The family is often considered to be a private matter, but its importance is not limited exclusively to the dimensions of private life. In various ways, the family is related to public life upon which it depends and which it influences. The underlying thesis of my paper is that, as the basic social group, the family embraces in itself both that which is private and that which is public.

It is easy to prove such a thesis in the case of a traditional society in which private life is closely related to public life. Whatever happens at public squares is talked about and continued at homes, and vice versa; whatever is going on within the small space of a family is well-known to the whole local society. The bedroom as a symbol of privacy is not so clearly isolated from the market as a symbol of sociality as is the use in modern society.

In modern society that which is private is clearly isolated from what is public; the two spheres of human life are looked upon as being opposite. The family, then, if it wishes to function well must preserve an appropriate distance from public life, think some sociologists, including T. Parsons. He proposed that only one member of the family should be professionally engaged or participate in the social system of public life, lest the balance of a family system be disturbed. T. Parsons' contribution to understanding the family as a system is one aspect of the present presentation of the dichotomy of family and state or society:(1) here the family is regarded as a system of private life, the state-society as a system of public life.

The isolation of what is private from what is public may go so far in modern society that the same individual becomes, as it were, two persons in the two kinds of life. In public life he or she can be open, friendly and helpful with dialogue and democratic attitudes; in private life, however, the same person can be closed, silent, strict, despotic and dictatorial; or perhaps the very opposite may be the case. Rudolf Hess, the commandant of the concentration camp in Oswiecim, is a perfect example of such a dissociation. In marital-family life he was sensitive, tender, direct, ready to help and democratize; in public life he was cool, disinterested, strict, cruel and despotic.

In modern society the family has withdrawn from many spheres of public life, but has not yet given it up. Its withdrawal from public life is particularly evident in the period of abrupt changes in the first phase of the transition between traditional and modern society. When social life gains a certain degree of stability, the family works out new forms of participation in public life; this is the second thesis of the paper.

Family relations with public life are more ephemeral than those with private life, for such participation depends upon social conditioning in the broadest sense of the word, upon systems and political orientation. Family relations with that which is private are much more stable, however: this is the third thesis of the paper.

I will try to prove the above theses first of all in the context of Polish society after World War II. In that period Polish society joined the group of so-called modern societies. The objective index of this process is a growth of the urban population from 27 percent in 1931 to 61 percent in 1987.(2) The complications of the social situation caused by this process were exacerbated by setting up a socialist system based upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism and allegiance with the USSR. As this system was totally alien to the cultural and political heritage, the process of creating relations between the family and the public sphere was much more difficult than in many other modernized countries. That process continued in an especially difficult situation as political and administrative authorities forced the family to withdraw from many spheres of public life by limiting possibilities, against which the family had to defend itself. For instance, there were attempts by the social-political system to tie the family to the place of work, e.g., by organizing infants' nurseries, kindergartens and nationalizing schools. These attempts failed because the family adopted a negative attitude towards them.


Two statements related to our subject follow from observation and empirical research: 1) A great majority of citizens concentrate their aims and activities almost exclusively on their marital-family life and are not interested in public affairs. A successful marital-family life is a value most often chosen by the young generation in a phenomenon called family-centeredness.(3) 2) The family as a social group has withdrawn from many forms of sociality, both those which are basic, such as neighborhood, local relationships and schools, and those which are of broader range, such as political parties and socio-cultural processes.(4) These phenomena are typical of all countries of Europe, but may differ somewhat in their causes. The following appear to play an important role in Poland.

Decrease in Family Size and Growth in Its Individual Character

The family is a small and clearly individual social group; the limits which describe who belongs to it and who does not are very clearly determined by marriage, kinship or a special legal act by virtue of which a person belongs to a family. In the case of the family, then, there is no instability of members, as would be the case in other social groups to which one can be assigned or from which one can resign. The family is a small group to which members constantly belong. In recent decades this group has decreased in number. In 1984 the Polish family consisted of an average of 3.26 persons: a little more in the village (3.45 persons) and a bit less (3.14 persons) in the town.(5)

The Polish family is less isolated from the circles of kinship and neighborhood in comparison to Western countries. It maintains quite frequent and lively contact with relatives of the first degree; with other relatives its contacts are real but more selective on the basis of mutual interests or the vicinity of one's place of residence. Quite often three or four generations live together under the same roof. Such so-called multi-generational families constitute ca 14 percent among the mass of Polish families (ca 20 percent in the village; 10 percent in the town).(6) In many cases they run the house together; this takes place more often in the village (where in 1984, 1167 families formed 100 households) than in the town (where 1078 families formed 199 households).(7)

In view of frequent and rich family contacts one can say that a typical Polish family is a small family consisting of parents and children who still depend upon their parents. Such a family is related to other small families and to relatives who are unmarried. Mutual family relationships are formed according to the principle: "familiarity, but at a distance," "intimacy, but at a distance."(8) The small family wants, as far as is possible, to preserve its individual character: to live in the seclusion of its own house. That family furnishes its apartment and forms the style of its everyday and festive life in a very individual manner. It creates a microworld beyond which only a few things escape, and when they do it is treated as something negative.

The Polish family has created an individual structure for the privacy of life. But this privacy opens rather easily to persons with whom the family members are either related, on friendly terms or acquainted; to keep to themselves is alien to the privacy of the Polish family.

In marital-familial life one can distinguish three kinds of ties: structural-objective, cultural and personal:

1) A structural-objective tie comes as an effect of the existing differences of sex and age among the members of the family; these differences arise in fulfilling different tasks, in achieving the material basis for life and in developing one's household. We can find such a tie first of all in the following relations: parents - children, husband - wife; the type of authority exercised and the way their house is run are some of its aspects.

2) The cultural tie is effected by accepting identical or similar values, norms, patterns of behavior, or different assumptions connected with the outlook on life and various political orientations. This kind of tie manifests itself in various ways of enjoying the cultural output and of acquiring new cultural content, as well as in taking into account the demands of religion and of legal rules. The cultural tie is manifested by the various ways in which people celebrate festivals and festive family occasions, in familial customs, and in whether family members belong to the same or different religious, ideological and political groupings.

3) The personal tie is an outcome of positive emotional experiences, mutual acceptance, mutual guarantees of a sense of security, coming to know each other and aiming at common goals. This tie manifests itself in mutual contact, whether in caring for another person in the family, bringing him or her help and being willing to be with that person. Various research proves that this kind of tie prevails in today's Polish family. Free choice of a spouse is conducive to the development of this tie. At its base is mutual love and a lesser number of so-called "unwanted" children.(9)

The family which is characterized by a personal tie possesses a high degree of consistency and is attractive for its members. They are willing to come back and to spend their time together both at home and outdoors. This enhances the private character of the family life.

The Attitude of the Younger Generation Towards Marriage,

Family and Children

Today young men and women are free to choose their own spouse and to establish their family with fewer family and social pressures than in the past. The young man treats marriage and family more as his personal and private matter. In Western countries this process has gone so far that many young couples live together unwed. They are married in the presence neither of the state authorities nor of religious leaders because they consider marriage to be their private business. In the United States more than two million couples live unwed, in West Germany over 500,000, in Austria ca 70,000. In Poland this phenomena is not so widespread, indeed, there is an opposite tendency: young people decide to live together and have as festive a wedding as possible in both the civil and church orders. Where not so long ago civil marriage was regarded as a legal necessity and was contracted in a very similar manner, today it is a festive secular custom.

There are two manifestations of marriage and family being regarded as a private matter. First, the younger generation searches almost exclusively for personal happiness in marriage and family; at the same time they think that happiness is given by the very fact of establishing a family, rather than by mutual cooperation with their spouse and children. Thus, after some time, if young people have not reached their expected happiness in their family, they break up easily and establish a new one. The increase in the number of divorces has at its base in part this development in a consciousness in the younger generation of marital familial life as a private matter.

In the period from 1960 to 1982 the annual number of divorces increased by 31,892--that is by 215 percent. An especially rapid growth of divorce is recorded in towns: in 1982 out of 1000 newly married couples in towns there were 207.1 divorces (vs. 57.2 in villages); thus, in towns statistically every fifth newly married couple breaks up. This is characteristic especially of such big cities as Warsaw, Wroclaw and Lodz.(10)

A second symptom of this private sense of marriage and family is that children are treated by young couples almost exclusively as the fruit of their mutual love, the fulfillment of their need for parenthood, and as a factor in the personal development of the parents. In fact, religious, marital and social motives to have children rarely play a role. This is one of the causes of the quite sharp decrease in the number of children in the Polish family. More often it is a family with two children; few families have three children; even less have four or more. In villages the number of families with more children is higher.

The fact that attitudes towards a child have become a private matter lies at the base of the rise in the number of abortions. The mother or both parents take this decision upon themselves when they conceive a child beyond their planned number of children or when the child is conceived in an unsuitable time. The Abortion Act, introduced in 1956, turned the child over to its mother or parents to do with whatever they please, including killing it. The legislation treats the number of children in the family as simply a private matter for the married couple.

Characteristics of Polish Society

In Poland, as in many other countries, social life has lost its general character and has been divided into particular sectors which have begun to function independently of one another. Hence, now we have the following sectors: production-trade-consumption, upbringing and education, work and culture, health and life environment, tradition and the past, and even religious outlook on life and morality. All these sectors now have lives of their own. We may add to these general civilizational and cultural changes in postwar Poland other changes, namely, those in the socio-political system. Based upon the alliance with the Soviet Union the new socialist authorities began to introduce, with all available means and methods, the principles of Marxism-Leninism throughout social and private life. New social structures were established and new social inequalities formed. Step by step citizens were deprived of the subjective character of political life and limited in their public activity.

As a result of all these changes, social life in the broadest sense of the word became very complicated, obscure and bureaucratic, leading to an atmosphere of uncertainty and indifference. Many citizens started to run away to such safer and "more humane" regions as groups of friends, informal groups and above all the family. This tendency to escape was aggravated in the 70s and remained till the end of that regime. With the establishment of "Solidarity", interest in public affairs revived strongly and can be observed nowadays when society has a better chance to participate and to take a more active part in many spheres of social life.

The young generation "escaped" by clinging to marital-familial life. This phenomenon is clearly observable in the sharp contrast between the images of this kind of life and those of public life which all Poles build up for themselves on the basis of their experience in their job, in government offices, shops or means of transportation. On the other hand, the marital-familial life seems to be a milieu of direct contacts filled with kindness and truth, of creative, free and totally responsible activity, of peace and rest.

There are various symptoms of the young generation's "escape" from public into marital-familial life, among which are: a strong tendency to establish one's own family and the lowering of the age of people who want to marry.

Young people, born and brought up in Poland, simply cannot imagine their life without establishing their own family. Almost all youth between 14 and 25 years of age (98 percent) want to marry. Comparing the present period with the period of non-industrialized, non-bureaucratized and non-socialist Poland, presently the percentage of adults who are married is higher than it was in the past. In 1931 every fifth woman at the age of 30-39 remained single, now every tenth.(11) Not to establish one's own family today is exceptional.

Despite the fact that the period of schooling is longer now and that we favor careful preparation for marriage and family, and even despite the difficulties in getting a flat and finding a job, young Poles establish their families relatively early. In 1982 the average age of women at marriage was 22.2, and in general women were two years younger than their husbands. From the period of 1931-32 up to 1982 the average women's age of marriage was lowered by 1.2 and men's by 2.1 years.(12)

Such a phenomenon that young people establish their family early takes place in all strata of society and also among students. In the 60s marriage among students was an exception; in 1979 over 20,000 students were married;(13) today it is a still more frequent phenomenon. When asked: "Why do you marry so young"? they usually answer: "It is easier to live together." For many young people marriage constitutes a kind of refuge, a protection from an unfriendly or even, in their view, sometimes hostile state or society.

The Attitude of the State Towards the Family

Aristotle said that the society or state consists of families and such a standpoint was maintained for ages. While fulfilling many functions, the family was also a strong partner of the state and played an important role in its life. The modern state has abandoned such a principle and based itself on the individual. Being more susceptible to changes and changing one's place of residence and social status more easily, the individual has become the crucial element of the modern state, which bases its development upon the individual. Authorities in the modern state treated the family as the totally private affair of its citizens and almost entirely lost interest in it. Premiers, generals and factory owners do not interfere in the marriage and family affairs of their ministers, officers or workers as was normal in traditional societies. In modern society the family has been left on its own. In the 19th century some held that the state should take care of the family. In that spirit Pope Leo XIII demanded adequate earnings for the family in his encyclical "Rerum Novarum". Despite many opinions that the state should take care of the family, the range of this support remains narrow, even in rich states which can afford it. There is a firm position in these states that marriage and family are exclusively the private affair of the citizens.

In postwar Poland the state's standpoint concerning marriage and family has been varied and incoherent. On the one hand, the socialist authorities tend to tie marriage and family closely with the state in accordance with a Marxist assumption that marriage and family are the basic cells of state life. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency to treat marriage and family as a private matter of citizens. The effect of this is that social policy towards marriage and family has been characterized by discontinuity. According to the party in power, the range of help and protection for the family is increased or reduced. For example, the family was given more help immediately after the war in the very difficult period under B. Beirut than in the prosperous 1970s under E. Gierek.

The second consequence of the standpoint adopted by the socialist authorities towards marriage and family is that they are to a great extent pro-familial in law and rules, while in practice the actual protection and help aimed at the family is small.

Polish authorities obliged themselves to give "as great as possible aid and protection to the family, especially at the time when it is established and in the period when the family is still responsible for the care and education of children dependent upon it."(14) The regulations are still being amended and extended to protect and help marriage and family. In many cases they were introduced earlier and are better than in other countries, though the actual help remains insufficient. Here are some examples:

Maternity benefits provided for women on maternity leave in 1984 equalled on the average 45.6 percent of an average monthly pay in a socialized industry. Child benefits, provided since 1976, in June 1986 constituted barely 8.56 percent of an average monthly pay in a socialized industry. Educational benefits, introduced in 1981, in 1984 constituted barely 1/6th of an average pay in socialized industry. Thus financial help provided for the family by the state is rather symbolic. Non-financial services are also insufficient and less than in other socialist countries, because in Poland less money is spent on non-financial social services. In 1984, 786.9 million was spent on such services, i.e., ca 11 percent of the State revenues. In 1980 somewhat more money was spent in other socialist countries, e.g., in Bulgaria and East Germany over 18 percent, in the USSR over 15 percent, in Czechoslovakia over 13 percent.(15) In the following years the share of non-financial social services in the State revenues was smaller still, which caused a reduction in the State's aid to the family.

The modern state is interested in the family and supports it, especially through different aspects of a so-called population policy, though the purposes of this policy are not always in accord with the family. From the state's point of view, a proper population policy can cause harm to the family in general. Present-day China or some Western countries may serve as examples here. In order to put a stop to the increase in the population, Chinese authorities drastically limited the number of children per family to one. This policy is inconsistent with the whole Chinese culture and may have negative effects for an average family. Some Western countries grant big allowances for the second or third child, but then for the next child they pay less; this can disturb the overall marital and family life. Sometimes the population policy is aimed at the optimum number of citizens or at preparation for life in the State. The care of the family as a whole decreases in importance and is treated almost exclusively as a private matter of the citizens. There is no generally planned infrastructure which could strengthen the ties between the spouses and generations, would be conducive to a just division of labor in the family, would strengthen the stability of moral norms and, finally, would be conducive to cultural development.


The political and broadly social situation in postwar Poland has created new conditions for the family's participation in public life. It was ousted from some domains of public life; it has withdrawn from others; almost by force it was drawn into still others. Since World War II the family has been working out new forms of participation in public life, such as the followingg.

The Family's Participation in Public Life Through the Process

of Socialization

Though there are many definitions of socialization, all express a process of introducing the young generation into social roles (the sociological formulation) or into a system of values, norms and patterns of behavior (the cultural formulation). Because of the relatively coherent set of roles, values, norms and patterns of behavior in traditional society, its process of socialization proceeded relatively easily. In modern society this coherence has been destroyed. In fulfilling socializing tasks the family has to choose between a variety of roles, values, norms and patterns of behavior which often are themselves contradictory. Hence, the family works out a special selective function. In the relatively isolated familial environment the of family members can live according to their own system of values, norms and patterns of behavior in introducing the young generation into social life and social roles. The family can create its own image of man and society and what it passes on to the younger generation in the process of socialization is not indifferent to public life, to the governing party and to opposition groups. Political leaders are perfectly aware of this role of the family.

In introducing political and social changes as rapidly as possible, the legal rules and moral principles regarding marriage and family life are also changed. Though quite often this causes many negative phenomena and weakens the family, the political leaders do not give up; they introduce changes through which they want to shake up the process of socialization in the family. They wanted to lessen the influence on public life which the family exerted in old and long accepted ways. The leaders of the French October Revolution as well as the socialist authorities in Poland after 1945 acted in a similar manner. Together with the change of the system, they began to introduce new legal rules and moral principles in relation to marital and familial life. The most important were the following: marriage and the family were regarded as merely secular institutions; divorce and abortion were encouraged; professional roles were preferred to familial roles; the younger generation was more important than the older one (it went so far that they were placed in opposition); extramarital relations were regarded as morally acceptable if they did no harm to the persons involved; the value of a child was appreciated above all in social rather than personal respects; affairs of state were more important than those of family.

According to much research the majority of Polish families remained religious, attached to tradition and with a strong multi-generational tie. They valued all that is connected with the concept of persons, rather than the concept of citizen; in general they did not accept divorce, extramarital sexual intercourse and abortion (though these phenomena occur quite frequently, this is less frequent than in other countries); they appreciate family above State life.(16) The process of socialization in families which adopt such attitudes undoubtedly influences the form and range of the participation of the average Pole in public life, assuming a dysfunctional role towards public life organized by the State. In recent decades the average person engaged in public life only in so far as was necessary and then only if it satisfied his own needs and convictions; however, he eagerly engaged in public life organized, not by the State, but by society.

Since World War II the family has played an important role in encouraging national traditions and in forming political opinions and social, moral and religious attitudes. Often the family played a more important role than the school, mass media, workshops or clubs. Preserving its own independence towards the State and the public life it organized, the family became a milieu where public life was formed, especially in periods of political pressure exerted by the governing party. Many social and political matters were discussed in the family which were dangerous to discuss in other places. The family organized meetings of political, social and cultural leaders; it created activists for public life and became an important structure for public life.

The Family's Participation in Public Life

Through the Professional Work of Its Members

In modern society the place of work has been separated from the family. This phenomenon has been more frequent and broad because, according to socialist theory, the means of production were nationalized wherever possible. The workplace then was to be more than a mere place for producing material goods; it should be a creative environment of political, social and cultural activity. Acting on these assumptions, the socialist authorities in Poland attempted to engage as many citizens as possible in their industries. Because the workplace was supposed to lead the whole of social and political life, many women were engaged in professional work to enable them to have an opportunity to participate in the totality of life. Thus, today, a very high percentage of women work professionally. In 1983 they constituted 43.7 percent of the total number of people employed in socialized industry; nearly every second worker was a woman, the majority of whom were wives and mothers. About 75 percent of married women earning their living in sectors outside agriculture worked professionally.(17)

Despite the fact that so many members of the family worked, their participation in public life did not increase. There were many political reasons for this, but the motives for which women went to work were important. They did so because their husbands' or fathers' earnings were not enough; few women went to work because they loved professional work, or wanted to broaden their interests, to participate in social life, to be independent financially of their husbands, or to have their own environment and friends.(18) It is such non-material motives that constitute a fuller engagement in public life, but in order to be engaged therein one has to have time and broad interests.

Hence, places of work did not become environments pulsating with public life, as the authors of socialism projected. A considerable change occurred when "Solidarity" was established. Workshops quickly became places of public activity; wives, mothers and whole families joined. Families became interested in what was going on in the workplace, and when needed they supported those who act for the common good.

The Family's Engagement in the Basic Sectors of Modern Society

D. Bell, when describing modern society, says that it is characterized by the development of the health, education, research and State sectors.(19) The family takes an increasingly active and effective role in forming these sectors of public life.

In the health sector the family demands a clean environment, unpolluted food, and home devices which are practical and neither dangerous to use nor expensive. It insists that producers and politicians work in this direction. If this does not bring about needed changes, the family puts the offending devices and goods under a boycott, organizes protest marches, etc.

In the sector of education and research, the presence of the family is becoming more and more important. It tends to create an independent structure for education and child-rearing. It demands the right to organize private kindergartens, schools and independent youth organizations. The family willingly sends its children to summer and winter camps organized by non-State institutions and individual persons, though those organized by the State were less expensive and better equipped. By doing this, the family supports and strengthens cultural and political pluralism.

In the state sector the family manifests its presence by demanding the revision of marital and family law, by putting forward proposals for new acts, and by demanding larger, better equipped and better functioning familial infrastructures.

The family participates in all these sectors on an increasingly wider scale and in a manner different from traditional societies. Today it participates in them not as a single family, but as groups and familial organizations. Here, we can distinguish two types:

The first type represents nationwide family organizations which, in turn, represent families of the whole country. Such an organization is, e.g., the Osterreichischer Familienverband. This is a strong organization that puts pressure on public authorities; indeed it has its own representatives in the government, including the minister for the family. The main task of this organization is to develop family legislation, create family infrastructure, form a positive social opinion concerning the family, and organize and support institutions that give aid to the family. There is no such organization in Poland. There is, however, the Polish Women's League, the Board of Family attached to the People's State Council, and the Polish Episcopate's Committee for Family Affairs. The main purpose of these three organizations is to analyze marriage and the family, and to put forward suggestions for social policy in favor of marriage and the family. In the past the efficacy of these organizations has been poor for they had neither power nor representation in national bodies.

The second type of familial organizations are those on the local level. Their task is to create ties between families, to help to organize kindergartens or special rooms where a small child may stay when its mother is occupied and there is no one with whom to leave her child, to organize meetings of young couples and family weekends, to provide instruction in the areas of marriage and family life or upbringing, etc. Such kinds of organizations and familial groups were established out of religious inspiration and act in connection with the Catholic Church. The most popular are the following:

- Family of Families: established in the 50s, it functions in Warszaw and its vicinity, with ca 3000 (1987) members;

- Home Church: established in 1973 in the context of the Light and Life movement, it has ca 1000 family circles in 26 dioceses (1987);

- Gaudium Vitae: established in 1930, ca 150 women (1987) join this organization annually;

- Alliance of Families, established in 1981, ca 2500 families (1987);

- Solidarity of Families established in 1981;

- Pro Familia: established in 1982.


A Basis for Joining the Private and Public

Dimensions of Family Life

We have discussed here domains of familial life in which the private and public are clearly marked. On the basis of this material we can formulate some more general statements:

a. Present modern societies began to develop along individualistic or collectivist conceptions of social life. Traces of these conceptions are found in legislation, the manner of governing, education and upbringing, industrial life, architecture and the social mechanisms. The consequence is a dichotomy in the understanding of the public and the private. In such a situation it is simply impossible for the family as a basic group in individual and social life to fulfill the role of a link between these two dimensions of human existence.

The situation in which the individualistic conception of social life dominates everything is conducive to the family's deepening its private character. This life style is best expressed by the English saying "My home is my castle." This motto was created in England in the second half of the 19th century when the individualistic conception of social life was stronger. In fact, the family is involved in many activities of a political character, but their ultimate motive is not the common good as the basis of that which is public, but their own or group interest.

In the situation in which the collectivistic conception of social life dominated, the family fled to the private as its refuge for the preservation of its own independence and identity. The family joined public life, which is identified most often with state activity, only to the extent necessary. The family itself organized public life in those dimensions in which the collective social system allowed.

b. It is not impossible to overcome the dichotomy between what is private and public in modern societies, but the only way to do so is to give up the individualistic or collectivistic conceptions of social life. This can be done by adopting a personalist conception of social life. According to this conception every person who wants to develop properly must participate at the same time both in what is private and in that which is public. As these are not only two different spheres of life, but two dimensions of human existence, the family should participate in both of them as the basic group of individual and social life. The family should organize its own life and form its members in such a way as not to lose the dimension of that which is public; public life should be organized in such a way as not to destroy that which is private. These mutual relations can be formulated in the following diagram:


The State



c. The private and the public are interrelated in the family which, however, tends rather to that which is private than to that which is public. In other words, the family is a basic social structure of that which is private, but cannot be closed to that which is public: it should not be deprived of that dimension. The development of that which is private is based upon the family being a small social group with personal and cultural ties. On the other hand, the basis for that which is public is the nature of the family as a social institution.

The Catholic University of Lublin

Lublin, Poland


1. 1. . T. Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 58-112.

2. 2. . Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1939 (The Little Yearbook, 1939), (Warszawa: GUS, 1939), p. 11; Rocznik Statystyenzny (The Yearbook, 1988), (Warszawa: GUS, 1988), p. 39.

3. 3. . W. Adamski, K. Staszynska, "Tozsamosc wartosci a konflikt interesow w relacjach miedzypokoleniowych: polemiki i interpretacja badan" (The Identity of Values and the Conflict Between the Generations: Polemics and Reinterpretation of Research), Kultura i Spoleczenstwo, 4 (1985), 133-148; L. Dyczewski, "System wartosci w swiadomosci mlodego pokolania" (The System of Values in the Consciousness of the Younger Generation), Roczniki Nauk Spolecznych "KUL", 8 (1980), 259-271; L. Dyczewski, Rodzina polska i kierunki jej przemian (The Polish Family and Trends in Its Changes) (Warszawa, 1981), pp. 23-25; W. Socha, "Miejsce rodziny w systemie wartosci moralnych czterech pokolen w Polsce" (Rok, 1984) (The Family in the System of Values of Four Generations in Poland - 1984), Problemy Rodziny, 4 (1985), 3-9; A. Sulek, "Wartosci zyciowe dwoch pokolen" (The Values of Two Generations), Kultura i Spoleczenstwo, 2 (1983), 77-87.

4. 4. . F.X. Kaufmann, "Die gesellschaftliche Situation der heutigen Familie," in: Ehe im Umbruch, A. Beckel, ed. (Munster, 1969), p. 116; G. Wurzbacher, H. Kipp, "Das Verhaltnis von Familie und offentlichen Raum," in Tio Die Familie als Sozialisationsfaktor, G. Wurzbacher, ed. (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 6.

5. 5. . L. Dyczewski, "Polityka rodzinna w Polsce. Stan aktualny i kierunki rozwoju" (The Family Policy in Poland. The Present Situation and the Trends of the Development), Chrzescijanin w Swiecie, 7 (1987), 50.

6. 6. . L. Dyczewski, Rodzina polska, pp. 73-76.

7. 7. . L. Dyczewski, Polityka rodzinna, p. 50.

8. 8. . L. Dyczewski, Wiez pokolen w rodzinie (The Bond Between Generations in the Family), (Warszawa, 1976).

9. 9. . L. Dyczewski, Rodzina polska, pp. 177-194; L. Dakowicz, "Wplyw systemu wartosci na spojnosc wiezi malzenskiej" (The Influence of the System of Values on the Bond Between the Spouses), in: Rodzina jako system interakcji (Lublin, 1988), pp. 153-167.

10. 10. . L. Dyczewski, B. Lachowska, S. Lachowski, "Systuacja kobiety w polskim spoleczenstwie" (The Situation of the Woman in Polish Society), Ateneum Kaplanskie, 2 (1988), 224-228.

11. 11. . L. Dyczewski, Rodzina polska, p. 23.

12. 12. . L. Dyczewski, B. Lachowska, S. Lachowski, "Sytuacja kobiety", p. 222.

13. 13. . "Raport o warunkach startu zyciowego i zawodowego mlodziezymateriaty wyjsciowe" (Report the Conditions of Life and the Professional Conditions of Youth" (Warszawa, 1981), p. 149.

14. 14. . Art. 10, ust. 1 z Paktu Praw Gospodarczych, Spolecznych i Kulturalnych, ratyfikowanego przez Rade Panstwa w dniu 3.03.1977 roku (Art. 10, 1 from The Pact of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).

15. 15. . L. Dyczewski, Polityka rodzinna, pp. 55-58.

16. 16. . Ciaglosc i zmiana tradycji kulturowej (Continuity and Change in the Cultural Tradition), ed., S. Nowak (Warszawa, 1989); L. Dyczewski, "Konflikt kulturowy czy kulturowa kontynuacja pokolen w rodzinie miejskiej" (The Conflict Between Generations or the Continuation of Culture in Modern Family), in: Z badan nad rodzina, ed., T. Kukolowicz (Lublin, 1984), pp. 130-158.

17. 17. . Obliczenia na podstawie Rocznik Statystyczny, 1984. (The Calculation on the Ground of the Yearbook, 1984) (Warszawa: GUS, 1984), p. xxxiv-xxxv; A. Kurzynowski, Aktywizacja zawodowa kobiet zameznych w Polsce Ludowej (The Professional Work of the Married Women in Poland), (Warszawa: 1979), p. 20.

18. 18. . Kobieta w Polsce (The Woman in Poland), (Warszawa: GUS, 1975), p. 75; L. Dyczewski, B. Lachowska, S. Lachowski, "Sytuacja kobiety," pp. 239-241.

19. 19. . F.W. Scharph, "Strukturen der post-industriellen Gesellschaft," Soziale Welt, 1 (1986), 3-24.