CHAPTER VIII
TOTALITARIAN DISCOURSE AS
REJECTION OF MODERNITY:
THE ON IRON GUARD, A CASE-STUDY
CONSTANTIN DAVIDESCU
1
"Noi nu dadeam nastere acum unei
miscari, ci aveam gata o miscare pe care
trebuia s’o încadram, s’o disciplinam, s’o
îndoctrinam si s’o conducem în lupta."
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu "Pentru Legionari"
Modernity is the great, original invention of Western Europe, which starts with the Age of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Modernity was born as a new, challenging way of life, opposed to tradition. Its main features are the modern state, the capitalist economy, the individualistic society, the culture of diversity and tolerance and peace as a normal state of being. The embodiment of these principles is liberal democracy.
Since the 16th century, there have been many reactions against modernity, as defined here, but we can classify them into two major categories: traditional conservatism and 20th century totalitarianism. The traditional conservative movements imagined different solutions able to deal with the crisis produced by modernity: religious renewal movements, strengthening of monarchical authority, and reactionary politics. All of them were oriented toward the past, that is to say toward a previous "Golden Age" which was thought to be the age of human happiness, opposed to an age of increasing decay. Gradually, this conservative tendency moderated itself and by doing so succeeded in, at least partially, integrating itself into modernity (19th–20th centuries). The totalitarian movements that appeared in Europe as a consequence of the First World War, represent the most radical anti-modern reaction ever known. They developed as two different versions (Communism and fascism) of the same type of movement, but they both have a common nature, being animated by a teleological political ideology. They were future-oriented, aimed to create ‘the Perfect Society’, and ‘the New Man’, who was to be better than the traditional or modern man.
Both Communists and fascists believed in the existence of historical or natural laws, which govern human destiny, laws that they knew and controlled. They took a holistic social approach, aiming at the same time to create social purity of class or of race. They conceived of war and violent conflict as the normal state of life, at the national and international level. They promoted a culture of intolerance, exclusion, and uniformity. Political power was to be held in totality by the state, that is to say, by those who control it. The justification for holding total power and for using terror as prevalent political tools was offered by the ideological claim of the achievement of a utopian Perfect Society. This radical critique of modernity, which the totalitarian discourse represents, spread to the whole of Europe during the inter-war period.
After the World War I, Romania found itself in the same situation as the other European states. The impact of the war, the politicization of the masses, and the weakness of liberal democracy created the proper conditions for the emergence of the totalitarian discourse in both forms: Communist and fascist. The Communist Romanian inter-war experience was short-lived. It succeeded initially in structuring a Communist Political Party (1921). However, after three years of existence the Party was declared unconstitutional and legally suppressed, because it agitated for the ideas of the Communist Internationalism, which was under the direction of the Bolsheviks. More importantly, the Communists had no public support within a nationalist Romania, which had not fully achieved its national unity and felt threatened by traditional Russian expansionism. As a consequence, during the inter-war period Communism was a marginal political movement, with no significant impact on Romanian politics or society.
The fascist movement was far more important, it revived Romanian nationalism and the Orthodox tradition, while warning against democracy and liberalism as the embodiments of modern decay. The most important Romanian manifestation of fascism was the Legionary movement,
2 which was politically structured as the Iron Guard (1930) and later on as the "All for the Fatherland Party" (1934). This was the first well-structured, totalitarian-inspired movement able to act as a significant political actor in Romania. This autochthonous version of fascism portrayed the most radical anti-modern discourse of inter-war Romania.The present study is an attempt to design the sociological profile of the Legionary movement at the confluence of three highly controversial concepts, such as modernity, fascism and totalitarianism. The political use and abuse of these ideal-type concepts, which are never to be found in a pure state in the real world, created a semantic inflation and a loss of conceptual precision. Nevertheless, this author believes that they can be successfully used as theoretical reference points and serve as heuristic and taxonomic devices within the human sciences. Of course, not all of the Communist or fascist regimes have been totalitarian, but they all shared a common theoretical complicity with the concept of totalitarianism, which, depending on the historical context, can be sublimated in close-to-the-model historical totalitarian regimes (as for example Russia under Lenin and Stalin and Germany under Hitler). Consequently, these concepts will be used as theoretical tools in order for us to better understand the Legionary movement.
The Iron Guard had a complex and composite sociological identity. It defined itself as a radical critic of democratic and parliamentary procedures, political parties, individualism, liberalism, capitalism, religious and political tolerance, which are the very characteristics of modernity – (a negative construction of identity). At the same time, the Iron Guard declared itself openly sympathetic to European fascism, recognized as a common ideological and political family, that is to say "a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism"
3 – (an affirmative, or positive construction of identity). The same logic of acceptance and denial applies when the Iron Guard refers itself to the totalitarian phenomenon. When the term totalitarianism received its initial meaning, given to it by Mussolini (the total power offered to the state in order for it to better achieve the well being of the nation), the Iron Guard voluntarily and openly accepted it. However, when it comes to totalitarianism, as understood in the present study (dictatorship by the Iron Guard), the members of the movement never officially declared themselves as the fomenters of such a political alternative. They claimed that Italian Fascism, German National Socialism and the Romanian Legionary movement are not dictatorships, nor democracies, but a new form of political regime which Corneliu Zelea Codreanu called "a state of spirit" (sic!).4When compared with Communism, which is more homogenous, fascism seems to be highly polymorphic, precisely because it has a nation-based political approach that stresses the specificity, the exceptionality of ‘us’ when compared with the ‘others’. It has at its core the experiences of Italy and Germany, the only inter-war European countries where a fascist movement acquired all the political power for itself. In the remaining cases, we are in the presence of abortive fascist movements, that is to say, movements that "fail in [their] declared aim to take over the state and embark on the total transformation of society."
5 The Iron Guard is one of the many abortive fascist movements in inter-war Europe, one to be "co-opted and neutralized by a para-fascist regime (that is, a radical right regime with fascist trappings)"6 like the military regime of Ion Antonescu. That is why, being nevertheless a fascist-inspired movement, the Iron Guard individualized itself as a national version of fascism.What creates the peculiarity of the Iron Guard in the context of the abortive fascist movements, is the way it reacts to modernity. It combines the two main currents of the anti-modern discourses identified before: conservative-traditional and totalitarian. On the one hand, the discourse recovers two traditional ideas, deeply rooted in the Romanian mentality: national unity and Orthodoxy. On the other hand, the political solutions offered by the Iron Guard as a remedy for modern decay are of totalitarian inspiration. Its heterogeneous message (especially the insistence on the Christian Orthodox credo) offers it somehow a unique place in the landscape of European fascism.
The basic idea of this study is that the Iron Guard was a political movement and not a sort of political mystical sect. It was an abortive fascist movement, with a unique religious touch, but nevertheless ideologically related to the common political family of European fascism. With this, the Iron Guard structured the first significant Romanian political discourse inspired by the totalitarian ideology of the 20th century.
POLITICS OF SALVATION: ORTHODOX NATIONALITY
In 1918 Romanians lived their best moment of national happiness. One century of national struggle and a fortunate international balance of power brought into existence one state for all Romanians (or almost all). But the moment of joy was short lived. Romanians were afraid not to lose Greater Romania. The newly born State was weak and powerless. It was confronted with new kinds of challenges. From the outside, it was the internationalist Communist hydra that seemed to gain power (Bolshevik Russia to the East and the short-lived Socialist Republic of Bela Kuhn in Hungary to the West). However, more dangerously, Communism infiltrated inside the country! The Romanian army liquidated the Communist experience in Hungary and the police cleared away the local Communist Party. Another problem was the rise of the number of national and/or confessional minorities within the state’s borders. Among these, the most dangerous seemed to be the Hungarians (revisionists) and especially the Jews, both of whom represented the most numerous ethnic minorities. In the political imagination of the time they became the scapegoats of Romanian misfortunes. This kind of threat seemed more dangerous, because it came from inside the state.
When the official political establishment failed to find solutions to the Romanian economic and political crisis, Romanians lost confidence in their leaders and the political system they claimed to represent. In the 20s, with the confusion of the Liberal Party, Romanians lost their confidence in liberal ideals. With the failure of the National-Peasant government to resolve the economic crisis, Romanians lost their confidence in democratic ideals. The ‘official Romania’, which promised to continue the modernization of the country in order to offer prosperity, democracy and national cohesion, was discredited. So salvation could come only from outside the official political system, from a political force able to propose different solutions. The best candidate was Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail.
Its success came not from its capacity to solve the concrete problems Romania faced, but from its ability to use the language of ultra-nationalism and Orthodoxy. The Iron Guard’s discourse succeeded in convincing, for different reasons, specific strata of society. The peasantry, recently brought into politics, with little or no political education, was very sensitive to this new type of political discourse, which referred to the only values and concepts they were familiar with. The working class, with little civic experience, was in fact composed of rural people or half-urbanized peasants. As a consequence, they formed an audience that was sensitive to the same types of ideas. More interesting is the case of the intellectuals who were highly intrigued by this new message. What was the reason for this? Romanian intellectuals were connected to the flow of ideas in Western Europe, where they went to study. Europe, of course, was in the center of the battle against materialism, either capitalist materialism or historical materialism. European culture prized the virtues of religion, irrationality and nationality. The Iron Guard praised the same ideas and claimed to be the spiritual successor of poporanism and samanatorism. The same discourse applied to different social audiences.
Rediscovery of the myth. The process of modernization dislocated Romanian society. The safety of the protective, predictable traditional authority, enveloped by the founding myths, traditions and customs disappeared. Modern society created insecurity and permanent change. Man faced the tyranny of history with its traumatizing experiences (World War I, the Great Depression). The ancient familiar order was replaced by the chaos of an unknown world.
The Legionary movement imposed a new kind of discourse opposed to the discourse of the other politicians. It insisted on the importance of the traditional values, especially religion, in the making and survival of a nation. Through this appeal to traditional values, the tried to reorder the world. They assumed the function of kosmokrators, who reinstall religion as the guiding Axis Mundi. Through the incessant appeal to the cult of the ancestors, of the dead and of sacrifice, they resuscitated the founding myths of modern Romanian culture. Death was seen by the Legionari not as the ultimate threatening experience, but as a duty and an honor. It was called metaphorically "the engagement with eternity," following the example of the legendary shepherd from Miorita. The sacrifice, as a heroic act necessary to the reconstruction of the Romanian nation, has its representation in the popular legend of Mesterul Manole. All this mystical and religious language had a broad audience, willing to understand it tale quale. In a Romanian society where the lay tradition was weak, the religious discourse awakened the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie to Orthodoxy, which had only been forgotten rather than violently denied and abandoned, and strengthened the Orthodox convictions of the peasantry.
Rediscovery of unity. For the Legionari Romania exemplified the lack of unity. Democracy institutionalized the disunity of the political parties. The Constitution guaranteed religious tolerance, freedom of the press, and full citizenship for Jews; that is to say anarchy, disorder. Everybody seemed to talk about unity, but they did not know how to realize it: through Orthodoxy and ethnicity. All these realities were viewed as incessantly eroding the very foundations of the Romanian State and nation. Unity could be brought about only when Romania would belong once again to the Romanians.
7The Iron Guard was unwilling to accept the modern democratic definition of the nation, as being a political artifact based on the principle of jus civilize and having a contractual nature. The only definition accepted was based on the principle of jus sanguinis and had at its core the idea of ethnic and cultural identity. Those who were aliens because of their blood or of their religious belief could not legitimately claim any affiliation to the nation and to the corpus of public rights.
The special character of the Romanians, heirs of an exceptional history, justified this politics of exclusion and intolerance. The Iron Guard went far beyond the traditional nationalism of the 19th century in its discourse. The Legionari were decided on promoting ultra-nationalism as a political platform and to impose their convictions with the aid of the Legionary state when the time came. The fear of disintegrative forces was particularly developed in Central and Eastern Europe, where the national states were recent creations, with no traditions and history. Each state and each nation in this region felt surrounded by enemies and was incapable of taking a different approach on the matter. Romanians were threatened from abroad (the revisionist states and Bolshevik Russia) and from inside their frontiers (the Hungarians, Russians, Bulgarians, Communists, etc.). The worst opponent was in the imagination of the Iron Guard, the Jew, quintessence of the enemy. The Jews were considered ethnically impure, reluctant to be re-educated in the Orthodox faith, undermining the foundation of the Romanian economy, and spreading the ideas of Communism and atheism among Romanians. They were considered especially dangerous because they were united, organized as an ‘army’, as a ‘state within a state’. They were thought to be working for the creation of an European Palestine, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, occupying great portions from Poland, Czechoslovakia and half of Romania.
8 Therefore, last but not least, being united meant being anti-Semitic.We are within the core of an imaginary construction – the myth of the conspiracy.
9 Nevertheless, for the people of that time it seemed real. They developed a ‘newspeak’ and the result was that the discourse was credited to be more real than reality itself. This new kind of discourse did not allow a critical perspective on reality, it only allowed the attitude of a believer. This brings us to the second level of our discussion, the totalitarian discourse.
POLITICS AS SALVATION: THE LEGIONARY STATE
The Legionari had the feeling of treason, of living in a ‘besieged fortress’ (this fortress being at the same time not only the whole of Romania, but also the Iron Guard itself). However, who attacked whom? The very Legionari were those who attacked, along with the other anti-democratic forces, the fragile foundation of the constitutional and democratic political order of Romania. Despite the others, they formed a distinct voice: that of the totalitarian discourse.
Romania was in a deep crisis (economic, political and moral) and exposed to the dangers of disunity. What could be the solution to surpass this critical situation? The institutions of liberal democracy seemed incapable of dealing with the complex problems Romania faced after 1918. The return to an elite, enlightened government was inconceivable in the age of universal male suffrage. Romanians fought for the right of political participation during World War I. This was a good political reform, which revealed that Romanians had reached political maturity, and therefore this measure should never be abolished. It seemed that the solution should come from a completely new political movement, able to control this flow of the masses into politics. Furthermore, it should be inspired and lead by a providential man, able to identify the problems and to solve them.
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the future Captain, was a young Romanian nationalist who cherished the Great Union. He was very religious, with great respect for traditional values, such as the Church, the Monarchy, the family, the nation, the army, and honor, the pillars that were intended to sustain the newly created state in the future. He was also a man of action, with a military education, which he valued significantly.
10 He tried to identify the sources of the Romanian crisis. Also, he saw that Romanians suffered from disunity and lack of organization. In his view, what they needed was to be informed, educated, and organized. The people were to be informed by the propaganda services, educated in the spirit of an ultra-nationalist ideology, and organized by a totalitarian political party. These practical solutions were totally new, adapted to a new social era: the era of the masses. He wanted to put into practice the project of a ‘perfect society’, an idealized image of what Romania should be, a society in which a ‘New Man’ would live, the result of the educational process deployed by the Legionary movement.The Party. The institutional tool able to fulfill these missions was a new kind of political party, with a military organization, armed with a teleological salvationist ideology, and which popularized its ideas through a sophisticated propaganda. This is not the relative or the heir of modern democratic political parties, which institutionalized the legal, permanent and non-violent competition for political power, but "the party as a whole" the party-state system
11 which wanted to dissolve all aspects of public life into its own existence. The democratic parties were seen as factions or private interest groups disrupting the unity of the nation. If someone could unite the whole nation within the institutional framework of one official party, disciplined and united as an army, then the nation would never be subjected to the danger of implosion.The Iron Guard and its political party, the All for the Fatherland Party turned these principles into practice. The latter was organized as a mass party: desiring to include as many people as possible (potentially the entire nation); having a hierarchical and rigid organization (discipline and obedience to the superior’s orders). Financially, the party had the combined support of the dues of the members and the financial donations of the rich sympathizers. The basic law of the party was the maintenance of total discipline (critique, opposition, divergent opinions, and minority factions were not tolerated). "The [Iron] Guard represents the perfect union" stated Codreanu.
12 The punishment of Stelescu was exemplary in this respect. In contrast, those who followed orders without questioning were promoted (‘sticks and carrots policy’). In an ideal legionary state, the party had to embrace the whole nation. Subdivisions were created for every membership category: Fratii de cruce, Cetatui, Corpul militarilor, al muncitorilor, corpurile de soimi si soimane, strajeri si strajerite, cercetasi si cercetase, premilitari, etc. The respect of these rules was guaranteed by the political police and the internal tribunal of the party. For the first time in Romanian history, a totalitarian party was organized and functioned.The ideology. This new party was armed with an all-embracing political ideology, pretending to explain and organize every detail for the good of the whole of human history and human activity. It was based on the belief in the existence of natural laws, which govern human life. Human nature was obedient to the law of natural selection of species. Therefore, in politics as well, the strongest, that is to say the more disciplined and united, would win.
The role of ideology was to educate ‘the New Man’ through the services of the propaganda department. The Iron Guard wanted to "reform man, not to reform politics … [because] it is more a school and an army than a political party."
13 This new type of education was taught by means of propaganda, which claimed the educative virtue of labor ("Labor makes you free!").The final goal of this activity should be the identification of the nation and the country with the Legionary movement.
14 Nevertheless, what is the Legionary movement if not a totalitarian world, governed by decrees (circulare, manifeste) by the mighty ‘Leader’, who wants to control and order everything (even the menu and the hygienic norms of the Cantina)? If we accept (as the Legionari accepted) that the Legionary movement was created in the image of a small scale version of the future Romania they proposed to build, then the Legionary Romania could only be totalitarian.This project did not materialize for many reasons. At the time when the Iron Guard came to power, it had already lost its ‘shepherd’. The movement was no longer unitary, and came into power under the control of General I. Antonescu. Even during his life, Codreanu did not accept the idea of a coup d’etat, being convinced that the movement will surely come into power after the completion of the moral revolution, which would create ‘the New Man’. The crisis of mysticism of Codreanu during the last period of his life and the lack of decision and of revolutionary will allowed the Iron Guard to lose its favorable momentum to set up power. In practice, the Legionary movement is a failed totalitarianism (manqué).
The Iron Guard represents an abortive fascist movement, the most radical anti-modern experience in inter-war Romania. Its heterogeneous character was due to the fact that it combined two different types of anti-modern discourses. The first one is inspired by the traditional critique of modernity and has within its core the ideas of Orthodoxy and ultra-nationalism. The other represents the totalitarian discourse. This duality of the discourse gives to the Iron Guard its double character of a mystic sect and of a totalitarian political movement. Paradoxically, this strange combination of totalitarian ideology and orthodox fundamentalism and chauvinism helped it to be popular in Romania and to successfully challenge the already established political parties, but prevented it from becoming a coherent, efficient and effective political party, able to repeat in Romania the success in Germany of Hitler’s N.S.D.A.P.
From the ambiguity of the discourse result the ambiguity and indecision of the public manifestations of the Iron Guard. Due to its high degree of centralization and discipline, and because of its strong dependence on its leader, the movement was decisively influenced by the evolution of the leader’s personal disposition (and dispositions). At the end of his life, Codreanu had the firm conviction that Romania had not yet realized the phase of the moral revolution, the prerequisite for political change. At the same time, he was convinced by the inevitability of this evolution in the immediate future. These convictions, along with the mystical crisis toward the end of his life, imposed political passiveness on the movement. The revolution was expected to come, and it had a spiritual nature.
The Iron Guard’s political thought was not animated by Romania’s past experiments, but by the then contemporary totalitarianism. Consequently, the true nature of the legionary political project is not Orthodox and nationalist, but totalitarian. The Legionari were convinced chauvinists and religious fundamentalists willing to fight their own war by violent means. In their main propaganda texts ("Pentru Legionari", "Carticica Sefului de Cuib", "Circulari si Manifeste") and journals, they are the supporters of a totalitarian state where the power should be held totally by a charismatic leader. This state should be national (that is to say ethnically based) and embodying the idea of a ‘Perfect Society’ made up by ‘New Men’ (young orthodox Romanians).
Even if the governing experience of the Iron Guard was of short duration, its influence on Romanian society was important. It was at the "legionary school" that Romanians first became comfortable with the violence and intolerance of totalitarian discourse and with the institutionalization of political murder. When the Communist takeover occurred in 1948, political discourse and practice created the impression of déjŕ vu. The scenario was not new. Sometimes, even the actors were the same.
NOTES
1
Constantin Davidescu, Lecturer, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest.2
If not specified, in this text the terms "Legionary movement" and "Iron Guard" are interchangeable. They are not to be confused, but this convention will allow us to avoid the use of the long and uncomfortable formula "Legionary movement" which is common in Romanian, but loquacious in English.3
R. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, p. 26.4
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Pentru Legionari, Editura "Totul pentru Tara," Sibiu, 1936, p. 133-134.5
R. Griffin, supra note 2, p. 116.6
Ibid, p. 117.7
The first saying Corneliu Zelea Codreanu learned from Nicolae Iorga, his spiritual mentor during his adolescence, was: "România a Românilor, numai a Românilor si a tuturor Românilor." In Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, supra note 3, p. 148
Ibid, pp. 151-153.9
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu opens his book Pentru Legionari with the following lines: "N’am timp. Scriu în fuga condeiului, de pe câmpul de lupta, din mijlocul atacurilor. La ora aceasta suntem înconjurati din toate partile. Dusmanii ne izbesc miseleste si tradarea musca din noi." In, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, supra note 3, p. 5.10
"... educatia de la Manastire ma va urmari toata viata ... notiunile de stiinta militara capatate acum ma vor face sa judec mai târziu totul prin prisma acestei stiinte." In Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, supra note 3, p. 11.11
See G. Sartori Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976, pp. 42-47.12
In Circulari si Manifeste – 1927 – 1938, Colectia ‘Europa’ München 1981, p. 20 See also p. 27. "Sa nu miste nimeni fara ordinul meu." Another idea of Codreanu: "Lumea vrea sef si disciplina tuturora." In Carticica sefului de cuib, Colectia "Omul Nou," München, Germany, 1971, p. 40; see also p. 41-44.13
"Din aceasta scoala legionara va iesi un om nou, un om cu calitati de erou . . . un urias. . . . Tot cetsi poate imagina mintea noastra mai frumos ca suflet, tot ce poate rodi rasa noastra mai mândru, mai înalt, mai drept, mai puternic, mai întelept, mai curat, mai muncitor si mai viteaz . . . ." In Corneliu Zelea Codreanu Pentru Legionari, p. 307.14
"Noi trebuie sa facem ca România sa devina legionara ... Tara trebuie sa fie condusa dupa vointa legionarilor," in Carticica sefului de cuib, p. 47.