CHAPTER X
Wahhabism and "THE Peoples’ Islam" in the Arabian Peninsula
ALEXANDER RODRIGUES
This study is composed of two interconnected parts, the first part of which examines the powerful heritage of religious vestiges of pre-Islamic beliefs, rituals and customs which have remained in Islam from the beginning to the present. Side-by-side and intermingling with Islam, these vestiges, not recognized formally by the orthodox Ulama (savants, sing: Alim), are widely spread among the peripheral nomadic and semi-nomadic populations of Arabia. Engulfing the entire fibre of social life and, at times even replacing official Islam, they usually are called "the people’s Islam".
The second part of this study elaborates the role of Wahhabism in the formation and development of modern Saudi Arabian state structures. However, the most important and most directly connected with the theme of the first part of this paper is that Wahhabism appeared and established itself as the most serious attempt to struggle with apostasy and pre-Islamic vestiges among the majority of the Arabian population—nomads and semi-nomads. Wahhabism, at that time, essentially meant declaring war on the people’s Islam.
RELIGIOUS VESTIGES OF THE NOMADS IN
THE WAHHABIST IDEOLOGY OF SAUDI ARABIA
History
The problem of the place and role of the Arab nomads as a part of the Arab-Islamic world has major significance for the history of Islam. It is notable not only for the purpose of studying the formative period of Islam, the birth of the Arab Caliphate, and the subsequent development of the Islamic world, but in particular for studying the modern Saudi kingdom. In that time nomads were a large part of the community and played a major role in the socio-economic life of the Arabian peninsula. They also acted as the keepers of a powerful layer of pre-Islamic, pagan beliefs, a large part of which were later incorporated into the Islamic faith.
More than 1,000 years have passed since the birth of Islam, the formation of the Arab Caliphate and the modern age (including modern Saudi Arabia). This study embraces that long period. From being the backbone of the society nomads and semi-nomads have turned into a marginal group in modern, prosperous Saudi Arabia. At the present time nomads are about one third of the kingdom’s population. In fact, this is a social mode, deliberately preserved by the government through generous subsidies. The reason being that the Saudi clan considers the Bedouins as strata that have not yet lost its tribal feelings of superiority, while still remaining a staunch supporter of the regime.
The thrust of this study is not the analysis of the socio-economic situation of the Bedouins. Other studies have been devoted to those problems (see, i.e. A.M. Rodriges, Oil and the Evolution of Social Structures in the Arabian Monarchies. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1989). The thrust of this study is on the religious beliefs of the nomads, since nomads indifferently observe the main prescriptions of Islam, while carefully observing their pre-Islamic customs and rituals. In this sense (of course, with a few exceptions, such as spreading Wahhabism among the Bedouins, which was carried out by the brotherhood sects in the beginning of the 20
th century), the Bedouins have not adopted, either factually or formally, Islam as an integral system of ideas and world perceptions. Similarly the nomads did not have a developed system of pre-monotheistic beliefs in comparison with the settled Arabs during the era of Jahiliyah. Their beliefs were a jumble of customs, mainly of pagan character. The actuality and complexity of these realities lie also in the fact that nomads are part and parcel of the Saudi society, which is permeated by Wahhabist ideology—an ideology of zealous supporters of Islam’s "purity". Of course, both religious and secular representatives of the state consistently attempted to Islamize the nomads. With time, the religious beliefs of the Bedouins have undergone major changes. Islam formally supplanted the most obvious manifestations of polytheism and partially replaced them with those Islamic beliefs which are closer in form to their pagan beliefs. In the last analysis, Islam was incapable of expunging the essential parts of nomad customs and rituals. Some of them will be elaborated in this study.Islam arose in the 7
th century A. D. in Arabia and spread its influence within one or two centuries over an enormous territory, including areas which were under the influence of Ancient and Persian cultures. It brought to these countries a new world view and much influence on the further development of their culture and ideology; it has become, along with the Arabic language, a factor of self-identification for the conquered peoples. However, being a reasonably flexible religious system, Islam has not destroyed, as did other world religions, most of the vestiges of paganism. The latter have even remained in the Islamic faith and turned into such cults as Ka’aba, Hadj, sacrifices, and many others, including manifestations in the so-called people’s Islam. The pre-Islamic layer of culture and beliefs exists in every region where Islam has spread—North Africa, Egypt, Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Iran (not to mention other major regions and countries, where Islam dominates). Islam could not destroy them and could not unify them both religiously and culturally. Regional differences remained and flourished.The history of religion does not record any example of the total annihilation of former beliefs after the adoption of a new religion. "The intermingling of different religious systems and cults was the rule in all times".
1 A "pure" Islam, completely based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, has never existed; there were regional syntheses with paganism only. Usually in this synthesis Islam’s share dominated, but the pagan traditions, which were strengthened in the consciousness of the people as the ‘true’ Islam, have retained a major place especially in the daily life of Muslims. It should be noted that paganism (in the form of quasi-Islam) contained a colossal emotional-psychological charge which has attracted broad strata of the population. If "religion is man’s attitude to the imagined supernatural world,"2 then in paganism that supernatural world was closer to man, more colourful, more understandable than was the Islamic doctrine. In Arabia Islam was also a syncretic formation of the Qur’an, Sunni and the beliefs of Jahiliyah. As von Liphardt has noted, Muhammad killed the ancient freedom of people’s life and desert poetry, and gave a new direction to their thoughts, feelings, occupations and relations.3 However, in order to destroy the spirit of the desert inhabitants, and accordingly, a significant part of their ancient beliefs, it was necessary to change their way of life, i.e., to turn them into settlers. Many governments have tried to no avail to tame or to subdue the Bedouins; yet they have existed almost 1500 years, and still continue to exist.In this sense, it is important to note an example from own days. The King of Saudi Arabia, Fahd, declared that every citizen of his country must have a house, and for this purpose has built for one of the Bedouin clans an exemplary village in Askan with all modern facilities—swimming pool, bathrooms, piped water, etc. Some of the Bedouins were interested in the project and moved to Askan. They drank water from the swimming pool which reminded them of a lake in an oasis, never used the toilets, played with the water faucets, and then abandoned the village, politely having explained to the monarch that they prefer to sleep under the stars as they always did.
4 To the Bedouins, just as to the settled, the Islamic dogmas clashed with their pagan beliefs, and since the latter were more adapted to desert life, these beliefs played a major role in the religious practice of the nomads. Not a single Islamic tradition or custom replaced the pagan custom existing before it. The Bedouins more readily began to pronounce the name of God—Allah—in their daily life, in sacrifice and other ritual ceremonies, but this did not change their pagan character at all. Apparently, citing the name of Allah has replaced mentioning their erstwhile gods, the top Arabian gods, tribal gods and totems. Islamic customs were superficial, and were not capable of changing the essence of their customs. More than that, in the period under survey Islam was not in its best days. By the beginning of Modern times the positions of Islam as a monotheistic religion were undermined.The paganism of the Bedouins was underscored by many travelers who lived with them or met them.
5 Their non-believing status is directly connected with their mode of production, style of life and the specific features of their world outlook. The centuries, which passed after Muhammad’s prophecy, have not changed these people. Niebuhr correctly underscored that Muhammad and his heirs have limited their mission to the Arabs who live in towns and villages, and left the nomadic Bedouins unconquered.6 The Bedouins have no ‘religious people’, who could teach them the basics of Islam.7 They do not know the religious legends that are well known to many Muslims.8 The nomads are indifferent to the stories about the Haj, about the Prophet and his precepts.9 Bedouins explain their indifference to fulfilling Islamic norms by saying that Islam is not adapted to their way of life. How can we clean ourselves before prayer when we have no water? Why should we pay Zakat, if we are poor? Why should we fast in Ramadan, when we fast all the year? Why should we pay visit(s) to Mecca, when God is everywhere?10But it would be a major mistake to say, that the Bedouins have no Islamic beliefs. Among many clans, mainly among the semi-nomads and those who do not live at the center of deserts, Islam has put deep roots. Blunt writes that Arabs who live at the boundaries have a more profound understanding of religious matters than do others.
11 The semi-nomad tribes around Baghdad were fanatical Shiites.12Some elements of Islam penetrated the Bedouins in three ways. The first is based on the common items of Islam and the beliefs of Jahiliyah; Islam has borrowed a lot from pagan-Arabs and implanted them into its dogmas. Three of the Harams of the Bedouins: pig meat, dead body and blood, have penetrated into Islam in this way.
13 The second way of penetration is through Islam itself, e.g. the doctrine on Muhammad on the order of inheriting sanctioned by the Qur’an,14 and some other elements such as citing Allah’s name. The third way is through the doctrine of Wahhabism, which was inculcated into the hearts of the Bedouins.We have already mentioned that Wahhabism dealt serious blows to paganism. Some aspects of this process will be discussed in the second section. Here it is important to concentrate on some aspects of the religious practices of the mutual penetration and interweaving of the two traditions in the past and present of Islam.
Prayer
One of the five pillars of Islam is prayer five-times daily. All Muslims must fulfill this task, since ignoring it is regarded as a retreat from Islam. The fact that Bedouins ignore this norm (although it is basically an external factor which does not guarantee that a person is a true believer) is considered by Islamic people as a clear proof of their ignoring the religion of Allah.
To say unequivocally that Bedouins never pray, is not right. It is also not correct that, if the tribe does know the prayers, all its members fulfill them. The prayers by themselves were not important to Bedouins; their version of Islam is contingent on the fact they have to be seen by others as orthodox Muslims. Buckhardt states that the Bedouin sheikhs who were connected to state cities close to their neighbourhood, support the practice of prayers while they are in the cities in order to be respected.
15 The ordinary members of the tribe never burdened themselves with these tasks (Ibid.). Blunt writes that the real Bedouins are not religious even when compared with the semi-nomads.16Most of the travelers share the opinion that even if Bedouins tried to fulfill some prayers, those prayers do not compare with real Islamic prayers. Having no knowledge about the prayers, they simply look at the sky and say something and add ‘Oh God! Let this day be good for us, so that we do not meet a devil’.
17 More than that Bedouins widely use ashes and dust on their heads, which is not allowed by Islam. Doughty writes about another prayer which is not accepted by Islam but practiced by Bedouins: "My God, make it so that we have not seen evil! Also make it so that this day was not a day of death to one of us or a day of losses."18 The low stage of social development of the nomads and the severe life of the Bedouins made their prayers similar in content to the prayers which existed in the early days of humankind, when prayer had no moral basis. These prayers were oriented towards the fulfillment of desires, but only desires of personal benefit. Only at later stages of religious development, came the idea of not only asking for the fulfillment of personal desires, but also of asking God to help the praying person in undertaking virtues and avoiding evil.19 Prayers became an "instrument of morality" in Islam only, but the Bedouins’ thanksgivings to God, which are basically pagan, were henceforth oriented towards not their tribal gods, nor to an abstract god, but to the Muslim Ar-Rabb—Allah.Many sources also cite the prayers often offered at the tomb of ancestors. We shall come back to this question in connection with the rite of sacrifices. Whole tribes of Bedouins usually offer these ceremonies at the tombs.
20 The adoration and worship of different saints also required some communication with them through offering sacrifices. This was a widespread practice among them.All the above-mentioned facts, to some extent, refute the complete irreligiousness (from the standpoint of Islam) of the Bedouins. Therefore, it is more correct to assume that the acceptance of Islamic rules and traditions has varied from one tribe to the other. But there are also many examples that witness that the Bedouins usually did not observe the commands of Islam, especially the prayers. Buckhardt considers that "very few among the Bedouins knew the prayers", i.e. no more than half of the nomads (men). He also writes that it was rather rare to see a woman offering her prayers with the exception of the month of Ramadan. According to him, more than that, most of those who offered their prayers, were the worst among the Bedouins.
21 Blunt adds that prayers, as an external characteristic of religiousness, were never practiced by ‘pure’ Bedouins.22 Cheesman never mentions prayers in his description of the morning timetable of the Bedouins.23 Therefore, we can say that the major tendency is obvious; but we have to take into consideration the imperfect character of many sources, their tendency to generalize and the usual contradictions of these sources as well.Sacrifices
Another important element of the religious practices of the Bedouins is the ritual ceremony of offering sacrifices. This custom was widespread, and the Bedouins inherited it from their ancestors who lived outside of the Arabian peninsula. There is no doubt that it can be regarded as one of the oldest customs, carefully kept by the nomads even today.
This ritual custom has its roots in the anti-mystical system. It is the way of offering presents to the deity as a human being.
24 According to Taylor there are three theories about sacrifices: the theory of presents, the theory of honoring and the theory of deprivation.25 The Bedouins fall into the second theory. In the course of its evolution this custom has gone through definite transformations, especially in the developed religions, ‘from a real act to a formal ceremony". The offers of valuable things were later transformed into giving less valuable things, till the whole ceremony turned into symbolical offerings.26 In general for the Bedouins, Arabs and Muslims offering sacrifices is not only a symbolic act. Nomads usually offer sacrifices on all major occasions.In explaining the motives behind offering sacrifices Taylor observes that if one takes into consideration the major point of Animism, saying that the human soul is a prototype of the idea of deity, then human relations should be explained in analogy with the motives of sacrifice-offerings. He compares offering sacrifices to the deity with offering presents to a leader in order to get some benefits, or to avoid something bad, get help from him or for forgiveness.
27S.A. Tokarev divides sacrifices into the following five groups: sacrifices related to the conditions of a primitive economy (hunting, livestock rearing and agriculture); sacrifices related to age-sexual interrelations; those which are related to the attitudes towards the dead; those connected with intertribal relations; and those which are connected with the first elements of social differentiation.
28 Of the five groups, the Bedouins have never practiced the last two.Let us review all these groups in detail. The Bedouins, i.e. pastoralists (both nomads and semi-nomads), offered the life of their animals: camels, sheep and goats—as sacrifices. Islam, with many of the pagan norms remaining in its ritual system, changed neither the meaning nor the pagan forms of offering sacrifices; instead of the tribal gods, Allah became the subject of sacrifices. In parallel with the all Muslim sacrifices (for example at Mount Arafat), Bedouins continued to use their pagan sacrifice offerings, whose deeper meaning probably was lost for the nomads. For example, Burton writes that they "visit a drowning sheep and offer sacrifices to it.
29 Poggenpol tells us that once a year the Bedouins offer sacrifices to the ruins of a Mosque (built in the 15th century) at Jebel Musa in the Sinai.30 It is difficult to assume that the ruins of the Mosque had any associations with Islam in the minds of the Bedouins. It is more probable to assume that the ruins became a new place for offering sacrifices to Allah (to be correct, to an abstract God, which is known to the Muslims as Allah, but whose essence remains pagan to the Bedouins).The sacrifice, known as "life for life", also belongs to the first group. If life is taken for life in general, then a life in danger can be sacrificed for another less valuable life.
31 A hierarchical system of offering sacrifices is common to Bedouins. Sacrificing one life for another does not mean that the life of the second is in danger. For example, a Bedouin swears that he will kill a camel if his horse produces another horse, and after this he kills his camel.32 For the health of a sick camel a goat may be offered as a sacrifice.33 Offering sacrifices was also practiced during the birth of a son (for girls no sacrifices) and also during wedding ceremonies "when the two sides have agreed"34The Bedouins of modern times could not perceive that in their country there was a time when such a "horrible tradition" existed as burying girls alive in sand.
35 Since sources do indicate its existence and the fact that Muhammad condemned it, it may be assumed that it was not widespread, but it was also not a rare phenomenon. Researchers explain this tradition in the sense that girls were a liability to their poor nomad families.The second group includes all sacrifices related to the age and sex division of the tribe and was expressed in the custom of circumcision. This custom to both Arabs and Jews is a survival of an ancient institution of age initiation, a milestone for babies. After it, their adult live began. The initiation customs were painful, and were some sort of offering sacrifices. Once circumcision became part and parcel of Islamic rituals, it achieved a new status and completely lost all connections with sacrifice offering customs.
At the same time, during the modern era, many tribes have retained a way of circumcision akin to the ancient forms of initiation. In addition to the all-Islamic type of circumcision, even as late as the second half of the last century some Bedouin tribes in Hijaz and in Asir kept intact an ancient type known as Salkh (removing the skin), a very painful operation undergone by 16-17 year old boys who were not permitted to give a hint of pain.
36 It is interesting to note that the inhabitants of Socotora, which was a part of the ethnocultural organism of Arabia, performed circumcisions only after their boys reached sexual maturity. The operation was carried out on a rough stone stool, where the boys usually coming from afar were seated.37 One can view this pagan custom as the ‘stool’ playing the role of the altar.Let us come to the third type—sacrifice offerings to the dead. This type is closely connected to the cult of ancestries. The cult of ancestries "corresponds to the patriarchal stage and is encountered in peoples who have kept many aspects of the patriarchal communal epoch".
38 Tokarev defines the third type as paying homage to the dead forefathers and relatives based on the belief that the dead ancestor protect their living relatives and descendants, and hence need to observe these customs of paying homage to them;39 in other words, belief in the living souls of the dead. He contends that the practice of respecting all tribal ancestries also belongs to this cult. Every example of sacrifice offering at the tomb of a dead relative or that of the mythical founder of the tribe at the same time is also a proof of the existence of the cult of ancestries.Information about this type of sacrifice offering is substantial. When a Bedouin dies his relatives sacrifice a sheep to his tomb, boil the meat and give it to the participants of the burial ceremony. Sometimes they even put some of the personal properties of the dead into the tomb. This tradition—presents to the dead—is widespread among many peoples. After a short time a she-camel is sacrificed.
40 When a tribe visits the tomb of an ancestor, they sacrifice to him a he-camel: the tribe Khuwaitat ibn Jad—to the tomb of their ancestor -with the eponym Jad; the banu Sahr—to the tomb of Fanda; the Tarabinto—the tomb of Atia; different clans of Tayakha—to the tombs of Dullam and Amra.41 During the sacrifice offering ceremonies rich members of a tribe kill camels in honor of their fathers and the fathers of the poor Bedouins.42 Sacrifice offering has passed from one generation of Bedouins to another and is an inalienable part of their beliefs. A son will bury his father in a dignified way, and year after a year will come to his tomb offering sacrifices and praying.43 On the day of sacrifice giving at the Mount of Arafat, every Arab family kills a number of camels corresponding to the number of adults in their family who died that year, irrespective of whether the deceased was a man or a woman. On the other hand the same author states that a woman who died alone never received sacrifice gifts.44 If the dead person bequeathed only one camel to his successor, it should be killed; if not, his relatives kill their own camel.45 Doughty has observed that sacrifice offerings for the Bedouins continued up to the third generation.Tokarev did not include in his system of sacrifice offerings to the saints—Wali, although it can be added to the offerings given to ancestors. The Walis have never been purely Islamic elements, but were based on the ancient traditions of Bedouins, and reflect the ideas of the Bedouins both in the times of Jahiliyah and in modern times.
In the custom of sacrifice offering the Bedouins have accepted one Islamic rule: the head of the animal to be sacrificed is always directed to Mecca. Pronouncing Allah’s name at these ceremonies was a pure formality to the Bedouins, since it never cost them any labors (in comparison to prayers and fasting). This custom of sacrifice offering also had a practical meaning for the Bedouins, especially for the poor among them. The meat of the sacrificed animals was a good addition to their meager menu, though the meat eaten in that friendly atmosphere did very little to alleviate their constant hunger.
46The custom of offering blood to the deity requires special consideration. It was a part of the sacrifice offering. It has already been noted that the God of the Bedouin uses only the spirit of sacrificed animals, leaving the body untouched. As Taylor underscores, from this group of their beliefs, the most naive and realistic is the belief that life itself is blood. In accordance with it, the sacrifice offered to the deity is blood, and even bodiless spirits are regarded as capable of consuming it.
47 In this sense the sprinkling of blood is part of the sacrifice offering ceremony. Apparently, some of the deities regarded that what is sacrificed to them is the blood and not the bodies of the animals. But these differences have lost their meaning to the Bedouins in the period under study, since the sprinkling of blood always followed sacrifice offerings. These two rituals were inseparable.For example, Bedouins offer their sacrifice to the tomb of the sheikh and sprinkle blood on the stones of the tomb. The same is true of the ruins of the Mosque where they sprinkle blood on its walls.
48 In the Northwest of Arabia, while offering sacrifices to the holy tree, they sprinkle blood on its leaves.49 This is an example of the direct ‘feeding’ by blood to the sacrifice-receiving subject. There were cases when blood was sprinkled not on deities, but on other subjects for whom the sacrifice offering was intended. For example, the tribes of Rual and Shararat even today sprinkle blood on the head and hands of the bridegroom.50 The ceremony of sprinkling blood was used during the opening of a new well, or the widening of an old one, or the opening of a new water source and in many other cases related to the life of the tribe and clan. All these examples show that the pre-Islam customs remain strong among the Bedouins.
Saints
The widespread practice of the cult of saints is a stable and paradoxical phenomenon in Islam. In the descriptions of travelers and in chronicles of modern times (to say nothing of the Middle Ages), there is much information on the shrines and tombs of the saints practically in all parts of the world where Islam has spread. The cult of the sacred was known also to the Bedouins, although its basis was somewhat different, as we shall see later.
The paradox lies in the fact that the Qur’an negates the cult of saints and their ability to offer help and protection to the people (Qur’an, 9, 31; 10, 19; 13, 17; 39, 44 etc.). Goldziher observes that the saints (Awlia) must have had a huge and attractive force, if, though in opposition to the Qur’an, such a cult existed everywhere and had many adherents.
51 The cult of saints within the body of a monotheistic religion meets the polytheistic need to fill the large gap between the people and the deity.52 As V. V. Naumkin notes, the idea of an intermediary between the people and God was characteristic of the ancient religion of the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula, where, in the period before the rise of Islam and aside from the higher deities there also existed a class of lower deities, which came to Islam in the form of devils (Jinni).53 The cult of saints completed (continuing the tradition of Jahiliyah) the abyss between the human being and God, as sanctioned by the Qur’an. At first it happened through Muhammad—a deitised Prophet—and later the Awlia appeared, which can be seen as a definite analogy to the institution of the church.The word Wali (Awlia) comes from the root which expresses in the Semitic languages closeness, relatedness and proximity and has as its primary meaning: the one standing near you, adherent, friend, relative. This specifically means blood relatives, who are obliged to blood vengeance for a murdered relative or who have the right of inheritance.
54 Later on, this concept expanded and began to mean protector, patron—somebody who is equivalent to the pagan deities—protectors. The Muslim Walis were not well-versed in the Islamic dogmas, but were men with ‘enlightened’ souls. In the cult of saints, women also played a major role, since they were respected on a par with men. The belief in the saints was widespread and, even "true" stories about the real lives of some of them never affected their high status, although some were known as not having a good reputation.55From the moment of the rise of Islam and up to modern times, the cult of saints has gone through interesting transformations—from its total rejection by the Qur’an to its acceptance in all corners of the Muslim world. With time the respect given to the saints developed in leaps and bounds. A peculiar cult of tombs developed everywhere, disguising the old pagan forms of worship which still live, but which, through Islam, were transformed into the cult of saints notes Goldziher.
56 The closer we come to the modern times, the more attractive the shrines and tombs became to the people. The cult of saints, in the heart of Islam reflects an apparent individuality, whose provincial character the universal and egalitarian tendency in Islam has not so far been able to obliterate.Factually, the Arab legends about the saints are less hyperbolic and less beautiful than, for example, the Persian ones. For the Bedouins (not only for Arabs, but also for nomadic Berbers) this cult has been less entrenched than for more sedentary peoples. But D’Arvil observed that holiness was one of the most valued qualities among the Bedouins.
57 Buckhardt writes that the tomb of some saint was always to be found near the site of the nomadic tribe. All the Bedouins near that site turned their prayers in the direction of that tomb. Once a year many Arabs visit such tombs and offer sacrifices. These prayers are recited in the hope that one may get a son, inheritor, or many horses and camels.58 The honoring of the saints by the Bedouins abounds with idol-worship; they believe unconditionally in the power of the saints to influence the skies for their own benefit in this and the other world. The tombs of the Bedouin saints are usually located on hilltops. The day when they visit the tombs of the saints becomes a holiday or a ceremonial day for all the tribe and their neighbors. Women wear their best dresses, and the camels are beautifully saddled.59The cult of saints for the Bedouins, being a transformed form of their ancient ideals, is related to the cult of heroes (Muruwi). The Bedouins also have their heroes, whom they respect posthumously. This honoring, according to Islam, could be related to the category of the cult of saints – Walis.
60 Goldziher comes to the conclusion that the legend related to the tombs of Arab heroes is related to certain views specific for the Bedouins. He describes a typical burial ceremony of sheikh Zuweid. Today, as in ancient days, the local Bedouins regard his tomb as a holy spot. The door of the tomb is always open. There is a belief among them that the property inside the tomb will never be looted, and that everybody will receive a protection and asylum from this holy tomb. This Bedouin legend of their saint both in content and form is different from the legends and miracles usually ascribed to the Islamic holy tombs. The Bedouin saints are not so much instances of piety; rather the legend of the Bedouin saint acclaims the good deeds of their chief which are part of the religion of the desert heroes. These continue even in the tomb of the clan sheikh. The last one, after his death, continues his worldly task of welcoming everybody who comes into his nomadic house and must provide him his full protection even at the cost of his own life.61 In other words his tomb is open to all who need his protection, as his house, during his life, was always open to them.The same understanding of the cult of saints is embodied in another place—the tomb of sheikh Serak in Khairan. His tomb instills an ‘indescribable fear’ in the Bedouins, which helps the settled inhabitants of these areas to be saved from the "robbery of Bedouins". If a local inhabitant leaves his country for a long time he brings his wealth—arms, precious metals and stones, carpets, dress, and even money into the tomb of sheikh Serak—in the confident belief that everything will be saved until he comes back. In the hot seasons the Bedouins even leave with him their bread left from the winter season, feeling confident that noone will touch that which has been entrusted to sheikh Serak. The same is reported of other holy tombs which even the thieves are afraid to rob, and where Bedouins save whatever they want saved.
62 Basilov also cites analogous examples, when the fear of retribution of the ancestors’ souls, who once were the Central Asian saints, kept the property of their ancestors from thieves and robbers.63Thus, the Bedouin’s saint is not the protector of his sinful admirers. He is not a miracle-worker, and has no close relations with Allah as the true Muslim Walis. His major functions are the protection of property, vengeance for the violation of an oath, overall protection, hospitality and defense from insults. Even in his temple he presents food to his visitors, just as the sheikh has done in his house. Sometimes, the quality of a ‘desert healer’ was attributed to the Bedouin saint since, according to the legend, his tomb is able to heal both people and animals.
This is confirmed by numerous legends about the tomb of Khatim from Tai tribe, around which his contemporaries built sculptures which looked liked grievers. According to one legend about this tomb, Arabs who passed near it believed that they would receive hospitality from this place. The dead hero also believed that all his good deeds and properties in his life would be with him in his tomb, and would help the needy and insulted. Thus, the hero turned into a saint.
Among the Bedouin saints there frequently were certain historical personalities reflecting the other side of the Bedouins’ heroes: predatory attacks on caravans, robbery and holy wars. Modern Bedouins remember those heroes, who became famous for the murder and robbery of enemies. The temple of Abu Gosha is well known to them. Being hanged as a robber, Abu Gosha became a symbol of love to his relatives: they considered him a ‘martyr hero’.
64 Another place of worship is the ‘sacred valley’, the tomb of the hanged knights-robbers, at Mount Abu Nuseir. If any Arab passes through this valley he will enter it if he says ‘with your permission, the blessed’. Walking further, he will kiss every monument of theirs. Goldziher reminds us of sheikh Shabla, whose temple became a respected place, and who was a well-known head of Bedouins robbers.65 The same is true of the central Asian saints: the holy helped and protected all those who stole rams from Iran.66The Bedouin cult of saints was formed as a result of the influence of Islam on pagan’s beliefs. The old pagan traditions, having taken a new form of paying homage to Islamic saints, actually continued their existence among the Bedouins. A closer look at them shows the rigidity of their initial pagan nature. Perhaps this may become apparent when we compare one custom which received two opposite interpretations. Goldziher reports that the Bedouins of the Sinai peninsula kept intact one of their pre-Islamic customs of a peoples’ festival which could be retained within Islam only if related to the quasi tomb of prophet Salih, whom God sent to the tribe of unbelievers of Samudeys. Yearly the Bedouins of this peninsula hold major festivals with many sacrificial offerings and amusements (including camel competitions) at his tomb (apparently an old sacred place). After these competitions, people go around the tomb, and cut the ears of animals for sacrifice, in order to sprinkle their blood on the temple’s walls.
67However, Stanley reports that the tomb of sheikh Salih is visited only by the Tawar tribe, although one cemetery belongs to them. Therefore, it is possible to assume that sheikh Salih was the progenitor of this tribe, and Bedouins do believe that he is their relative even though mythical. In the same work Stanley also reports that sheikh Salih was their founder, and his simple tomb was located in Wadi al-Sheikh. He reports that this tomb for contemporary Bedouins is a temple on a peninsula. When Bedouins touch the tomb they exhibit religious feelings which they never show in their daily lives. Once a year they all come to the tomb. There they dance and compete in horse racing.
68 The author contradicts himself by stating that only the Tawar tribe visited the tomb, but in any case sheikh Salih is their progenitor. The traveler also notes that Bedouins who entered the temple felt uncomfortable, and impatiently waited for Stanley to come out.69Nomads not only paid homage to the tombs of their saints (or their Bedouin heroes), but also, for example, frequently visited the tombs of Avel, Noah and Cane which are in Syria between Tripoli and Khoms.
69 The Bedouins considered an oath on a tomb of saints solemn, and since they usually violated the simple oaths, it was difficult to compel them to take oaths to the tombs of saints: the nomads were afraid of being punished if they violated the oaths.In general the Bedouin’s cult of saints can be described as a mixture of a ‘minimum of religion’ and the cult of heroes. The cult of saints is another example of the parallel existence and intermingling of pure Islamic and pagan, pre-Islamic traditions and beliefs.
Superstition
This was another important part not only of daily religious practices, but also of the way of life and behavior of the Bedouins. As with many other people at a low stage of social development, many ancient superstitions and prejudices were spread among the nomads. Although Blunt considers the Bedouins to be indifferent to supernatural things and superstitions,
70 we do find many contrary examples. The belief that some horses bring evil was widespread. It was evident in the marks on the body of the animal. If there was a star on the right side of the horse’s neck, that meant it would be killed by a spear. If a star was on one of the bones of the shin, it meant that its owner was not honest, and therefore, not a good Muslim. There were more than 20 such marks which could bring evil of this type.71 Blunt, accepting the existence of superstitions about the colors of horses, at the same time states that nobody would refuse a good animal for such reasons.72A sacrificed camel’s brain was only eaten by women, since men supposed that it could worsen their eyesight.
73 Shtein writes that brains were given to women so as to make them afraid of men.74 It is not clear why Bedouins suspected the selling of gee and milk. The Bedouins of Kerek regarded selling gee as shameful; while those around Mecca regarded the sale of milk shameful. To be called a milk-seller (labban) was the worst possible shame, although during pilgrimages milk cost a lot. But the Banu Kureish—the desert aristocrats—allowed themselves to deal in this trade.The Bedouins of the Sinai peninsula were infinitely afraid of the monks in monasteries, believing that they had the power to call in or stop rainfalls.
75 Burton reports that in the desert region of Northwest Arabia there was a stone, which the Bedouins called ‘Hajar-al-Kidr’ (the stone pot). Everybody who passed by either threw a stone at it or wiped a stick on it, believing that it would sprinkle a golden rain.76 Bedouins were also afraid of bad omens: if they saw a bird or a cow, which according to them could cast a bad spell on them, they remained in their tents and nothing could force them out.77 Taylor calls bad omens the "principle of direct symbolism".78 Perry-Fogg reports a curious fact, that Bedouins of Iraq considered mane-less lions as Muslims, lions with long manes as Kafirs. They approached a Muslim lion with respect by reciting holy words, believing that it would be kind to them; from Kafir lions they could expect no mercy.79For the Bedouins the knot was a symbol of strong relations between peoples. The meaning of the knot was later transformed into the concepts of help and protection.
80 The knots had different meanings to different peoples, including the sedentary Muslims. Pilgrims to Mecca were not allowed to carry rings, nor to fasten knots on their clothes.81 To the Arabs knots were also considered as a method of keeping the beloved; knots save from death.82 The last two examples are somehow closer to the Bedouins’ understanding of knots.A large part of the Bedouins’ beliefs are beliefs in various spirits, devils (Jinni), angels and the spirits of the dead as well. Kelman writes that Jinni and miraculous wheels, dragons and demons which howl and wail in the "desert home" were normal sights and sounds for the eyes and ears of the Bedouins.
83 Strictly speaking all these things should be differentiated, since beliefs related to them vary. However, the deficiency of materials allows us to group them into one, and to regard them as supernatural objects of worship or fear. Aside from natural differences, they are close enough typologically.Let us begin with the question of spirits, or the souls of the dead. Belief in the spirit of the dead became for the Bedouins, just as for other peoples, the cult of ancestors. Sacrificial offerings are made to them, because people believed that the souls of the dead watch over the life of living relatives.
Respect for the spirits or souls of the dead actually repeat the social relations of this world. The dead ancestor who is turned into a deity continues to protect his living family, and continues to receive their attention and respect. This is also related to the cult of the saints.
Bedouins trusted in the spirit not only of their tribal members, but also of strangers, who occasionally instilled fear in them. This fear was even greater than their fear of God’s chastisement. Nomads from one tribe in the nighttime never used one road in the valley, saying that the spirits of the infidels inhabited there.
84 The Sinai Bedouins were always afraid of the ‘mount of death’, where some time before Orthodox priests were killed; they refused to be guides to that mountain. An old Arab legend says that the mountain had swallowed a Christian monastery, and today the ringing of its bells can be heard even by the neighbourhood villagers. The Bedouins are very afraid of this sound.85Nomads believe both in evil and kind spirits, which they usually called Jinnis and demons. These spirits usually inhabit the desert and deep rocky regions. For example, Samum, the whirlwind of the desert, was called an evil spirit.
86 Old Bedouins knew how to deal with Jinnis and Ifrits, both evil and kind ones. Bedouins believe that spirits bring to the people, in accordance with their mood, either good or evil deeds.87 The rich imagination of the Bedouins turns heaps of stones, parts of mountains spread unevenly in a place, into places where the Jinnis play by throwing stones at each other.88 The Bedouins considered evil spirits those who brought illness. In the Oasis of Kheibar at Hidjaz, during a malaria epidemic, Bedouins cried like donkeys, as if to inform the malaria that only donkeys lived there.89 Freizer writes about the expulsion of the spirits of cholera through shouts, wild screams and drumming.90Bedouins approached old ruins in a variety of ways. In Sinai there was a place they called Jardania. Buckhardt found there a semi-dark asylum which the Bedouin vagabonds used as a shelter and a hiding place.
91 Nieburh reports that when he got information about the ruins of an old town, not far away from his route, on the sea coast of Sinai, he decided to visit it. But when the Arabs understood that he wanted to go there, they abandoned him, without explaining anything about the place.92 Piren noted that Bedouins visited Palmira with great reluctance and uneasiness, since they mistrusted their inhabitants as infidels damned by God.93 From these examples, we can infer that Bedouins dislike visiting old ruins, justifying their behaviour by various reasons and pretexts. This fear of the Bedouins, who are such courageous and fearless desert warriors, can only be explained by their belief in supernatural forces, which, according to them, live in these ruins.The Bedouins believed that Europeans who visited their regions were interested in using their miraculous art in order to take possession of the great treasure buried under the ruins which the spirits guarded.
94 The Bedouins of Bannu Khumaid, in Palestine, according to Burton, broke an antique stone with inscriptions. Its chips were distributed among the families. Each family placed its chips in its barn, since they believed that these chips would save their grain from diseases.95The Bedouins attributed many inexplicable phenomena to the work of the spirits and Jinnis. The phenomenon of falling rocks was prescribed to the work of spirits.
96 Even the sands, moved by whirlwinds which bring death, acquired supernatural qualities among those who lived in these areas.97 Bedouins doubtless accepted these objects as the homage of spirits, which could inhabit any object.Different spiritual creatures such as souls are believed to have life and to freely fly, or to enter and live in different bodies for long periods.
98 This is the so-called theory of incarnation which results in fetishism and idolatry. In the Sinai there were two stones, each having 12 holes from which at some time water sprinkled; but in the 19th century the sources dried out. These stones are related to one of the biblical stones. Taking into consideration that the places related to the biblical legends were, as a rule, far away from towns, we can assume that the sources talk about Bedouins. The sources also note that Muslims paid a great respect to these stones.Stanley wrote about this place. The Mount of Moses in the Sinai, mentioned in the Bible, has 12 mouths for the 12 tribes of Israel.
99 The Qur’an also mentions this mountain.100 Taylor writes that the mention of this place in the Qur’an has apparently increased, if not caused, the Bedouins’ respect for this mountain. They used to throw leaves into its supposed mouths and recited prayers at its foot.101Badr—another holy place where the Prophet Muhammad won his first battle—writes Philby, continues to instill a real horror to the Bedouins passing by. They believe that supernatural forces inhabit the sandy hills which under certain climatic conditions produce deep voices.
102In many cases, the spirits which were thought to inhabit known places summoned not only fear, but also respect and adoration. Sacrifices were brought to them. In the land of Midian, a pyramid of sands, created by the winds, was known as ‘the screaming heap of sands’ by the Bedouins. During the pilgrimage people walking near it heard music coming from inside.
103Only one author, Doughty, reports that the Bedouins believed in angels and heavenly spirits, i.e. entities of the Islamic mythology. He lived, for some time, among the Moahib nomadic tribe and wrote of their beliefs. They told him that in the desert there was a place to which all angels fly. That place was near a wild coppice where the tribal tomb was located, reports the traveler.
104 The fact that, the place is near a coppice underlines the connection of their beliefs with the belief in spirits of trees, widespread in pre-Islamic Arabia. In the given example the angels and spirits of the trees are connected; this is a key to understanding the cult of trees.When Doughty told them that angels could not land on the ground, the Bedouins replied to him: "Though we have not seen them, our fathers saw them. In our tribe there are people who swear by the faith, that they have heard dancing steps, their sounds, night songs and have understood the words. They came to this land of Dibr for hunting, believing that not a single Arab lived here.
105 Angels were believed to come onto the ground from one of the trees, which the Bedouins regarded as their home. They think that if anybody pulls a leaf of that tree he will be taken into the heavens and never will return. At one time a Bedouin kindled a fire under that tree, and after a short time fell ill, his intestines erupted and he died horrifically. His sons and his animals met the same death. 106That is how the angels or the spirits of the trees punished those who did not respect them. Nomads considered that an angel was but an ancestor of somebody, and that all angels were ancestors of the tribe which by such visits paid attention to them. "If these appearances are not from the angels, then from whom are they?" In fact Bedouins totally associate angels with the spirits of ancestors by declaring that angels can be seen in the air like horsemen swinging from side to side, and when you come nearer to them, they disappear.
107 The traveler writes that respect for sacred trees as the home of angels in Wadi Dibr (in northwestern Arabia, Taim region, Safarj) is a normal phenomenon, perceptible in any camp of nomads. These are ordinary trees and even small shrubs. Nomads come to these tree; the sick among them offer sacrifices of sheep or goats to them for their health and sprinkle blood on the tree(s). The meat is cooked on the spot and distributed to friends, leaving some pieces at the tree. Then the sick sleep, in the belief that the spirits will cast a shadow on them and that they will wake up in the morning healthy. 108In the case of offering the tree spirit sacrifices, the tree can serve as a convenient place for the sacrifices.
109 The angel or tree spirit in the above-mentioned examples became a heavenly protector and helper; the same function being fulfilled by Islamic saints (or the Bedouins’ pagan saints), with the only difference that in the past they could be real persons.In this sense, it is clear that the belief of the Bedouins in angels is not related to the belief of a Muslim. The first nature of angels, doubtless, was pagan, but at the same time their dependence on the will of Allah and their function of bringing the world of Allah (for example, Gabriel) to the people pushes their pagan elements into the background. The Bedouin angels are pagan spirits which have nothing to do with either Allah or religion in general. The Bedouins themselves confirmed the pagan origin of their beliefs in those angels, and declared to Doughty that their beliefs are superstitions.
110The cult of trees, as well as other pagan cults, were the products of their world outlook. As we can see, according to their perceptions, these spirits could inhabit mountains, sand and also people. The world to the Bedouin is inhabited by spirits; trees and plants are not an exemption to this rule. The Bedouins believe that trees and plants also have souls, and therefore summon them.
111The pagan custom of decorating trees with clothes and other things remains with the Bedouins.
Conclusions
In this section, we have analyzed many of the customs and rituals of the pastoral society—a part of the Islamic civilization—which were inherited from the era of Jahiliyah, and practiced even today. We have touched upon the practice of prayers, sacrifice offerings and the cults of saints, spirits, Jinnis, angels, and also of the souls of the dead. Unfortunately, the limits of this paper do not give us a chance to analyze the impressive layers of superstitions such as worship of spirits, burial ceremonies, oath-taking customs, amulets, witchery, magic and many others. However, even the above-mentioned part allows us to make certain conclusions.
The society of Bedouins—pastoral Arabs—being a part of a larger Arab ethnos, was and is a unique organism, living in the harsh desert and semi-desert climate of the Middle East. The nomad world, surrounded on all sides by more developed sedentary civilizations, to a large extent, has kept its economic, cultural and religious autonomy. The expansionist campaigns of the 7
th century and the formation of Arab Caliphate led many pastoral peoples to assume the sedentary way of life. While these processes undermined the economic life of the nomads, leaving it to stagnate, the old traditions and customs of ancestors were rejuvenated. The way of life of the Bedouin tribes is basically patriarchal and tribal, and, in spite of modern technology, it changes slowly.The capacity of Islam to flexibly adapt itself to the pagan cultural and religious traditions of different countries and regions was what made it extremely attractive to the peoples who wanted to perceive themselves as Muslims, without totally rejecting their pre-Islamic traditions. But Islam is, first and foremost, the religion of a sedentary society; despite its flexibility, it was unable to adapt itself to the world of the nomad. As corollary, this is why many pagan traditions have remained among the nomads, unlike the peasants and urbanized Muslims.
European travelers who visit pastoral peoples in modern times share the opinion that the nomads cannot be called ‘pure’ Muslims. Many facts show that they do not wholly believe in Allah and do not observe the basic demands of Islam. Among the pagan elements still widespread is the cult of saints, which is not equivalent to the Islamic cult of Wali, but is a transformed cult of heroes (Muruvvis)—the Code of Honor. Within the context of various ceremonies and customs, offered the Bedouins daily sacrifices. This tradition, in certain aspects, is akin to the Islamic sacrifice offering, but more often than not it had a pagan character. Apart from the above-mentioned customs and rituals, many other similar rituals and customs existed among them. In general, one can conclude that Islam was unable to get rid of this strong layer of beliefs and rituals inherited from the era of Jahiliyah. Islamic customs rarely replaced them.
WAHHABISM: THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDEOLOGY
Early History
The Wahhabist doctrine of Islam exerted and continues to exert exceptional influence on all spheres of social life in Saudi Arabia. In comparison with other large Islamic states (with the exception of Iran), Islam is accorded a special place in Saudi Arabia. This is predetermined by three major factors: the Arabian peninsula is the cradle of Islam; it is the cradle of Wahhabism which is the official ideology of the state; and lastly, the ethnic genesis of the Arabs took place in Arabia. These factors are widely used by the monarchies in articulating their exceptional role in the modern Islamic world. These pretensions are supported by the phenomenal economic and geopolitical potentialities of Saudi Arabia. However, Wahhabism has existed for more than two and a half centuries, and plays a key role in the formation and development of the Saudi state. An analysis of these aspects of the history and development of religious thought is the theme of this paper.
The birth of Wahhabism is related to the most serious trials of uprooting faithlessness among the majority of Arabian people, the nomads. In the history of Islam, the problem of the place and role of Arab nomads as part of the Arab-Islamic world always had major importance. During the time of Prophet Muhammad, nomads played a major role in the socio-economic relations prevailing in the Arabian peninsula. They were also the repository of strong pre-Islamic traditions and pagan beliefs and Islam later borrowed some of these traditions and beliefs.
From the 7
th century and up to the spread of Wahhabism in the 18th century, the Bedouins of Arabia never adhered to a single dominating Islamic ideology. The history of no monotheistic religion, including Islam, provides an example of a complete and unconditional obliteration of old beliefs and cults, even after the triumph of the new religion. In general, a ‘pure’ Islam never existed in the Islamic society, to say nothing of its nomadic periphery. A synthesis was always the end product whereby the pagan traditions unintentionally or purposefully were incorporated and assimilated by the new religious system. Usually in this synthesis Islam held a dominating position. However, the pagan traditions taking Islamic coloring took deep root in the minds of the people, in the form of quasi-Islam, which had a large place in the daily life of the nomads. These traditions also had great emotional and psychological energy which attracted large sections of the population.Islam in Arabia became an ideational system based on the holy religious heritage of the Qur’an and Sunnah, as well as on the firm beliefs left from the epoch of Jahiliyah. The new religion could not, and was not oriented towards totally destroying the spirit of the desert people and, correspondingly, a large part of their ancient beliefs. The eradication of these ancient traditions became possible only after the nomads joined a sedentary way of life. The pastoral life existed for more than a millennium and a half, and exists up till now. For the Bedouins, just as to the sedentary people, Islamic dogmas came into contradiction with their pagan dogmas; and since the latter were more adapted to life in the desert, these traditions acquired leading positions in the religious beliefs of nomads. Not a single Islamic tradition replaced a pagan one. The Bedouins more frequently merely pronounced the name of Allah in their daily life, in sacrificial offerings and in other ritual ceremonies, which in no way changed the pagan nature of these traditions. Mentioning the name of Allah, apparently, just replaced the reciting of their erstwhile gods: the chief Arab deities, the tribal deities and totems. The Islamic borrowings were simply an outward borrowing, which did not change the essence of these phenomena. It is necessary to underline that in this period, Islam faced difficult problems: on the eve of the modern age, a renaissance of pagan beliefs became markedly obvious, and the position of Islam as a monotheistic religion was undermined to some extent. In the modern age Wahhabism became the first serious challenge to these beliefs and called for a return to the ‘purity’ of classical Islam. It condemned the widespread beliefs of paganism.
The Wahhabian doctrine is named after its founder Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, a descendent of a settled tribe—Banu Tamim. Born in 1703 in Aiyan (Nejd), he belonged to a family of hereditary Ulama. In preparing himself for a spiritual career, he traveled widely, visiting major religious centers such as Mecca, Medina and possibly even Baghdad and Damascus. Everywhere he was a student of the leading Ulama (savants), and actively participated in religious disputes of those times.
112 Being still a young man and long before he became a preacher, Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab appealed to the people to return to the norms of true monotheism in Islam. According to him, monotheism boils down to the belief that Allah alone is the Creator of the world, its master, who gives it laws. Among His creatures no one is equal to Him and capable of creation. Allah needs no help or support from any one no matter how close to Him. The ability to do good or evil is in His hands only. Noone is worthy of glorification or worship other than Allah.113Wahhabists have a specific attitude to Muhammad, the Prophet and Founder of Islam. They consider him as an ordinary human being, a person whom Allah selected for a prophetic mission. Therefore, it is wrong and unacceptable to look at him as divine, to worship him or to ask any help from him as a ‘deity’. No site related to the life of Muhammad should be turned into a place of worship.
All types of worship and beliefs that contradict these norms were considered to be apostasy, shirk or polytheism. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, though he did not emphasize this, called for a struggle against magic, witchcraft and soothsayers. He also condemned such pagan remnants as exorcism, amulets and talismans.
At the same time (and this is important for this theme) Wahhabism was also directed against the official ‘Turkish’ Islam. He called for a relentless struggle against apostates—Shiites, Ottoman Sultans (as pseudo-Caliphs) and the Turkish Pashas. The anti-Turkish aim of Wahhabism was the expulsion of Turks, the liberation and uniting of Arab countries under the banner of ‘pure’ Islam.
Wahhabism—the title, given to this doctrine by its opponents or by non-Arabs—became its official title also in oriental studies. The followers of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab called themselves monotheists or simply Muslims, but never Wahhabists.
114A widespread notion about Wahhabists in European literature was that they are ‘Puritans’ or the ‘Protestants’ of Islam. These notions were adhered to by El Coransez
115 and later by I. Buckhardt.116 However, the comparison of Wahhabism with the trends of the European Reformation is just an outward comparison, based on the need to ‘purify’ Islam and return to its first and true variant. This outward likeness hides the total socio-political differences of the two movements and the trends.Wahhabism has seriously undermined paganism in Arabia, although all attempts to turn Bedouins into real Muslims failed. (Only at the beginning of the 20
th century was this aim attained). We shall elaborate on this below. Wahhabism did not change the inner world and beliefs of the Bedouins, but made a mark on their outward attitude to Islamic dogmas; the less the direct pressure of Wahhabists on the Bedouins, the quicker and easier they turned back into their age-old paganism.However, even in those conditions the influence of Wahhabists left an indelible mark on the Arabian Bedouins. New people—Mullas—who knew and loved Islam came to the Bedouins. Their task was to spread the Wahhabist ideology among the desert tribes. Later, being the only educated strata among the Bedouins, they became teachers, rather than direct preachers. They taught elementary education to the sons of tribal chiefs and the rich. Sometimes, they were even used as secretaries. The English traveler Blunt noted that the Mullah was an important figure in the tribe, and not only because of his religious obligations: in fact he was the only educated person in the tribe. He read and wrote all letters and conducted all diplomatic negotiations between the Sheikh and his neighbours.
117Yet, Wahhabism never took deep roots among the Bedouins during the first half century from its birth. This ideology came into being during a trying period for the Arabians, a period of intense psychological crisis, when many people were not happy with the spiritual situation in Arabia. As an ideology it was a reaction to the crisis of this society, which was in need of spiritual innovation.
Meanwhile, in the history of Islam different ideological trends appeared, some of them with no future. Wahhabism had been very successful. It became the official ideology of Saudi Arabia and, to my point of view, also the forerunner of modern Islamic fundamentalism. Its success was made possible because the leaders of a small ruling feudal family in Nejd—the Dariya—accepted Wahhabism in the mid 18
th century, apparently for its unitive force, and concluded union with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744. That small kingdom was ruled by Emir Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), and his son Abd al-Aziz (d. In 1803). From that time onward, this dynasty continuously fought for uniting the Arabian lands under the banner of Wahhabism. With time, this dynasty succeeded in bringing the whole of Nejd and other tribal lands under its control.In the mid-1890s the Saudis actually had under their control the whole of Nejd. As a result, the former warring emirates formed one large (on the Arabian scale) feudal-theocratic state. When Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was still alive, the secular and religious aspects of the state were separated, but after his death in 1791, the Emirs of the Saudi dynasty united the two aspects and concentrated both secular and religious powers into their hands.
The victory of Wahhabism in Nejd and the formation of the Saudi state did not create a new social formation, and has not brought to power a new social class. However, Wahhabism and its adherents have succeeded in surmounting the feudal anarchy in Arabia, and in this sense it was a progressive ideology.
118However, the Wahhabists, in the early days, were unsuccessful in creating a centralized state. The rulers of the conquered towns and villages were left as rulers on condition that they accept Wahhabism and the overall sovereignty and spiritual leadership of the Saudi dynasty. In the 18
th century, both Wahhabism and the state were very weak, and were confronted more than once by different feudal and tribal uprisings. These uprisings were a common factor in the life of the early Wahhabist state, whose army moved from one region to the other to suppress the apostates.After strengthening their control on Nejd, the Saudi dynasty began their expansionist policies against neighboring territories. This began in 1768 when they attacked the al-Khas region, a coastal area at the Persian Gulf. After seven years that region was conquered by them. So began the Wahhabist conquests beyond Nejd. After the death of Abd al-Aziz, Emir Saud (1803-1814) continued these policies, and as a result united almost the whole of the Arabian peninsula under one state.
The conquest of Hejaz with its major holy cities, Mecca and Medina, in 1803-1804 was a major step in this direction. This event played a major role in the fate of the Wahhabist movement and the Saudi state. The Wahhabists had destroyed all the mosques and mausoleums built in honor of the heroes of early Islam. They destroyed all buildings whose architecture was not consonant with the dogmas of Wahhabism. They obliged the inhabitants of Mecca permanently to conduct the prayers, not to use silk dress, and never to smoke in public places. All prayers for the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire were prohibited. A new governor and a new judge were appointed for Mecca, who became famous for their just judgements, unlike their Ottoman predecessors.
119More than that, Saud sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Selim III. Different sources do indicate the existence of that letter, in which Saud declared that he took Mecca on the 4
th of Muharrem in the year 1218 (26.04.1803), and brought peace to its inhabitants. Saud says that he destroyed all pagan monuments and prohibited all taxes with the exception of those allowed by Islamic law. The Emir told the Sultan that he should give orders to the Governors of Damascus and Cairo not to send to Mecca messengers with Mahmels, drums and other prohibited musical instruments, since these things are not needed by religion.120This severely wounded the prestige and authority of the Sultan-Caliph, the Protector of the holy shrines. He was accustomed to being the servant and protector of the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina and also of Jerusalem. He declared himself the supreme Caliph and king who rules uncountable empires, provinces and cities and who incurs the envy of the rulers of other parts of the world. These territories were located in Asia, Europe, at the Mediterranean and Black Seas, in Hejaz and Iraq.
121Thus, the case was not only confined to the fact that the Sultan was insulted. With the loss of the holy shrines, he also lost the right to hold the title of Caliph (which he had received at the beginning of the 16
th century with the conquest of Arabia), and the huge incomes from the pilgrimages to those shrines. The general crisis of the Ottoman empire, aggravated by its military defeats, its socio-economic difficulties coupled with the lost of Arabia, hastened its decline. The government of the Sultan was not able to send its own army against the Wahhabists. This task was left to the rulers of Baghdad and Damascus who, instead of attacking the Wahhabist strongholds, only defend themselves from the forays of the Wahhabists. The only force capable of defeating the Wahhabists was the new Pasha of Egypt—Muhammad Ali—and his army.When Muhammad Ali established his power in Egypt, and in 1805 became the Pasha of Cairo, the Ottoman rulers ordered him to retake the holy shrines for the empire. In the first years Muhammad Ali was occupied in strengthening his power against his local opponents, waging struggles against the Mamlukes and defending Egypt from English attacks, while at the same time carrying out major internal reforms. But by the end of 1809, he began to give serious attention to dispatching an expedition to Arabia.
The famous desert wars between the Egyptians and Wahhabists began in 1811 and ended in 1818. Both sides committed large forces and fought heroically. In the first years the Wahhabists were stronger and luckier than the Egyptians, but towards 1817 the tide turned against them. On April, 1818 Egyptian forces surrounded the capital of the Wahhabists, Ed-Dariya. After six months, the first Saudi state collapsed, and Emir Abdullah was arrested and executed in Istanbul. However, the downfall of that state did not mean the death of Wahhabism as an ideology. The doctrine of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab which seemed a "pure" Arabian phenomenon found many adherents in countries thousands of kilometers from Arabia. Wahhabism, as a matter of fact, became the forerunner of modern Islamic fundamentalism, but this aspect is beyond the framework of this paper. For the given theme, it is more important to underline that Wahhabism found in itself sufficient resources for its re-emergence in the Arabian peninsula to play an active role in the creation of the second and third modern Saudi states.
Wahhabism in the second state lost much of its fanatical character. This state, with various ups and downs, existed from 1843 to 1891 and never achieved its former strength. Nevertheless, the support of the Wahhabist priests who were interested in uniting parts of the aristocracy, merchants and farmers, strengthened and promoted the prestige of the Saudis and helped them extend the authority of Riyadh to a significant part of central and eastern Arabia. But owing to internal rivalries in the ruling family, which began in 1865, and the ‘independent’ deeds of the Bedouins, the second state lost much of its power, and later collapsed.
The Establishment of A Central State
The third and last attempt to create a centralized state in the Arabian peninsula began in the first quarter of the 20
th century. The founder of this state was the legendary military leader and statesman Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud. When in 1902 he began his campaign to regain Nejd, the fact that the title of Imam remained in the hands of the Saudis greatly helped him. It allowed him to send messengers to all other tribes in order to rally them under his banner. In the struggle for re-establishing the Wahhabist state Ibn Saud, just as his predecessors, tried to minimize the power of traditional rulers and to bring a large part of the Bedouins to a sedentary way of life. He used the influence of the Brotherhood movement which appeared in Nejd on the eve of the 20th century. This new movement had a major influence among the Bedouins of Arabia, and Ibn Saud grasped quickly the vast possibilities of this rapidly spreading movement as a tool of strengthening his authority among the Bedouin tribes. He began to help the Brotherhood movement by giving them financial and other support (crops and agricultural equipment, building houses, schools and mosques). They also received weapons and equipment from Ibn Saud for ‘the defense of religion’. The Saudi leadership and their clan were wary of this movement, both by virtue of its Bedouins roots and of its strong egalitarian tendencies. But with the support of the Brotherhood, Ibn Saud surmounted the resistance of the powerful Bedouin tribes in central Arabia and, in the words of the English scientist and traveler, Philby, brought unprecedented order into Arabia.122In these and consequent events, the most important for us is the religious—Wahhabist aspect. Strict demands were presented to the members of the Brotherhood movement: observance of the five basic pillars of Islam; loyalty to the members of the brotherhood; no communication with Europeans and with the population of the territories ruled by them; and last and most important demand, unconditional loyalty to the Emir, the Imam of the Wahhabists.
123The religious enthusiasm of the Brothers organized in ‘Khidjrs’ (special settlements) was to be directed towards worshipping Allah, and naturally should serve His representatives of the Wahhabist state as a truly Islamic state. Their religious and secular zealousness was to be remunerated as before by military booty, but at this time not through intertribal wars and pillage, but through a war against the ‘polytheists’ i.e. non-Wahhabists. Religious leaders educated in Riyadh and in other centers, who represented the last echelon of the Ulama, were sent to all settlements. They fulfilled the onerous task of being the ears and eyes of the central government. The founder of the doctrine usually sent into the biggest settlements Kadis, judges, from the Sheikh’s family (the ancestors of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab).
Most of the Bedouins who joined the settlements considered that they had abandoned the traditions of Jahiliyah i.e. the condition of pre-Islamic ignorance, and usually became devoted Muslims. Their religious zealousness led them even to punish nomads and sedentary peoples who refused to join the settlements, labelling them as non-Muslims. Their zealousness reached such heights that even Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud together with the Ulama was compelled to issue a special edict (the highest theological conclusion) calling the Brothers to be more tolerant.
124The transformation of the Bedouins’ spiritual and practical life from tribal rules to Shari’a was dramatic. They became converts who were ready to fulfill all the rules of Islam and even to beat the insufficiently zealous who dressed differently from other Muslims and whom they regarded as ‘polytheists.’ They prohibited listening to music, drinking coffee and alcohol, etc.
With time, the fanatical converts who defended the egalitarian principles would turn into a great threat to the very existence of the state which they helped to create. In 1929, after only three years of the formation of the new Saudi state, the Ikhwany (Brothers), defending their egalitarian principle of state and social life, organized a revolt against the state, which nearly overthrew the new king Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud. Characteristically, both sides used religious arguments in this battle. In December 1926 the King was presented with a list of accusations, the major points being: religious tolerance, introduction of some technical innovations (the telegraph and telephone) and dealings with the infidels (his negotiations with the British). In turn, the King, with the support of the hereditary Wahhabist Ulama, accused the Ikhwany of defaming ‘true Islam’. By January 1930 the rebellion of the Ikhwans was suppressed, and the process of settling the Bedouins was temporarily halted. As a result of the suppression of that rebellion the central state became far stronger than hitherto. The Wahhabist religious-political movement, after defeating its radical wing, Ikhwany, managed in its third attempt to triumph in Arabia. The union of the top layers of the Wahhabists and the Saudi clan which began in the 18
th century laid the foundations for the modern Saudi state.Instead of the ‘primitive’ social-tribal system, a new state emerged; and although this state was based on the absolutism of the Saudi clan, paternalism and Islamic traditionalism, its very formation was, historically, a new development in the history of Arabia.
Oil became a new catalyst for the strengthening and development of the Kingdom. In the 1940s to 50s the Kingdom still remained an underdeveloped part of the Middle East; but by the 1960s, a new period began. Petrodollars created a solid and constantly expanding basis for the fast growing national economy. In turn, this led to sharp shifts in the social structure of the country, speeded up the process of class formation and modification of the role of traditional social stratums. In the last quarter century, Saudi Arabia has played a noticeable role on international arena and has become one of the centres of power in the Islamic world so that Saudi Arabia became a major world financial player and a regional power to be reckoned with.
During this whole period, the state ideology, Wahhabist Islam, played and continues to play a huge role. And, if in many Islamic countries some form of re-Islamization was observed, for Saudi Arabia this term is inapplicable. Moreover, from the 1960’s Islam was more active than before in politics and became more politicized. But this phenomenon is not new to the history of the country, which is truly obliged for its formation to the alliance of secular rulers and the ideologists of Wahhabism.
Here it is pertinent to note that the latter have always insisted that Wahhabism is part and parcel of Sunnism and not a new trend. The founder of the modern Saudi kingdom Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, in trying to prove that Wahhabism is not a new religious, but the same orthodox Sunnism, declared on 11 May, 1929 that although we are called Wahhabists as if it is a new trend, this is an extremely erroneous perception which has arisen from false propaganda. He added that they have never proclaimed a new trend or dogma.
125Saudi Arabia is the only Islamic state where the Qur’an and Sunni fulfill the function of the constitution and all legal norms are regulated, first of all, by the instructions of Shari’a. Despite the impressive successes in economic development and the rapid changes in the social sphere and infrastructure, Saudi Arabia is, in matters of state organization, structure and functioning of the political mechanism, an archaic society. The state and political systems are based on the following principles: preservation of the hereditary principle of supreme state power transmitted from the father to the elder son and the son to his brother; a strict control of state organs by the Saudi clan and other close tribes; underdevelopment of representative institutions; prohibition of all political parties and mass organizations (trade unions and other social organizations); regulation of social and political life, legislation and judiciary system through the Shari’a norms and non-written tribal norms.
126As mentioned above, as Saudi Arabia has no written constitution the power of the King is limited only by the Qur’an (and Sunnah). From the legal point of view—structures and organizational principles of the state power—Saudi Arabia is an absolutist state. However, the political functioning of the monarchical system in Saudi Arabia has its own specifics, unique in the modern world.
In this case, the discussion is not so much about the absolute power of the monarch himself; rather, it is about the absolutization of the clan which has historically turned into the ruling class of the country. The king, as a matter of fact, is the personified embodiment of the power of the clan, which is recognized as the ruling tribe. Therefore, the definition of the form of rule in Saudi Arabia as an absolute monarchy requires certain clarifications and reservations which have manifested a Wahhabist colouring. According to the Wahhabist interpretation of Islamic law, both religious and political power should belong to one person—the King, i.e. he is the Imam and the ruler. The legitimacy of the political authority emerges, therefore, not from its legal basis secured in a constitutional form, but from the oath of loyalty to this or that ruler, which is, in turn, limited by his own activities as the head of religious power only by the instructions of the Qur’an and Shari’a. On this basis, the Saudi authors argue that their political system is not autocratic, since the power of the King is based on the norms of Shari’a, and its violation would necessarily lead to his dethronment (‘impeachment’).
127Legislation, not within the perimeter of the Shari’a, is one of the top secular prerogatives of the King. The King has to take into account the ‘social interests’ in his legislative functions. These are some general-theoretical positions which characterize the concepts of the state system and the status of supreme power in the form developed in Saudi Arabia.
In this paper we cannot go more deeply into the legislative functions of the ruling royal clan from 1924 onwards, when it conquered Hejaz, a more developed region. Notwithstanding, an analysis of the constitutional-legislation which regulate the modern structure of state power in Saudi Arabia shows that the legislative system of the country is based on an hierarchical principle which has not change essentially. Here, it is pertinent to characterize some legal acts related to the religious situation in the country.
In the practical aspect, the formation of the secular statehood and legislation in Saudi Arabia began in 1924, after Ibn Saud conquered Hejaz. Before 1924, tribal and religious laws totally dominated in that state. These laws, coupled with military force and the fanatic belief in the sacred mission of the Wahhabist doctrine, were at the basis of the state system and the ruling hierarchy. After conquering Hejaz, King Saud issued new decrees and proclamations, which later spread to the other regions of the country. According to the well-known jurist Abdel Jawad, the legislative activities of the King later became the basis of legislation in the Kingdom. Some of the decrees issued in those days continue to have a legal force in Saudi Arabia.
128In 1924, after conquering Hejaz, Ibn Saud being the Sultan of Nejd, issued a decree concerning this new province. It said that all legislative and administrative acts must be "the subject of consultations between Muslims" (Shura).
129 In the development of this decree, the Consultative Council was created, its task being to advise the king on legislative and administrative matters. This council was the prototype of the modern General Consultative Council under the King of Saudi Arabia. Its activities are based on Shari’a.The central administrative apparatus of Saudi Arabia, as such, began to take shape after the 1950s. The strengthening of the monarchy, centralization of power and the spread of its sovereignty to the provinces took place in the early stages on the basis of clanish dependency. King Ibn Saud, as the military, political and religious head of the state appointed his relatives (clan members) to head different provinces and regions, where they had absolute power. They also kept the support of the sheikhs, Ulama and Kadis (Shari’a judges). Thus, the tendency of institutionalization of clan-tribal structure into one state based on the strict unitary concept of the Wahhabist doctrine operative formed from the very beginning of Ibn Saud’s rule was granted organizational-legislative substantiation.
King Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz (1953-1964) kept intact the hierarchical system of state administration created by his father, although he lacked the religious and political authority of Ibn Saud as founder of the modern and united Saudi kingdom, or, as he is known in the western historiography, the ‘Bedouin Bismarck’. In 1953 a significant step was taken in the further creation of state structures. The King issued a new decree, the first in the history of Saudi Arabia, instituting the Council of Ministers headed by the vicegerent of Hejaz, the heir prince Emir Faisal. In 1958, another decree (#38) signed by the King gave the Chairman of the Council full power to conduct both the internal and foreign policies of the kingdom.
130The decree on the Council of Ministers actually did not mean a division of power between the King and the head of the Government. In fact, it was a result of the inner struggle among the Saudi clan members. In 1964, the new King Faisal, after deposing Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz, amended the 1958 decrees of the Council of Ministers. His idea was to liquidate the dualism of top state power between the King and the Chairman of the Council. This amendment, as always, was supported through religious canons; and the former practice was declared wrong, since, according to the Shari’a, the spiritual and secular head of the state should himself carry out both functions (something akin to Presidential-type republics). The temporary exclusion of the king from the functions of the Prime Minister was based on the need to correct the mistakes committed earlier and for the sake of preserving Islamic legality.
131The amendments were: first, the Council of Ministers was declared a permanently working institution to be headed by the King. All its sessions were to be chaired by the King or by the first deputy of the Chairman. Second, in contrast to the decree of 1958, members of the council were appointed, released from their posts or retired in accordance with a decree signed by the King, and were responsible directly to the King.
132As is clear from the above, the essence of the amendments, after Faisal’s coming to power, boiled down to the re-establishment of the real control of the activities of the Government by the royal family, without, at the same time, weakening the wide administrative-executive powers given to the government in the decrees of 1958. The Rule of 1958 on the status of the Council of Ministers with the amendments of 1964 are the only legal acts with constitutional character, which regulate the formation and the structure the major state organs in Saudi Arabia.
The religious leaders—Ulama – remain an important and a traditional support base for the political system of the kingdom. They have direct influence on decision-making. The majority of them belong to the family of Al-Sheikh, whose founder was Abd al-Wahhab. They have a decisive voice in the formulation of matters concerning current internal policies, the working out of laws and also court matters. The Shari’a theologians, Kadis (judges) and preachers, try to control the key spheres of the life of the Saudi society, following all the Wahhabist rules on the internal policies of the government, and also on the private life of the citizens. "The Council and acceptance" of the Ulama is needed in all matters concerning changes and amendments to the legislation, education, information and the daily life behavior of the citizens, etc.
133 .The committees for controlling social morals are a strong weapon in the hands of the Ulama. Created in the 1920s in order to spread the Wahhabist doctrine, they turned into a force which dictated to society ‘correct’ morals and behavior. They carefully assured the entrenchment of the segregation of women, prohibition of smoking, alcohol and dances.
134 In the 1960s, these committees were compelled to accept the appearance of modern radios and music players, the selling of tobacco, the appearance of modern illustrated journals and newspapers and the fact that women began to work in radio broadcasting.135 Since no human monuments and figures could be exported to Saudi Arabia, the Ulama also prohibited all commodities which resembled a cross.The judiciary system is still under the total control of the Ulama. In the 20
th century the majority of Islamic states adopted new commercial, criminal and even civil codes. Saudi Arabia is the only country where Shari’a is preserved in its "primary purity". The judiciary and legal systems in Saudi Arabia, adhering to the needs of a centralized feudal state, were not prepared to tackle the socio-economic problems created by the development of Arabian society. The Wahhabist doctrine kept intact the canons which formed in the first three centuries of Islam and rejected all later innovations as Bida’. Here lies one of the major difficulties which that society faces, since it is difficult to apply the laws of the Middle Ages to the situations of the 20th century.The need to adapt the Shari’a to the modern situation has compelled the Ulama to search for loopholes in the Shari’a for the approval of new legal norms. For example, by using some theological substantiation, the authorities allowed the Shari’a courts to transfer some of their competencies to the administrative organs or to social institutes such as the trade and industrial chambers.
However, all these innovations have not principally changed the Wahhabist judiciary system which came into being in the 1920-1930s. The role of the Wahhabist ideology and its servicemen—the Ulama—in implementing the social order and the functioning of the judiciary system is, as before, strong and decisive.
We have analyzed only some of the obvious examples indicating the influence of the Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. In a short paper like this, it is difficult to analyze the influence of this ideology on all social structures, including finance, industry, education and the mode of life. However, the analysis done here leads to this conclusion: the fast and deep capitalist transformation which Saudi Arabia has undergone is in direct contradiction with ‘Wahhabist values’ both in the economic and socio-political spheres. Only the near future can show whether these contradictions can be resolved in an evolutionary manner.
NOTES
1. V. I. Basilov, Kult Sviatykh v Islame (The Cult of Saints in Islam) (Moscow, 1970), p. 67.
2. A.S. Tokarev, Ranniye formy religii (The Early Forms of Religion) (Moscow, 1990), p. 39.
3. L. von Liphart Aravia. "Biblioteka dlia Cheteniya" (Arabia. "Readers Library") (1885, (Oct.), p. 55.
4. Umm al-Kura (Mecca, # 20, 1989).
5. Ch. Doughty, Travels in Arabian Desert (Camb., 1928), V. I, p. 17; C. Nieburh, Voyage de M. Niebuhr en Arabie et en d’autes pays de L’Orient (En Suisse, 1780),V. 1. p. 255 ; W.-G. Hflgrave, Un anee dan L’Arabie Centrale (1862-1863) (P. 1872), p. 209; L.V. Shtein, V chernykh shatrakh beduinov (In the Black Tents of Bedouins) (Moscow, 1981), p. 130; G. A. Wallin, Notes Taken During A Journey Through Part of Northern Arabia in 1848 (London, 1850), p. 21.
6. C. Niebuhr, Description de L’Arabie d’apres les observation et recherches faites dan le pays meme par M. Neebuhr (A Copenhague, 1773), p. 234.
7. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 17.
8. Ibid., pp. 81-83.
9. A. Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates (London, 1879), V. II, p. 243.
10. K.-F. Volnei, Puteshestvie Volneya v Siriyu i Egipet, byvshiye v 1783 i 1788 godakh (The Travels of Volnei in Syria and Egypt in 1783, 1784 and 1785. Vols. I-III.) (Moscow, 1791-1793), pp. 604-605; R.F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah (London, 1907), v. 1, p. 175.
11. I. Goldziher, Kult Sviatykh v Islame (The Cult of Saints in Islam) (Moscow, 1938), p. 570.
12. A. Blunt, op. cit., v.1, p. 217.
13. J.L. Buckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Collected during His Travels in the East (London, 1830), p. 57.
14. J.L. Buckhardt, op. cit., p. 75.
15. Ibid., p. 161.
16. A. Blunt, op. cit., v.1, p. 180.
17. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 244.
18. Ibid., v. II, p. 72.
19. E.B. Taylor, Pervobitnaya kultura (Primitive Culture) (Moscow, 1990), p. 459.
20. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 488.
21. J.L. Buckhardt, op. cit., p. 238.
22. A. Blunt, op. cit., v. II, p. 217.
23. R. Cheesman, Unknown Arabia (London, 1926), p. 224.
24. E. B. Taylor, op. cit., p. 465.
25. Ibid., pp. 465-466.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., pp. 474-475.
28. A.S. Tokarev, op. cit., p. 59.
29. R.F. Burton, Personal Narrative. V. I, pp. 65-66.
30. N.V. Poggenpol, Puteshestivie na Sinai. 1910 (Travels in Sinai. 1910) (S. Petersburg, 1912), p. 35.
31. E. B. Taylor, op. cit., p. 480.
32. J.L. Buckhardt, op. cit., p. 51.
33. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 452.
34. E.Y. Lein, Nravy i obychai egiptian v pervoi polovine 19 veka (Mores and Customs of Egyptians in theFirst Part of the 19
th century) (Moscow, 1982), p. 213.35. Ch. Doughty, Op. cit., v. I, p. 240.
36. Narody Mira. Etnograficheskie Ocherki. Narody Perednei Azii (Peoples of the World. Ethnographic Essays. The Peoples of Near Asia) (Moscow, 1957).
37. J. R. Wellsted, Travels to the City of Caliphs Along the Shores of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean (London, 1840), p. 317.
38. V. I. Basilov, Kult Sviatykh, p. 69.
39. A. S. Tokarev, op. cit., p. 255.
40. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. I, p. 451.
41. A. I. Pershits, Khozaistvo i obshestvenno-politichesky stroi Severnoi Aravii v 19—pervoi treti 20 veka (istoriko-etnograficheskiye ocherki) (The Economy and Social-Political Structure of North Arabia in the 19th to First Third of 20th Century (historical-ethnographic essays) (Moscow, 1961).
42. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. I, pp. 136-137.
43. Ibid., p. 240.
44. Ibid., p. 451.
45. J. L. Buchhard, op. cit., p. 57.
46. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. I, p. 452.
47. E. B. Taylor, op. cit. p. 469.
48. N. V. Poggenpol, op. cit., p. 35.
49. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. I, p. 449.
50. Umm al-Kura (Mecca, 1978), N 16.
51. I. Goldziher, op. cit., p. 29.
52. Ibid., p. 25.
53. V. V. Naumkin. Sokotrytsy (The Socotraneans) (Moscow, 1988), p. 61.
54. I. Goldziher, op. cit., p. 26.
55. Ibid., pp. 29, 33, 41.
56. Ibid., p. 46.
57. A. D’Arvil, L’arabie contemporaine avec la discription de pelerinaige de la Mecgue (P., 1868), p. 133
58. L. Buckhardt, op. cit., p. 147.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., p. 55.
61. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
62. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
63. V. I. Basilov, op. cit., p. 73.
64. I. Goldziher, op. cit., p. 57.
65. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
66. Ibid., p. 71.
67. Ibid., p. 63.
68. A. P. Stanley, Sinai and Palestine in Connection with their History (London, 1866), p. 56.
69. C. Niebuhr, Dscription de L’Arabie d’apres les observation et recherches faites dan le pays meme par M. Neebuhr (A Copenhague, 1773), pp. 213-214.
70. A. Blunt, op.cit., v. II, p. 216.
71. L. V. Shtein. V chernykh shatrakh beduinov (In the Dark Tents of Bedouins) (Moscow, 1981), p. 121.
72. A. Blunt, op. cit., V. 2, p. 223.
73. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 499.
74. L. V. Shtein, op. cit., p. 42.
75. A. P. Stanely, op. cit., p. 55
76. R. F. Burton, op. cit., v. 1, p. 158.
77. P. S. Baturin, Kratkoe povestvovaniye o aravitianakh. (A Short Story about Arabians) (Kaluga, 1787), p. 28.
78. E. B. Taylor, op. cit., p. 97.
79. Perry-Fogg, Puteshestvie po Egiptu, Aravii, Maloi Azii i Persii (Travels in Egypt, Arabia, Minor Asia and Persia) (S. Petersburg, 1876), p. 165.
80. Ch. Doughty, v. 1, p. 42.
81. J.G. Frazer, Zolotaya Vetv. Issledovaniya magii i religii (The Golden Bough. Studies in Magic and Religion) (Moscow, 1990), p. 271.
82. Ibid., p. 276.
83. J. Kelman, From Damascus to Palmyra (London, 1908), p. 208.
84. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 448.
85. A.S. Norov, Ierusalem i Sinai. Zapiski vtorogo puteshestvie na Vostok A. S. Norova (Jerusalem and Sinai. Notes about the Second Travels to the East by A.S. Norov) (S. Petersburg) (in Russian), p. 74.
86. L. V. Shtein, op. cit., p. 131.
87. Ibid., p. 178.
88. R. F. Burton, op. cit., v. 2, p. 128.
89. R. Cheesman, op. cit., p. 177.
90. J.G. Frazer, op.cit., p. 628.
91. J. L. Buckhardt, op. cit., p. 29.
92. C. Nieburh, Voyage de M. Niebuhr en Arabie et en d’autes pays de L’Orient (En Suisse, 1780), v. 1, p. 137.
93. Zh. Piren, Zh. Piren, Otkrytie Aravii. Piat vekov puteshestvy i issledovania (The Opening of Arabia. Five Centuries of Travels and Research) (Moscow, 1970), p. 149.
94. A. S. Norov, op. cit., p. 19.
95. R. F. Burton, op. cit., p. 341.
96. R. Cheesman, op. cit., p. 236.
97. J. Kelman, op. cit., p. 208.
98. L. Shtein, op. cit., p. 320.
99. J. R. Wellsted. Travels to the City of Caliphs Along the Shores of Northern Arabia in 1848 (London, 1850), p. 44.
100. Qur’an (Quran/ Translated by Krachkovsky) (Moscow, 1991), p. 57.
101. E. B. Taylor, op. cit., p. 386.
102. H. St-J. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis (London, 1928), p. 93.
103. R. F. Burton, op. cit. v. 1, pp. 65-66.
104. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 488.
105. Ibid., p. 499.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. E. B. Taylor, op. cit., p. 375.
110. Ch. Doughty, op. cit., v. 1, p. 491.
111. J. G. Frazer, op. cit., p. 131.
112. V.B. Lutsky, Novaya istoria arabskikh stran (Modern History of the Arab Countries) (Moscow, 1965), p. 69.
113. A.M. Vasiliev, Istoria Saudovskoi Aravii (History of Saudi Arabia) (Moscow, 1982), p. 74.
114. Ibid., p. 74.
115. L.A. Corancez, Histoire des wahabis de puis leur origine jusgu’a la fin de 1809 (p. 1810), p. 82.
116. J.Z. Buckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabis collected during his travels in the East. Vols. I -2 (London, 1893), p. 31.
117. W.F. Blunt, A Visit to Jebel Shammar (Nejd) (PRYS, 1880), Vol. 2, p. 217.
118. V.B. Lutsky, op. cit, p. 71.
119. Ibn Bashir Osman, Unfan al-Maj fi tarikh Nadj. (Mecca, 1349 Hijra), Part I, p. 122.
120. A Dictionary of Islam (London, 1885), p. 600.
121. AVPR, f, Kantsilaria (‘chancery’), 1804. D. 2242, l. 202.
122. H. Philby, The Heart of Arabia (London, 1946), p. 3.
123. H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London, 1968), p. 153, 156.
124 . A.M. Vasiliev, op. cit., p. 255.
125. F. Al-Farsi, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development (London, 1978), p. 33, 35.
126. A.G. Giorgiev, V.V. Ozoling, Neftianye monarhii Aravii (Oil Monarchies in Arabia) (Moscow, 1983), p. 67.
127. Ahmed Isa. Al-Muajiza faka ar-rimal (Beirut, 1973), p. 274.
128. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (London, 1978), p. 92.
129. Umm al-kura (Mecca, 12.12. 1924).
130. Mohammed Abd Al-Jawad. At-tata-vvur at-tashry fi al-mamlaka al-Arabia al-Saudia (Cairo, 1977), p. 58.
131. Ahmed Isa. op. cit, pp. 290-291.
132. Ibid., p. 60.
133. H. Philby op. cit, p. 181.
134. Area handbook of Saudi Arabia (Washington, 1966), p. 193.
135. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1 (1978), p. 195.
REFERENCES
Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii, F. "Kantselaria" 1804. 2242, 202 (Foreign Policy Archives of Russia, fond, "Chancellery", 1804, Document 2242, paper. 202).
Ibn Bashir, Osman, Unwan al-Madj fi tarikh Nadj, part 1, Mecca, 1349 AH .
V. I. Basilov, Kult Sviatykh v Islame. (The Cult of Saints in Islam) (Moscow, 1970).
P.S. Baturin, Kratkoe povestvovaniye o aravitianakh. (A Short Story about Arabians) (Kaluga, 1787).
K. Bazili, Siria i Palestina pod turetskim pravitelstvom b istoricheskom i politicheskom otnoshenii. (Syria and Palestine under Turkish Rule in Historical and Political Relations. Part II) (S. Petersburg, 1875).
A. Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates. Vols. 1-2 (London, 1879).
W.F. Blunt, A visit to Jebel Shammar (Nejd). PRYS, 1880, vol. 2.
J.L. Buckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Collected during His Travels in the East (London, 1831).
J.L. Buckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, Collected During His Travals in the East. Vol. 1-2 (London, 1893).
R.F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah. Vols.1-2 (London, 1907).
R. Cheesman, Unknown Arabia (London, 1926).
L.A. Corancez, Histoire des wahabis de puis leur origine jusqu’a la fin de 1809.
A.D’Arvil, L’arabie contemporaine avec la discription de pelerinaige de la Mecgue (Paris, 1868).
H.R.P. Diskson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London, 1968).
A Dictionary of Islam (London, 1885). P. 600.
Ch. Doughty, Travels in Arabian Desert (Cambridge, 1928).
Kh. Al-Fahouri, Istoria Arabskoi literatury v 2-kh tomakh. (The History of Arab Literature in 2 vols.) (Moscow, 1959).
F. Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development (London, 1978).
J.G. Frazer, Zolotaya Vetv. Issledovaniya magii i religii (The Golden Bough. Studies in Magic and Religion) (Moscow, 1990).
A. G. Georgiev, V. V. Ozoling, Neftianie monarkhii Aravii (The Petrol Monarchs of Arabia) (Moscow, 1983).
A.Kh. Al-Ghazali, Voskresheniye nauk o vere. (The Renaissance of the Science of Faith) (Moscow, 1980).
I.Goldziher, Kult Sviatykh v Islame (The Cult of Saints in Islam) (Moscow, 1938).
C. Guarmani, Nothern Nadj (London, 1938).
Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia (Washington, 1966).
W.-G. Hflgrave, Un anee dan L’Arabie Centrale (1862-1863) P. 1872.
Ahmed Isa, Al-Muajiza fawq ar-rimal (Egypt, 1973). P. 274.
J. Kelman, From Damascus to Palmyra (London, 1908).
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (London, 1978).
E.Y. Lein, Nravy i obychai egiptian v pervoi polovine 19 veka (Mores and customs of egyptians in the first part of XIXth c.) (Moscow, 1982).
L. von Liphart, Aravia, "Biblioteka dlia Cheteniya" (Arabia. "Readers Library") (1885, August), pp. 1-42, (Oct.), pp. 43-90.
V. B. Lutsky, Novaya istoria arabskikh stran (Modern History of Arab Countries) (Moscow., 1965).
Narody Mira. Etnograficheskie Ocherki. Narody Perednei Azii (Peoples of the World. Ethnographic Essays. The peoples of Near Asia) (Moscow, 1957).
Muhammed Abd al-Jawad. At-Tadawur at-Tashri’I fi al-mamlaka al-arabia as-Sa’udia (Cairo, 1977).
V.V. Naumkin, Sokotrytsy. (The Socotraneans) (Moscow, 1988).
C. Niebuhr, Dscription de L’Arabie d’apres les observation et recherches faites dan le pays meme par M. Neebuhr (A Copenhague, 1773).
C. Niebuhr, Voyage de M. Niebuhr en Arabie et en d’autes pays de L’Orient. V. 1-2. (En Suisse, 1780).
A.S. Norov, Ierusalem i Sinai. Zapiski vtorogo puteshestvie na Vostok A. S. Norova. (Jerusalem and Sinai. Notes about the Second Travels to the East by A.S. Norov). S. Petersburg.
A.I. Pershits, Khozaistvo i obshestvenno-politichesky stroi Severnoi Aravii v 19-pervoi treti 20 veka (istoriko-etnograficheskiye ocherki). (The Economy and Social-Political Structure of North Arabia in the 19th—first third of 20th century (Historical-Ethnographic Essays) (Moscow, 1961).
H. Philby, The Heart of Arabia. L., 1946.
Zh. Piren, Otkrytie Aravii. Piat vekov puteshestvy i issledovania. (The Opening of Arabia. Five Centuries of Travels and Research) (Moscow, 1970), p. 628.
Perry-Fogg. Puteshestvie po Egiptu, Aravii, Maloi Azii i Persii (Travels in Egypt, Arabia, Minor Asia and Persia) (S. Petersburg, 1876).
H. St-J. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis (London, 1928).
N.V. Poggenpol, Puteshestivie na Sinai. 1910. (Travels in Sinai. 1910) (S. Petersburg, 1912).
Qur’an (Qur’an / Trans. by Krachkovsky) (Moscow, 1991).
L.V. Shtein, V chernykh shatrakh beduinov (In the Black Tents of Bedouins) (Moscow, 1981).
E.B. Taylor, Pervobitnaya kultura (Primitive Culture) (Moscow, 1990).
A.S. Tokarev, Ranniye formy religii. (The Early Forms of Religion) (Moscow, 1990).
A.P. Stanley, Sinai and Palestine in Connection with their History (London, 1866).
Umm al-Kura (Mecca, no date).
Umm al-Kura, Mecca, 12.12. 1924.
A. M. Vasiliev, Istoria Saudovkoi Aravii. (History of Saudi Arabia) (Moscow, 1982).
K.-F. Volnei, Puteshestvie Volneya v Siriyu i Egipet, byvshiye v 1783 i 1788 godakh. (The Travels of Volnei in Syria and Egypt in 1783, 1784 and 1785. Vols. I-III.) (Moscow, 1791-1793).
G. A. Wallin, Notes Taren During A Journey Through Part of Northern Arabia in 1848 (London, 1850).
J. R. Wellsted, Travels to the City of Caliphs Along the Shores of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean (London, 1840).