feudalism that is being transformed into a new city type period of its history."14To agree with this rejection in the East of a direct connection between the Renaissance, on the one hand, and the appearance of early capitalist economies and the development of capitalist manufacturing, on the other is not to deny this connection in Europe in general. But it is a substitution of concepts to introduce the notion of a city period in the history of Feudalism, anticipated by a village (castle) period. The idea of the Renaissance as a global phenomenon is forced and artificial, due to this substitution, for the constitutive, essential features of such a supposedly global phenomenon cannot depend on absolutely external circumstances such as the presence of some ancient classical culture that might be resurrected. It is not possible to confirm by empirical materials relevant to the history of all the people of the world the proposition that humanistic urban culture develops as a negation of the preceding village (estate or castle) culture, implying for every country or cultural historical community a "Medieval" period of development?
Concerning the Islamic world, to validate the concept of global Renaissance, it is said that their scholars and philosophers created a new education, a new enlightenment, "overcoming a certain historical period between their time and ancient world," the world of "great ancient civilizations," that is, their own "Middle Ages."
15 But, everyone who knows the Medieval Islamic culture can easily notice that in this discussion, the term "ancient civilization" is used ambiguously and, as a result, a logical mistake arises, known as quaternio terminorum. In one premise, this term means centuries-old civilizations that appeared in early antiquity in another "civilization" that existed in hoary antiquity and also disappeared in those times. Hence, a false conclusion appears, as if the people of the Medieval Islamic world stepped over their "Middle Ages."The people of the Islamic East had no "Middle Ages" either as "a historical period," or in that culturological sense in which the authors of the above mentioned discourse used the term as an epoch of village-type culture, developed in feudal castles and monasteries. In contrast to Europe, in the Medieval Islamic East, besides cities there were no other centers for culture could be formed. A distant resemblance with monasteries could be found, perhaps, in hanaks, the places of dervishes, but their cultural role was insignificant, and their spiritual values were derivative from the culture of the cities.
But if the development of humanistic urban culture in the Islamic East did not accompany the decay of Feudalism, if it never replaced some "village" cultures or was practiced in castles and monasteries, and if, beside that, the alien cultural values it absorbed were not restored to life but were adopted from their living bearers, just as the cultural values of the Islamic world were taken in by the European scholastics of the 12th and the following centuries—then is there any basis to speak about the Eastern, Iranian, Central Asian, and other Renaissances? This term was turned into a metaphor, into a kind of a quality sign, and the "city type" culture, discovered here and there, was honored with this sign.
The development of institutes for the study of the Eastern Renaissance reflects the transfer of specific developments of the West-European burgher community to the history of Middle East cities. Some specialists now note: "We think, that we honor the East, finding its resemblance with Europe, but in reality we only hamper the search of the truth."
16 It misrepresents the empirical material by adjusting the subject realm of the concept to an a priori scheme, and perverts the idea of Renaissance by alternately reducing it to the period of a flourishing "Renaissance literature" or "Renaissance philosophy" in the East, and broadening its content to the notion of a period of highest development, resurrecting "the progressive moments of the past" through negation of the negation (without the characteristics of the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis).17This fact does not reject the possibility of finding certain common regularities in the development of cities and the city cultures in the East and West, but it is necessary, first, to look for such regularities based upon firm empirical ground, not upon artificial scheme; second, it is necessary to characterize these regularities without using the name of this unique phenomenon "Renaissance," but by finding more adequate, universal categories. This phenomenon can be characterized as Humanism.
At the beginning of the 19th century, the term Humanism was introduced by a German teacher, F. Hithammer, who wanted to promote the teaching of the ancient classics in secondary schools as opposed to the natural sciences and technical subjects. In the Renaissance, beginning from the 15th century, a person was called a Humanist (Italian: humanista, humanista), who devoted himself to studia humanitatis, to an educational program emphasizing more cultural refinement and the dignity and earthly destination of a human being. But the sources of Humanism go back to antiquity.
The main attribute of Humanism—the idea of the unity of humanity—developed on the ground of the great empires that opened the space for political, commercial, and cultural communication. These, in turn, created conditions for using a single language for interethnic communication. At the period of late antiquity, the language was Hellenistic Greek. In the empire, created by Alexander the Great, a person who knew this language could pass from the Nile to the Indus without an interpreter. Thus, the former boundary line between a Hellen and a barbarian was overcome: Now the term indicated belonging to a definite culture, hence, the stoic’s idea of the world state came closer. Theofrast spoke about friendship (philia) and union (syngenes) that rule in the world, and about the community (oikeiotetos), unitin all people. The roots of these ideas can be found already in Aristotele’s Nicomachean Ethics, widely known in the Islamic world.
For Aristotle, it was the polis that represented an ideal context for a human community, and in the epoch of Hellenism, such a context formed the world state. As Stoics thought, humankind was divided into a wise minority and an unwise majority (later the Islamic philosophers used a similar idea of dividing people into an intellectual elite (al-khassa) and the "general public" (al-amma).
In the Hellenic epoch, the term Humanism was widely used to mean humaneness. It was encouraged through wars when the humaneness of a conqueror or ruler often was represented as a saver and a benefactor of humanity. The word "philanthropy," originally used in the 4th century BC, meant the charity of Gods and autocrats towards their people, especially toward the helpless and suffering.
The idea of Humanism was further developed in the era of the Roman Empire. Soon after the Roman conquest of the West Mediterranean, Polibius, a Greek, wrote the first general history of humankind, representing humankind as an integral formation. Cicero, who had great influence on the Western interpretation of Humanism, understood humanitas to correspond to the Greek words anthropismos, cultural humaneness, and paideia, education, as well as the word philanthropiaas, meaning humaneness in the sense of merciful.
The appearance of humanistic ideas in the Islamic world was also due to broad interethnic contacts, the development of international trade, and intensive urbanization. Though the Islamic power gradually disintegrated to such a degree that al-Masudi compared the resulting states with the ownership of diadikhs True Muslims were united by a common religion, literary language, law, culture, and citizenship.
A cosmopolitan spirit ruled at the Baghdad school of Aristotelians that united scholars of different confessions. Abu Zakharia Yahia ibn Adi, the head of this school, was a Jacobite and a pupil of the Moslem al-Farabi. A Nestorian, Yuhanna ibn Khailan, was al-Farabi’s philosophy teacher. A close friendship connected Abu Nasr and another Nestorian, the interpreter, Matta ibn Junus. Among direct pupils of Yahia ibn Adi were a Nestorian, Abu-l-Hair al-Hasan ibn Suwar ibn al-Hammar (or al-Humar), and a Jacobite, Abu Ali Isa ibn Ishak ibn Zuraa, as well as Muslims, among them the famous philosophers Abu Suleiman al-Sidjistani and Abu Haian at-Tawkhidi. European philosophers, Wabh ibn Yaish and Abu-l-Hair Daud ibn Muzadj, were also in close contact with this school of thought. Vivid descriptions of the cultural activity in Baghdad, left by al-Tawkhidi showed that a scientific circle of al-Sidjistani united Muslims, Christians, Jews, and pagans from all partsof the Islamic world, who shared common spiritual values and aims stimulated by studying the ancient scientific and philosophical heritage.
In the 9
th and 10th centuries, scientific meetings of educated people were organized (medjlis), and one such meeting is described by an Andalusian theologian, Abu Umar ibn Muhammad al-Saadi, who twice visited such meetings. He wrote of being literally shocked by the atmosphere of free exchange of innermost thoughts and ideas which was supported by the belief that the truth was single and that all religions were expressions of this one general truth. This was common to all humankind, as well as a widely cultivated "ideology of friendship," as described in Ibn al-Mukaffa’s book, Al-adab al-kabir. This ideology compared with the spiritual contacts uniting the ancient philosophical schools of the Stoics, Epicureans and Neoplatonics and with those of the Italian Renaissance such as Marcilio Ficino’s study group.The thinkers, oriented to the Greek models of philosophizing (falasifa), were well acquainted with the universalistic spirit of the ancient cultural heritage, with the continuity between the wisdom of the ancient philosophers and that of the most recent philosophers of Islam, providing links of classical Greek science and wisdom with the rising Arab-Islamic culture. Abu Nasr al-Farabi describes the historical paths transferring ancient philosophy to the Islamic world. At those times, the ancient sciences were considered to be familiar to all people and religious communities and were attributed to the falasifa and called falsafa*
18In his treatise, On First Philosophy, Al-Kindi expressly depicted the conditions in which the Islamic world became acquainted with the universal ancient sciences: "One should not be ashamed of approving and attaining truth, wherever it came from—be it even from tribes and peoples of countries remote from and not in contact with one’s own. There is nothing better for the seeker after truth than the truth itself; one should not scorn and look down on those, who expressed it or passed it on: the truth cannot belittle anyone."
19 Analogous to this statement existed a maxim, widely used by the Islamic authors, that required one to judge a truth by what was said, not by who said it.
EDUCATION
The idea of the unity of humankind, disputed by philosophers, was one of the most important features of the Humanism of Medieval Islamic culture. It had another important feature—an ideal of enlightenment, of intellectual and moral culture, every close to the ancient ideal of paideia.
Though the theory of education did not form a special discipline, the problems connected with education were very often discussed in the works in jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, Sufism, and Adab. Jurists were the first to devote works to education (Ibn Sahnun, al-Kabisi, Ibn Jamaa), but their discourse concerned mainly the juridical aspects of education. The connection of education and the upbringing of a person acquired paramount significance in the works of the philosophers ("The Brethren of Purity," Miskawayh, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd) and Sufis (Abu Talib al-Makki, al-Kushairi, al-Suhrawardi). The representatives of Arab literature also showed great interest in the problems of education (Al-Jahis, Ibn Kutaiba, Ibn Abd Rabbih), as well as Ibn Khaldun. Authors of books about upbringing devoted special chapters to the related moral and pedagogical issues (Ibn Kayyim al-Jauzia, Ibn al-Jazzar al-Kairavani). However, a number of works in pedagogy are known only by their titles, mentioned in a bibliographical work of Hadji Halif, Kashf az-zunun, and in different catalogues of Arabic manuscripts.
Philosophers regarded their science as the highest aim of humanitarian education and as the cornerstone of all the sciences, as a means of human perfection, of achieving happiness and salvation. Miskawayh represented philosophy as the only mean of genuine upbringing (al-adabal-hakiki-alethinepaideia) and the way to salvation (nadjat-soteria). According to him, an ideal upbringing is one in accord with religious scripture (adab al-Shari’a) in order to teach a child and to conform him to the prescribed rules of behavior. After that a child must study arithmetic and geometry, demonstrative speech and love of truth. Learning must continue until a person reaches the highest perfection and happiness.
The opposite results are achieved, Miskawayh said, when young people are educated on false values, on falsity and immorality, spread by indecent poetry, such as poems by Imru al-Kaisa, an-Nabigi, etc. J. Kraemer sees the last point as reflecting a negative attitude towards poetry by Plato, who excludes poetic activity from his model of the ideal state. Kraemer adds that the charming heroes of Homer, seen by some as insulting for Islam, because in his representation Gods were similar to people and were also insulting and unpedagogical for Plato, one of the main creators of the conception of paideia.
20The philosophers’ ideas on education originated in continuity with the translation of texts from classical Greek science and philosophy and were inspired by Hellenistic—sometimes by neo-Pythagorean models, where the program of education was closely connected with the classification of the sciences. At the source of both was a work of Paul the Persian, included the Miskawayh’s treatise, Tartib al-saada, where different stages of human happiness, as well as the ways of their achievement were analysed.
This became the second part of Miskawayh’s treatise which was devoted to the classification of the parts of Aristotle’s philosophy, divided into theoretical and practical philosophy. Theoretical philosophy has two parts. One deals with nonmaterial objects whether abstracted from matter as in mathematics or separated from matter mentally, or metaphysics. The characteristics of all material objects is studied by Aristotle’s physics. Among such material objects there are the eternal and passing objects. The former are treated in Aristotle’s treatise "On Heaven". Those which arise and pass away are analyzed either in a general form, in the Physics or in "On Generation and Destruction" or in special treatises. Some treat things above the Earth; others treat those that are on the Earth, which are divided into inanimate and animate things. Animate objects are subdivided into plants and animals. The second part of theoretical philosophy includes also a science which is close to metaphysics, namely psychology. To this Aristotle devotes such treatises as "On the Soul", "On Spirit" and "On Senses and the Sensually Perceived". Lastly, practical philosophy is divided into two parts, one of them deals with an individual (ethics) and the other - with his environment (economics and politics). According to Miskawayh, Aristotle’s philosophy must be studied, beginning from ethics and then passing to mathematics, logic, physics and metaphysics.
D. Gutas underlines the obvious dependence on this classification of Arab-Muslim philosophers as well as the educational program of the highest level schools in the late period of the Alexandrian learning (5-6
th A.D.).21 He also noted the connection important for understanding the nature of humanism at the Medieval Islamic East, namely that between Paul the Persian and the Alexandrian tradition in their approach to the problem of the correlation of faith and knowledge. In Paul’s introduction to logic the most important idea was that knowledge is better than faith, because religious belief is relative and generates quite different ideas. "The objects of knowledge are close, obvious and knowable, while the objects of faith are distant, unseen and cannot be subjected to exact knowledge. The latter are doubtful, the former are not; consequently, knowledge is better than faith." The superiority of knowledge over belief was argued in the same way by David, one of the main Alexandrian commentators of Aristotle, who said: "Divine subjects as such are really invisible and incomprehensive; they are more likely known through imagination, than by strict knowledge."22 Here knowledge through imagination includes faith.Behind such reasoning there is hidden a whole tradition of allegoric interpretation of sacred texts, both Pagan and Christian, that was used even in early Hellenism and Neoplatonism. Before Olympiodor, a direct predecessor of the author of this reasoning, a considerable experience in the adaptation of philosophy and religion had been accumulated; Olympiodor himself regarded Christianity as a credo for uneducated common people.
At the court of Anushirvana, where traditionalists had no strong influence, Paul the Persian could openly raise the problem of the correlation of faith and knowledge, as well as underline the epistemological role of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, which had not been analysed before in the Syrian tradition in order not to conflict with religion.
The classification of sciences, stated above, directly influenced the classification, advanced by Abu Nasr al-Farabi and represented to philosophers a program of higher grade education.
Such words as adab (paideia) and ta’dib (paideusis) were the main terms denoting education in the Medieval Islamic world. The last word denoted the process of education, the first one, its result. Accordingly, adib meant an educated man, a carrier of ada-ba (paideutos). The philosophical theory of education, proceeding from the identification of adaba with paideia, was not limited to the circles of professional philosophers, but became a part of "the general course of the Islamic thought" (26, p. 152). The essential features of philosophical education are seen in a number of works on pedagogy, to which belong the works, Exhortation to the Education of a Young Man, attributed to Plato and included into the Miskawayh’s treatise, Jabidan Herad, as well as fragments, traced primarily to Plato and included in the book of Abu-l-Hasan al-Amiri, Al-Saada va-l-isad; and a pedagogical part of a work of a neo-Pythagorean Brison, entitled Oikonomicos.
Exhortation to the Education of a Young Man declares the formation of character and the acquiring of good manners and good ways of behavior to be the highest aim of education. The treatise has two parts. One part analyses the ethics of the teacher’s behavior, the other contains general instructions, addressing those who strive for education. Education will bring the desired results if the pupil is disciplined which, however, does not exclude equality between the teacher and the pupil. Pupils should lead a virtuous life and believe the wisdom of their main instructor—a philosopher. The latter shows them the way of acquiring genuine wisdom. "Those who want to enter the domain of knowledge, must have stainless purity, because association with the almost holy community of those who gain knowledge demands from them the highest level of intellectual honesty, sincerity, humbleness and modesty in their everyday life and work." As to the subjects they study, only military arts and music are mentioned, which correspond to the strictly aristocratic outlook. The original text could have more information about the process and the subjects of education, but probably it was believed that pupils should acquire only certain aristocratic habits, and teaching them concrete sciences was neither necessary nor desirable. The true aim of education was its philosophical content and the code of behavior typical only of true intellectuals.
23"Al-saada Wa-l-isad" treats politics as a means of achieving the final end of philosophy—happiness. Here the aim of education coincides with that postulated in the work analyzed above, but not only adults were concerned, but also children. The basis of education from childhood is the firm belief that happiness and blessings are achieved through obedience to the laws (su-nan) and to seniors (akabir). If there is such a faith, then a law or order can be received as something that gives pleasure.
The treatise begins with the definition of adab (education), mutaaddib (the one who receives education), and adib (an educated one). Plato, it is said here, equates adab with philosophy (hikma). Another definition comes from the first person (wa-akul): Adab is human wisdom, and human wisdom is knowledge about behavior that leads to happiness. In Kraemer’s opinion, this definition could belong to al-Amiri’s pupil, but in Rosenthal’s opinion, it could belong also to the commentator of this work.
Referring again to Plato, it is affirmed that the aim of education is to form a virtuous man, who can keep himself from physical pleasures and display emotional indifference whether facing joy, troubles, or other occasions This person can stay calm always, if only reason impels him to. In the treatise an educated man is equated to a sensible one (natik), while the noneducated is compared with one who is sleeping (this last comparison is attributed to Plato, while the Greek tradition attributes it to Antisphen). The education of children must be adapted to their abilities. At the beginning (as Plato taught), serious matters (djidd) are represented as amusement (hazl) with the help of parables, containing adab. For example, with the help of poems that teach virtue and modesty (corresponding ideas are found in Plato’s work, The Republic), as opposed to poetry that propagates dissipation and idle fun. A human being from his childhood must be taught to be brave, to scorn death, to learn to write, to swim, and to know the rules of etiquette. The highest degree of education—learning philosophy—is prepared for by a propedeutic program (attributed to Plato) that included arithmetic, the science of measuring areas, geometry, astronomy, music, dialectics and logic. It must also impart disgust as regards what is dirty and ugly.
Though Exhortation and Al-saada Wa-l-usad contain certain references to Plato, their ancient sources point to Pythagorean literature. The neo-Pythagorean origin of Brison’s Economics leaves still less doubt inasmuch as for Brisson happiness is also the final aim. His work is concentrated on the sphere of home and family life,and the part devoted to education concerns exclusively small children. The problems of higher education, which as a rule, takes place out of the family sphere, are completely excluded. Brison thinks that besides physical qualities and natural talents, the constant education of correct habits plays a great role and is also the most important aim of education. He attaches special significance to good table manners and to developing habits of proper sleep. It is recommended to avoid sexual activity, as well. Respect for elders, endurance, simple tastes, and games from time to time are mentioned among other elements of upbringing.
24Brison had great influence on the development of a philosophical theory of education in the Islamic East, beginning from the 10th century. Miskawayh directly refers to Brison as an authority in pedagogy in his work, Tahzib al-akhlak. The thought of Miskawayh himself became the basis for the following interpretation of the subject and were included in the works of al-Gazali, Ihyia ulum ad-din, and of Nasir ad-Din at-Tusi Ahlak-i nasiri. Interpreting Brison, Miskawayh characterizes education as a reliable guide in the formation of proper moral and intellectual skills, leading to true humaneness and happiness.
The importance of philosophical theory for the Islamic Medieval culture becomes still more evident if we refer to the Greek-Arabic gnomology. The vast depository of popular wisdom was not only for philosophical or even for court circles, but also for a wider audience. D. Gutas cites a reference from Al-imta Wal-muanasa by at-Tawhidi that the typical literature of that kind was to educate and instruct the ordinary reader and that aphorisms and anecdotes of philosophical content were included here along with quotations from Arabic poetry, hadiths, and Quranic verses.
25 Assimilation of this material was not facile, as is evident from at-Tawhidi’s statement, cited by the same author: "The sayings of these people are outstanding, positive and instructive; that is praiseworthy. Let Allah help us to gain benefit from their sayings and let Him save us from the evil that is said about them."26 In this connection, J. Kraemer cites famous words of the Safarid ruler of Sidgistan, Abu Jaafar ibn Banui, included in the book of his protégé, al-Sidjistani, Sivan al-hikma. Abu Jaafar used to remember sayings, anecdotes, biographies, and deeds of Greeks as no one else. Usually he said: "These are nuggets of gold and something like metal, unpolished and unfounded into a form." He was so delighted with Greek anecdotes, that he said: "What kind of people they must be when they are serious and apply their full natural talents, if they are thus when joking, amusing, relaxing?" Then he noted: "I like the saying, ascribed to Democritus: "That one who sails on our sea has no other seashore but himself."27But all this did not mean, that philosophical comprehension of the truth was available to the broad population of the Islamic cites. Beginning from al-Farabi in Arabic-Islamic philosophy, it was affirmed that philosophy was the property only of the intellectual elite, while the general population or masses were induced to virtuous life only by the poetic and rhetoric reasoning of religion. According to Ibn Rushd, political education of the citizens of an ideal state was to include several levels of introduction to truth: the lowest level was formed by poetic debates, a higher one by a combination of poetic and rhetorical debate, while the highest level involved apodictic (conclusive) discourse. The lowest level of education used parables and mytho-poetic images. At the same time, Ibn Rushd was radically against using "bad tales," for example, about the other world (as in Plato’s works) or describing God as the reason of good and evil. From political education together with "bad tales," Ibn Rushd excluded the imitations of evil and sophistical statements (sophistry was excluded from the teaching in general). According to him, analogous statements, typical of the Islamic theologians, lead to absolute relativism and subjectivism in defining good and evil. Supremacy of theologians in the state might mean the end of regular social life, because there might be a war of everybody against everybody.
At the same time, one of the main difficulties met by Ibn Rushd while working out his theory of education, consisted in the following: He held the point of view, dating back to Plato, that the highest happiness is gaining theoretical (intellectual, dianoethical) virtue, that is, philosophical knowledge; and at the same time he was to agree with the Islam directive that the main principle of morals, including the teaching of happiness, had already been presented in the Qur’an. This difficulty was compounded by Abu Hamif al-Gazali’s critique of philosophers, who, in his opinion, when distinguishing between the broad public and the intellectual elite, argued that the Prophet addressed the former with rhetorical reasoning based on allegories and metaphors, or, in other words, he misled them because any allegory and metaphor is a lie. That is why for Ibn Rushd, it was not enough to declare (after Aristotle) that a man could not acquire theoretical virtues if he did not lead a righteous, morally irreproachable life. He underlined that truth is one both for a crowd and for philosophers and that the difference was only in the way it is comprehended. He concluded that both philosopher and a common believer can be happy, but each in his own way.
Adab, who required knowledge of philosophy, history, geography, and other sciences, represented simultaneously a certain art of living, certain behavioral morals, the ethics of the Medieval Islamic citizenry. An adib could be a fasik—a sinner or a libertine—or a zurafa, sometimes demonstrating even atheism. But whereas, F. Gabrieli considered religiosity to be alien to adibs,
28 P. Brown (a specialist in Western culture of the late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages) contrasts adab to paideia precisely by its religious orientation.29 He illustrates this idea by the following observation: The inscriptions on gravestones by laymen at the epoch of the late Roman empire up to the 6th century did not mention fear of God or of the Day of Judgement as the reason for those virtues, with which they generously endowed their deceased. From the time of Alexander the Great until the period of the Justinian government, a man was prayed for using adjectives that characterized him as a product of paideia. In other words, paideia was interiorized by a layman without religious motivation. In Islam, however, we have a completely different situation: here adab is primordially, penetrated by religion and in such a form it becomes a code of upbringing for a layman. He finds this interpretation in Abu Hamid al-Gazali’s work, Deliverance from Error.Adab had a clearly defined aesthetic character, displaying the highest value in general. It was said by the ancient sages:
"adab for a man is a treasure, that cannot be robbed";
"Adab is like a harbor for everybody";
"When Aristotle was asked about the most beautiful living creature, he answered: "It is a man decorated with good education";
Aristotle said: "Education (adab) is a decoration for the rich and permits the poor to live among their friends" (or to live the life of a free man");
"When Socrates was asked, what things are the most pleasant in the world, he replied: "Education, training and contemplation of things unknown";
"When Socrates was asked: in what respect education (adab) had a wholesome effect on young people, he said: "If the only benefit of education were that it kept them from bad behavior, even that would be quite enough";
"Lack of education (adab) is the reason of any evil."(Pythagoras);
"Education (adab) decorates the wealth of the rich and conceals the poverty of the poor."(Aristotle);
"Train your soul by parts of education (adab), because they are a source and a depository of miracles of thought and of the fineness of speculations"(Aristotle).
30In the Medieval West, adab fulfilled the same moral, social, and intellectual mission as the Latin humanitas. It implied the values of the city courteous, refined behavior, an index of good breeding, and education. Originally, adab was akin to humanitarian education that made a man cultured and refined. Contacts with foreign cultures broadened the adab’s content and began to include non-Arabic literature, expressing in this way a more universal form of Humanism. Secretaries (katibs), copyists, functionaries, literarymen, and courts were the main representatives of this humanitarian culture. In these surroundings, wittiness and oratory were highly appreciated. Refinement (zarf) (hence, the designation of the above-mentioned social group "zurafa") was a synonym of this culture. The education of secretaries was encyclopedic, combining Arabic and non-Arabic learning (Greek and Persian), for which they were often accused of apostasy.
Adab conveyed the idea of paideia. Humanitas corresponds to the Arabic insaniyya, that in philosophical terminology denotes human nature, a quality, and characteristic of a man as such. But like Cicero’s humanitas, it also means to be a man in the full sense of the word as a result of self-perfection. (Insaniyya as Humanism is a neologism). In al-Farabi’s, Kitab al-huruf, the word insaniyya is used to denote the general quality of people, and it correlates with the Persian mardumi (man). Human perfection, "insaniyya," was often used as a synonym for intellect, and the use of intellect, possession of real wisdom or philosophy, was equated by philosophers with happiness (saada-eudaimonia). Al-Amiri says that through "divine wisdom" that one can reach humaneness (kamal al-insaniyya).
This "humaneness" had different degrees. The most imperfect man, says Miskawayh, is provided with minimal intellect; such people are only "on the border" of the animal world, and an animal soul gains the upper hand over them. Fascinated by sensual pleasures, they can be honored by the designation "al-insaniyya" only in a limited sense. Usually such half-men, half-animals ("barbarians") reside somewhere on the borders of the civilized world. In the middle part of this world, people are more predisposed to intellectual activity, and some of them are inclined even to philosophizing. But the majority of people that have limited intellect and differentiating power (tamyiz) cannot overcome their animal inclinations.
Love of persons and of humanity is the third important feature of Humanism in the Medieval Islamic culture. This feeling penetrated the inspired words of Yahia: "The whole people is something single in the many individuals. As soon as their souls are a single whole, and love exists thanks to their souls, then people must feel love and affection towards each other. It is natural for people, until they are ruled by hunger in their souls. When a man subdues his angry soul and obeys his wise soul, then everybody becomes his brother and friend. People may be either virtuous or mean. One should love virtuous people for their virtue and should be sorry for mean people—for their meanness. So a man, striving for perfection, should love everyone, feel pity and compassion for everyone—especially if he is a tsar or a chief; tsar is not a tsar if he does not feel love and compassion for his subjects."
31The idea of philanthropy is present in the Islamic conception of Jihad. All the Islamic schools of jurisprudence agree that, for example, during a war against those who are not "true believers," one must not kill women and those underage if they do not fight against Muslims. Some Islamic theologians considered murder of the prisoners of war as an unlawful deed or, to say the least, as reprehensible. There also existed a rule of temporary protection of non-Muslims that guaranteed the inviolability of their lives, freedom, and property.
32There is also a general secular interpretation of Humanism in the sense of charity and philanthropy without religious motivation. Thus, at-Tawhidi asked about zindiks (atheists) and adhrits (who supported a teaching of the eternity of the world and independence of its life from any other worldly beginning): "What moves zindiks and dahrits to do good, to choose noble actions, to show honesty, not to compromise truth, to be merciful to the suffering, to come to those who need help, to support anybody, addressing them with their troubles? They behave like that not in the least hoping to receive otherwordly rewards, waiting for gratitude or fearing retribution."
33In this work, we analyzed the ideals of the Islamic Middle Ages mainly to the extent to which they were in contact conceptually with the notions of paideia and humanitas. But it is not sufficient to show the groundlessness of the statements of a number of authoritative scientists (B. Yeger, K. Bekker, G. Sheder, B. Shpuler, J. Kraemer, etc.), who affirmed that the Medieval Islamic culture appeared to be incapable either of developing its own humanistic ideals or mastering an adequate form the humanism of Antiquity. Indeed, Sophocles did remain unknown to the Medieval Islamic bookman. Perhaps, they did not feel a vital need for him, because they had at their disposal a heritage of the centuries-old belles-lettres of the East, enriched by contemporary poets and prose writers.
If now we return to the argument at the beginning of the article to the Humanism of the Age of the Renaissance and compare it with the Humanistic ideals of the Islamic Middle Ages in its full extent, we find that the ideas that European humanists drew from the Scholastic tradition appear not only in Islamic fiction and general literature, but also in its professional philosophy. Secondly, its secular thinking, in some cases, surpassed even the humanism of the age of the European Renaissance.
NOTES
1 N. A. Sidorova, Zarozhdeniye gorodskoi kultury vo Frantsii (Origin of Urban Culture in France of 11-12
th centuries) // Middle Ages. V. III (Moscow, 1951), p. 152.2 A. F. Losev, Estetika Vozrozhedeniya (Aesthetics of Renaissance) (Moscow, 1982), pp. 120 - 138.
3 V. I. Ruttenburg, Antichnoe naslediye v kulture Vozrozhdeniya (Ancient Legacy in the Culture of the Renaissance) (Moscow, 1984), p. 46.
4 F. Engels, Dialektika prirody (The Dialectics of Nature) (Ìoscow, 1955), p. 5.
5 Ibid.
6 Filosofsky entsklopedichesky slovar (Philosophical Encyclopedia Dictionary) (Moscow, 1983), p. 665.
7 Svobodomysliye i ateizm v drevnosti, sredniye veka i v epokhu Vozrozhdeniya (Free Thinking and Atheism in Ancient, Middle Ages and in the Epoch of the Renaissance) (Moscow, 1986), p. 254.
8 V.I. Ruttenburg, op. cit, p. 48.
9 V. V. Bartold, "Ucheniye musulmanskogo "renessansa" (Teaching of "Islamic Renaissance"), Zapiski Kollegii vostokovedov pri Aziatskom muzee Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk. (1930). Vol. V.
10 K. Marx, F. Engels, Soch. (Works. 2nd ed., V. 20), p. 345.
11 V.I. Rutenburg, Vozrozhdeniye i Reformatsiya v sovietskoi literature (Renaissance and the Reformation in the Soviet Literature) (Leningrad, 1981), p. 5.
12 D. E. Bertels, "Predisloviye" (Foreword // A. Mets, The Islamic Renaissance) (Moscow, 1966), p. 11.
13 V.A. Karpushin, "Abu Ali Sina i vostochny Renessans" (Abu Ali Sina and Eastern Renaissance), Philosophy and History of Culture, (Moscow, 1985), p. 52.
14 N. I. Konrad, Zapad i Vostok (West and East) (Moscow, 1972), p. 240.
15 Ibid, pp. 81-82.
16 O.G. Bolshakov, Srednevekovy gorod Blizhnego Vostoka (Medieval City in the Near East), p. 288.
17 Kuli-Zade, Teoreticheskiye problemy istorii kultury Vostoka i nizamivedeniye (Theoretical Problems of the Eastern Culture and Nizamology) (Baku, 1987), p. 53.
18 G. von Grunebaum, Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition. (1964), p. 15.
19 Izbrannie proizvedeniya myslitelei stran Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka, (Selected Works of Thinkers of the Near and Middle Eastern Countries 9-14
th centuries) (Moscow, 1961), p. 53.20 J. L. Kraemer, "Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: Preliminary Study," Journal of American Oriental Society (1984), V. 104, N 1, p. 149.
21 D. Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotle’s Philosophy: A Milestone Between Alexandria and Baghdad", Islam, (1983), Bd. 60, N 2.
22 Ibid., p. 247.
23 F. Rozental, Torzhestvo znaniya (Moscow, 1978), p. 278.
24 Ibid., p. 280.
25 D. Gutas, Greek Wisdom in Arabic Translation: A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia (1975), p. 460.
26 Ibid., p. 461.
27 J. L. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, p. 155.
28 J. Gabrieli, "Adab", The Encyclopaedia of Islam. (N.E.V.I.), p. 175-176.
29 P. Brown, "Late Antiquity and Islam: Parallels and Contrasts," Moral Conduct and Authority: ThePlace of Adab in South Asian Islam (Berkley etc., 1984).
30 J. L. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, p. 155.
31 Rasail al-Bulaga’ (Cairo, 1946), pp. 517-518.
32 M. A. Boisard, L’Humanisme de l‘Islam (Paris, 1979).
33 At-Tawhidi wa- Miskaweikh, Al-Hawamil wa -sh-shawaiml (Cairo, 1951).