CHAPTER VII
THE TENDENCY OF TOLERANCE IN
ISLAMIC-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS
The definition of "tolerance" is
an important part of our project. “Tolerance” can be defined as a policy of
patient forbearance in the presence of something, which is disapproved of or
disliked. Tolerance is the recognition of the necessity to provide opportunities
for other persons to be agents of their own ideas, faiths or behaviors. More
importantly, the principle of tolerance promotes understanding and appreciation
of many values espoused by various religions. On the scale of human relations,
tolerance is not the highest point. It does not include such definitions as
acceptance, openness and complementarity. Donald Freeman states the implicit
message of tolerance: "We don't need you, and would rather that you were
not around, but we will put up with you and leave you alone, so long as you
leave as alone."1
The limits of tolerance are wide and mobile, ranging from indifferent
neglect of "otherness" to the urge to support and protect it. In the
historical sense, tolerance means to concede to a lesser evil in order to avoid
a bigger one; i.e., it always means the priority of one's own values and,
simultaneously, tolerance towards those who are different and often treated as
inferior. Tolerance must be distinguished from freedom precisely because it
implies the existence of something believed to be disagreeable or evil.
Tolerance is not only a policy or legislation, but also the emotional
state of a person. It forms under the influence of social processes, as well as
under individual experience. Tolerance depends on the level of society,
traditionalism or modernity. Traditional society is characterized by its static
nature, where information is transmitted via traditional channels and religion
acts as an influence to maintain national moral values. In such a society the
importation of new ideas is a weak process. In traditional societies, policy and
legislation do not strongly influence the process of forming tolerance. Stronger
and more important are the influences of family tradition, historical
stereotypes and individual experience.
In the case of Islamic-Jewish-Christian dialogue, we have dealt with some
traditional and modern societies. But the theoretical religious basis of all
theological conceptions is nonviolence. The teaching of Islam requires the
Muslim not to be an offender. The Qur’an states: "And you shall not be an
offender, for God does not have offenders." Rather, a Muslim is expected to
be forgiving and tolerant toward those who offend him. The term
“nonviolence” has an equivalent in Arabic, meaning to tolerate others by
saying "you may pardon and forgive, for God is forgiving and
merciful." Islam recognizes the dignity of human beings regardless of
religion, color or sex: "We have given dignity to Adam's children."
Islam recognizes Christianity and the Christian Gospel, Jesus as the
Prophet of God, Judaism and the Torah as given to Moses. Judaism commands
justice and truth, as does Christianity. The holy land and holy city of
Jerusalem, where the empty tomb stands, are the source for many reflections. As
Elias Chacour writes, "First the fundamental belief in human dignity is the
foundation for nonviolence as the primary value of human life. Second, that the
God in whom we believe is not a `regional' God. Third, that God is not a
`tribal' God. We must refuse to say that God is God of the church or Christian,
Muslim or Jewish."2
From this view we understand that the cause of conflict and violence is
not inherent in religion, but is a result of political and economical factors.
Our question is, "What do Muslims (same as Christians and Jews) apply in
their own religious teachings?"
The characteristics of belief give us the possibility to see two
different views -- different degrees of commitment to the practical
implementation of the principle of a given belief. To believe is the same as to
have faith. Faith may be seen and understood in terms of the outcome of two
quite different kinds of experiences. The first kind of experience is faith
through birth into a society or a community where all of the members have a
particular tradition of belief. In contrast the second is faith through personal
conviction, which is a matter of the individual struggling to believe. This
two-faith experience can lead to situations of tension and conflict, in the
second case from the view of Islamic culture and to the integration of society
from the view of Western and American culture. Some scholars admit that Islam
and the West are at opposite poles with respect to human rights and tolerance.
They conclude that notions of right or principle do not guide Islamic culture,
as the West understands them. Governance of personalism and of pragmatism
characterizes Islamic culture, where the ruling authority is "illegitimate
and coercive almost by definition."4
Others admit that "the Islamic world is ill-suited to democratic
conceptions of society and simply does not present the individual with those
opportunities for freedom of action and association that are characteristic of
Western Christianity."5 The other view on this subject, as James
Piscatori concluded, is that "Islamic theory does not present a notion of
the rights of the individual. Rights do not attach to men qua men. It is more
appropriate to refer to the privileges of man."6
The Islamic view seems committed to giving human rights status to freedom
of religion and conscience, so long as those rights are properly restricted
according to traditional teaching. If we would then be allowing Muslims the
right to follow their own conscience and, thus, to act on the internationally
isolated right to religious liberty, we will have two problems here. First,
tolerating all possible policies and views, even the most intolerant ones,
yields a contradictory result, especially when intolerance toward certain
beliefs can be enforced. Equally troublesome will be the case of reciprocal
repression of Muslim minorities in nonMuslim states. From the view of Charles
Amjad-Ali "Without agreeing that a belief in freedom of religion entails
tolerating any belief, even those that enforce intolerance, it does seem that
the cultural differences over this question create some subtleties and
perplexities for human rights advocates that are not present in respect to the
more notorious violations, such as gross mistreatment of prisoners, political
opponents, etc."7 The author concludes that the subject of human
rights, in general, and of religion, in particular, has suffered in the West
from a fashionable, but unconvincing belief in relativism, and in the Islamic
World from a failure to subject the Qur’anic foundations of Islamic faith to
reexamination in light of the issues under consideration here.
Islam concentrated more on the problem of double laws, or two sorts of
laws: "the way off Allah" and "the way of the world.” When we
use the words "the way of the world," we think about differences
between our law and Islamic law. It is meant that "the way of the
world" is the Western way, and we must know how far Islamic law differs
from the Western. The answer is partly given to us in the Qur’an. "Let
there be no compulsion in religion" (2:256) or "As for those who
divide their religion and break up in to sects, thou hast no part in them in the
least: Their offers on with Allah: he will in the end tell the trust of all that
they did" (6:159).
For our discussion on religious conscience and liberty, we must more
deeply research the meaning of Qur’anic text and its realization in
contemporary social life. The case of Salman Rushdi gives us an example of how
far the Arabic world is from the Western conception of religious and human
rights. Also, this case demonstrates for us the deep tension in Islamic
experience between tolerance and pluralistic spirit in the two kinds of
relations: God-person relationship and person-person relationship.
Francis Fukuyama wrote in his famous book, The
End of Historyand the Last Man, that the Islamic fundamentalist revival was
not a case of "traditional values" surviving into the modern age.
"The Islamic revival was rather the nostalgic re-assertion of an older,
purer set of values."8
The definition of "syncretism" has become more popular and more
discussed during the last years. Using this definition is a controversial
subject from the point of view that for every national and religious majority,
it means some kind of loss of identity. The case of the Turkish community gave
strong impulse for the new vision and interpretation of this definition.
During the last 20 years, Western Europe and especially Germany gave us
the case of Arabic-Muslim minority as community. The process of the Muslim
community's integration to society is long but successful. Many famous
researchers think that the culture and religion of the Muslim Turkish migrants
in Germany is a case in point for studying the power and agency of syncretism.
On the one hand, syncretism as a process in the religion of Muslim migrants is
flourishing, but being refuted. On the other hand, syncretism within the
dominant Christian religion and culture is blamed as postmodernism as well as
secularism, but any hybridization between these two main world religions is
highly contested and symbolically loaded.
The Muslim Turkish community's and the German society's views of one another's religiosity and religion are indexical to various other debates of modernity versus traditionalism, secularism versus fundamentalism, liberalism versus conservatism, integration versus ethnic isolation and, finally, racism versus multiculturalism -- debates which are indeed particular and global at the same time.
The case of intermarriage gives to us the possibility for more detailed
understanding of what difference exists in the close contact of the two ethnic
and religious groups. Many surveys on this subject of interfaith marriage open
the basic question, "How can we recognize the other as really other?"
One Christian woman with a Muslim partner, who spoke on educating children in an
interfaith family, said: "[Another speaker] just now said that we,
Christians and Muslims, believe the same. Many respondents think that the utmost
importance for this world that we learn to accept that we do not believe the
same, instead of burying our differences."
A struggle implies there are power factors at work. There is a power
difference when one partner belongs to an ethnic minority. In our typical
interfaith marriage, this power difference works the other way round. Another
factor has to do with the socioeconomic situation of the partners. Often the
European, Christian partner has the better job, better access to housing, and so
on, and is also supported by his/her community. This can cause tensions in the
relationship, which are frequently translated into a struggle about religion.
When the partner who is the more "other" in the relationship feels
he/she is not respected for who he/she is, he/she tries to win back self-respect
by stressing what is central and most sacred to him/her: religion.
Another factor is that interfaith partners are seen as representatives of
their communities. As Ge Speelman from Utrecht University wrote: "The
Turkish Muslim represents the `terrible Turks' who have shaped the history of so
many Eastern European countries. The German wife is the `imperialist European'
whose community has been responsible for so much repression and bloodshed."
Many problems in an interfaith marriage are exactly the same as those
experienced by many other couples.
But what is at stake in the power struggle is not merely the winning of
prestige or an easy life. Interfaith partners are looking for a way to maintain
their identities. In everyone there is an inner core of conviction about who one
is, what the world is, how God is spoken of and how self-respect the identity
chosen for oneself, can be maintained. Loved ones want to be more than merely
"that Christian,” or "that Muslim.” Of course, they are also
"a Christian" and "a Muslim"; much of what we are ties up
with our religious traditions.
Interfaith partners have to face this question of otherness, and it is
the most important question in a dialogue between those of different religions.
Ge Speelman offers four strategies used by couples; she calls them annexation,
yielding, ignoring and negotiating.
Annexation and yielding are complementary. When one partner holds
particularly strong religious convictions, he or she (mostly he/men have more
difficulties in dealing with what is different) tries to convert the partner to
his/her faith and way of life. The other may respond by attempting to annex
her/his partner in turn (these marriages are not likely to last long) or by
gradually yielding to all the demands.
Ignoring is the policy by which both partners, tacitly or not, try to
deal with their differences. It may work for a time but leads to unexpected
surprises when there is a family crisis. It may be a sorrowful experience (a
parent of one partner dies; one partner has to face unemployment), or it may be
joyful (the birth of a first child), but when crises arise, and especially when
children come, real and existing differences cannot always be ignored.
The fourth strategy is the difficult and uncertain one of negotiation,
which is like an open-ended story. Partners keep promising each other things,
going back on their promises, bringing their resources into play in order to get
the upper hand. But that is not the only story. If marriage was only a power
struggle, why be married at all? If interfaith dialogue were only about who gets
the upper hand, where would the world end? How can we be truly reconciled to our
brother and our sister, and how can we be partners in an interfaith marriage or
found a family if that is all there is?
We return to the question: How can we recognize the other as really other
and still be reconciled to him/her? Ge Speelman tries to find an answer in
Christian theology where self-respect is what every human being strives for. And
Christian tradition says that this self-respect is due to every human being
because we are all recognized and respected by God. That is the foundation of
our selfhood and also of the relationship between human beings and God. As the
Psalmist says: God is the One who knows us for what we are (Ps. 139).
Does this self-respect also lead to respect for the otherness of others?
We have learned that there is only one unbroken and indivisible Truth that we
should follow. How can we account for the otherness of others? I hope that these
questions will give an impulse to future investigations.
1. Religious Traditions and Limits of Tolerance. Ed. by L.J. Hammann
and H.M. Buck (Anima Books, 1988), p. 121.
2. Adda Bozeman, The Future of Law
in a Multicultural World (Princeton, 1971), p. 76.
3. Max Steakhouse, Creeds, Society,
and Human Rights (Grand Rapids, 1984), p. 40.
4. James P. Piscatori, "Human Rights in Islamic Political
Cultures," in: Moral Imperatives of
Human Rights (Washington, American University Press, 1980), p. 144.
5. Charles Amjad-Ali, "Text and Interpretation: Superfluity on
Issues of Human Rights," in: Religion
and Human Rights (Geneva, 1996), p. 31.
6. Francis Fukuyama, The End of
History and the Last Man (The Free Press, 1992), p. 236.
7. Charles Amjad-Ali, p. 31.
8. Francis Fukuyama, p. 236.