The historical past of the areas situated at the confluence of Eastern
and Southeastern Europe demonstrate that the cultural and political thought
interaction and unity have always been matched by diversity. This peculiar
situation calls for a thorough analysis to consider local and regional factors,
the evolution of the respective communities under multinational state
administrations, the process of formation of the identities, and last but not
least the interests of the smaller or larger groups. From this viewpoint,
Romania has some distinctive features as compared to other states in the
above-mentioned area. Firstly, her modernization was influenced by France in the
Old Kingdom, and by the former Austrian empire in the regions of Transylvania,
Banat and Bukovina. Secondly, the formation of Romanian national consciousness
reflects the political thinking promoted by Herder and Hegel, namely the German
model. A third aspect is the Byzantine-Orthodox legacy, which is hardly
compatible with the western Catholic, let alone the northern Protestant,
traditions. Last but not least, the traditions and the everyday way of living,
shaped for centuries by the Turkish influence and which often came in
contradiction with those under the Viennese influence, could never be totally
overcome in Romania even after more than a century as an independent state.
The beginning of Romanian modernity coincides with the effort to become
part of European culture. To be more specific, while the Wallachian and
Moldavian intelligentsia adopted the European cultural and
political-administrative models and the Western values, while studying in Paris
during the middle of the 19th century, the Romanian speaking
Transylvanian and Banatian intelligentsias adopted the civil and political
culture professed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1880 to 1914. What are the
differences between the French and the Austrian models?
Romania did not have an educational system that was shared and largely
accessible. Hence, the various social strata had different ways of speaking.
There was faulty communication between the urban and the rural milieus, between
creators and receivers, between the cultural circles and those who aspire to
them. This was due to the parallel assimilation of history, to different family
experiences from one case to another and from one region to another, to the
uncritical acceptance of the past ideologies, and especially to the
“elitism” of a self-sufficient elite which for decades rejected the goals of
the social pedagogy.
Thus far the analyses of the December 1989 has brought more controversy
than understanding. Though the above introduction is necessary, I will approach
the topic from a different perspective in order to circumvent the risk of
partisan interpretations. The efforts of social scientists to provide acceptable
concepts and discourses should not be ignored, especially when the past is at
stake. I prefer a theoretical approach, conceived not so much with the mechanism
of overthrowing the dictatorship than with epic of the events.
Hence, I do not go into the details of the conflicts, nor discuss the
circumstances under which people disappeared or at whose command the
demonstrators were repressed. Rather, I was very interested in the extent to
which changes of December 1989 could be defined through the term:
“revolution”. This approach has as reference point the data selected in
function of their importance to understanding the truth. From “incomplete
revolution” to “entangled
revolution”, from “popular uprising” to “coup
d'etat”, an impressive number of interpretations have been given to what
happened at the end of 1989 in Romania. None seems satisfying; at any rate, I do
not believe that any can cover, fully and credibly, the phenomenon, taking into
account history and sociology.
The description of the events must be matched by an evaluation of the
phenomena in the past and an unambiguous terminology. Only in this way would any
type of definition of an event be possible. One cannot use the term “street
gathering” instead of “revolution”, or “revolution” instead of
“popular uprising”. The meanings
of the words used in an analysis should not be allowed to drift. If
interpretations do not follow some minimal rules, inaccuracy might overwhelm the
reader leading to mistaking the fictitious for the real. Mixing truth and
circumstantial fantasy wonderfully helps ad-hoc
ideologies, confusing people, and atomizing society. Even whenever the
documentation is rich and directly linked to the event, or whenever description
and the awareness of the facts seem to meet the reader's expectations halfway, a
correct understanding of terminology is necessary. Reinhart Koselleck -- the
historian who began a recent trend in Germany and considerably improved the
tools for historical discourse -- believes that the research on concepts has
become a minimal condition of historical knowledge, and that history is a field
of human societal evolution1.
It is useful deciding the universally accepted meaning of the term
“revolution”. The historian,
sociologist, philosopher and political scientist understand “revolution” as
a complete change of administrative structures and of the political ruling
power, which implies a majority of the social group aspiring to the radical
change of a system. I believe that many of us know, or at least accept, on the
ground of rational explanation of the contents, that a revolution also implies a
well-articulated program, a group of political leaders able to take over central
or local power, and a long training in the theory of radical change. I shall try
to explain the political phenomenon of December 1989 starting with the question:
was there or was there not a “revolution” in Romania? Compelling a term to
cover the sum of events only partially uncovered so far is a most strenuous
task.
What can be ascertained if we look to the Timişoara of that moment?
What can be found about what happened in Bucharest in the same December 1989? We
can remark that a civil society, incredibly well preserved under the
dictatorship, existed in Timişoara. There also existed a civic attitude
created by clubs and groups of writers and scientists in the capital city of
Banat region. I described in the second study of this book how years before
‘89 the Phoenix rock band had generated a non-conformist attitude and
opposition to the regime among the younger generation. I also presented how the
Mehala flea market -- where free trade was practiced and merchandise
approximated Western standards -- had a considerable role in reinforcing silent
opposition to the communist regime. I noted the beneficial impact of the media
in neighboring countries (i.e. Yugoslavia and Hungary) inciting the discontent
of the people in Timişoara. The Aktionsgruppe
Banat -- the group of the German writers -- were a landmark of civic
anti-totalitarianism in the 1970's Timişoara, unique in the
nationalist-communist Romania.
Was such a state of spirit -- let us call it “unfavorable” to the
dictator and inducing seething protest -- to cause a revolution? Did there exist
a group that, in the 1980s, might have prepared the ideas necessary for a
revolutionary program, other than the manifestos written by a few brave people
such as poet Petru Ilieşu? Were there identifiable leaders, able to take
over local power, as a professional alternative to the Communist Party staff of
dilettanti? I do not believe that there existed an intelligentsia, a lab where
the great ideas of the 1970s-80s, as expressed by Charter
‘77 in Czechoslovakia, or Solidarnosc
(Solidarity) in Poland, could have been processed. Evidence that Timişoara
was inside the circuit of political ideas specific to Prague, Budapest or Warsaw
is scant. There is enough explanation for the absence of such a group that could
have helped to dub the December ‘89 events a “revolution”.
In Timişoara we can speak about an ample movement against Ceauşescu's
regime, as well as against totalitarianism. This firstly arose because of the
wish for freedom and for a decent private and public life. The people in Timişoara
proved their decision openly to protest against a regime incapable of realizing
the economic and political management of the country. The great ‘89 uprising
in Timişoara reflects such understanding. Timişoara became then the
terrain of an authentic demonstration against Ceauşescu, a bourgh sending a
beam of hope over Romania. Its inhabitants took the political power by surprise.
The huge collective voice of the population sent a clear message of the need to
remove the dictator. The most common slogans during the demonstration in the
Opera Square, should reflect the ideas of the times. “Down with the
dictator!", "We want freedom!", "We want our Christmas star
, not this crazy Tsar!", "We want passports!", "Let him be
judged here in Banat!". But nothing beyond simple change can be induced
from them, no premeditation can be detected. The spontaneous protest movement
suggests no prior leaders and projects carefully thought over in detail or at
least in ideology. Protest focused on freedom should be valued as such, i.e. as
an expression of a marvelous civic spirit that life is not worth living if one
cannot speak his or her mind on the politics of the regime. But, no matter how
valuable such things are, a truly revolutionary program or organization which
could have led to basic change in the state administrative structure did not
exist at the time.
What the people in Timişoara were waiting for was a reaction of
other urban communities in Romania, especially in Bucharest. The time lag
between the uprising in Timişoara and that in Bucharest testifies to the
absence of a revolutionary project meant to overturn Ceauşescu, let alone
the whole regime. It seems important here to note the obvious communist
mechanism for isolating Timişoara from the rest of the country, as well as
of forcefully repressing the movement. The scenario used in repressing the ‘87
uprising in Braşov was considered for Timişoara. All the more
surprising was Ceauşescu's leaving for Iran, which seemed to suggest some
ambiguity in the attitude of clan’s close supporters. The communist structures
in Bucharest seemed not quite to know how to react to the Timişoara
uprising. It also seems rational to suppose that the dictator may have been
misinformed by the communist milieus and the presidential staff as to what
really happened in the capital city of the Banat.
Timişoara’s provincial-city status had never allowed equal
treatment with the capital, Bucharest, a fact proved also during the peaceful
and somewhat democratic developments of the interwar period. It is
characteristic of centralized regimes to exploit the remote provinces and run
them through institutions appointed by the political power. Diplomatically or
militarily to control any type of rebellion was a principle of an older strategy
to which the national communist regime took no exception. And twelve years later
it can be seen better and with less prejudiced that the problem of the
minorities must be taken into account, the revolution in Timişoara was
triggered in Maria Square, in front of the Hungarian Calvinist Church2.
This topic called for continued attention upfront during the dictatorship, and
powerfully echoed in the neighboring countries' media, as well as in the Western
world. The Schwab-German population was in mass emigration, a fact very well
known by the communist leaders.
The same could not be stated about the Hungarian minority in Timişoara,
a population less numerous than the German one. The hostile action by an
individual in some minority population would often be regarded as disloyalty to
the Romanian nation-state. Reverend László Tőkes's protest was directed
against Ceauşescu’s projects meant to destroy the rural civilization in
Transylvania. For ideological reasons the Securitate
initiated the Reverend’s surveillance in the spring of 1989. As a consequence,
the core of the matter was Ceauşescu's opposition to the Hungarians in
Transylvania and Banat, and to Hungary's more liberal politics. Such matters are
not to be overlooked in an accurate understanding and identification of the
political phenomenon. In solidarity with its Reverend, the Calvinist-Reformed
community called for intervention, but the people of Timişoara reacted only
in December ’89: the mixed discontent of the religious community and of the
society at large triggered the spontaneous uprising. In Maria Square, the
vicarage of László Tőkes provided a flame, which the town dwellers
extended over the whole city. It was a totally unexpected civic spirit on the
part of the citizens that led the town December 16th to 21st.
This unexpected link, which made possible the broad popular uprising
possible, was foreseen neither by the Securitate,
nor by the ex-leaders who created in Bucharest a small circle of opponents led
by Silviu Brucan and Ion Iliescu*.
This is seen from the letter of six ex-communist leaders, Brucan among them,
broadcasted through the BBC and Radio Free Europe. It was a protest coming from
inside the Communist Party against Ceauşescu’s dictatorial policy. The
signatories criticized Romania’s economical situation, the country’s
isolation, the official politics regarding minorities and the dictator’s
nationalist orientation. However, it contained no reference to a plan aimed at
replacing the dictator, nor hints as to the places where the popular uprisings
should take place. As an author of the above-mentioned letter, and one who
coordinated the December ‘89 political changes, Silviu Brucan was in no way
connected to the uprising in Timişoara. One can conclude that neither the
popular uprising, nor the institutional conflict in Bucharest can be directly
connected with the events in Timişoara. There exists however a
non-premeditated connection of the respective interests of the two cities. The
movement in Bucharest, starting with the meeting at which Ceauşescu was
driven away, saved Timişoara from an even more cruel repression. Once it
happened this moment could promote a unity of ideals for a larger segment of the
Romanian population. But nothing mentioned thus far is in any way characteristic
of a revolution.
Philosopher Isaiah Berlin says that as long as social forces do not
coordinate based on ideas, they remain "blind and vagrant"3.
The nonexistence of anti-communist programs indicates, at least, inconsistency
of action by the rebelling masses and by leaders entering the public stage after
the initiation of the protest movement. That is how, instead of revolutionary
ideas, reformist ones inspired by Gorbachev’s orientation stole the stage
rather than the trends promoted by Prague, Budapest and Warsaw. The facts speak
for themselves: there were no previously trained leaders for a power takeover,
and no articulate programs, based on the need for change of the communist
regime. The appearance of Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan at the time when the
popular uprising should be directed to some definite goal is well known. The
ex-Communist leaders led the uprising; no revolution could be possible from such
a background. Consistent with this interpretation is the unprepared state of the
intelligentsia at that time and the impossibility of action against the
background of dictatorship and close surveillance of the population by the Securitate.
Let us consider the facts. The popular uprising was triggered in
Bucharest by Nicolae Ceauşescu's discourse delivered in the Palatului Square on December 21, 1989. The idea of organizing a
meeting attended by large masses of people seemed to come from the dictator's
staff. Ceauşescu wanted to temper the masses as a consequence of the Timişoara
uprising which started on December 16. He labeled the protesters as being
traitors. The dictator's speech took no regard either for the discontent and the
tragic situation in Timişoara, or for the state of mind of the Bucharest
people in those days. Even a teenager might have found incredible his promises
about better living conditions. Yet that was the time when great popular protest
had to be quieted. Conflict between the army and the population developed at the
crossroads and major squares of the capital. The citizens built barricades in
defense against military repression. At the moment the state institutions in
Bucharest – just like in Timişoara -- seemed uncertain about the need for
such action and about how all that was to end, no matter how the protesters
acted. Ceauşescu’s abrupt desertion of the communist headquarters and
departure by helicopter on December 22nd, suggests that either part
of the military and political leaders had remained loyal in spite of the
situations of the moment, or his personal guard military elite group betrayed
him. For the latter, a possible argument could be that the dictator himself
mentioned -- during the Tîrgovişte trial -- that he probably had been
betrayed by some of the persons then acting as judges for he could recognize
faces loyal to him up to December 22nd among the people in the room
of his ad-hoc trial. No serious approach of such events can overlook this
argument on the pretext that they belonged to the defeated and not the victor.
What is striking us on the 22nd is not so much the massive protest as
the jailing of the dictator by the communists. Both top military and reformed
communists on the blacklist of the moment involved themselves in that jailing
process which was to precede proper political changes.
The example of Victor Atanasie-Stănculescu (general in the Romanian
Army close to Ceuasescu’s) is major, if not singular. In an interview with
Gelu Voican-Voiculescu4 (member of The National Salvation Front) he
described the executions of the Ceauşescus after a brief trial in Tîrgovişte.
This emphasizes the role, in fact the agreement, of the communist state
institutions in the changes that were to come.
In fact, the anti-Ceauşist desiderata had been stated long before by
Silviu Brucan and his partners in the famous letter already mentioned. The
street protests in Timişoara seemed to have pressed the moment before its
own time, which made the development of a coherent scenario even more difficult.
When such statements are made, one should duly notice that the letter conceived
by the six former communist leaders covered a number of the basic ideas. In
reality, the reform program broadcasted on the national TV station came from
outside the groups who had fought on barricades5. The authors of the
regime reform came into the spotlights under pressure from the street; they were
the outcasts of the communist party, or at best, those acting in the second
line. We shall have never have enough evidence to untangle the web of larger or
smaller details marking the trajectory of power as it passed from one hand to
another. However, a part of such evidence has come into light in the past twelve
years, and apt argument can support it.
Why did the new leaders come to the fore? It is all too possible that the
support offered by the Communist Party, army and Securitate
staff may have been decisive, once they took sided with the protestors in favor
of replacement of those who held the power. Ion Iliescu – leader-to-be of
National Salvation Front (FSN) – was presented by the national TV on the
balcony of the Central Committee headquarters. He was seconded by Petre Roman (a
name unknown at the time), a genuine surprise for the masses of people gathered
in the Palace Square. Iliescu seemed to be a quick and acceptable political
solution against the background of his relative popularity, based in the ‘70s
when he was excluded from the top communist executive. He was well received in
the provinces, as well, his name being invoked in Timişoara as a valid
solution under the circumstances.
Beyond all this, in 1989 the Romanians had little knowledge about
ideologies, which made it difficult for them to be pragmatic. Many citizens had
become co-participants in the development of the events, expressing only a
general wish in the media: let it be done with, the sooner the better. This
explains how the left wing could take over the power, though not without
violence -- immediately after Ceauşescu's arrest; the confused decision
making; and the conflict among institutions and various actors of the old regime
who intended to preserve their positions or even to get more important ones.
Silviu Brucan once said that it would be difficult to prove that the popular
uprising in December ‘89 had a political right wing character. This seems
correct, for how else is one to understand that the calls for reform in Timişoara
and Bucharest proved to have left wing political contents, and the co-ordination
of the masses was done by reformed, ex-communist former leaders.
The Romanian left wing is a topic which needs a thorough examination to
define its limits against the background of the December ‘89 protest movement.
To be more specific, I am considering the effort to the redeem the Marxist
political ideas, an attitude enhanced by Mikhail Gorbachev's political speeches
and his Perestroika in the Soviet
Union.
During the period 1985-1989 I happened to visit frequently homes and
circles of former professors of Socialism in Romanian universities, of
journalists active during the first communist decade, and also of authentic
professors of Marxism. Thus I came to know about their direct or indirect
relations with the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest and with the intelligentsia in
Moscow. They circulated Russian media literature there, just as Hungarian,
German and Serb media literature was circulated in Timişoara.
While in western Romania, the Belgrade and Budapest television broadcasts
became the main source of the world news, in Bucharest, the Moscow television
broadcast was one of the most creditable. There were cases, in such milieus when
I learned how various ex-communist leaders related to one another, at times
happening involuntarily to witness such meetings. It was easy enough to see how
their knowledge and information came from the Moscow media of the time. Some of
the people I am talking about had been in constant contact with Ion Iliescu, a
fact which counted for bravery and could suggest disaffection from the
dictatorship. Professor William Marin, told me of such encounters with Ion
Iliescu and frequent talks on political topics, during the former's brief stay
in Bucharest6. A letter written after 1990, that I came to possess,
testifies that William Marin, a former university professor in Timişoara,
had been in contact with Ion Iliescu long before.
In the house of one of the FSN leaders-to-be, we had a long and open talk
on political issues7 which revealed that in Romania of that time an
attempt existed for at least an alternative to dictatorship. This was a ray of
hope. On the other hand, I found intriguing the ideas that invariably propounded
Moscow as a model, as well as the distance separating the world of the guests
invited there from the world of authentic scholars. Then, it seemed important to
me to discover that our respective university training and cultural backgrounds,
which shaped our thought and ideological propensities, were so far apart.
Various political concepts were circulated there, touched by the Marxist
doctrine, which did not correspond to my Western-oriented views.
Somewhat different was the case of the professors of Marxism, or of the
Marxist historians, I met at that time, yet who had placed themselves at a
distance from the regime, the dictator and his personal dictatorship. They were
valued for their work and able to articulate their thought into some consistent
doctrine, or at least, a decent vision of the contemporary panorama such as
Henri Wald and Paul Cornea in Bucharest, David Prodan and Andrei Roth in Cluj.
The impact of their reflections was imperceptible in the political milieu
invoked above, but quite remarkable for the younger generation of intellectuals
in search of pragmatic models and solutions. They seemed to have nothing in
common with the people surrounding Ion Iliescu. The intelligentsia influenced by
Gorbachev reflected exclusively ideological argument and highlighted impersonal
forces found in all historical events.
A certain slyness of History made it possible for the communists trained
and shaped in the ‘50s to enter a second time into the forefront of public
life in Romania. Taking advantage of their expertise, of favorable political
circumstances and of the ability to reform their discourse, they managed to
advance the first reasonable political program for a post-Ceauşescu regime.
Things were thought up in closed circles, in the absence of the genuine
dissidents and in non-communication with the masses of people, which resulted in
a trail of political confusion and tragic moments in December ‘89. Against the
background of an almost non-existent political culture, or minimal freedom of
expression -- a prerequisite for a critical spirit or a pro-democratic social
layer -- I might reasonably state that no other type of transition could
naturally have developed.
Were the ex-communists interested in preserving power after the dictator
was removed? Today's panorama over the evolution of the Romanian political stage
entitles us to state that the reformed communist left wing retained the
privilege of ruling the state in the new configuration. Unfortunately, Romania
had no creditable alternative to the communist group. As a protagonist of the
December events, Brucan admitted to sheer evidence when he declared with
panache: ‘The train was in the station and we were the only ones who could get
on. What were we to do, say no? So we climbed on.” The question is: how? The
idea of overturning Ceauşescu was no secret, indeed, many knew about it at
the time Gorbachev visited Romania. All the neighboring countries’ events
during the period 1985-1989 heralded the end of dictatorships, if not of
communist regimes. The USSR -- as possessing the most conservative left wing --
understood the signs of the changing times once Gorbachev acceded to power. In
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, forces antagonistic to the communist regimes
had been built throughout the ‘80s, calling for the later defeat of communism.
Romania lagged behind, because of Ceauşescu’s rigid and closed system.
Outer influences had become evident, both in their own way, Timişoara and
Bucharest ranking first in absorbing them, as compared to other towns of the
country. Under such circumstances, the theory of an international conspiracy is
perfectly consistent with a nationalist interpretation, itself contrary to the
political tendency in contemporary Europe.
None of the great powers liked Ceauşescu's regime, and it happened
that in international reunions the Romanian dictator would be disavowed. Direct
or indirect encouragement of the few dissidents who existed was as real as the
discouragement of Romania's state policy by many Western states. Romania's
neighbors were truly worried by the preservation of an anarchical political
system, and the USSR could not have agreed with Bucharest’s anti-Perestroika
policy. Yet, the tabloid journalists, so deft in political, diplomatic and
military scripts, offered a different variant. Conspiracy was in vogue during
dictatorship, and it continued in many milieus through the twelve years after
Ceauşescu was gone.
This later approach was circulated not only by the extremist Greater
Romania Party, but also by a part of the new opinion leaders, such as
journalists, university faculty, writers, politicians, and directors of
institutes researching the communist totalitarianism. No wonder, therefore, that
we read or hear about statements naming as the over-turners of the inconvenient
Romanian dictator "the Westerners", "the Germans", "the
Americans", the "NATO", the "IMF", or the
"Roman-Catholic Church". In other variants, the “mafia” of the
minority population is to be credited for the December '89 popular uprising. Let
us remember the invectives around Tőkés's action, or around the action
related to the supposed role of the Jews, freemasons, Greek-Catholics and
Gypsies in the political change of December ‘89. It may be duly noted that
inventing inside and outside enemies was a concept familiar to Ceuşescu's
political doctrine, and also an old-time practice, specific to dictatorships and
authoritative regimes. If brutal government and discriminatory doctrines are the
means by which totalitarian spirits impose themselves, it is nonetheless true
that the intention of reviving them is frequently met within the obscure circles
of any democratic state.
In countries with a relatively poor pluralist experience, or where
traditionalism is still in power -- as it is the case of Romania – the
"conspiracy paradigm”8 was quickly recovered after 1989.
Anti-Western voices could be heard, and also the idea that the moral authors of
the ex-dictator's murder were the Jews. "Ceauşescu was killed by a
bunch of criminals […] because he was a dignified Romanian, because he defied
the Jews". Other fantasies show the perverted logic of the extremist
national-communists, stating that the post-WWII dictatorship in Romania fell
under the "freemason-Zionist coup in December 1989"9. One
well-known champion of the above theory considers that Ceauşescu was
overthrown following the action taken by irresistible forces, hostile to the
Romanians10.
A group of authors speaks of
a "revolutionary coup d'etat",
meaning that a popular uprising and the coup
d'etat overlapped and inter-conditioned each other11. While the
popular uprising wanted to overthrow communism and return European values, the coup
wanted to replace Ceauşescu. The uprising was spontaneous; the coup
was premeditated months or even years before. The people rebelled non-violently
while the conspirators "based themselves on violence". Finally, the
former aspired to "economic normality, while the ideology of the coup
d’etat meant to set up some Perestroika
type measures following Gorbachev's model12. Definitions are
appealing, attempting to apply classical academic formulas to a political
reality where appearance is often misleading. Were we to consider only the
historical background, we would notice that Romania's politics is difficult to
understand in the absence of a good knowledge of the mentalities particular to
the cultural and ideological area of East-Central and Southeastern Europe13.
A description of the trifling events going on in a burgh such as Timişoara,
indicate that the popular uprising could not have resulted from
"provocative agents" as Ceauşescu stated in his discourse of
December 21st. Timişoara managed to be the hard nut to crack of
the Romanian dictatorship, insisting on the arguments which ruled out the idea
of manipulation in December ‘89. Political scientists who champion such ideas
are not far from the "conspiracy paradigm". Even if they decently
approach the topic of assessing Ceauşescu's Romania, their generalizations
do not contribute to any better knowledge of the overthrow of the national
communist dictatorship. An interpretation lacking both evidence and rational
theoretical arguments is hardly convincing. It does not quench legitimate
inquisitiveness and does not help creative imagination to get an image within
the limits of normality. It is true that Bucharest, if compared to Timişoara,
showed a different composition of social layers. Rural collectivities
transferred to Bucharest of the ‘70s were a lot larger than those in
Transylvania and Banat. Social variance is the specific difference that gives an
important, specific color to the type of uprising in the two cities under
consideration.
In the ‘80s Bucharest was economically disorderly. Civism was a concept
known to, and applied by, only a small percentage of the population. Huge plants
and works, but also public services, with workers scantly trained and lacking a
decent life, all became problematic. The administration was obsolete and could
not cope with the rapidly overcrowding city (over two million inhabitants), and
with the ensuing incapacity to assure minimal lodging, food supply and
transportation. Do these reasons support the idea of manipulation? Are they
background circumstances which determined the state of mind of the people of
Bucharest, a sensitive point where manipulation could have been easily effected?
There is one insufficiently argued hypothesis which would accredit the idea that
events in Bucharest were triggered by a happy interaction between the protesters
and the forces of order. In such a vision, a part of the communist political
leaders and another one of the military leaders staged some provocative action.
Thanks to the National Romanian TV station which
recorded on tape Ceauşescu's last speech and his last meetings we
have a material in need of study in the above sense.
Did popular resistance, when faced by armed detachments, generate a
revolutionary character for the uprising? Barricades in the center of Bucharest
were real, as were the fights and the many dead and wounded. One cannot fake
days on end of protest, nor the anti-Ceauşescu, anti-national-communist
slogans. Masses gathered in the squares of the capital were the true image of
discontent. So how should we interpret such facts? The absence of political
landmarks should be noticed when we talk about masses. On the other hand, we
could even agree that a population lacking a civic attitude hardly ever rebels,
even in difficult living conditions. Consequently, such a population is
vulnerable and subject to manipulation by political and military leaders opposed
to the dictator.
The leader of one of the action groups for overthrowing Ceauşescu in
December ‘89, General Nicolae Militaru, supported such an interpretation. He
said that a coup d'etat was impossible
at the end of the ‘70s, but by ’89 had become so. Why so? Because the moment
had to come when the austerity policy of the national-communist regime made such
action legitimate.
“Militaru allegedly planned a coup
as early as 1984, together with Ion Iliescu and also Ion Ioniţă,
Ministry of the Defense, and János Fazekas a high party activist. Two scenarios
had been considered: either a small group of putschists getting quick support
from the population; or the putsch comes together with a popular uprising which
later would have to be gotten under control”14.
Popular psychology was an ace up the sleeve of many of those who wanted
to overturn Ceauşescu.
Silviu Brucan is a strong case in point. He is one of the ideologists of
the former Romanian Communist Party who knew very well the mass reaction to
various stimuli and made public statements to this effect. In spite of some
fictions he created around the events of December ’89 and his deterministic
logic originating in the Marxist-Leninist theory of history part of his
diagnosis concerning the evolution of the Romanian social segments and political
ideas, remains. He symbolized the
idea of progress in the communist party. He had first-hand knowledge of
political organization and doctrines and longtime contact with the Western world
and diplomacy; he had been the head of Scînteia,
the most important communist newspaper; and thus became the ideologue of 1989
Romania's political metamorphosis.
All during the '90s, Silviu Brucan was one of the most listened to
political analysts in Romania. His opinions being often taken up by the
political powers, thus shaping the way the communist leaders chose to cope with
the new circumstances. The wind of change in 1989 did not blow on political
leadership and cultural models opposed to national-communism. This is important
and is consistent with the fact that non-communist intellectuals did not seize
their chance to ascend to the leadership of the democratic state to be. I will
explain why.
Recent polls, by the Romanian Sociology Institute, show that only 41
percent of the Romanians still believed it was a revolution after all, while 36
percent say it was a coup d'etat and 4
percent suspect something other than the above. The events of 1989 escaped
control; they were scarcely prepared and the minimal plan of the reformist
communists did not apply as designed. Facts prove that the temporary government
-- set up after Ceauşescu was overthrown -- would have been inconceivable
without the reformer ex-communists. Such assessment does not overlook the
disputes of the national communists, those within the army or the advance to
front stage of creditable anti-communist protesters, such as Doina Cornea, Ana
Blandiana and Mircea Dinescu.
What we can say today considering both the events and the rules of the
academic sciences approach is that the popular uprising was accompanied by a coup
d’etat. Ideological change was promoted by the most active and pragmatic
reformist communists; the army and Securitate
supported the protesters. In the absence of the two latter institutions,
Ceauşescu and his regime could not have been felled. The army has been
considered as an example, because almost invariably, the army is liable for the
success, or the failure, of a rebellion against a political regime. "A
government or a party to whose control a country's army is subjected is
politically indestructible"15. In December ‘89 part of the
high officials in the Romanian army turned disloyal to Ceauşescu, which was
decisive for the political change. This explains the coup
d'etat which followed the popular uprising, or interacted with it.
To more thoroughly cover the medley of facts, one more explanation can be
considered, namely that the absence of freedom before ‘89 made impossible the
development of an authentic dissident movement, and the formation of an
intelligentsia which should have been capable of peacefully taking power out of
the hands of the communist party and avoiding bloodshed. Since everything was
still in the hands of the old masters -- even the management of change -- the
term “revolution” for what
happened in December ‘89 can only come through imaginative empathy. The
protests, the indictments, the complaints, all point to poor understanding of
what happened or, at best, to sentimental reference.16 Myths have a
sentimental component; recent or remote history may only be understood based on
rational argument. Therefore an earnest effort at expanding the borders of
knowledge remains always useful, making also possible the observation of the
facts and the assessment of their meaning and value.
Political change immediately following the overthrow of the dictatorship
is worth a thorough examination. The Proclamation,
conceived by the intellectual elite in Timişoara, covered a few basic ideas
which had impact on the development of Romanian political thought. In fact it is
a novel articulate discourse where the specific radical character of any
revolutionary process is obvious, as also is the trend towards a genuine
pluralist democracy. Cohesive with the other East-European countries, the Timişoara
Proclamation advanced the idea of abolishing communist totalitarianism right
then and there.
“We declare ourselves against typical
communist manipulation through class struggle and antagonism of social layers.
The Bolsheviks took the power in 1917 based on the concept of class struggle,
and after 1944 the Romanian communist nomenclature threw one social class
against the other and tore society into shreds, to better control it through
terror”18.
The authors of the Proclamation
were familiar with the proletarian dictatorship manipulation, and connoisseurs
of the Stalinist texts used in Moscow or the Soviets world. This is how they had
the expertise necessary for deconstructing the 20th century left-wing
utopias. One of them, George Şerban, had taught Marxism as a faculty member
in the Social Science Chair of the Polytechnics Institute of Timişoara. As
a consequence, his critique of the old practices was based on pertinent
examinations of the theory of the communist state19. The Proclamation
explicitly states the idea of freeing society of the “captive mind”20.
Decades of nationalist-communism had so brainwashed the Romanians that the Proclamation
actually met with antagonism. Thus the document issued on March 11, 1990 under
the title of Timişoara Proclamation
chose to denounce the indictment of the historical parties, the ideology of
class struggle, the revival of chauvinist nationalism and age discrimination.
The document is valuable as the first to denounce the left-wing reformed
communists' access to power in the Romanian state.
The Proclamation makes it
crystal clear that Timişoara rose "against the whole of the communist
regime and its nomenclature and does not mean to serve as a springboard for a
few anti-Ceauşescu Romanian party communists. Such people climbing to the
top deprive the deaths of the revolutionary heroes of all meaning. They might
have been accepted twelve years ago, if in the 12th Congress of the
Romanian Communist Party they had joined Constantin Pârvulescu (former leader
of the Communist Party, marginalized by Ceauşescu, who opposed the
dictator’s regime) and overthrown the dictatorial clan. They were in top
positions, the moment was ripe, but they chose not to do so”21.
Such judgment should be read considering the circumstances, namely an
ad-hoc government, general instability of the economy, inter-ethnic and
inter-denominational disputes, anonymous threats, scant democracy, mono-cultural
manipulation of opinion, and political apocalypse. The Proclamation
should also be read in the light of conscientious overreaction to the events in
December ‘89. Yet the document shows the maturity of the political discourse
of the new intelligentsia. The remark concerning the risks in the preservation
of the obsolete administrative structures is objective22. What
remains questionable, and cannot be overlooked by an independent analyst is the
Marxist moral-historical theory.
This is only a minimal critical analyze, meant to bring on stage the
significance of the political ideas. Items seven and eight of the document
judges the morality of the communist political class, which is requested to
withdraw until “steady state and national reconciliation” is achieved. Item
seven of the Proclamation literally says, "The cowardice of the reformer
communists in 1979 cost us the hardest ten years of dictatorship and a painful
genocide." The election law was to forbid the right of candidature to
ex-communist and Securitate leaders.
Karl Popper argues that if the moral futurist expresses disagreement with the
moral conservative on the side of the existent power, it is equally true that
the moral conservative can direct his criticism contrariwise. The moral
conservative can say that the moral futurist is a coward for placing himself on
the side of the future power, i.e. of tomorrow's government.
I do not support such a Marxist moral view because there is no law in
sociology which make it simple to choose one moral code or another. Cases such
as the above require compromise. Therefore I will focus on the fact that the
theory of morality, invoked by the Timişoara intellectual elite in the Proclamation,
and based on Marxist ideas, was to generate confusion and ideological dispute.
First of all, it induced in former enrolled communists fear of exclusion from
their various jobs and social positions. It also stirred self-defense in the
ad-hoc government by a show of authoritarianism in contradiction with the
freedom begot in December '89. This will become even more evident if we accept
that at the beginning of 1990 a vengeful, hard wing of the former regime -- a
segment of the nationalist-communist nomenclature -- came upon the public stage.
The Timişoara Proclamation had a
definite positive audience, its political content opening constructive debate,
but it is also received acid criticism. The dispute around the above-mentioned
items came out of insufficient maturation of the population, out of the power's
inability to communicate, and out of an incomplete or callous phrasing in the
document, when it came to changing the leaders.
Let me be understood here. The Proclamation
has definite positive aspects. It said in items nine and ten that economic
reform was a must, as was private economy and better productivity for higher
wages. Moreover, as per item eleven, economic and administrative
decentralization was promoted, as well as experimental implementation of the
market economy in the Timiş County, based on foreign capital attracted
through local expertise of executives. What the authors had in mind was a pilot
structure for the whole of Romania, not a cut off province. George Şerban
expressed his regret for the fact that its supporters diminished the Proclamation’s
value exclusively to item eight, while the document's antagonists abused item
eleven as a pretext for denigration23.
Why was no other town in Romania but Timişoara the vortex of such
change of political ideas? How was it that the first genuinely revolutionary
program appeared first in the Banat region with the formation of the group of
signatories24 in relative contrast to the Bucharest intelligentsia
that took over the power on December ’89? The new type of political discourse
focuses on liberal ideas and on the underdevelopment of political thought
compatible with the ways of Central Europe, freed from communism, and also on
the desideratum for European integration. Such discourse is revolutionary,
propounding the need for deep change. No vision of the document will be correct
unless expressly remarking the non-violent character of the ideals of a segment
of Romanian population's, in contrast with the trend chosen by Ion Iliescu’s
political group. In spite of its positivism, the Timişoara Proclamation was largely misunderstood.
What the document attempted was to generate a positive public opinion in
favor of real change. It is worth mentioning that failures of this revolutionary
intent was due largely to the fact that different regions in Romania held
different political and economic responses to the discomfort created by the
centralist regimes; to the low level of civic spirit of Romania's citizens (only
a few towns rose in rebellion in 1989; the towns which followed Timişoara
were Arad, Lugoj, Sibiu, Cluj, Braşov, Bucharest, Iaşi, and Reşiţa).
The gap between Timişoara’s revolutionary ideals and the poor
accomplishments nationwide in 1989-1999 Romania can be explained through the
persistence of obsolete political and administrative institutions, through the
political antagonisms leading to nothing positive in the real world, through the
inaccurate reading of capitalist ideas. These led to delayed decision making for
economic reform, preservation of the obsolete public administration,
continuation of monopolist ownership of the key strategic economic areas, (i.e.
electricity, coal, gas, metal industry, road building), and continuation of
centralism in state policies concerning most professional areas, all hindering
regional development and private competition. It goes without saying that,
against such a background, Timişoara itself could not function as intended.
Moreover, not only did the estranged old town inhabitants not show up with
investments, as predicted in the Proclamation,
but one important part of the population emigrated to Germany, USA and Canada.
Prejudice and failures thus delayed the appearance of a better competitive
system which would be better able to cope with world competition. Does all this
explain December '89? We have to admit that a good part of the arguments above
are personal in character and provide a brief comment in the light of the
development of political ideas.
1.
See R.Koselleck, "Geschichte", in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, (Stuttgart: Clett-Cotta,
1975).
2.
This does not mean that I tend to state bits of truth as selected
through a grid of minority groups’ political preferences, as I will also avoid
focusing exclusively on the martyrs; overstatement of both the former and the
latter aspects would make creditable research impossible. As to a positive
possible working method for the historian, a liberal philosopher of our century
once said: "Let us not view the past through the victors’ eyes only, but
let us not lean too much on the victims, as if truth and justice were the
secured privilege of martyrs and minorities. Briefly, let us try to be fair,
even when a whole squadron of people are at stake.” See Isaiah Berlin, Four
Essays on Liberty, translated into Romanian by Laurenţiu Ştefan-Scalat,
foreword by Mihail Radu Solcan, (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1996), p. 183. Twelve
years after the events in 1989 people tend to either one trend of interpretation
or another, therefore the assessment of events is far from settling on the right
position and from getting general approval from the Romanian audience.
3.
See Isaiah Berlin, Patru eseuri
despre libertate (Four Essays on Liberty), translated by Laurenţiu
Ştefan-Scalat, foreword by Mihail Radu Solcan, (Bucharest: Humanitas,
1996).
4.
Profeţii despre trecut
[Prophesies on the Past], “ProTv” Television broadcast,
Bucharest, December 5th, 1999.
5.
See Octavian Paler and Gelu Voican Voiculescu, over the hidden side of
the Romanian revolution (I), in the Curentul
daily, Bucharest, December 13th, 1999, p. 13.
6.
Professor William Marin was a Marxist-oriented historian in Timişoara
University with whom I was in close contact in the ‘70s to the ‘90s. We were
not friends, nor did I share all of his views; yet, surprisingly, I often found
out that he had an understanding at variance with his colleagues or the official
communists. Beyond our disagreements over concepts, our relation was legitimate
in our common attempt to fight the chauvinist-nationalist and anti-Semitism
cultivated by the old regime. William Marin was well read in the German media
and well informed on the social-democracy trend. He had benefited from a
scholarship from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the German Social-Democrat
Party. He had also deep understanding of the USSR in the '90s.
7.
It is about Professor N.S. Dumitru, one of the persons who took part in
the first provisional political team set up in state power in December '89.
8.
See a general analysis of the topic in George Voicu, "Paradigma
conspiraţionistă" [The Conspiracy Paradigm], in "Sfera
politicii", nr.70, 71-72, 73-74. According to philosopher Karl Popper
“Conspiracies do exist, undeniably. But what is remarkable, and in spite of
all evidence, denies the theory, is the fact that few come to a good end.
Conspirators seldom see their work through”. According to The Open Society and its Enemies, II, Hegel & Marx, (London:
Routledge, 1966), see the translation into Romanian, by D. Stoianovici, Societatea
deschisă şi duşmanii săi, vol II, (Bucharest: Humanitas,
1993), p. 108.
9.
Radu Theodoru, Nazismul sionist
[Zionist Nazism], (Alma Tip Publishing
House, 1997); according to George Voicu, l.c.,
in Sfera politicii, no. 73-74, p. 69.
10.
Ion Coja, Marele manipulator
şi asasinarea lui Culianu, Ceauşescu, Iorga [The Great Manipulator and
the Assassination of Culianu, Ceauşescu and Iorga], (Bucharest: Miracol
Publishing House, 1999), pp. 205 and 249, according to George Voicu, l.c., in Sfera politicii, no. 71-72, p. 65. (Ion Coja teaches linguistics in
Bucharest University, and is a regular contributor to the România Mare [Greater Romania] extreme-right and nationalist
review).
11.
Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Revoluţia
neterminată [Revolution Without
an End], (Bucharest: Fundaţia
Culturală Româna Press, 1999), p. 159.
12.
Ibidem, p. 160.
13.
See Victor Neumann, “Die bürgerliche Kultur in Siebenbürgen und im
Banat: Die Rolle Temesvars in den
politischen Umgestaltungsprozessen vom Dezember 1989”, translated from
Romanian into German by Herbert-Werner Mühlroth, in Halbjahresschrift
für südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik, 11. Jahrgang,
Heft Nr.1, Mai 1999, pp. 38-51. See also the study of this book entitled:
“Civic Culture in Banat and Transylvania: The Role of Timisoara in the 1989
Transformation of Political Order”.
14.
Anneli Ute Gabanyi, l.c., p.
162.
15.
Thomas H. Greene, Comparative
Revolutionary Movements. Search for Theory and Justice, Englewood Cliffs,
1984, p. 129, according to Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Revoluţia neterminată, [Revolution
Without an End], (Bucharest: Fundaţia Culturală Română
Press, 1999), p. 171.
16.
Isaiah Berlin, op. cit.
17.
Proclamaţia de la Timişoara. The
Proclamation of Timişoara. La
Proclamation de Timişoara. Die
Proklamation von Temeswar, March 11, 1990, the "Timişoara
Society”, 1994.
18.
Ibidem, p. 10.
19.
For a recent analysis on
Marx’s philosophy see Paul Ricoeur, L'ideologie
et l'Utopie (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1997), pp. 41-149.
20.
The purpose of the Timişoara
Proclamation was to explain the reasons underlying the December '89
uprising, as well as to offer minimal doctrinaire landmarks for the next stage.
We will confine ourselves to placing such projects in the context of the
Romanian political thought at the end of the '90s.
21.
See item 7 in Timişoara
Proclamation, p. 12.
22.
Ibidem, item 8, p. 12. The item
quoted was that the new elections law should deny to former communist party and Securitate
leaders the right to run for Parliament or for Presidency, for the following
twelve years.
23.
See George Şerban, “Afterword” in Timişoara
Proclamation, p. 41.
24.
George Şerban, the main author of the Proclamation, not only belonged to a new generation, but also to a
new school of thought and mentality. G. Şerban, graduated from the
History-Philosophy Department of the Al.I.Cuza
University in Iaşi, Romania. At the end of the '70s he moved to Timişoara,
where he was quickly adopted into the socio-cultural life of the city due to his
family contacts and his interpersonal skills. He had some managerial and
ideological expertise as a former leader of the Communist Students'
Association in Iaşi and put these to good use. In the '80s he
co-operated in the Forum Studenţesc [Student
Forum] Review, and meanwhile made
efforts to study modern European history and its revolutionary processes. He was
particularly interested in the 1945-1948 process of the communists taking power.
Writer and critic Alexandra Indrieş, one of the prominent figures in
Timisoara's cultural life, was his mentor. As a former political prisoner, an
open minded and flawlessly moral person, Alexandra Indrieş was for many
young people of the '80 an intellectual to measure oneself against. To George
Şerban she was a true model, and also the person who connected him with the
civic society of Timişoara. After 1989 the two continued to work together
in editing the revolutionary newspaper Timişoara.
References
BERLIN, I.-- Patru eseuri despre
libertate (Four Essays on Liberty), translated by Laurenţiu Ştefan-Scalat,
foreword by Mihail Radu Solcan, (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1996).
GABANYI, A.U. -- Revoluţia
neterminată [Revolution Without an End], (Bucharest: The Romanian
Cultural Foundation Press, 1999).
GREEN, T. H. -- Comparative
Revolutionary Movements. Search for Theory and Justice.
(Englewood Cliffs, 1984).
KOSELLECK, R. -- "Geschichte", in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, (Stuttgart: Clett-Cotta, 1975).
NEUMANN, V. -- “Die bürgerliche Kultur in Siebenbürgen und im Banat:
Die Rolle Temesvars in den
politischen Umgestaltungsprozessen vom Dezember 1989”, translation from
Romanian by Herbert-Werner Mühlroth, in Halbjahresschrift
für südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik, 11. Jahrgang,
Heft Nr.1, Mai 1999, p. 38-51.
POPPER, K.R. -- The Open Society
and its Enemies, II, Hegel, Marx, and
the Aftermath, (London: Routledge, 1966). The last edition, the 21st,
is dated 1998. The Romanian translation is done by D.Stoianovici, under the
title Societatea deschisă şi duşmanii
săi. Epoca marilor profeţii:
Hegel şi Marx, volume II, (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993).
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VOICU, G. "Paradigma conspiraţionistă" [The
Conspiracy Paradigm], in Sfera politicii,
no. 70, 71-72, 73-74.
*** Proclamaţia de la Timişoara. The Timişoara Proclamation.
La Proclamation de Timişoara. Die
Proklamation von Temeswar, March 11th, 1990, "Timişoara"
Society, 1994.
* Silviu Brucan was the former editor-in-chief of the main communist daily, Scînteia. Ion Iliescu was the former leader of the Romanian Communist Youth Organization. They both were marginalized by Ceauşescu at the beginning of the ‘70s due to their reformist-communist ideas.