Burhanettin Tatar

It makes sense to talk about dialogue between Islamic and Christian cultures since the academic and political circles have debated the celebrated thesis of "the clash of civilizations," proposed by Samuel P. Huntington.¹ Whether Huntington's thesis validates or invalidates the picture drawn formerly by F. Fukuyama in his work, The End of History and the Last Man, remains an unanswered question.² What interests us here is the general question of whether the differences between the cultures and civilizations (and, of course, religions) can entirely be taken into account as the source of the prophesied clash of civilizations and cultures. And what kind of role do the authoritative texts, specifically sacred scriptures, play in the constitution of this difference between the book-centered,³ i.e., scriptural cultures and societies?⁴

If the aforementioned word “difference” is taken to mean "absolute distance" or "absolute otherness," then talking about dialogue between different cultures and religions would be an inconsequential, theoretical talk about the question of how to bridge an insurmountable gap between them. Nevertheless, when Hegel's celebrated objection -- that to recognize the limit is already to have gone beyond it⁵ -- is applied to this context, we can conceive that the idea of absolute distance or absolute otherness between the cultures is merely a matter of fallacious abstraction. However, if the notion of dialogue is to acquire a practical meaning, we must show that differences between the cultures and religions are rather a condition for a dialogue between them.⁶ Nonetheless, this puts before us a specific question in the context of textual authority, How is it possible for different scriptural cultures to have a constant dialogue with each other by sustaining the differences between the authoritative texts? In this paper, I shall argue that a constant dialogue between the book-centered, i.e., scriptural cultures (and religions) is possible so long as the authoritative texts are interpreted in terms of the horizons, which the texts open with infinite potentiality of their content.

The notion of textual authority seems to lack clarity of meaning when taken in isolation from its historical appearances. This is because the notion of "textual authority" in its practical sense presupposes a community of readers (or hearers) who holds the text as claiming something true;⁷ namely, a text can establish its authority on the mediation of its historical interpretations. If this is the case, since the practical sense of the authoritative text is always situational and contextual, then the locus of the being (meaning) of the text lies in between its written form and its historical interpretations.⁸ Nevertheless, this approach should not be taken as collapsing the being (meaning) of the text into its historical appearances by following the reception hermeneutics⁹ as well as the deconstructionism. Otherwise, the notion of textual authority would be an almost entirely empty one to be filled according to ever-changing contexts. Given that textual authority implies also the historical continuity of the content of the text, we can conceive that text transcends each particular historical horizon by putting up "an invincible resistance to being transformed into the identity of the concept."¹⁰ I will attempt to reveal this by making some brief remarks on the history of the Qur'anic text as an impersonal authority in Islamic societies.

The question of how the Qur'anic text established its authority in the beginning within the pagan Arabic society requires a much deeper examination than what we can conduct here. Obviously, the authority of God as the Supreme Being, the reliability of Muhammad before the advent of Islam, and later his charismatic leadership within the Muslim society played great roles in the establishment of the authority of the Qur'an. However, it should be noted that since both the authority of God and the charismatic leadership of the Prophet Muhammad are considered within the category of personal authority, they differ from the impersonal authority of the Qur'anic text. Given that before the arrival of Islam the Arabs were familiar customarily with personal authorities -- whose legitimacy was based on the oral texts conveyed in the form of narratives (rivay_t) -- we can observe a radical transformation within the Arabic consciousness from the authority of the oral texts (tradition)¹¹ toward the impersonal authority of the written text of the Qur'an.¹²

Indubitably, at the outset, the establishment of the authority of the Qur'an was resisted by the traditional narratives which had historically played a tremendous role in shaping the pagan beliefs of the Arabs. It is interesting to note that, when casting a logical doubt upon the act of legitimization of the common pagan beliefs on the ground of historical narratives, the Qur'an proposed a large narrative according to which all prophets from Adam to Muhammad had conveyed the same divine message throughout the history of mankind. In this sense, it was not revealing a totally new message. But, by maintaining that it was the last message sent by God to humanity, the Qur'an linked the beginning of human history with the end of it on the basis of its content. In this sense, it was the re-“presentation” (Vorstellung) of the divine Truth in human language which God used.

The fusion of human language (temporal) with divine message (eternal) in the case of Qur'an¹³ can be taken as an account for the event-character of the revelation.¹⁴ F. Rahman indicates the immediacy (happening) of the revelation as follows:

We see, then, that the Qur'an and the genesis of the Islamic community occurred in the light of history and against a social-historical background. The Qur'an is a response to that situation, and for most part it consists of moral, religious, and social pronouncements that respond to specific problems confronted in concrete historical situations.¹⁵

The Qur'an was an epoch-making event which designated a discontinuity within the general course (continuity) of history. This discontinuity revealed itself with the Qur'an's re-interpretation of the past history in such a way that what was "true" in the past started to address humanity in a new world view (weltanschauung).⁶ The engaging power of truth, revealed through the Arabic language of the Qur'an, can be seen as the basis of the impersonal authority of the Qur'anic text. The Qur'anic text was apprehended by its first hearers as something which speaks to people, not as something which talks about someone/something else. In other words, the Qur'anic text appeared in the first, not third, person, as a “Thou” facing the “I” of the human beings.¹⁷ Hence, we can observe a kind of dialogical relationship between the Qur'anic text and its hearers.¹⁸ In this dialogical relation, the Qur'an does not exist only as an answer to the problems, as Rahman contended¹⁹ but also as a text which questions the source of the problems, that is, as a text which questions the answers given from a traditional, pagan perspective.²⁰

Nevertheless, due to the variety of reasons, such as sociopolitical, economic, environmental, cultural, etc., the history of Islam has witnessed a diversity of appropriations of the authority of the Qur'anic text. For instance, in the first appearance of the group known as Kharijite, we observe an acute rejection of the mediation of interpretation (personal authority) in such a way that "interpretation" was set as diametrically opposite to the authority of the Qur'an. They expressed this by their strict adherence to the Qur'anic idea that "authority belongs only to God" (la hukma illa li-llah). By virtue of their naive realistic viewpoint, the Kharijite group represents the most radical understanding of the authority of the Qur'anic text. From their perspective, the Qur'an looked to be a text whose meaning was as if wholly present out there – complete and outside of the personal context. While the Kharijite group was eliminating everything human with regard to the authority of the Qur'an, Mu'aviya, the Governor of Damascus and the leader of the group fighting against Khalifa authority of the Qur'anic text, was in favor of his personal political interest.²¹

Shi'ite understanding of the Qur'an revealed itself first by linking the impersonal authority of the written text of the Qur'an with its authoritative (personal) interpretations in an extreme form. Accordingly, the personal authority of Imams became the most authentic mediation of the Qur'anic meaning. From another perspective, Shi'ite understanding can be seen as an interesting example of the mistrustfulness of the interpretations whose legitimacy is based on the common practice of language. Therefore, by establishing the authority of the Qur'an, Shi'a understood the "mediation" of this authority as an extraordinary (epoch-making) event itself.

In contrast to the act of anchoring the meaning (and authority) of the Qur'an within the personal interpretation of Imam in Shi'a, the Zahirites accepted that the authority of the Qur'anic text reveals itself through its literal, apparent meaning as determined by its original historical context.²² To rehabilitate the impersonal authority of the Qur'an and to eliminate every kind of manipulation of the Qur'an for personal interests, they saw it necessary to re-establish the original meaning of the Qur'anic language as practiced in the lifetime of the Prophet. Nevertheless, they failed to see that, with regard to ever-changing contexts, this was, at the same time, paving the way toward restricting the impersonal authority of the Qur'anic text and opening a constantly broadening territory for the personal, and perhaps arbitrary, authority of the interpreters.

In mystical interpretations of the Qur'an, the authority of the sacred text seems to be appropriated in terms of ontology of experience.²³ The Qur'anic text does not stand merely as an "other" over against the community of its interpreters, but it also exists at a different existential level when its "world" is shared/experienced by its particular readers. Hence, it seems possible to differentiate the authority of the text on individual consciousness from its authority on social consciousness. This becomes apparent specifically when the mystics attribute a symbolic function to the textual meaning as appropriated traditionally. If we put aside the extreme trends in Islamic mysticism, we can contend that it would be misleading to argue that the Muslim mystics put the commonly practiced meaning of the sacred text diametrically opposite to its inner appropriation. I suppose they saw it as a one-sided idea that the authority of the Qur'anic text reveals itself basically through the controlling function of language, which is fundamentally social.

No matter how much the variety of appropriations of the Qur'anic text can be detected in the history of Islam, it remains true to contend that Muslim people have understood the text commonly as a divine message to be understood and applied to ever-changing contexts. In short, it is a text which speaks on something which has been already shared by its readers. Perhaps, the most striking feature of the authority of the Qur'anic text is to make its followers turn toward the future by opening an absolute horizon (eternal life before God) with regard to which the accurate meaning of the past and the present will be determined. Accordingly, the Qur'an is a text which constantly creates a tension by reminding us that human being exists in between the ambiguous past and, yet, open future headed for an absolute horizon. Because of this tension which it creates, it is capable of opening new horizons -- and, hence, of establishing its authority -- whenever its meaning is mediated. Therefore, without considering the event-character (immediacy) of what it says, it does not seem possible to have a genuine dialogue with the Qur'anic text.

Consequently, it seems to be a requirement to propose the concept of dynamic identity of Qur'anic text. This dynamism reveals itself in the constant mediation of the authority of the text by ever-changing contexts. The fact that the meaning of the sacred text cannot be totally identified (i.e., presented) within a particular appearance (interpretation) signifies that the oneness of meaning toward the future (other) is an intrinsic feature of the text itself.

In conclusion, we identify basically two features of the authoritative text: (1) the happening (event-character) of its meaning, and (2) its openness toward future (other) interpretations. I presume they reveal the fact that "difference" is an essential ontological dimension of the textual identity. Precisely because of this ontological dimension, it is possible to have a constant dialogue with the text, given that the notion of constant dialogue presupposes the process of contextualization of textual meaning.²⁴ If we really want to have a dialogue with the other (Islamic or Christian) culture, our basic responsibility is, then, to let the authoritative texts speak to us on the problems common to both sides, and never to forget the historicity of our understanding (interpretations) of the texts. The real danger facing dialogue is to attempt to fix a static identity of the texts.

Faculty of Divinity

The University of Ondokui Mayis

Turkey

NOTES

1. Huntington proposed his thesis of "the clash of civilizations" in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), 22-49.

2. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

3. Though the term "the societies of the Book/book" is applied mainly to Muslim, Christian and Jewish societies, it can be broadened to include the societies within which nonreligious text constitutes the basic reference point to the mediation of its particular (authoritative) interpretation.

4. For instance, the contemporary French Catholic theologian, Jacques Jomier, author of The Bible and the Koran, tran., Edward P. Arbez (New York: Desclee, 1964) argues that Islam and Christianity, as products of their respective scriptures, are "two separate worlds." With regard to the respective scriptures (and the doctrines they present), there is fundamentally nothing in common. See for further discussion on his position, F. Peter Ford, Jr., "The Qur'an as Sacred Scripture: An Assessment of Contemporary Christian Perspectives," The Muslim World LXXXIII, No. 2 (April, 1993), 145-146.

5. Hegel directed this objection against the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon.

6. I think the appearance of a work like The Challenge of the Scriptures: The Bible and the Qur'an (New York: Orbis Books, 1989) can be considered as a vindication of this supposition. See it for a philosophical discussion on the role of the "other" as the basis of dialogue and self-reflection. David Tracy, Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1990).

7. Obviously, we do not take into consideration here the notion of "absolute text" which does not presuppose any reader and, hence, is cut off from interpretive context.

8. With this approach, I follow Heidegger's and Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics which view "text" as an autonomous being that reveals itself on the mediation of its interpretations. See H.-G. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation," Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, ed. Diana P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), pp. 21-51; "Religious and Poetical Speaking," in Myth, Symbol, and Reality, ed. Alan M. Olson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), pp. 86-98.

9. Farid Esack and W.C. Smith seem to follow reception hermeneutics when they approach the Qur'anic text. See Farid Esack, "Qur'anic Hermeneutics: Problems and Prospects," The Muslim Middle Eastern Studies, 11:4 (July 1980), 490. I do not see how Smith's argument for the active role of the Qur'an in the history of Islam can be reconciled with his concluding remark that "The meaning of the Qur'an as scripture lies not in the text, but in the minds and hearts of Muslims." Ibid., pp. 498, 505. While in the first argument the Qur'an seems to be an autonomous text, in the concluding remark its being is reduced into the consciousness of the Muslims.

10. Gadamer, "Reflections on My Philosophic Journey," in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed., L.E. Hahn (Illinois: Open Court, 1997), p. 44; see also Gadamer, "Hermeneutics and Logocentrism," in Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, ed. Diana P. Michelfelder and R.E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), pp. 114-125. From this approach, F. Rahman's objective (and functionalist) hermeneutics does not seem to be satisfactory since it bases itself on the subject-object ontology which separates universal meaning from its applications when attempting to disclose self-identical meaning of the Qur'an with regard to its particular historical context. See Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

11. This is not to say that the authority of oral text was diminished within Arabic societies after the event of the Qur'an. In the history of Hadith (tradition of the Prophet), we can observe the continuation of the authority of oral text in the form of narrative. Later, by establishing the so-called authentic Hadith Corpus, Muslim scholars tried to restrict the authority of oral text (hadith) in order to prevent the innovation of hadith on the name of the Prophet. See for further information, Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History, 2nd reprint (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1984).

12. In this context, we do not deal with the question of how the transformation occurred from the Qur'an as an authoritative "discourse" toward the Qur'an as an authoritative "text."

13. Due to this fusion, the Qur'an has been considered also as an event of language, which the doctrine of I'jaz (inimitability of the Qur'an) attempts to clarify. In this context, see Issa J. Boullata, "The Rhetorical Interpretation of the Qur'an: I'jaz and Related Topic," in A. Rippin, Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur'an (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 139-157. This fusion can be considered as the background of the historical theological discussions between the Mu'tazilite and Sunni (orthodox) scholars on the question of whether the Qur'an is the created or uncreated (eternal) speech of Allah.

14. See for the event-character of the Qur'an, Smith, "The True Meaning of Scripture," p. 490; The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), pp. 161-162; Kenneth Cragg, The Event of the Qur'an: Islam in Its Scripture (London: George Allen and Unwin., 1971), 13-17. See for an analysis on Cragg's view of the Qur'an, Andreas D'Souza, "Christian Approaches to the Study of Islam: An Analysis of the Writings of Watt and Cragg," The Bulletin (July-Dec., 1992), 33-80.

15. Rahman, Islam and Modernity, p. 5.

16. Hence, by overlooking the historical effect of the Qur'anic meaning on the tradition of its interpretations, to move from the original historical context to the Qur'anic meaning, as the so-called "occasions of revelation" (Esbab-1 Nuzul) suggests, would be taking the text as one-sided. This is because meaning as an event changes even the sense of its original historical context. For instance, after the advent of Islam, the earlier periods were considered as a period of ignorance (Jahiliyya) and everything in this period was evaluated from this new perspective.

17. Precisely for this reason, Ibn Hazm, the great Zahirite scholar of Cordova, based his linguistic theory "upon an analysis of the imperative mode since, in its most radical and verbal form, the Qur'an, according to Ibn Hazm, is a text controlled by two paradigmatic imperatives, iqra: read, or recite, and qull: tell." E. Said, "The Text, the World, the Critic," in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed., J.V. Harari (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 167-171.

18. In this context, M. Arkoun remarks: "The principal idea is that of a recitation conforming to a discourse that is heard, not read. That is why I prefer to speak of Qur'anic discourse and not of text in the initial phase of enunciation by the Prophet." See M. Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers, trans. and ed. by R.D. Lee (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 30.

19. Rahman, Islam and Modernity, p. 5. I think, it is Rahman's contribution to rehabilitate the hermeneutics of the Qur'an by indicating that the act of interpretation of the Qur'an should start from the consciousness of the problems. In fact, this consciousness was the starting point of the legal hermeneutics of the Qur'an in the first centuries of Islam. Nonetheless, after a while, we can observe that a priority was given to "answers" over against "questions.” In other words, in the following centuries, since the answers were considered as the locus of truth, the questions acquired a negative sense, and hence, the dialectical relation between question and answer was dissolved.

20. Therefore, I think, it is a mistake to approach the Qur'anic meaning only from a functionalist perspective by considering it solely as an answer. Rather, by engaging the power of its questions, the Qur'an resists being taken as a tool "ready to hand,” (Zuhanden), (i.e., manipulability), and being objectified as something "present at hand" (vorhanden), to use Heidegger's language. See also, Arkoun, ibid., p. 34.

21. As this historical phenomenon signifies, it is also possible for text to become "an instrument of authority and a way of excluding others and regulating their access to it." See Michael Gilsenan, Recognizing Islam (New York: 1982), p. 31; Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 161-169. Due to this fact, some Muslim scholars who are critical of Islamic tradition tend to separate "text" from its interpretations.

22. This is because, according to Ibn Hazm, the leading Zahirite scholar, "There exists in language a reality, instituted by God." See R. Arnaldez, "Ibn Hazm," Encyclopedia of Islam, new edition (Leiden: 1979). See for a structuralist analysis of the Zahirite view of the Qur'an, Said, ibid.

23. See G.L. Bruns, Hermeneutics: Ancient and Modern (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 124-136.

24. In this context, Ricoeur accepts that the text must be able to "decontextualize" itself in such a way that it can be "recontextualized" in a new situation. See P. Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans. K. Blamey and J.B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), p. 83. Gadamer refers to this process with his celebrated notion of "fusion of horizons" (Horizontenverschmelzung). See Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 5th ed. (Tübingen: J.B. Mohr, 1986), p. 310, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), p. 305.