CHAPTER III

 

DIALOGUE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

AS A BARRIER AGAINST CASES OF

EXTREME RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

 

MILKO YOUROUKOV

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

                The content of my presentation is closely related to the topic, "Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue," about which this conference is convoked. The title itself offers the dilemma, conflict or dialogue, and it also raises questions. From a religious viewpoint, interesting questions arise, such as, What does dialogue between cultures mean for religions? What are the qualities that make certain attitudes appropriate for dialogue and others inappropriate? How are these attitudes grounded in human conscience? If we want to answer these questions and discuss the issues together, it is because we believe that possible one-sidedness of perspectives and conclusions can be avoided only if we employ philosophy together with all the other humanitarian disciplines, religious studies being one of them. It is in this sense that I would like to express my gratitude to the faculty of philosophy at Sofia University for inviting specialists of different fields to participate in this conference.

                My presentation focuses on the issues of "dialogue" and "conflict" between cultures from a perspective of human attitudes grounded in religious beliefs. The attitudes themselves are considered in the light of a quality which I call "dialogical." This quality is shown as both a feature of human conscience as well as a ground for a particular human attitude. Accordingly, a variety of attitudes that stand between "dialogical" and its opposite—"conflictive"—will be analyzed. In my presentation I proceed according to the following plan of organization: firstly, I pose the question about the relationship between religion and culture and the role of religion with regard to culture. Secondly, the explanation that follows allows me to place religion within culture and then look at the dialogue between cultures in the light of dialogue between religions.

                The dilemma of "dialogue or conflict between cultures" is the second point to be discussed. I link my answer to the dilemma with the issue of "religious fundamentalism," which appears as an item under discussion in the conference list. This is not by chance, since fundamentalism is a highly disputable phenomenon, and its influence cannot be judged as simply positive or simply negative.1 The suggested linkage between religious fundamentalism and interreligious conflicts would predetermine a totally negative interpretation to the former, unless some clarifications are made. Originally, the term fundamentalism would refer to an evangelical, anti-modernist movement from the beginning of the 20th century.2 At that time, the term was used only in a Christian context, but later on, it was applied to other religious movements. As far as Christian-Muslim relations are concerned, a number of scholars of Islam, Muslims as well as Christians, are worried that the term "fundamentalism" could become misleading when it is drawn from the Christian context and applied carelessly to Islam.3 In order to avoid bafflement, further on in this presentation, I offer a brief discussion on the history and meaning of this term. A tendency for an increasingly negative usage of the term "fundamentalism," due to its confusion with some other phenomena, "extremism" being the main one, makes this discussion necessary. Often, the meaning of the terms "fundamentalism" and "extremism" are jumbled, or the terms themselves are used interchangeably without the necessary discrimination. Today's mass media, for example, uses the term "fundamentalist" widely, but often uncritically, to identify a person of the attitude of extremist groups within religions such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism or Hinduism.4 In order to preserve the original (and not necessarily negative) meaning of the term "religious fundamentalism," I choose to use different terms—such as "extreme" or "radical" religious fundamentalism—to which I can attribute most negative influences. Besides, I hold that conflicting situations come to occur when extremism, which is grounded in religious fundamentalism, takes over and predetermines the circumstances for such occurrence. Accordingly, what I call "radical fundamentalism" manifests attitudes that contain fundamentalist as well as extremist features.5  The combination of these two, I believe, provides the basis for most of the interreligious conflicts in the world. With a view of clarity, this presentation discusses the importance of interreligious dialogue between cultures and the usefulness of dialogue for avoiding conflicts, according to three main points, as follows: 

 

1.        In its objectivization, religion represents this essential element, inseparable from culture, on which the establishment develops and the enduring of culture itself depends.

 

2.        The establishment of dialogue between religions is the indispensable condition for the existence and further expansion of intercultural dialogue.

 

3.        Dialogue appears to be the only humanly meaningful option for intercultural and interreligious relations and the only hopeful remedy against further occurrences of interreligious and interethnic conflicts.

 

                To provide evidence for the three statements above, I first stress the vital importance of religion within culture and their factual inseparability. Secondly, I shift the attention from the importance of religion to the importance of interreligious dialogue for the dialogue between cultures. Dialogues between religions and cultures always take place together and can be only distinguished—never separated. To defend this point, I make use of Clifford Geertz's and Peter Berger's theories of religion. Geertz explains religion as a cultural system, while Berger shows its role in human society as a "distinctive lace" in the never completed enterprise of building a "humanly meaningful world."6 

                Finally, the dilemma between dialogue and conflict urged me to demonstrate the incompatibility between the former and the latter and opt for the dialogue. I suggest that interreligious dialogue and extreme religious fundamentalism are incompatible not only as notions, but also as phenomena, and so are the human attitudes that stand behind them. The very objective of intercultural and interreligious relations shows that conflict cannot and must not be an option, otherwise no communication is attainable. On the contrary, interreligious dialogue—which I maintain is intrinsically implied in the dialogue between cultures—cultivates attitudes which are anticonflictive and which facilitate communication. By influencing people in this way, dialogue can be used as a means against the spread of extreme religious fundamentalism throughout the world. I believe that dialogue, when it is successfully established and regularly maintained, can clear away the seeds of the conflictive attitude out of which extreme fundamentalism arises. 

 

Dialogue between Religious Traditions as a Basis for Dialogue

 between Cultures

 

                With this assumption I do not play down the notion of culture. Rather, I intend to emphasize the essential link between culture and religion and the importance of the latter within the former. While religion can be distinguished within culture, it is not a separate element. There is no analysis that can thoroughly clarify the content of these two notions, nor is an exhaustive definition of either of these possible.7 Furthermore, no definition can perfectly determine the distinction between "cultural" and "religious." The paradox always remains: the more deeply we analyze the religious and cultural phenomena, the less complete our analysis becomes, and the less true any definition will sound. This is what Clifford Geertz means when he reports that cultural analysis is "intrinsically incomplete," 8 but I think that Geertz's conclusion applies to the analysis of religion as well. Definitions are not hopeful, but still, a distinction between religion and culture is necessary and thinkable from the viewpoint of meaning. Here, I suggest that, as a cultural system, religion exemplifies the way in which humans seek to accomplish their ideals of liberation and fullness of life.9  As such, religion appears to be a most basic source of meaning within culture, but, in fact, there are many religions in the world, just as there are many cultures. So far, I have used the term religion in general, applying it sometimes in the singular and sometimes in the plural. This double usage can be confusing unless it is explained.

                The term "religion" could be misleading, especially in reference to interreligious dialogue, if it implies only a general notion. In reality, dialogue only occurs between specific representatives of the various religious traditions, and, in this case, one should admit that no religion exists which is not a particular religion.10  What we identify as "religion" is a much broader notion because in every human community some­thing exists that can be called by this name. Until it is objectified and contextualized, however, religion cannot be a "valid object of inquiry or of concern either for the scholar or for the man of faith."11 When externalized, religion stands outside of the subjective consciousness of the individual and attains the character of objective reality, just as the humanly produced cultural world does.12 In its historical contextualization in the human world, religion appears as "religions" which are perceivable only as religious traditions. The dialogue between religions, therefore, means nothing else but a dialogue between religious traditions in which the respective cultures are rooted. Notwithstanding, the general notion of religion is inevitably used when theorizing about religion and its relationship to culture.

                Many scholars believe that culture embraces the totality of all human products and would argue that the notion of culture contains the notion of religion within itself.13  There will be some who would suggest the opposite, namely, that the notion of religion is more basic than the notion of culture.14 I believe that when religion and culture are objectified through and within the society, the contents of these two terms somehow overlap. Just as culture consists of socially established struc­tures of meaning, according to which people do things, so does religion. Accordingly, the importance of religion for culture does not come from the fact that religion comes "first in time" or somehow "before" culture—just like the opposite is not attainable—but rather that it supplies culture with meaning. Peter Berger emphasizes this importance of religion as a source of meaning by describing religion as a “distinctive lace” within culture and society.15 It is only religion that supplies the various sociocultural structures with ultimate meaning and, thereby, keeps all together. Besides, religion has the unique capacity to spur the ultimate sense of rightness in the conscience of the individual with the result of uniting the individual with others for a common religious goal. It is for that reason that distinguished scholars, Panikkar being one of them, regard religion as the content and “soul” of culture.16 Smith, who emphasizes the same idea in an even stronger manner, refers to religion as "the center of the total human orientation to life."17 As such, religion takes the role of a most important guide for humans. By locating human phenomena within a cosmic frame of reference and by applying cosmization to human institutions, religion, in effect, points out the cosmos and its divine laws as the ultimate ground and validation of human nomoi—the rules and principles established to regulate human conduct.18 Once religiously legitimated, the human nomoi become the primary regulators of human society, which provide the necessary order for a further cultural development. The main protagonists of this historical process of consecration and validation--Berger calls it "cosmization in a sacred mode"--are the various religious institutions throughout the world. The persistence of religions from the very beginning, in contrast to some other social and cultural factors, shows religion to be a most basic sociocultural element on which the stability of the society and, thereby, the establishment and development of culture itself depend.19 Through its system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms, religion shapes humans' attitudes toward life and directs the ways in which humans develop, communicate and perpetuate their culture.20 As such, religion appears to be both the social and "anthropological phenomenon par excellence" and, thereby, the basic carrier and transmitter of culture.21 The horizon reached as a result of the dialogue between religions will determine both the basis and the boundaries within which the dialogue of cultures can possibly expand.

                By emphasizing the importance of religion within culture on the one hand and on the other declaring their inseparability, I, in fact, recognize that, in the process of their objectification, culture and religion come into being together. Put in Berger's terms these two both originate in and derive from human subjectivity, which continually produces and reproduces them.22  The dialogue between cultures, then, always alludes to the dialogue between religions and has an essentially religious connotation, and vice versa; any dialogue between religions is inevitably cultural. This is the reason that the establishment of dialogue between religions appears to be such an important condition for the more general dialogue between cultures, but this also mean that, in the case of the occurrence of the former, the latter is always implied.

                So far, I have emphasized the constitutive role of religion and dialogue between religions for the dialogue between cultures while simultaneously confirming the inseparability between interreligious and intercultural dialogues. In the second part of this presentation, I discuss the two basic, but mutually incompatible, subjects of dialogue and conflict; the latter, I assert, is most likely caused by a radical fundamentalist attitude. In this area questions arise such as, "In what does dialogue consist, and what is its purpose?" "What are major attitudes that the praxis of dialogue has already shown?" "How in the light of these attitudes can we interpret the radical attitude that inspires extreme religious fundamentalism?"

               

Hermeneutic Analysis of the Meaning of "Extreme Fundamentalist"

                and "Dialogical" in Reference to Human Attitudes

 

                My second suggestion is that the establishment of dialogue, even at its lowest level, precludes extreme fundamentalism. A discussion on a choice of attitudes that characterize the praxis of dialogue—which I name "dialogical"—becomes necessary in order to evidence this assertion. The discussion will compare these attitudes with the attitude that confronts dialogue. An attempt to explain the criteria of "dialogical" and "conflictive" will be made after the clarification of the etymological meanings of the terms "dialogue," "fundamentalism" and "extremism."

                As a noun "dialogue" derives from the Greek verb "dialegomai" which in philosophical terms refers to an action through which we can reach the "Logos,"or the idea.23 The term "Logos" could also refer to the "divine mind" or "word," if applied in a religious context. In its New Testament usage "dialegomai" was the act of exercising one's powers of argument with a view of reaching the meaning of the Word of God: the Logos revealed in scripture through revelation. If revelation is defined in terms of "comprehensive declaration of the divine will, which sets all life in the light of the divine truth,"24 then the word "dialogue" would have a different connotation in religion than in philosophy. Instead of reasoning with a view of reaching the truth, meaning that would suggest the philosophical usage of "dialogue," its religious use would imply the idea of reasoning upon the already given divine truth. It is in this sense of the word "reasoning" that the verb is used in Acts 17:2, where Paul is said to reason with the Jews from the Scriptures for three Sabbaths. The same meaning of "dialegomai," is implied in Acts 17:17; 18:4, 19; 24:12.25  Today, many scholars define the term, dialogue, in a similar way. Swidler, for example, outlines dialogue as a "conversation proceeding from systematic reasoned reflection upon the religious or ideological convictions between two or more persons with differing views."26 

                Much newer than the word dialogue, the term "fundamentalism" was coined in the United States in the early 20th century to describe first a certain kind of Christianity that was opposed to "modernism" in religion.27 The opposition took expression through a series of pamphlets published between 1910 and 1915, entitled "The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth." These booklets were authored by leading evangelical churchmen and were circulated free of charge among clergymen and seminarians. A "fundamentalist" was defined as anyone who would hold to the "fundamentals." 28 The religious movement, which emerged out of "fundamentalism" was particularly distinguished by its struggle against the Darwinian theories of evolution and its upholding of a literal reading of the Bible. After the late 1950s, the term was applied more broadly to similar tendencies in other religious traditions, particularly in Islam. Today's usage of the term "fundamentalism" shifts its meaning from holding to some religious truths as fundamentals to narrow-mindedness, at best, and an opposition to everything modern that questions and challenges traditional religious teaching. As I have already noted, in its most negative application "fundamentalism" is often used as a synonym of "extremism," but here I will associate the latter with what I call "radical" or "extreme fundamentalism," which is grounded in a certain conflictive attitude. My analysis will show that the "radical fundamentalist attitude" is incompatible with other attitudes, which fit under the term "dialogical."

                In his book, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age, Bruce Lawrence defines fundamentalism as "the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criticism nor reduction; it is expressed through the collective demand that specific credal and ethical dictates derived from scripture be publicly recognized and legally enforced."29  It is the nature of the demand to contain within itself the potential danger of going to extremes when an attempt for the completion of this demand is made. The demand for recognition and enforcement of certain credal and religious dictates over others does not make an exception to this general rule. Instead, the doctrinal support which backs it up makes this religious demand much stronger and, thereby, vulnerable to the danger of extremism. Cases of radical, religious fundamentalism occur when there is a moral acceptance of the violation of another person's rights as a means to an end.30  This acceptance of violation may grow and take some monstrous forms in which terrorizing and even killing others become routine. Generally speaking, people, who represent cases of such extreme Christian or Islamic fundamentalism, claim much more than holding only to the fundamentals of their own faith. In contrast to fundamentalists who see themselves as guardians of the only true interpretation—usually to the exclusion of others' interpretation—of the Bible or the Qur'an, the extreme fundamentalists seem to demand and also enforce their demands by all means. Not only do the latter insist that the Bible or the Qur'an are to be understood as literally true, but also they literally apply some commandments that, they think, are divinely prescribed.31  Extreme fundamentalists consider themselves to be in charge and judges of the nations of the world through a power that comes from the Highest—from God Himself.32  This radical fundamentalist attitude, I argue, is infantile.33  It is based on prematurely motivated human behavior and therefore is always abortive; that is, it inevitably brings the two opposite sides into conflict.  In contrast with this extremist attitude, the attitudes that favor dialogue carry within themselves the eternal principal of maturation and as such are manifestations of a most authentic aspect of human consciousness. Contemporary hermeneutics calls this aspect "dialogical" and considers it to be reflected in the way in which the human mind functions. Humans seem to relate to the world, among themselves and to themselves, in a dialogical way, that is, in a way "absolutely and fundamentally verbal in nature."34  There are different theories that attempt to explain the mechanism of this relatedness, but here I offer only my interpretation of Gadamer's hypothesis to the point, supporting it with some of Tracy's observations.

                While commenting on Aquinas' explanation of the human act of thinking, Gadamer stresses the part when thinking is presented as a form of internal dialogue between human memory and mind. This emphasis allows Gadamer to explain humans as dialogical beings whose internal life represents a continuous dialogue of one's speaking with oneself. The dialogue begins when an emanation—of general notions shaped in words (interpretation mine)—proceeds from the memory and pauses on the mind.35  The words, which reflect the things of the outside world, without however being able to contain them as a whole, bring this reflection to the mind. In the process of thinking the memory does not lose anything, although it gives to the mind, while the mind hurries from one thing to the other, seeking a perfect expression of its thoughts through inquiry. It is this inquiry of the mind that enriches the general concepts meant by the words. During the course of action, thinking goes in parallel with the memory's usage of pre-established words with general meanings and the process of word formation. The three simultaneous operations—those of memory's usage of pre-established words, word formation and thinking—reveal human consciousness as verbal in nature. Human consciousness widens ever more its experience during the process of thinking. This widening is rooted in the reflection of the similarities among things and shows the metaphorical way in which the human mind functions. Gadamer's concept of the inner unity of human thinking and speaking illustrates this great mystery of the human mind, its relationship to itself and to the world. Using the Trinitarian mystery of the Incarnation as a root metaphor for human internal unity, Gadamer assumes: "A person who thinks something—i.e., says it to himself—means by it the thing that he thinks . . . Being that can be understood is language."36  It is in this sense that the American theologian David Tracy describes dialogue as both "a mode of human life and a manifestation of the dialogical reality of all human life."37  Human internal life is “dialogical”; it represents a continuous and never-ceasing conversation. To understand is to interpret, according to Tracy, and to interpret is to converse, to participate in a discourse. 38 Gadamer, for whom the hermeneutical task of interpreting consists of a questioning of things, reflects the same view. Discourse, therefore, always takes a form of question and answer, whereas the essence of the question is to open up possibilities and keep them open until some kind of understanding is achieved.39 The dialectic of questioning and answering always precedes and enables the acts of interpretation and understanding which otherwise are not conceivable.

                This concise review of Gadamer's and Tracy's reflections on human language and thought leads us to some conclusions about how the "dialogical" attitude would refer to the act of understanding which is substantial for human life, in general and for any dialogue, in particular. Thus, if humans are, by their very nature, "conversation beings" who express and understand themselves in a dialogical way, then the acts of "questioning," "reasoning" and "answering," belong essentially to human conscience and its dialogical nature. From the perspective of this most essential aspect of the human psyche, some basic principles can be derived with regard to acts of interpretation and understanding of religious texts:

 

1)       All the texts -- all the more, the traditional religious texts -- are to be interpreted in order to be understood.

2)       No question, or an attempt for clarification, should be considered to be a taboo.

3)       Any exemption from the continual challenge implied by the dialectic of questioning and answering would obstruct the process of understanding and learning and betray what is most genuinely human.

 

                Quite opposite to these dialogical principles, the fundamentalists show an attitude that opposes questioning the sacred texts, and thus maintains a one-sided perspective. Explained in Gadamer's terms, this one-sided perspective comes as a result of the fundamentalists' refusal to employ tradition as a source of ever-prescient understanding. For Gadamer tradition is crucial. The tradition in which one is born and raised historically conditions the initial horizon—that is, one's pre-understanding—that makes interpretation and understanding possible. Understanding is dynamic and represents a constant change of the horizon of the interpreter.40 The radical fundamentalists tend to enforce their one-sided perspective by all means. By denying dialogue and a free interpretation of the sacred texts and by enforcing strict adherence to their literal meaning, extreme fundamentalists resist learning and understanding "how the Bible originally came to be written and collected in the sacred cannon. . ."41  By doing this, fundamentalism ends "in a hermeneutical leap from the Bible to contemporary life."42  The Qur'an represents a different problem from a hermeneutical viewpoint, but still, there is a great deal of tension between the 7th-century Qur'anic prescriptions and the contemporary needs of the Muslim communities. Discussions and interpretations, therefore, are always necessary. The lack of understanding and unwillingness for a dialogue sets the ideal condition for the further deterioration of fundamentalism to the levels of fanaticism and extremism. It is at that level where the false confidence of some presumed infallibility based on scriptural texts encourages radical fundamentalists to feel totally free of guilt even when they do wrong.43  Some quite monstrous forms of radical fundamentalism, characterized with literal interpretation and indiscriminate application of some passages of the sacred texts to the exclusion of others, prove well the statement above.44  By justifying violence as a means of persuasion on the basis of these texts, the extreme fundamentalists fail to justify their behavior as truly religious, especially considering that religion is always about compassion and liberation, rather then oppression and terror. In contrast to the dialogical openness, which comes as a natural, human way of living and thinking, the extreme fundamentalist closeness (to the point of animosity) shows itself as a prematurely motivated and gradually adopted behavior which is alien to what is genuinely human. Conversely, the dialogical approach, manifested in the dialogical attitudes, with its innate openness represents what is most authentic in the human psyche: its dialogical nature.

                From what I have submitted so far, further questions arise, such as, Which attitudes shown during the praxis of dialogue fit under the denominative "dialogical"? Why does the extreme fundamentalist attitude not stand along with the other dialogical attitudes? How should we define extreme religious fundamentalism on the basis of its distinctive attitude?

 

Extreme Religious Fundamentalism Analyzed in Light of the Praxis and Goal

                of Interreligious Dialogue.

 

                My second assertion is that interreligious dialogue and extreme religious fundamentalism are incompatible -- not only as notions, but also as phenomena. From Swidler's definition, it follows that interreligious dialogue takes place among persons who identify with particular religious communities and defend different positions with regard to matters of religion, theology and philosophy. If it is natural for dialogue to manifest a variety of opinions during the discussions, then the question about the conditions of these discussions becomes crucial. On the other hand, there can be no talk about conditions of dialogue unless the issue of tolerance is brought up as a priority. For the adherents of interreligious dialogue, tolerance should become a basic criterion to judge attitudes toward one another and toward others' respective religions.

                The praxis of dialogue has shown several possible attitudes for approaching the other or the other's religion. When theoretically analyzed, these attitudes—which I call "dialogical"—are named: "exclusivism," "inclusivism," "parallelism" and "pluralism."45 In order to reveal the incompatibility between extreme fundamentalism and dialogue, I will first show the incompatibility between their respective attitudes, namely, the radical fundamentalist attitude with the four dialogical attitudes.

                The first attitude is that of the exclusivists, adhering to the fundamentals of their faith as those are revealed in the scriptures. As such the exclusivists can rightly be named fundamentalists in the original usage of this term, in addition to which, however, the sense of narrow-mindedness is also presupposed. On the basis of "God's exclusive language" in scripture, exclusivists declare false anything different from the expression of truth found in their religion. By regarding other religions as "diabolical," or at best as human aberrations, exclusivists carry this name because they exclude any way of salvation different from their own way. The bearers of this attitude seem to underestimate the importance of the fact that human interpretations are strongly subjective. Hence, their exclusion of others or other religions does not appear to be justified, even if God is assumed to speak an exclusive language. It is only by means of interpretation that we determine what God does and does not exclude. In exclusivism, truth is perceived as purely logical, rather than relational with many facets. Today, most of the scholars in the field of religion consider exclusivism to be "an uncritical attitude of an epistemological naivete."46 It is because of these two deficiencies, i.e., lack of mature epistemological reflection and lack of self-criticism, that the exclusivists are so inefficient in their effort to expand the limits of the religious horizon within which exclusivist ideas function. This limited horizon, in turn, affects the exclusivists' capability to participate in interreligious dialogue and renders their participation an exercise in proselytizing, rather than a real dialogue. Nevertheless, the exclusivist attitude can still be identified as dialogical because of the exclusivists' desire to participate in dialogue in order to convert others.

                In contrast to exclusivists, inclusivists hold to the fundamentals of their religion without excluding other religions, or the right of their followers to hold some other particular doctrinal fundamentals. As such, the inclusivists can also be classified under the title "fundamentalists," but not exclusively. Inclusivists hold to the fundamentals of their faith, however, with the awareness of the importance of interpretation for understanding some difficult passages of the scriptures. This is why inclusivists manage to hold both to their religion and to consider positive and true values outside of its domain. Inclusivists, however, believe that their religion includes the whole truth, while other religions contain less truth or are corrupted. An umbrella pattern helping to embrace different thought systems is essential for the inclusivist approach.

                The third attitude, which Panikkar defines as "parallelist," envisions religions running parallel without interfering with each other. In parallelism, the fundamentals of one's own faith are as important as the fundamentals of others' faiths, but still these fundamentals should be finally transcended. The parallelist attitude cannot be defined as "fundamentalist" because, in contrast to the exclusivists' and the inclusivists', attitude it does not consider any priority of holding to the fundamentals of one's own religion before those of some other religions. The variety of religions in the world is justified through the goal of the "eschaton," when, at the very end of human pilgrimage, all different ways of salvation will meet.47 This ultimate meeting will happen for everyone in the depths of one's own tradition. No conversion would be necessary; rather, a deepening in one's own tradition would be required.

                Pluralism is a perspective that recognizes the pluralistic quality of truth, affirming that truth is always relational. Accordingly, the pluralistic approach does not aim at finding a common truth, but rather the connection to truth in a given context. This is what distinguishes pluralism from all the other approaches, namely, that real pluralism can only be applied if we are "confronted with mutually exclusive and respectively contradictory ultimate systems."48 In pluralism the questions arise, as to what is truth and how do we relate to truth rather than whether or not the fundamentals of a certain religion are true? Pluralism emphasizes understanding and harmony. Dialogue, from the pluralist perspective, is never about winning over the other through argumentation and disputation, but only about establishing a proper communication. Instead of aiming at total agreement, pluralism annihilates all problems created by mutual ignorance and misunderstanding.

                 It is necessary to see how these four attitudes stand between the two opposites, "dialogical" and "conflictive." From the summary above it follows that while "exclusivists" can be identified as "fundamentalists," "inclusivists" can be, in a sense, "parallelists" and the "pluralists" cannot be seen as such. Notwithstanding, bearers of all four attitudes participate in dialogue though on different levels and with different objectives. The term "fundamentalist," when this is applied in its original meaning, does not presuppose attitudes that should necessarily be characterized as "anti-dialogical" or "conflictive." It is only when fundamentalism decays to the level of fanaticism and extremism that it becomes incompatible with dialogue. There must be a major difference between the four dialogical attitudes and that attitude which identifies itself as anti-dialogical. My application of the hermeneutic analysis of human conscience shows two key features that characterize the notion of "dialogical," first, the natural desire for understanding and learning and secondly, openness and tolerance that allow such understanding and learning. On the basis of these basic dialogical features and in the light of the goal of dialogue, I will identify the exclusivist attitude as one that represents the lowest level of dialogue. Then I will compare this attitude with the radical fundamentalist attitude and discover what the main differences are between these two.

                While Smith identifies the goal of dialogue with the understanding of the faith of other people, "without weakening our own,"49 Swidler adds another element, that of learning. For the latter the primary purpose of dialogue is that each participant learns from the other so that "both can change and grow."50  "Understanding" and "learning," however, are not possible without tolerance. The comparison between each one of the four groups—"exclusivists," "inclusivists," "parallelists," and "pluralists"—shows that understanding and learning, as well as tolerance, increases when we start from exclusivism and proceed toward pluralism.

                Thus, for example, exclusivists, by ignoring other religions and ideas, limit the area of possible dialogue. Exclusivists justify their disregard by their reference to the exclusivist's particular understanding of truth. Exclusivists fail to recognize that their basis for judging what is true and what is not is their interpretation of truth rather than the truth itself. Exclusivism presupposes general tolerance towards other beings and concern for their salvation but not for their ideas and beliefs. That is why the exclusivists consider proselytizing and missionary work to be the only means through which God's will can be made known and the others saved. Here understanding and learning go in one direction because the exclusivists need not learn about others or understand them. The exclusivists believe that they possess the whole truth; therefore, others are supposed to learn from them and understand them.

                While the exclusivists exclude other religions without enough epistemological reason, the inclusivists include these religions according to their own perspective. By doing so, inclusivists widen the area of discussion although they fail to recognize the independent intellectual content of truth in other religions. Inclusivists show greater tolerance, not only towards others but also towards their ideas and beliefs, with the exception that the latter are considered to reflect the same truth to some lesser degree. Here, understanding of others and their religion has a priority over the proclamation of some religious truth.

                The perspective of parallelists expands further the zone of dialogue. Parallelists are ready to discuss and listen to every religion, regarding them as perfect illustrations of the entire human experience, equal to the other religious traditions. The limitation of the area of dialogue, however, comes from the fact that parallelism assumes no obligation of discussing real problems of interference or mutual influence between religions. The latter is accomplished in pluralism.

                In contrast to inclusivists and exclusivists, parallelists admit the fullness of truth in all religions and, thereby, render proclamation obsolete. Parallelists are more interested in delving into the truth of their own religion, which they think would raise the general level of understanding of other religions. Just like inclusivists, parallelists show tolerance towards others and other religions and ideas. Understanding and learning, according to inclusivists and parallelists, come from both sides of the dialogue. Inclusivists hope to learn from others how the truth of their own religion is manifested through other religions (though to a lesser degree), while parallelists have already understood and learned that truth is equally represented in any religion.

                It is only pluralism that takes into account our factual situation as real and does affirm that "in the actual polarities of our human existence we find our real being."51 Accordingly, if two views are only apparently opposite and allow for a synthesis, we cannot speak of pluralism; rather, we speak of two different, mutually complementary attitudes. The issue of pluralism belongs to the ultimate level of dialogue and truth. As far as the pluralist attitude is concerned, it represents tolerance to such a degree that even totally unbridgeable human claims are conjoined. Pluralists—in contrast to parallelists—do not exclude proclamation, but rather harness it with a view of reaching an ever higher perspective of truth. By raising questions as to whether two mutually exclusive things can both be true, pluralism appears as the greatest manifestation of dialogical openness and thereby the ultimate possible catalyst for deepening dialogue. By allowing even opposite religious claims to be considered as witnesses to the truth, pluralists transcend classical Aristotelian logic, reaching for the very core of discussion about truth and meaning. The goal of dialogue for pluralists is not only proclamation, or learning, or even mutual understanding, but, before all, understanding about understanding. Accordingly, the pluralist attitude manifests the highest possible degree of tolerance, epistemological reflection and hermeneutical concern.

                With the expansion of the boundaries of tolerance and philosophical reflection, the quality of dialogue also changes. On the level of exclusivism, dialogue is superficial, lacking internal connection mainly because each side defends its own position without paying necessary attention to the other side. Dialogue here is on the level of debate. On this level, dialogue is not well-established and can be rightly described as two (or more) different monologues going on at the same time.52  The desire for dialogue is, however, evident. In contrast to exclusivism, inclusivism essentially presupposes, looks for and establishes dialogue. While the exclusivists aim at winning the debate and eventually convincing others to change their position, the inclusivists try to understand others. Understanding, here, has a greater priority than that of persuading others to change their perspectives. With the change of the priorities of the dialogue, from convincing others to understanding them, the character of dialogue also changes from that of debate to a higher level of dialectics. In inclusivism, regression to the level of debate is still possible, but only with an intention of achieving a higher level of understanding through dialectics. The inclusivists' goal of understanding others, by analyzing their religions and ideas under the larger umbrella pattern of some particular perspective, pushes dialogue away from the level of debate to a more sophisticated type of dialogue, i.e., dialectical dialogue. Accordingly, dialogue at the "inclusivists' level" is not superficial and does not consist in different monologues in opposition to one another.

                The parallelists' perspective is the first that precludes the possible development of dialogue at the level of debate, but it remains within the zone of "dialectical dialogue." The pluralist position, however, breaks with "dialectics" and goes to a qualitatively different, dialogical level. At this level questions arise in relation to the nature of truth and meaning rather than which one of two different assertions is true.53

                The question still remains, "What is it that distinguishes the lowest level of dialogical attitude—that of the exclusivists—from the radical fundamentalist attitude?" The first difference between exclusivists and extreme fundamentalists is the concern for others. The exclusivists demonstrate love and concern for the other people, albeit in their particular way, while extreme fundamentalists do not. The exclusivists deny the truthfulness of other religions, yet they want to share the truth of their own religion with others in order to save them. Conversely, extreme fundamentalists do not appear to have love and concern for others. They show an attitude that justifies hatred in the minds of its adherents.54 Furthermore, extreme fundamentalists have been known to kill people for religious reasons. Seen in the light of the previous analyses, the extreme fundamentalists' attitude seems to lack all the various degrees of dialogical openness, understanding and interest for learning, as well as tolerance and concern for the others. Even the most basic degree of existential tolerance -- the human tolerance toward the lives of other human beings -- seems to be missing here, not to mention tolerance and concern for other religions, ideas and values. The extreme fundamentalists' lack of tolerance and concern for others determines the second difference between them and exclusivists: the interest in dialogue itself.

                Whether it is colored with its effort to proselytize or not, the exclusivists' participation in dialogue contrasts sharply with the extremists' rejection of such participation. In contrast to all the other groups that undertake dialogue—exclusivists with a view to proclaim, inclusivists to proclaim and understand, parallelists to deepen in understanding and pluralists to understand understanding itself—the radical fundamentalists deny dialogue. As such, the radical fundamentalists manifest an attitude that goes against the most essential aspect of human conscience, namely, its "dialogical" nature.

                On the basis of these major differences, the radical fundamentalist attitude can be described as an erosion of the natural human need and ability to change and grow, to carry on dialogue within itself and to engage in dialogue with others. Because of its disastrous effect on human beings, extreme fundamentalism can be qualified as both godless and antihuman. When represented in such an extreme, fundamentalism goes not only against human nature, but also against that which people believe God is—Unconditional Love.

 

Conclusion

 

                What has been accomplished so far is believed to be in accordance with the main task initially undertaken: namely, to consider the problem of dialogue between cultures and its impact on religious fundamentalism from a religious perspective. After establishing the necessary link between the notions of "religion" and "culture," this study suggested that interreligious dialogue at all its levels is to be used to avoid the occurrence of extreme cases of religious fundamentalism. Incompatible with the radical attitude that inspires extreme religious fundamentalism, the attitude cultivated by interreligious dialogue proves to be the indispensable basis for the existence and further expansion of intercultural dialogue.

                Secondly, the study affirmed the incompatibility of dialogue and extreme religious fundamentalism. The analysis of the four dialogical attitudes toward others and their religions helped the study to situate extreme fundamentalism in the light of the praxis and goal of dialogue. Besides, this analysis aimed at finding a remedy against the spread of extreme fundamentalism. The antidialogical and radical attitude on which extreme fundamentalism is embedded has unveiled itself as a prematurely motivated and gradually learned, hostile behavior that estranges humans from their true nature and from one another. Only the successfully established and systematically practiced dialogue can combat this ever-premature and infantile human behavior. The gradual decay from fundamentalism to fanaticism and from there to extreme fundamentalism and terrorism represents a long period of intensive brainwashing in which lack of understanding and false motivations finally bring about a particular attitude. It is in the stage of exclusivism—which is, in fact, fundamentalism—when dialogue, in all its aspects, can still prevent such a decline.55  This study has shown these aspects of dialogue to be proclamation, understanding, learning and mutual growth in knowledge and love, as they are manifested in the various attitudes. The argument then shifted to a demonstration of how dialogue, in all of its stages and aspects, precludes fundamentalism. Even the lowest level of dialogue and tolerance, that is, the exclusivist level, proved to be radically different from extreme fundamentalism. The most basic human concern, that for the salvation of others, has been found in all levels of dialogue but not in extreme fundamentalism where it is totally missing. The praxis of dialogue, which essentially implies concern for others, their salvation, their instruction and, finally, their acceptance and their appreciation, appears to be the most hopeful remedy against the further formation of the extreme fundamentalist attitude. 

 

 

 

 

NOTES

 

                1. See the discussion on fundamentalism in William M. Shea, "Catholic Reaction to Fundamentalism," Theological Studies 57 (March, 1996) 264-285. See also John F. Whealon, "Challenging Fundamentalism," America 155 (September 27, 1986) 136-38 as quoted by Shea.

                2. Jaroslav Pelikan, "'Fundamentalism and/or Orthodoxy?' Toward an Understanding of the Fundamentalist Phenomenon," in The Fundamentalist Phenomenon. ed., Norman J. Cohen (Michigan: Grand Rapids, 1990), p. 2.

                3. For more information on the Muslim reaction see S.H.Nasr, “Present Tendencies, Future Trends,” in Islam: The Religious and Political Life of a World Communitv. ed., Marjorie Kelly (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 279. See Fredric M. Denny, Islam and Muslim Community (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 117, about similar concerns by Christian scholars of Islam.

                4. Not only the secular mass-media but also most of the sources of the periodical Christian literature, as well as a number of books written by Christian authors, regard funda­mentalism as a threat, or at best as radically incomplete, or even "false" Christianity, which is inadequate or distorted. For more information see Richard Chilson, Full Chrístianíty: A Catholic Response to Fundamental Questions (New York: Paulist, 1985); O'Meara, Fundamentalism: A Catholic Response; Damien Kraus, “Catholic Funda­mentalism: A Look at the Problem," Living Light 19 (Spring 1982) 8-16; as quoted by Shea, "Catholic," p. 267. Similar is the attitude towards Islamic fundamentalism, which often is confused with extremism and terrorism. The religious fundamentalists are said to prepare military attacks, to hijack, to hold hostages and finally to kill. See James M. Wall, “Shi'ite Fundamentalist Leads '85 Newsmaker," The Christian Century 103 (January 1, 1986) 3-4.

                5. "Radical fundamentalism" refers to those manifestations of "extreme religious fundamentalism" (I will use these two synonyms interchangeably) which are materialized as terrorists' acts, including acts of killing people. By applying the adjectives "radical" and "extreme" I avoid abolishing the positive meaning implied by the term "fundamentalism," whose etymology will be discussed further in this paper.

                6. Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Doubleday, 1967),

p. 28. Berger derives his general theoretical perspective from the sociology of knowledge and applies it to the phenomenon of religion.

                7. Berger believes that definitions, if they are possible at all, can be only more useful or less so, but never "true" or "false." Even the discrepancies between definitions of religions would raise discussion which still is useful. See Ibid., pp. 175, 76.

                8. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 29.

                9. My assertion about religion does not exclude the possibility that some ideologies and even sciences may perform the same role. The question, however, goes deeper: "Up to what level is faith represented in the scientific and ideological endeavor, so that these two represent religious features as well?" Contemporary hermeneutics shows clearly how even in science, which before was considered to be a purely experimental and rational discipline, intuition, personal choice and faith are involved. For more information on the hermeneutical nature of science see David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. (San Francisco. CA: Harper and Raw, 1987), pp. 33, 34.

                10. Every living and healthy religion, Santayana says, "has a marked idiosyncrasy. Its power consists in its special and surprising message and in the bias which that revelation gives to life. . . Any attempt to speak without speaking any particular language is not more hopeless than the attempt to have a religion that shall be no religion in particular. . ." as quoted by Geertz, The Interpretation, p. 87.

                11. Wilfred Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Tradition of Mankind. (1963), p. 15.

                12. Berger, The Sacred pp. 9, 10,

                13. Ibid., p. 6.

                14. Berdiaev, the famous Russian philosopher, thinks that the very name "culture" shows the dependency of the notion of culture, from religion which gives the "cult" that is the root of "cult-ure."

                15. Ibid., p. 3.

                16. Raimundo Panikkar, "La transformacion de la mision cristiana en dialogo." Pliegos de encuentro islamo-crisitano 15 (Madrid: 1992), p. 14. If we agree with Berger that to be in culture means "to share in a particular world of objectivities with others. . ." and that "everything genuinely human—including the need for sharing (emphasis mine)—is ipso facto religious. . ." then we can understand what Panikkar means when talking about religion being the soul of culture. See Berger, The Sacred pp.10, 177.

                17. Smith, The Meaning p.14.

                18. By legitimizing human nomoi, religion also legitimizes social institutions "by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid ontological status." It is in this sense that religion regulates human society which is not only "an outcome of culture, but a necessary condition of the latter." Accordingly, here I do not focus on the question of whether or not religion is a constitutive factor for human well-being, but suggest that it is constitutive for the society and culture. See Berger, The Sacred pp. 10, 32, 33, 182.

                19. Through its "religious acts and religious legitimations, rituals and mythology . . ." religion serves "to recall the traditional meanings embodied in the culture and its major institutions." Ibid., p. 41.

                20. Here, by symbolic forms, I understand and imply Geertz's notion of symbols as embodiments of historically transmitted patterns of meanings communicated from generation to generation. Geertz sees religion as a system of symbols which act "to establish powerful pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations." See Geertz, The Interpretation pp. 90, 119.

                21. Berger, The Sacred, p. 177.

                22. Ibid., p. 9. Berger's understanding of religion as a human projection "grounded in specific infrastructures of human history. . ." does not preclude the logical "possibility that the projected meaning may have an ultimate status, independent of man." For more information see Ibid., pp. 180, 81. 

                23. In Socrates "dialegomai" takes the form of question and answer, which is to carry a conversation directed toward reaching a decision or settlement. The English verb "to confer" is very close to this meaning in its basic uses, such as "to give," "to meet" "to exchange" views or "to negotiate." In Plato and Aristotle the meaning remains generally the same, with the emphasis on "treating" something, or "conferring." In Philo, "dialogue" means nothing more than "conversation" or "speech," and only once does it meant "disputation." For more details see Gottlob Schrenk, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Gergard Friedrich et al. eds. Geoffrey Bromiley tr. (Grand Rapids, MI, WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974) II, 93.

                24. Ibid., p.94

                25. The text of Acts 17:17 better characterizes this usage: "Therefore he reasoned in the synagogue with the Jews and with the Gentile worshipers, and in the market place daily with those who happened to be there."

                26. Leonard Swidler, "Interreligious and Interideological Dialogue: The Matrix for All Systematic Reflection Today," Toward a Universal Theology of Religion ed. Leonard Swidler (Maryknoll, New York 10545: Orbis Books, 1987) p.12. The reason for this opposition was the loss of influence of the traditional revivalism. The decline of revivalism was attributed to the growth of the liberating trends of German biblical criticism as well as to the invasion of Darwinian theories into the field of religion. Claiming a "scientific explanation" of the origin of the universe—as opposed to the traditional religious explanation—the Darwinian theories overstepped the boundaries of science and entered the religious field. They had an enormous influence on people and eventually turned some of them away from religious beliefs. This caused a resistance to these influences from the side of some religious circles. 

                28. The reason for this opposition was the loss of influence of the traditional revivalism. The decline of revivalism was attributed to the growth of the liberating trends of German biblical criticism as well as to the invasion of Darwinian theories into the field of religion. Claiming a "scientific explanation" of the origin of the universe—as opposed to the traditional religious explanation—the Darwinian theories overstepped the boundaries of science and entered the religious field. They had an enormous influence on people, and eventually turned some of them away from the religious beliefs. This caused a resistance to these influences from the side of some religious circles. For Christian believers these fundamentals consist of a five-point formula concerning: 1) the inerrancy and infallibility of the Scriptures; 2) the complete deity of Jesus Christ; 3) the virgin birth; 4) the substitutionary atonement; 5) the physical resurrection of Jesus Christ and his future bodily return to earth. For more details see Pelikan, "Fundamentalism," p. 2. Muslims have their own fundamentals, the main being the inerrancy of their scripture, the Quran.

                29. As quoted by Steven Jones, Fundamentalism [database on-line]; available from http://cti.itc.virginia.edu/~jkh8x/soc257/nrms/fund.htiml; Internet; accessed 30 October 1998, p. 2.

                30. Scott Gibson, "There's Nothing Extreme about Religious Conservatism" No Extremism Here [database on-line]; available from http://www.issuesets.org/chargod.htm; Internet; accessed 03 December 1998.

                31. In the Bible and the Qur'an there are passages that must not be taken literally; see for example Ex. 21:24; Matt. 5:29; Mark 9:47; Qur'an 9:5. An example of such literal usage is the statement made by the radical Islamic fundamentalist Sheikh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin who is leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt. The text which urges Jihad against Americans was published in Al-Quds al-`Arabi on February 23, 1998 and is accessible in Yarom Schweitzer, Osama Bin Ladin: "Wealth Plus Extremism Equals Terrorism" [data-base on line]; available from http://www.ictorg.il/articles/bin-ladin.htm; Internet; accessed 10 January 1998. Applying literally verse 9:5 from the Qur'an and backing it with another verse from the Hadith, and referring these verses to his own mission, Bin Ladin encouraged his followers in the following way: ". . . fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)." Then he quotes the Prophet, Muhammad saying: "I have been sent with the sword between my hands to ensure that no one but God is worshipped, God who put my livelihood under the shadow of my spear and who inflicts humiliation and scorn on those who disobey my orders."

                32. See "Religious Extremism, Religious Truth," Christian Century (December 20-27, 1995) 1235-1237. There we have two reports. One is on Rabin's assassination by Amir and the other reflects the killing of two abortion clinic workers in Brookline by a man. The first of the murderers reported that he had acted "on orders from God," while the second said that he did it "in the name of Jesus."

                33. John O'Donohue, "Fundamentalism: A Psychological Problem," in African Ecciestastical Revíew 29 (1987) 344-52 as quoted by Shea, "Catholic," p. 268.

                34. Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1995), p. 476.

                35. Aquinas' usage of "words" in plural stresses the fact the human word is imperfect in contrast to the word of God, which is always completed and by nature one. Due to their imperfection, human words cannot fully reflect the things of the world. Human words are many and need be constantly renewed, i.e., while some of them die, others are newly formed. See Ibid., pp. 425, 426.

                36. Ibid., pp. 426, 474.

                37. Tracy calls humans "conversation beings." Conversation, for him, is a game in which the player of the game is willing "to follow the question wherever it may go." Conversation, "is not a confrontation. It is not an exam. It is questioning itself." Tracy, Plurality, pp. 18, 28.

                38. Ibid., pp. 9, 20.

                39. Gadamer, Truth , pp. 269,270.

                40. Gadamer explains this dynamism as a movement from "fore-understanding" to "understanding," a back and forth. While the former represents the text being familiar and belonging to a tradition, the latter envisions it as an intended object which is distantiated historically. The play itself is the participatory transformation into the structure of the text which reveals a horizon as a field of vision from a determinate standpoint. The interpreter must surrender his standpoint i.e., his initial horizon of pre-understanding in order to be able to interpret further. The surrender takes form in a fusion of horizons, that of the text with this of the interpreter in which a new understanding is born. Ibid., 281.

                41. As quoted from the "Pastoral Statement on Biblical Fundamentalism" published in Origins 17 (November 5, 1987) 376-77 by Shea, "Catholic," p. 270.

                42. Shea, "Catholic," p. 270

                43. This situation is quite correctly formulated by Tracy who says: "Persons willing to converse are always at one major disadvantage from those who do not. The former always consider the possibility that they may be wrong." Tracy, Plurality, p. 23.

                44. See footnote # 30.

                45. No schema can perfectly distinguish and classify different human attitudes and approaches. Still, with a view of clarity, using theoretical schematizations is useful and necessary. Here, I make use of Panikkar's classification of the variety of approaches that people disclose during the praxis of dialogue.

                46. Panikkar Raimon, The Intra-religious dialogue, (New York, N.Y.: Paulist Press1978), xiv.

                47. Ibid., xvii.

                48. Panikkar, "The Invisible," Toward ed. Swidler, 125.

                49. Smith, The Meaning p.14.

                50. Swidler, "Interreligious," 12.

                51. Panikkar  The Intra-religious, xvii.

                52. Hence, for Swidler the very nature of dialogue forges a systematic reflection upon its object, which in this case is religion (or ideology). This, he says, implies two things: first, that the dialogue is not a debate and secondly, that dialogue is "the most appropriate matrix" within which all thinkers ought to carry out their systematic reflections about the most fundamental things concerning the meaning of life.

                53. In contrast to the "dialectical area," the area of the Logos, characterized by internal struggle between opposites, the "dialogical area" belongs to the zone of Spirit and Myth, where even mutually opposed witnesses to religious experience are accepted.

                54. In his hypertext essay "Why The `Fundamentalist' Approach to Religion Must Be Wrong," Scott Bidstrup quotes Randall Terry, extreme fundamentalist and a founder of Operation Rescue The News-Sentinel, Fort Wayne, Indiana. August 16, 1993. Terry addressed his followers with the following words: "I want you to just let a wave of intolerance wash over you. I want you to let a wave of hatred wash over you. We have a Biblical duty, we are called by God, to conquer this country. We don't want equal time. We don't want pluralism." The text is available from http://pe.net/~bidstrup/religion.htm; Internet; accessed 30 October 1998, p. 1.

                55. In footnote #27 I have already made reference to O'Donohue's article, "Fundamentalism: A Psychological Problem." In this article, he suggests that the only adequate response to fundamentalism—which is for him infantilism—is to invite the fundamentalist, "him or her to grow up, painful and even agonizing though this process must always be." This invitation and process of growing up, I believe, can take place by participating in dialogue. It is only dialogue that lets the fundamentalist stop the process of brainwashing which would keep his or her motivation in an ever-premature stage.

 

 

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