The complicated and inconsistent character of the modern epoch, the rapid development of scientific and technical revolution, and the values of cultures, religions and civilizations in the mutual understanding and cooperation of the peoples living in various countries, West and East. To a large extent, the interest in a probable dialogue of civilizations has increased in connection with the increase of the weight in global politics and economy of the countries of the Islamic East. This is understandable for, on the one hand, the Islamic civilization has been historically part and parcel of the Mediterranean civilization. On the other hand, the strengthening social and political role of Islam from the days of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the growth of Islamic "revival" movements after the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the strengthening tendencies of international Islamic solidarity have generated in the minds of the Western people a feeling of danger and fear. Accordingly, there has been a rejection of what is known in the Western literature as the militant Islam, while for the Muslims a return of the feeling of dignity and piety towards religious traditions. In conditions of deep social changes in these countries, there is an increase of the role of the factors of consolidation, integration and self-determination, in which a major role belongs to the religious factor.

In connection with this many questions which arose have to be addressed. What are the peculiarities of the Islamic civilization? Which place does Islamic civilization have in the movement of humanity to its real and true aim—liberty of the human being? And how could this be realized, while taking into consideration the increasing role of fundamentalism, which is oriented towards the past?

Not claiming at all exhaustive answers to for those questions, this paper try to analyze these questions.

Z. Sardar considers the following to be the main parameters of Islamic civilization: (a) the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which compose an absolute system of coordinates of Islamic civilization; (b) an organic synthesis of types of world outlook: materialism, rationalism and mysticism (since Islam to a larger extent than other religions is a "religion of the human being," ensuring to the human being and society all necessities of life; (c) an epistemology as a special path of cognition based on an absolute system of coordinates (whose main characteristics are: activity, objectivity, public character, a mainly deductive integration of knowledge on the basis of the values of Islam, consideration of levels of consciousness or of subjective experience etc.) and; (d) the system of Islamic values based on the concepts: Tawhid (unity of the God), the human being as the highest divine creation and deputy of God, equality as a basic social concepts (13, pp. 35-39). As a synthesis of these aspects of civilization, Islam approaches the human being with its strengths and weaknesses, needs and desires (13, p. 32).

According to N. Daniel, it is better to study the specific features of Islamic civilization in comparison with European civilization as regards what is common to them, what integrates them, or what distinguishes them from one another. As a rule, the majority of Muslims very painfully react to any disrespect and belittling of the role of Islamic religion and tradition. For example, they ask the following questions: why do Europeans speak about the illnesses and strangeness of the Prophet, while in Islamic tradition there is always a respectful attitude to Jesus and his mother? In order to prove the superiority of one religion and culture, is it necessary to discredit the other?

Muslims, even if not believers, always recognize the Islamic nature of their culture. In contrast, the European nonbeliever prefers to consider the state as something secular, and is surprised occasionally, to find vestiges of official religion in his/her own culture (6, p. 4). Thus, the well-known contrast of Islam and Christianity is, rather, an historical problem. When we speak about religions, we speak about Islam and Christianity; when we speak about culture, we should speak about the values of Islamic and European cultures.

In Europe as a whole it is impossible to think of any specifically Christian government. Therefore, the aspiration of radical Islam, for example, in the Iranian revolution to capture power has caused shock waves in the West. Any progress connected with religion, the revolutionary character of religion which assumes the support of religious authority is considered in the West as a strengthening of conservatism, as a historical deviation from the path of progress.

In the last two or three decades, the problem of the "spirituality" of the East, and "materialism" of the West has been widely discussed. This is based on a typical error of some Islamic contributors. When Islamists investigate and analyze the role of religion and church in the West and find that it is somewhat insignificant, they conclude that the Europeans are ripe for conversion without delay to Islam, rather than any other faith. Such an erroneous conclusion is connected with the fact, that it is difficult for Muslims to understand and imagine the very existence of a secular state and the fact that there exist more complex societies than theirs (6, p. 4).

In Islam lack of faith is considered as a personal matter, while secularization is a matter for all: the community and society. Religion is the common task of believers, not a matter of private faith. A person can be an atheist, but should be a Muslim or a Christian. Atheism is one’s personal judgement, while Islam or Christianity is one’s religion. Even religious practice can mean simply loyalty, rather than positive faith. This does not mean that society can exist without religion. It is always possible to say that religion is a social phenomenon, and that faith is the cementing of any social structure. Western students of Islam underline the communal character of Islam both as a religion and as a culture. But how to distinguish Islam as a religion from Islam as a culture. One opinion holds that it is difficult to imagine Islam in a non-Islamic medium. Obviously, for Muslims living in the countries of Northern and Western Europe it has been difficult to adapt to new conditions, but they have adapted. But Europeans obviously cannot adapt to conditions, for example, in Islamic society though as a whole, any person would feel ill at ease when far from home. However, as the religion of community Islam generally has been rather tolerant of coexistence with foreign communities, including Christians and followers of Judaism inside itself (6, p. 5).

Historically, medieval Christian society was more unified than is Islamic society today. It did not retain alien communities inside itself, but actively suppressed them by force of law and courts of inquisition dealing severely even with individual deviations from devout Christianity. Its uncompromising stand and intolerance generated the hundred years’ war and other conflicts within Christianity. The principle of tolerance actually has pushed Europeans to work out the idea that faith is a private matter, instead of being loyal to the community. The reaction to a single belief later developed into indifference and even animosity to all religions. This is characteristic of a large part of modern European thinking. From the European experience, it is possible to extract two lessons for the future of Islam. First, something similar could also happen to Islam. The ongoing transformations today could destroy tradition and, on the basis of reason, create something new. Second, the changes in Islam might differ from the Christian experience which created modern Europe. It would be an expression of haughtiness on the part of Europe and humiliation for the Islamic world to assume the European path of development to be the only possible and correct path. It is impossible to assert that Islam is unchangeable, rigid and invariable society, but only in the most general form is it possible to propose the specific features of the future development of Islam. We cannot tell about the possibilities of the secularization process, about its possible forms, and what sort of a character it might take, but it is possible to forecast that the community nature of Islam will remain today and always. This should be taken into account in any possible dialogue between Europe and the Islamic world. It is necessary to overcome mutual suspicions whereby the parties hear only what they expect or want to hear.

In trying to find common ground between cultures and civilizations, it is necessary to remember the lessons of the recent past, which, to a large extent, determined the modern psychology of the European, and the Muslim. One hundred years ago, the aggressive West dominated a silently resisting Islamic East. But for the last 25 years, the West has been surprised by criticism from the Islamic East. Their control of the production and distribution of petroleum made clear the boldness and resoluteness of their anti-Western position, related to the collapse of the hopes and expectations of adapting European ideals and values. Today Islam demands of the West respect for its ideals and traditions. At the same time, the problem of the correlation of the religious and the national remains significant. The brilliant past of Islam, especially for the Arabs, has both a religious and a cultural sense.

The superiority of Europe in scientific and technical progress is clear; however, some Islamists assert that a return to the practices of early Islam would lead to the economic and scientific revival of the Islamic world. They consider that Islam could and should accept the challenge from the West and adopt the methods and results of science and progress. Islamic modernizers promote the doctrines of such great reformers as al-Afghani (d. 1897), M. Abduh (d. 1905), R. Rida (d. 1935). The idea of the openness of Islam and consistency of dogmas to scientific and historical knowledge lies at the basis of their doctrines. These Islamic thinkers rethought traditional theology in such a way that it has found a new expression quite adequate to the realities of the new century.

Other representatives of Islam, known as traditionalists or fundamentalists, reject all attempts of rethinking religious traditions. They look at the future of Islam focusing their attention on the Islam of the times of the Prophet and his four "righteous Caliphs", while considering the methodology of modern scientific knowledge to be a "methodological atheism".

Faith in the Qur’an, however, does not necessarily mean a demand for the inalterability of all traditional trends in the Islamic law, dogmas, exegesis, politics, economy, etc.

The first example is connected to the history of the development and systematization of Islamic law. Considering the sources of Islamic law, importance should be given to those laws which allow taking into account the conditions of time and space and were considered no less authoritative than the Qur’an itself. These are, analogy (Qiyas), the unanimous judgement of authorities of religious knowledge (Ijma’), and the historical practice of the times of the Prophet and his followers (Sunnah). Moreover, the use of methods "of free reasoning" (Ijtihad, Ra’yi) allowed the study of the legal heritage of Roman-Byzantine culture. Thus, the whole history of Islamic law shows that early Islam and its practice, in contrast to modernity, were open to finding solutions to the ever-emerging and existing problems.

The second example concerns the history of the development "of speculative theology," philosophy and science. An analysis of practically all areas of knowledge reveals that the flowering of the philosophy of science and medicine, which, in many respects determined the character of development of medieval Europe, took place within Islam. The doctrine of Averroes about truth received its further development in the so-called theory of dual truth of Latin Averroists, and instituted the trend of independent thinking and the adventurous spirit of philosophy. But here an important question arises: was Averroism also known to the Islamic East? Everyone, who is slightly familiar with the history of classical Arab-Islamic philosophy knows that this was not the case. As Wahba remarks, there is a paradox here: though Ibn Rushd (Averroes) came later in life from Spain to the Islamic East, Averroism did not. The role which the philosophy of Ibn Rushd played in the development of human civilization is determined by its paradox of Averroes (16, p. 84). It is still an open problem, whether the doctrine of Ibn Rushd can play in the history of Islamic East the same role it played in the Christian West.

In determining the specific features of Islamic civilization, a significant role belongs to the interaction of Islam and nationalism as socio-political and cultural phenomena both historically and theoretically. Beyond doubt, in the development of Islamic civilization, in addition to Arab-Muslims, so large a contribution was made by Christians and Jews, Persians and Turks, Copts and Kurds that their cultures should be considered a constituent part of Islamic civilization. But another fact of the recent history of Islamic countries is also pertinent: that the consolidating basis in defining the paths of social development in these countries frequently became not religion but nationalism. The key problem of the modern history of the countries of the Islamic East is reconciliation of Islam, nationalism and modernism. Which tendencies will predominate in modern conditions: the religious or the nationalistic? The answer to this question is vital both for politics and for culture. The practice of such organizations and movements as Ba’th (The Party of Renaissance), the FNL of Algeria, "the third force" of Khomeini, "Islamic-Marxism" of Ali Shariati, "The Muslim Brothers" etc., does not give an unequivocal answer to this question, nor do the solutions offered by them, provide a basis for stable social development.

Concerning this problem, as a rule, two approaches are distinguished: the dogmatic-religious and the socio-cultural. The religious elements of Islam were integrated into the national cultures of the peoples who accepted Islam. African Islam, for example, contains a set of traditional African beliefs. We cannot study African Islam without a preliminary study of pre-Islamic African culture. The fact that African Islam does not speaks the Arabic language means that native languages are part of the cultural identity of these peoples. In speaking about the language situation, some authors remark that the situation is not that much different in Arab and non-Arab countries. For example, in Morocco even today 60 percent of the population are Berbers and half of them speak not Arabic but a Berber language. Even the first Islamic republic, established in the north of Morocco in 1920, was Berber-speaking (8, p. 130).

From one point of view the problem of language is not so essential; what is important is that which integrates, namely, religious dogmas, tradition and practice (4, p. 19). The religion of Islam, based on the Shari’a, has unequivocally solved the main problem of the practice of any state by asserting the leadership and sovereignty of God; Christianity "handed Caesar Caesarship, and God to divinity."

An analysis of the historical situation in Turkey after the disintegration of the Ottoman empire is interesting. Throughout many centuries the Ottoman empire was an embodiment of the power and prosperity of Islam, its firm advance post and a counterweight to the rest of the world. But in the beginning of our century it simply collapsed like a house of cards, Islam as a religion, way of life and institution of power conceded its role and place to nationalism. An analysis of the opposition of Turkish nationalism to Islamism and to Westernization may shed light on the path of the Turkish Republic’s final choice of its path to development: secularization, modernization, and the nationalism of Kemal Ataturk.

Considering the intellectual situation in the last years of the Ottoman empire and paying special attention to the second constitutional or young Turk’s period (1907-1918-), E. Ozbudun underscores the significance of the opposition between the Islamists and Westernized nationalists. The position of the latter was reflected in the well known declaration of their leader Kevdet: "There is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization and should be imported with its roses and thorns" (12, p. 41). The supporters of the Western orientation, though personally not anti-religious, did not keep Islam as the basic element of their theoretical views. Both the Islamists and nationalists undertook collective efforts to preserve Islamic identity and were conscious enough of the necessity of modernization as a prerequisite of the survival of the Turkish state. However, they differed on a number of key questions.

The Islamists can be divided into three groups: Islamic modernists, Islamic fundamentalists and supporters of a militant political Islam. The last group composed the basis of the movement "Union of Mohammed", headed by D. Wahdeti. This movement was violently suppressed for its participation in counter-revolutionary and anti-state activities. The second group (Islamic Fundamentalists) did not put any major emphasis on ideological controversies and justified its position by traditional religious arguments. The first group (Islamic modernists) was led by Halim-Pasha (Prime Minister from 1913 to 1916), the poet-Mehmet Akif, Mehmet Shamsuddin, and later by Gyunaltai (Prime Minister from 1949-1950).

On the problem of the compatibility of Islam and modernization, the Islamic modernists based themselves on the doctrine of Abduh, who was well known and popular among Turkish nationalists. They believed the following: (a) that Islam does not hinder the development of science, rationalism and progress: on the contrary, Islam itself is a factor of progress; (b) that the source of the backwardness of Islamic countries should be sought not in Islam, but in ignorance, illegal innovations (Bida’), superstitions, obscurantism and despotism; (c) that it is necessary to return to the original and pure Islam and open the gates of Ijtihad and; (d) that that Muslims do not need to borrow any moral values from the West, since the Islamic values are superior to European ones. However, our interest in the West lies in its technology and economy, and in these spheres it is necessary to learn from it and even borrow certain things for the economic development of one’s own state.

This position can best be defined as "limited rationalism" (12, p. 43). In counterbalance to rationalistic philosophy in general, "Islamic" rationalism begins with dogmas (an-nas) and attempts to conclude from these various judgments by means of rational reflections. More than that, the interpretation of the sacred text (Qu’ran, Hadiths) is supposed to be carried out in such a way as to be compatible with the conclusions and results of modern science and correspond to the ever changing conditions of time and space. But reason is free only within the framework of the interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadiths. Therefore, for example, Abduh determines circumstances in which reason is free in its interpretation of what, in the Qu’ran and Hadiths, has no precise and clear explanation or instructions.

Although "individual Ijtihad" is rather important it cannot explain something which lies outside the framework of the Qur’an and Hadiths. If, in the sacred texts, something is incompatible with reason, there is need of additional efforts to explain it or it is accepted without understanding. The difficulty of such an interpretation lies in the possibility of over accentuating religious meaning. This would limit the sphere of reason, in particular in cases where dogma is clear and constant. On the other hand, it is possible to so emphasize the rational content that religion ceases to be actually a religion and is transformed into a system of ethics and rules of good behaviour in this life. This interpretation of Abduh opened the possibility of bringing into Islamic doctrines and laws various kinds of innovations from the modern world. This understanding of the above-mentioned problem not only became an alternative to secularism, but also allowed it to go far beyond its framework. It is not accidental that one group of students of Abduh further developed this doctrine in the spirit of absolute secularism. The Turkish Islamic modernists, however, have not gone so far, but act counter to the will of the Islamic fundamentalists.

The problem of the correlation of religion and state was resolved in the same way. The Islamic modernists believed that Islam is a social religion, which confers the rules of power and management. Therefore, religion cannot be separated from the state. The source of the sovereignty of the Islamic forms of power has a divine nature. However, their existence is limited by the principles of justice and collective leadership. The Islamic modernists reject absolutism as contradicting both Islam and reason. All Muslims have the right to rise against an unfair ruler. At the same time, obedience to the ruler is a prescribed responsibility of religion when power corresponds to the rules of Shari’a and the practice of collective leadership. If these conditions are observed, then Islamic rule may be either republican or monarchical in form. Some Turkish Islamic modernists, however, described the ideal Islamic form of rule as the "the perfect Caliphate," that is, where the people themselves elect the Caliph.

Although all Islamic modernists prefer constitutional rule, they deny people the right of sovereignty, preferring the sovereignty of Shari’a and the rule of Ulama. So, they consider parliament as a source of all troubles and the constitution as "a weak medicine" (12, p. 45). To them, constitutionalism represents a product of the erroneous ideas of Westernized reformism. They also criticize the usage of the terms "law-making" considering the exclusively a divine prerogative.

At last, on the question of nationalism and national self-consciousness they are close to the positions of fundamentalists, who consider nationalism a threat to Islamic unity. For example, Mehmet Akif exclaimed: "Oh! the Islamic society, you are not Arab, Turkish, Albanian, Kurdish etc." (12, p. 46). It is impossible to conduct nationalistic policies without rejecting Islam. Islamic modernists believe there to be no Turkish history distinct from the history of Islam. At the same time, they try soberly to look at this problem. Understanding that in the realities of present times it is impossible to establish united rule for all Muslims and create a single Islamic state, they have proposed the idea of an Islamic confederation, reflecting al-Afghani’s thesis of the absence of any contradictions between Islamic unity and local nationalism.

The problem of Turkish nationalism stands by itself, since it soon became the dominating idea in all political programs. The first indications of Turkish nationalism can be traced back to the second half of the 19th century, when a new interest in Turkish history, language, and folklore awakened. Turkish nationalism (Turkism) as a political doctrine was formed during the activity of the Young Turk movement). However, in the first years of their rule even the Young Turks did not openly propose nationalistic policies, since they were afraid of the possible disintegration of the empire. They preferred to speak about Ottomanism, which had given freedom and equality to all peoples of the empire, irrespective of their races, creeds and languages. However, after the loss of almost all the European provinces of the empire, nationalism among the Arabs, Armenians, Albanians, etc. became very popular. Consequently, Turkish nationalism became the single realistic basis for the future Turkish state. At the same time, the Young Turks took huge steps in preserving the administrative centralism of the Turkish language, thereby preserving the unity of the state. They struggled against the separatism and nationalism of non-Turkish parts of the population of the state.

Turkish nationalism in the interpretation of Zia Gokalp represented a symbiosis of nationalism, Islam and modernization; it differed considerably from the ideas of the Islamic modernists. One of the best known pamphlets of Gokalp was called "Turkization, Islamization, Modernization". He considered Turkish nationalism and Islam as two different realities, both nationally and internationally. Neither of which contradicts modernization. Modernization requires an adaptation to Western science and technology. The satisfaction of moral demands should be accepted from national and religious sources. These three realities, supplementing one another, ensure an effective development known "as modern Islamic Turkism" (12, p. 48).

The application of the experience of Western civilization is, thus, confined to the usage of Western technology and science. In this question, the position of the Young Turks and Islamic modernists were very similar. At the same time, Gokalp considered that the civilizations based on religion were being historically replaced by new civilizations based on positive sciences. The joining of Japan and Turkey into the European community of nations gave the latter an international character without a religious character. Hence, the spheres of internationality and civilization are, accordingly, separated from one another. For Goklap the Turkish nation today is a society that belongs to the Ural-Altai family, to the Islamic Umma and to European civilization. In his "Basic Foundations of Turkism" he asserted that societies which differ from one another in culture and religion could, nevertheless, belong to one and the same civilization.

Civilization, from the point of view of Turkish nationalists, is then something distinct from religion. There is no civilization with one specific religion. Since, there is no Christian civilization, so there is no Islamic civilization. Considering civilization in an international context, Z. Gokalp defines culture as a purely national phenomenon.

What then is the role of Islam in defining Turkish identity? For Z. Gokalp, membership in a nation is determined to a large extent by the existence of a common language, culture and ideals. It is not difficult to agree with some researchers who assert that, in the synthesis of Turkish culture and Western civilization carried out by Gokalp, no place remained for Islam. Thus, Islam began to be considered as a junior partner accompanying this trinity. The insignificant role of Islam in Gokalp’s doctrine can be understood also from his program of "Islamization", which contains the following positions: preservation of the Arabic alphabet for all Islamic peoples; organization of a terminological congress on the creation of a common, unified scientific apparatus; organization of a pedagogical congress with the purpose of establishing a common educational system; maintenance of constant contacts among the Muftis of all Islamic countries; and preservation of the sanctity of the crescent as the symbol of the Islamic community.

These positions of his program clearly show that by Islamization, Gokalp understood to a large extent the establishment and consolidation of cultural relations between various Islamic countries, without any orientation to their political or cultural unity. The program of Gokalp and the reforms of Ataturk appear to have much in common. Turkish nationalism achieved great influence in the epoch of the young Turks and became the dominant doctrine in the Kemalist republic.

In modern Turkey the study of Islam is concentrated on the problems of secularism and secularization, but in other traditional Islamic countries these problems have not yet become subjects of open and broad discussion. On the one hand, this is connected to the need carefully to look back on the religious tradition. On the other hand, secularism was always considered a European innovation, the essence of modern Western "materialistic" civilization.

The term "secularization" has a Latin origin, meaning worldly or related to events in the world. In Europe secularization, which has its roots in the Reformation, is connected with the development of modern industrial society. The process of secularization began from the peasant disturbances led by the priest, Thomas Munster, and was directed against the feudal lords and high clergy. In contrast to Europe, in the Islamic world the term "secularization" has a strictly negative connotation. It is usually considered that, since that there is no clergy in Islam, then there can be no conflict between religion and state. As Tibi remarks, what actually happens is the substitution of the ideal for reality. A number of studies on Islam published in the 970s, demonstrated the existence in Islam of religious institutes that reproduce their own clergy (14, p. 70).

If one proceeds from the thesis that secularism is a prerequisite of modern society; an analysis of the problem of the applicability of the concept "secularization" to the history of Islam from the point of view of the sociology of religion requires an answer to the following questions: have any attempts at secularizing modern Islam been undertaken in the Islamic world, is Islam as a socio-cultural system compatible with a secularized religion; and what form may secularized Islam take in the future.

Defining Islam as a highly developed civilization of the pre-industrial period and as a principle of legitimizing power of the mighty state created under its aegis, it is necessary to take into consideration that pre-industrial empires were not functionally differentiated systems. In these empires, political dominance was achieved on the basis of an alliance between religion and political leaders, whereby, the former ensured religious legitimacy to the political rule of the latter. In such empires the religious leaders supported the political legitimacy of the system. They were required to formalize and formulate faith and traditions in such a way that they could be expressed and organized at a developed cultural level. They were also obliged to adjust and to direct the various dynamic tendencies and elements originating in religion and to support internal organization and discipline. Such internal problems promoted the emergence of specific models of behaviour of the religious elites and organizations in these societies. These were based on fidelity and loyalty to ruling authorities and excluded any kind of opposition to them. Thus, in the traditional system where politics is sacral, religious leaders ensure the preservation of the traditional style of thinking and control the development of critical, independent public opinion.

As the Islamic religious leaders were not organized into a separate church or society, they depended heavily on the rulers. Taking into account that religious leadership played a decisive role in determining the cultural and political value-orientations of the traditional system, one can assert that this dependence of the Islamic religious leaders on the rulers became a conventional norm in the history of Islam. Members of society are not citizens in the fullest sense of the word, but subjects having their corresponding relations with the authorities.

According to the German sociologist of religion, N. Luhmann, modern societies should be considered socially developed and differentiated systems; and secularization is connected with the differentiation of functions.

At the same time, secularization in no way means the abolition of religion. In a functionally differentiated world the system of religion simply fulfills other functions. Secularization is one of the results of society’s reorientation into a functionally differentiated system, in which each functional sphere requires a high level of independence and autonomy, but, at the same time, each function depends more on the fulfillment of functions and how they are fulfilled (20, S. 227).

The idea of the existence of a connection between secularization and the level of domination over nature is very important. A close relationship exists between secularization and politics in societies which are oriented not on the domination of nature, but on relating to it and consider themselves as a prolongation and reflection of nature.

If we address the main sources of Islamic religious system, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, we cannot find in them any hints of intermediaries between God and the human being. It is frequently concluded, therefore, that there is no clergy in Islam, since there is no necessity for such an intermediary. However, there is a yawning chasm between ideal images and reality. Though the ideal Islamic community (Umma) does not recognize any clergy, nevertheless, the actual history of Islam testifies to the formation of a stratum of Islamic authorities on religious knowledge (Ulama), which partially fulfilled the role of clergy. Yet, it can be said that an important difference between Islam and Christianity consists in secularism being more inherent in Islam than in Christianity. This can be said in as much as all Islamic reformist movements against the traditional clergy, Ulama, for hindering the social modernization and development of the Islamic religious system are considered secular

The problem of the correspondence between the sacral and political during the Islamic middle ages deserves attention, since that was when Islamic culture achieved its golden age, which could have been followed by the industrial revolution. Despite its pre-industrial stage of development, the Islamic empire achieved a high level of social differentiation, favorable to the development of science and technology.

According to studies carried out by the modern Syrian philosopher Taiyib Tizini, who devoted a long time to the history of Arab-Islamic philosophy, Islamic philosophers were among the first who undertook a secularized, scientifically substantiated interpretation of the Cosmos. One of the early trends of the secularization of Islamic society can be found in the philosophical works of Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Al-Farabi, Ibn Tufayl and others, and also in the philosophy of history and society of Ibn Khaldun. Another secularizing trend in Islam was the Sufi tradition, which contained protests against the rule of the Islamic clergy in union with feudal aristocracy. If the "heretical" Islamic philosophers, the Islamic Sufis, had won the upper hand in Islamic history and the Ulama had been less successful, probably an important contribution to the industrial development of Islamic society could have been made in terms of socio-economic relations. However, the transition from a developed commercial capitalism to an industrial society was not achieved, and the Arab-Islamic empire stagnated.

In the study of secularization in the context of modern Islam, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that all varieties of modern developments of Islam can be adequately understood only in the context of its confrontation with the West-European culture, which is interpreted as the embodiment of the modern scientific and technical epoch.

Paying attention to the fact that since the 19th century in the Islamic countries a sense of their backwardness in comparison to the world of Europe was growing alongside economic expansion, there was also a cultural expansion in the region, having responded in various measures towards safeguarding its cultural heritage. Tibi formulates the problem of the Islamic world and culture as follows: how far can the pre-industrial culture accept modernization without violating its basic characteristic or essence. In characterizing modern Islam, Von Gryunbaum, remarks that for the Islamic world the main difficulty in its struggle against Westernization lies in the contradictions between the successful acceptance of foreign ideas and its inability to overcome traditional principles and norms.

The Reformation of Christianity preceded the industrial revolution in Europe, and its results were not only the struggle against a concrete religious institute—clergy—but also the depoliticization of religion and the creation of new religious ethics. The Enlightenment and the secularization of all spheres of life was the culmination of that trend. Through scientific and technical achievements, Europeans were able to free themselves from the power of nature; indeed, the domination of the forces of nature became a distinctive feature of European culture. From this followed the transition of the correspondence between the sacral and political into the technical-scientific culture and its secularization correspondingly, S. Freud’s analysis of religion by giving due to religion proposed and supported the idea of a "rational substantiation of cultural images."

The founder of Islamic modernism in the 19th century and the spiritual father of modern Islam, al-Afghani underlined the significance of the Reformation for the subsequent achievements of Europe. Of Luther, he wrote: When we want to explain the reasons behind the revolutionary transition of Europe from barbarity to civilization, then, we discover that these changes were possible thanks to the religious movement begun by Luther. This great man had seen what disturbed the ambitions of the Europeans, and the extent to which they were due to the clergy. He also understood how tradition undermines everything that is not based on reason. He urged European nations to awake from their lethargy and convinced them to reform their values. He explained that they were born free, but remained in shackles (19, p. 328).

The activity of Luther was an example for Islamic modernization, and al-Afghani doubtless saw himself as the Luther of Islam. According to al-Afghani, only a new reformed Islamic movement, equally against both the European forces of colonialism in the Middle East and against Islamic clergy, could promote the beginning of a development similar to the European.

From the point of view of Islamic modernists who respect the Islamic ideal, the prevalence of Ulama in Islam is not legitimized by Islamic dogma. They consider Luther as a product of his time, and the Reformation and secularization as the result, not the cause of the changes in Europe and the development of modern society. They believe that a correct following of the religious instructions of Islam in itself is capable of overcoming the backwardness of the Islamic world. An illustration of these views can be observed in an article by the Islamic modernist Arslan (1869-1946) in "Al-Manar," a journal edited by R. Rida. In this article, published in 1930, an answer to the following question is given: why have Muslims lagged behind despite observing God’s demands, whereas others have developed? The answer was also published as a book under the same title which was reprinted several times, and is still read today. These words from the Qur’an form an epigraph to the book: "God does not change for the people what they for themselves will not change." The meaning of the answer is that the Muslims have lagged behind because they have neglected an essential position of Islam, which consists, according to al-Afghani, in maintaining their "prevalence and superiority".

Arslan argues this idea as follows: it is erroneous to suppose that the acceptance of the relativity theory of Einstein, or other natural and scientific discoveries would become a panacea for Muslims. In reality, all these achievement are but products, not the causes. Only sacrifice and sacred war are the top sciences, enlightening all other sciences. When the community (Umma) accepts this science and lives according to it, then only comes the mastery of all other sciences and areas of knowledge and all possible progress. If Muslims will live in accordance with the rules of the Holy Book, then they will attain the level of the Europeans, Americans and Japanese, while continuing their adherence to Islam (14, p. 73).

This is a typical position of the supporters of modernized Islam, as well as of their intellectual predecessor al-Afghani, who were in opposition to the Islamic clergy. But neither al-Afghani, nor Arslan perceived Islam as a pre-industrial culture, to be adapted to the demands of the scientific and technological era. Dogma remained central to their reflections. This operates with abstractions which cannot be verified by analysis. In this respect, it does not consciously deliberate on its social functions or context but tends to apply itself categorically. Being considered universal and hence non-contextual in applicability, it supposes indefinite boundaries of interpretation.

This interpretation holds captive the social function of Islamic dogma and its response to the penetration of the modern world through its superior scientific and technical culture. This is not reflected in modern Islamic thought, which remains in the custody of dogma. Islamic modernists who discussed the problem of the common points of Islam and modern scientific and technical culture, never succeeded in going beyond the dogma. In as much as truth cannot contain contradictions, since, on the one hand, truth is God, and on the other, science by its very nature is also based on truth, it can be concluded that Islam does not contradict science. But for Islam, as well as for any other religion, the method of knowing truth consists mainly in commenting on the religious texts, which are announced as "sacred," or on the works of commentators on these texts. The scientific method is far from the religious exegesis: reconciliation remains within the framework of religious dogma.

The attempt to find a difference between religion as the content of a specific culture and religious consciousness as the form of spirituality shows promise. In the Islamic East, religious consciousness was literally overwhelmed by the traditional forms of faith and religious practice. This religious consciousness must be freed from its fetters, and reflect in such a way as to adapt itself to the conditions and demands of the new century. One of these paths of liberation is cultural renewal, a process which includes, among other things, the modern understanding of Islamic culture.

It is possible to divide all the positions of the supporters of secularization in the Islamic world into following:

1. Today Islam is in need of reformation, which will lead to a separation of the sacral and the political.

2. Secularization will follow this reformation.

3. This process presupposes the development of a culture, characteristic of an industrial society, with a scientific and technological base.

4. As in Europe secularization did not mean the end of Christianity, so in the Islamic East it will not undermine the positions of Islam. Islam will become depoliticized and will be an important part in a wholeness of the social system based on faith.

In contrast to the point of view of Tibi, who sees the differences between Europe and Islamic countries on the level of industrialization, Mercier considers the divergences between North and South to be not simply socioeconomic or connected to the level of industrialization, but to lie rather to lie in the absence of a long tradition in philosophy which is capable of separating and developing outside religious frameworks. Islam and Islamic culture today, to a large degree, are in dire need of such philosophers as Descartes and Kant, who separated the spheres of religion and philosophy (11, p. 109-111).

B. Eisenblatter, in speaking of the differences between a society of believers and non-believers, or the Islamic countries and Europe, remarks that one should consider the differences in mental horizons and conditions of consciousness of these two types of societies which hinder dialogue and communications between them (7, p. 165). Z.N. Mahmoud considers the safest path for Islamic countries to be in their own cultural and philosophical traditions. On the basis of Islamic faith the person can reasonably resolve the emerging problems without support from above. Reason, according to him, and the method of deduction provides objective consideration of facts and the search for appropriate solutions, which are universal and moral, and whose principles and rules depend neither on time, nor on space (1, p. 2).

The pre-Islamic world, says Mahmoud, knew two civilizations: Greek (Western) and Persian (Eastern). Only Alexander the Great, and for only a short time, succeeded in uniting these two civilizations. In the 7th century, with the birth of Islam, the boundaries between East and West were once again eliminated, uniting all humankind. The essence of these unifying tendencies was the Islamic faith, which created citizens of the world, and a new cosmopolitan spirit. In uniting Persian wisdom and Greek reason. Islam generated surprisingly harmonic new civilization, namely, the Islamic.

The intellectual tradition connected to the development of Arabic grammar, the development of various Islamic schools of law, the preservation and enrichment of Ancient philosophical traditions by the famous representatives of Arab-Islamic philosophy, great discoveries in mathematics, astronomy, optics, medicine etc., were formed around the Qur’an. At the same time, there remains a question, which should be carefully studied today: how to compare the cultural history of Islam, which was open to all other cultures, and the modern Islamic culture, which is, objectively, resisting the integration of European and Islamic cultures?

By way of a conclusion, let me make the following suggestion: problems concerning the specific features of the Islamic civilization should be considered not in a context of the opposition of East or West, old or new, past or present, origin or modernity, traditionalism or rationalism, faith or reason, heritage or renewal, religious or national, but on the basis of their interconnections.

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