Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970) is considered to be an initiator of a second objectivistic and realistic phenomenology.1  His research in the area of aesthetics is highly regarded by world philosophy. It is not surprising that he developed a theory of the work of art and aesthetic experience since he emphasised that his way to philosophy led through literature, which fascinated him in his youth. Ingarden was born in Cracow and he died there. He studied philosophy, first in Lvov with Professor Kazimierz Twardowski for a short time. With the advice of Twardowski he continued his academic education in Ghent (29.04.1912–14.10.1914 and 6.05.1915–17.04.1916); Vienna (23.10.1914–5.05.1915) and Freiburg (13.03.1916–18.10.1917). The encounter with phenomenology–with Edmund Husserl and a group of his disciples from Ghent and Freiburg–became a turning point in his philosophical development. He particularly treasured the lectures of Adolf Reinach, a phenomenologist killed during the First World War. Ingarden had a chance to study with Max Scheler in two series of private lectures in Ghent. He also attended the lectures of psychologist Georg E. Muller, mathematician David Hilbert, and philosophers Heinrich Maier and Leonard Nelson. While studying in Freiburg he made friends with Edith Stein. In January 1918 he defended his doctoral dissertation entitled Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson. Dartstellung und Versuch einer Kritik. Apart from philosophy he passed exams in mathematics and physics.

Returning to Poland, he taught at secondary schools in Lublin, Warsaw, Torun and Lvov. Having defended his thesis Essentiale Fragen: Ein Beintrag zum Problem des Wesens to qualify as an assistant lecturer in 1925, he began lecturing at the Jan Kazimierz University of Lvov and in December 1933 was nominated assistant professor of the Chair of Philosophy.

During the Second World War he was professor at the German Department of the Ivan Franko State University in Lvov. He read German literature and the theory of literature. From January 1942 to June 1944 Ingarden taught mathematics at a technical college. He was involved in secret university teaching and at that time wrote two volumes of his most important work, Spor o istnienie swiata/ Dispute on the Existence of the World, to prove that "the Polish resistance movement was also alive in the area of scientific research".2  Helen Michejda made the following commentary: "It would be difficult to find in the chronicles of modern philosophy anything comparable."3 

After the Second World War he was philosophy lecturer at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow from March 1945 to June 1950 and from March 1957 to his retirement in 1963. In 1961 he founded the Aesthetics Section at the Cracow Division of the Polish Philosophical Society and was active in it until his death. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz wrote of Ingarden "...in Lvov he formed himself and in Cracow he formed a school, the Polish school of phenomenology."4 

Ingarden participated in numerous congresses of philosophy and aesthetics. He often lectured at various universities and scientific societies abroad. It would be difficult to enumerate his lectures as their number is too great. He made two longer visits, to the USA (September 1959–January 1960) and Norway (September–November 1967) and was actively engaged in the international phenomenological movement. He was a member of the International Phenomenological Society and the American Aesthetic Society. He was awarded the Jurzykowski Prize in the USA in 1966, and the Gottried-von-Herder-Preis in Austria in 1968.

There were no spectacular turning points in Ingarden’s versatile research, which however was continuously enriched with new reflections. Many a time the philosopher would return to subject matters already discussed and illuminate them from another angle. New editions of his works were often revised. Ingarden’s inventiveness in perceiving new aspects of the issues in question seems inexhaustible. Apart from adding new dimensions to the issues around which his interests centered, he continued to explore new areas. His interests were situated within three fields of philosophy: ontology (which he separated from metaphysics), a theory of cognition, and aesthetics. Many of Ingarden’s commentators emphasize that his extraordinary analytical talent was linked with a special ability of approaching problems synthetically.

The most ambitious attempt at insight into the structure of Ingarden’s achievements was that of Danuta Gierulanka, his student and an expert on his philosophy.5  She differentiated nine spheres in the works of the phenomenologist: ontology, a theory of cognition, methodology, logic, the philosophy of language, aesthetics and a theory of art, axiology, the philosophy of man, and critical studies. Gierulanka’s study includes a graphic illustration showing which of Ingarden’s works belong to these respective spheres and how these spheres relate to one another. In spite of the vast field of research, claims Gierulanka, Ingarden managed to maintain an extraordinary coherence and consistency in his research. Not only did this result from his conception of philosophy and the phenomenological method, but also from his continuous systematisation of problems and establishment of this logical interdependence, from focusing on the issue of an argument between idealism and realism with reference to the manner of existence of the real world, and finally from his perception of numerous aspects of the issues in question.

Ontology, approached as a science and exploring possible ways of existing, occupies a special position in Ingarden’s research. It does not contain any existential judgements but only explores the contents of ideas and necessary connections between ideal qualities. In the sphere of facts nothing can exist that would contradict pure possibilities. Thus ontology constitutes a filter eliminating problems and conclusions incoherent with an idea of the issues in question. Ingarden paid special attention to ontological considerations; they should constitute a starting point of any philosophical research. Theoretically they come first and are more general than the statements of detailed sciences. Ontology uses a priori analysis of the content of ideas, but it does not lose connection with experience approached in a broader sense. Ingarden treats a priori cognition intuitively, not in a deductive way; thereby he allows ontology a wide area of research. Since every object can be approached with respect to its way of existence, its formal structure (for example: object, property, process, relation and state of affairs) and the qualities that belong to it, ontological research includes existential and formal, as well as material and ontological, issues.6 

According to Gierulanka ontological conceptual categories applied in various spheres of interests play the role of a binding agent, organising all philosophical research and making it coherent. It should be mentioned that Ingarden’s philosophy is not generally considered coherent. Some commentators of his works point to inner tensions in his philosophy. I shall try to present them while discussing axiology.

However, first of all some attention should be paid to where axiology is situated in the structure of Ingarden’s philosophy. Although some philosophers try to apply one, an axiological criterion is useless in differentiating philosophy from detailed sciences.7  Defining philosophy as a science of values would be narrow, for it is concerned not only with values; on the other hand, it would be too broad, for not all problems connected with values are considered by philosophy. Philosophy is not interested in actually existing values, but in what values are at all possible. In order to separate philosophy from other sciences it is not enough to formulate a definition. Philosophy’s problems (ontological, metaphysical and epistemological) have to be identified and specific non-dogmatic methods indicated for a priori and immanent cognition.

Beyond any doubts Ingarden’s reflection was not focused on axiology. His first strictly axiological work Uwagi o wzglednosci wartosci/ Remarks on Relativity of Values was published as late as 1948.8 

Other works worth mentioning here are:

- Wartosc estetyczna i zagadnienie jej ugruntowania/ Aesthetic Value and the Problem of Its Objective Grounding, 1956.9 

- Uwagi o estetycznym sadzie wartosciujacym/ Remarks on Aesthetic Evaluating Judgement, 1958.10

- Artistic and Aesthetic Values, 1964.11

- Zagadnienie systemu jakosci estetycznie donioslych/ The Issue of the System of Aesthetically Significant Qualities, 1965.12

- Czego nie wiemy o wartosciach?/ What We Do Not Know About Values?, 1966.13

- Z rozwazan nad wartosciami moralnymi/ An Analysis of Moral Values, 1969.14

- Uber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente, 1970.15

 

Some axiological problems were marginally discussed in the following works: Das Literarische Kunstwerk (1931);16 Czlowiek i jego rzeczywistosc/ Man and His Reality (1935);17 O poznawaniu dziela literackiego/ The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art (1937).18 We should also mention his lectures on ethics in Lvov (1930-31, 1937-38) and in Cracow (1961-62);19 and on aesthetics in Cracow (1960) and discussions in the Aesthetic Section of the Polish Philosophical Society.20

Man as a realiser of values was presented in the study Man and His Reality.

He first attains to his genuine stature as a human being because, and only because, he creates a reality which manifests or embodies in itself the values of goodness, beauty, truth and law; because in his life, or at least in that of it which is of sole importance, he remains in the service of realising values within the reality he has created; only thus does he attain to the mission that tells of his humanity: he becomes a man who mediates between what is merely ‘nature’ and what he can divide only crudely, as if in a reflection, through the values he has disclosed and embodied.21

 

In his paper Czlowiek i przyroda/ Man and Nature we come across an analogous statement: "with his endeavours–through his victories, even defeats–one realises the values of good and beauty, which, to be sure, appear in merely intentional works, but which at bottom have for him a higher reality than the world of sheer nature. He remains in the service of realising these values. When he has managed this, he is at peace in his soul that he does not live in vain."22

Axiology is connected with ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, anthropology and–what Gierulanka did not take into account–philosophy of culture. The last area was not researched by Ingarden separately, but many problems inherent in his work lead in this direction.23 He did not separate the respective areas of philosophy from one another. He approached different aspects of the same problem: individual themes are linked and open new perspectives into relevant.

Ingarden’s axiological reflection can be arranged from the point of view of the generality of his considerations and it is possible to distinguish a general axiological plan and detailed plans (the latter being restricted mainly to the considerations of aesthetic and moral values). This is the order I shall adopt when presenting Ingarden’s axiology.

According to Ingarden the fundamental problems that axiology face are:

- the typology of values;

- the formal structure of values and its relation to a carrier;

- the way in which values exist;

- the rank of values and their hierarchy;

- the existence of autonomous values; and

- the objectivity of values.

 

Since Ingarden advocated axiological pluralism, his philosophy exemplifies a clear tendency not to solve problems generally–with reference to all values–but partially, with reference to respective groups of values. He differentiates between various fields of values and is aware of the fact that there may exist essential differences between their types. He realises numerous difficulties axiology has to overcome, but he is far from scepticism. He presented his doubts in search of ways of overcoming them. Ingarden’s most important argument was to show the mistakes made in the process of the cognition of material things. The awareness of making these mistakes does not usually lead to radical agnosticism. Therefore axiological illusions, occurring in the actual recognition of values or the historical changeabliness of views concerning them–often stimulated by non-cognitive factors–do not prove that there is no chance to build adequate axiological knowledge. What is more, at least we have at our disposal some obscure intuition concerning values and certain attempts at theoretical formulation. "We can realise what is missing only when there are some flashes of knowledge in a given area. When we know nothing, when we do not have any significant experiences, or even any attempts at general statements or hypotheses then as a matter of fact neither can we realise what is missing."24 This entitles one to quarrel with the belief that Ingarden was concerned only with so-called "negative axiology". Wegrzecki’s statement25 in treating the key problem of Ingarden’s axiology, namely that concerning the relation between ontology and axiological experience, that only negative axiology is being treated has been taken out of context and understood in a literal sense by some of Ingarden’s critics.

Ingarden looks for the objective conditioning of values. He does not agree with subjectivism and relativism. Originally he declared himself a determined objectivist and absolutist. His approach underwent some modifications, presented in the articles he wrote in the sixties, in which he put restrictions on absolutism, but this did not mean a change leading towards a relativist attitude.

Ingarden’s partition of values is not based on precisely defined criteria. The philosopher states explicitly: "The performance of this task is very difficult in the present (1947) state of inquiry into values, since thus far the very principle for the partition of values remains unknown to us. Therefore, we can today do no more than point to certain groups of values which are empirically familiar, on the basis of our contact with them, without being able to define them rigorously."26

Ingarden enumerates the following types of values:

- ‘vital’ (the values of food, efficiency of organs), a special variant of the economic type of value (significance of life);

- cultural–aesthetic, cognitive; and

- moral (ethical).

 

In the treatise What We Do Not Know About Values?, Ingarden proposes a similar typology:

- vital values, to which utilitarian and pleasure values are related;

- cultural values–cognitive, aesthetic, social; and

- moral values in a narrow sense.

 

The above quoted classification of values triggers reservations. Without applying external criteria to the philosophical approach, in the light of Ingarden’s other statements this typology cannot be maintained, as it does not take into account all groups of values such as the personal or artistic. Cultural values are approached here in a narrow sense. In the case of a selective attitude towards culture, it would be acceptable to exclude some vital values as well as useful or economic values. But it is difficult to understand why Ingarden does not include moral values in cultural values. It is true that they are found in a different way in the objects to which they are attributed. There are no products analogous to works of art or science that would embody moral values; they are manifest in the actions of conscious subjects. But it seems that a lack of moral ‘products’ is not an argument in favour of a thesis that morality exists beyond culture. If Ingarden states that culture is a sphere of the realisation of absolute values,27 he considers moral values to be such values. They are even of a more absolute character than aesthetic values since they demand realisation.

Ingarden’s axiology is a material theory. The philosopher believes that it is not enough to state formal requirements for the appearance of values. It is necessary to take into the account qualitative aspects of objects on which values are founded. The differentiation of one kind of value from another is determined by quality–determinations which are difficult to articulate conceptuallly. Ingarden pays special attention to the intuitive cognition of values. A qualitative relation of objects is much easier to grasp in direct contact with them than through acts of discursive thinking. An additional complication is caused by the fact that values of the same type manifest qualitative differences. There are many kinds of beauty, there are many kinds of goodness. What is more, negative values are also determined qualitatively.

Making typology dependent upon the attitudes of a subject and dealing with them leads to falsification, because there are too many experiences of which a definite value is one. All that results is the fact that it is not easy to get a clear picture of the fundamental types of values and to characterise them conceptually. However, Ingarden does not think that reaching intellectual recognition of axiological matters is not at all possible, that no value is definable: "This would be true only if every value were determined in its matter [Materie] by a simple, original quality."28 Obviously not all values are of this kind, but the philosopher admits the possibility of the existence of such strange values. "We should not forget, however, that values may exist whose matter is so peculiar, original and unrepeatable, that they cannot be ordered into any group or class of values."29

In Ingarden’s statements on the form of value, there are more negative decisions than positive settlements. In relation to values, Ingarden excludes the form of object, relation and property. Values are not objects since "a value is never something that exists for itself, but it is always the value of something; there is no value whatever which would exist without that something of which it is a value."30 If we remember that the philosopher does not assume the identity of the way of existence of a value and the object in which it is grounded, it becomes understandable why he opposes attributing a form of the property to values. A property cannot exist in a radically different way from an object, which is a subject of property. Ingarden does not even agree to recognise values as secondary properties. He also opposes treating values as relations, due to the danger of relativism.

Ingarden believes that a value constitutes a specific superstructure. "The circumstance that a value is always a certain kind of superstructure built upon the basis of that whose value it is, plays a special role in its form. This superstructure, however, if the value is a genuine one, is not something alien in relation to the valued object. It is not thrust upon or added onto it from without, but emanates out of its very essence."31 If it is a positive value, then "it confers upon the object a particular dignity, a certain wholly new aspect, which this object could never manage to attain without this value. It elevates the object above all objectivities that are devoid of value; the latter merely are, exist, but do not ‘signify’ anything."32

Values are so versatile and so specifically grounded in the objects to which they are attributed, that it is necessary to take into account various ways of existence in relation to various groups of values. "It also seems that in the diverse modes of being we encounter in the domain of values we have to do with new modes of existence in comparison with those I have tried to circumscribe in volume I [#33] of Streit."33

Ingarden does not accept axiological idealism. He engages in polemics with Plato and Scheler. He would incline towards accepting the existence of ideas of values, the contents of which can be investigated, and thus acquire eidetic knowledge on values. However, he does not attribute ideal existence to values as such. They are not general beings, but individual ones. "For I was at all times concerned with those peculiar non-self-sufficient entities that appear as bound up with individual, real objects, entities which are just as individual as those objects."34 In connection with an individual and non-independent character of value we have to take into account, while discussing the way value exists, of the way a carrier of a value exists and the way value is grounded in its carrier. Due to these two aspects of the problem, there is no identity of the way a value exists and the way the object, to which the value is attributed, exists. The same object can have various values grounded in it in different ways.

A lack of independence and derivation in relation to its carrier does not characterize satisfactorily the way value exists, because there are moments that can be found in non-value spheres of existence. Referring to ‘significance’ (Geltung) or ‘oughtness’ (Seinsollen) of value is not extremely helpful. "That is not, however, a satisfactory solution. For, something can ‘hold sway’, ‘be in force’ or have ‘significance’, if and only if it exists in some manner. Non-existence makes Geltung together impossible."35 ‘Oughtness’ can be conceived of in two ways: when value has not yet been realised, or when its realisation has been already carried out. In the first case we draw ‘obligation’ from the contents of an idea of a given value. We learn that it requires substantiation in an individual object or act. In the second situation ‘oughtness’ already has been realised effectively. Ingarden enters into polemics with Scheler who maintains that the fulfilment itself of a positive value constitutes a new positive value. Ingarden rejects such a statement as a manifestation of axiological formalism, which carries the danger of a regressus in infinitum. "It is not that a new value emerges in this situation, but that the valueableness of the realised value somehow encompasses the existence of the value, or better put, it has one of its foundations in this existence. Hence, it stems not only from the matter itself of the value, but also from the effectiveness of its realisation. In this case, not the Sollen alone characterises the existence of values of this type, but indeed also the fulfilment of this Sollen."36

Ingarden wonders in what way definite types of values can exist. He neglects here a problem of the way of existence and a satisfactory grounding for a certain individual value. This new issue leads to more detailed axiological questions and is connected with the problems of criteria on the basis of which we attribute values to objects, and with the problems of the adequacy of evaluating propositions. He discusses this issue on the basis of aesthetics.

Sometimes we are forced to choose between values because the realisation of one value excludes the realisation of another one. It makes us face the problem of the ‘ranking’ of value or its hierarchy. We have to compare values not only within one type, but also values of different types. According to Ingarden we lack the theoretical premises to settle possible axiological conflicts, as we do not know what the rank of a value is. "Nor do we know what it is that stipulates this rank, whether it is the value-matter, its mode of being, ‘impact’ [Kraft], or finally ‘the oughtness of its existence’."37

Ingarden presents the opposition between absolutist and relativist theories of values. He considers unsatisfactory the attempts at establishing criteria for the ranking of values that have been made so far, in particular Scheler’s axiology.38

"In the everyday practice of comportment with values of this or that type, in the struggles waged for their realisation or elimination from human life, there occurs sometimes a certain falsification of the very experience of values."39 This influences our theoretical investigations on values and creates additional complications in solving many problems.

All values are existentially dependent in relation to the object to which they are attributed. What connections are possible between values themselves? "The question arises whether there are values that can appear in an object without the simultaneous and necessary concomitant appearance in that self-same object of some other values of the same or another basic type."40 Ingarden calls such values autonomous. The problem of value autonomy should not be mixed with the dependence of values on other values appearing in the same object or only in the same phenomenal field or time sequence. As a result of this co-occurrence, the matter of value sometimes undergoes specific modifications which are functionally dependent or interdependent. In his treaty, What We Do Not Know About Values?, Ingarden does not settle a question of autonomous values, although we know that in other works he spoke, at least, in favour of the autonomy of aesthetic and moral values.

The problem of founding a value in an object or the problem of the objectivity of a value looks differently in relation to various types of values and has to be solved piece by piece. "In the sort of general considerations set forth here it can be a question only of the possible way in which particular types of values can be founded in the objects to which they appear to accrue. But the exploration of the question whether in some individual case a particular value is really founded in this or that way in the object for which it is a value cannot be confined to the results of those general investigations. It must consider the factual attributes of the given object and take account of all the circumstances in which the value appears in the given concrete instance."41 Appearance of a value sometimes can be an illusion. Theoreticians of art and morality should solve a problem of the objective founding of a value in works, and justify their evaluations in concrete situations.

Ingarden’s considerations of value prove that the philosopher did not apply in a mechanical way the ontological conceptual apparatus he had elaborated. He admitted explicitly that the existential and formal-ontological concepts from Dispute on the Existence of the World turned out to be insufficient to define the essence of value.

Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk aroused protests as it neglected problems concerning the value of a work of art. It is true that they were treated marginally, but this marginalization resulted from the systematisation of the problems proposed by the philosopher. In order to enter upon the axiological problems of literature one has to start with examining the structure of a work of art. Ingarden states explicitly that although all research should be started from the anatomy of a work of art, what makes a work of literature a work of art are aesthetic qualities settled on respective layers. Value qualities, constituted by various layers of a work of art, form a polyphonic harmony. This harmony does not exist independently from a work of art, and it is not itself a work of art. This harmony is the moment which makes a work of art out of a structural skeleton and combines with other elements into a compact whole.

At the same time this polyphony shows us in the best way that the basis for the individual ‘voices’ of this harmony is embedded in the individual layers of a work of literature. On the other hand, the harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities constitutes a new bond connecting or binding even more closely the individual layers of a work which, from their very nature, are internally fused with each other, and it shows again the homogeneity of a work of literature in spite of heterogeneity of the elements characteristic of it.42

Aesthetically valuable qualities in a work of literature are potential; they are fully expressed in a concrete realisation.

Besides, the masterpieces of literature allow us to contemplate metaphysical qualities. A hidden longing for metaphysical qualities slumbers in human being. The metaphysical qualities are unveiled in complicated life situations or interpersonal contacts. They appear suddenly, unexpectedly, causing the suspension of ordinary experience; they create a special atmosphere as "what attribute the value of ‘experience’ to our life."43 Metaphysical qualities always constitute some value (either positive or negative) in comparison with the expressionless routine of everyday life. They cannot be subjected to rational comprehension. You can perceive them only directly. Thanks to them, "’the deeper sense’ of life and being in general is revealed to us. What is more, ... they constitute this usually hidden ‘sense’ itself."44 Ingarden enumerates the following metaphysical values: nobleness, sanctity, sinfulness, ‘infernality’, ecstasy of admiration, silence of consolation, grotesqueness, pomposity, celebration, charm and lightness, seriousness and heaviness; what is shocking, incomprehensible and mysterious. They bring about enchantment or shock. A normally hidden form of being, its mystery, is revealed in them. We are not capable of evoking metaphysical values whenever we want to do so. When they come into being, they introduce radical changes into our life. The situations in which metaphysical qualities appear in life are not frequent and their realisation is a kind of euphoria or shock which makes their contemplation impossible. When we want to feast on them in consolation, it turns out that they have already been hidden.

We long for this contemplative emergence in them–for some reasons–and we are not able to cool this longing which is a hidden source of a great number of our actions. On the one hand, it is a source of philosophical cognition and an urge to reach it; on the other hand, it is a source of artistic creativity and relish in art. Our two spiritual acts and activities, so completely different from each other, finally convey towards the same destination. Art, in particular, can provide us as if in miniature and only in a distant reflection what we cannot obtain in real, everyday life: the peaceful contemplation of metaphysical qualities.45

In the references, Ingarden quotes Friedriech Hebbel: "Art is not only something infinitely more, it is something completely different. It is the realised philosophy."46 This quotation deserves special attention since Ingarden often pronounces his negative attitude towards the presence of philosophy in literature. On the one hand, it proves his unquestionable fascination with philosophy and art; on the other hand, we can infer that where the intellectual competence of philosophy fails, art reveals what is incomprehensible for the intellect.

Since it is often said that Ingarden did not refer to the concept of metaphysical qualities in his later works, it is worth quoting a fragment from the German edition of Spor o istnienie swiata (1965):

Creating a work of art is a form of giving vent to spiritual creative forces as well as fulfilment of a longing of a special kind, that is, for the embodiment of what initially are only sensed valuable aesthetic qualities and possibly also certain metaphysical qualities, which are to be revealed in a work of art and its concretisation. This constitutes humanity’s urge to be able to escape from its lonely existence and the loneliness of experience, to find a common world of certain values, shared with others. A work of art ... makes it possible to share one world with other people in common aesthetic experience and common fascination.47

 

The basic ontological factors proposed by Ingarden in Das literarische Kunstwerk were: the existential foundations of a work of art; a work of art as a schematic creation (including in its contents some understatements); and aesthetic concretisation (an aesthetic object). As a result of the communion between man and a work of art, accomplished in an aesthetic attitude, an aesthetic object is constituted. The differentiation between the artistic value (of a work of art) and the aesthetic value (of an aesthetic object) is a consequence of these conceptual distinctions.48

In the fifties and sixties Ingarden continued defining notions more accurately and precisely, while looking for objective conditioning of aesthetic value. In a work of art he differentiated axiologically neutral qualities and axiologically valent qualities. The philosopher tried to overcome the difficulties with defining qualities by relating them to other notions and referring to the experience in which qualities are given.49 Among axiologically significant values there are: aesthetically neutral but artistically valuable moments; aesthetically valuable (positively or negatively) moments superstructured upon them; and aesthetic value itself.

Artistic qualities are the constructive moments of a work, fulfilling artistic functions: they undergird the synthetic artistic value of the work of art; and they make it possible for aesthetically significant qualities to appear in an aesthetic object. It should be emphasized that this operation is not purely existential conditioning, but defines qualitatively superstructured moments and values. Basically there are two types of artistic qualities:

(1) qualities which are manifestations of perfect performance (artistry, mastery), and

(2) qualities which are capable of efficient impact on the perceiver.

 

Artistically positive and negative moments present in the work of art cannot be considered in isolation. Since they occur in groups, they undergo mutual modifications. A certain negative quality in a given work of art can bring about the intended artistic effect and, in association with other moments, it can determine the artistic value of a higher order than is possible by a group of artistically positive qualities only.50 In the case of masterpieces, every moment is valorised.

Ingarden pointed to the difficulties in separating artistic values from aesthetically valent qualities. It should be noted that theoretical criteria of this conceptual opposition are clear and have numerous aspects. Artistic qualities belong to the neutral skeleton of a work of art. Their being is derived from the creative activities of an artist, and they are sufficiently founded in an artistic object. They do not have to be given in an evident manner; we get to know them indirectly. As the means that make aesthetic qualities evident they are indirectly valuable. The criteria assumed here are of an ontological (structural and genetic), epistemological and phenomenological, as well as axiological (instrumental) nature.

Ingarden’s fundamental idea was the search for grounding aesthetically significant qualities in artistic qualities. He distinguished nine groups of aesthetic qualities:

material (emotional, intellectual, pertaining to materials);

formal (purely objective, derivative–for a perceiver);

types of selectiveness or cheapness;

ways in which qualities occur (for example, mild, bitter);

types of novelty;

types of naturalness (for example, simple, artificial);

types of truthfulness (for example, responsible, sincere, false);

types of reality (for example, real, illusory, fairytale-like);

ways of affecting a perceiver (for example, shocking, neutral).

Ingarden approaches correlative types of artistic qualities and aesthetic qualities as a theoretical hypothesis. He treats the necessary and sufficient grounding of aesthetically valuable qualities in artistic qualities as a theoretical boundary case. He admits that aesthetic qualities are conditioned by a perceiver and the cultural context. He does not maintain that artistic qualities determine artistic value automatically. The variety of art with respect to types and styles forces him to take into account the differentiated interdependencies occurring between artistic qualities and the artistic values founded by them, and aesthetically valent qualities. Aesthetic qualities are given in an aesthetic experience on the ground of the constituted aesthetic object. They support the synthetic aesthetic value of this object. Ingarden assumes various qualities of aesthetic values: beauty, loveliness, ugliness, charm, grace, maturity, and perfection.51

Providing that artistic values are relational, because they serve to constitute an aesthetic object, aesthetic values are non-relational and absolute, because they do not serve anything. However, this text proves, contrary to what Ingarden declares, that relationist motives do exist in his theory. It is worth quoting his statement made during the meeting of the Aesthetic Section: "I am always talking about a work of art in concretisation, this work of art has to be there in all the new attire which it is provided with when it becomes appropriately concretised in the form of an aesthetic object. An aesthetic object is not something else in relation to a work of art; it is only something more than a work of art."52 This statement dispels many doubts aroused by Ingarden’s conception of a work of art and aesthetic concretisation.

Ontological solutions offered by the philosopher were not conducive to the radical isolation of a work of art and the subject associated with it. It is true that in the beginning Ingarden would distinguish as two sciences the philosophy of art and aesthetics (the philosophy of aesthetic experience). But he reconsidered his attitude later. Searching for such a definition of an object of philosophical aesthetics, which would guarantee its homogeneity and at the same time avoid one-sidedness, he proposed reflection on the encounter of an artist or a perceiver with a work of art. This overcomes the extremes of an objectivistic and subjectivist approach. Not every contact with art constitutes a research object for philosophical aesthetics. There are encounters taking place when we adopt the aesthetic attitude, motivated by a desire to embody, co-constitute and grasp the value. The philosopher is aware of the actual uniqueness of each individual encounter with a work of art, but he is mainly concerned with what belongs to the essence of such an encounter.53

Ingarden divided ethics into theoretical, normative and applied ethics. Theoretical ethics focuses on moral values. It has to provide answers to the following questions: "What is a moral value? What objects are equipped with moral values or can be equipped with them?"54 Only on the ground of the conclusions reached by theoretical ethics is it possible to formulate norms in the form of propositions defining conditions that have to be fulfilled by a given object in order to be valuable. Applied ethics (ethical technology) aims at influencing people, motivating them to undertake moral efforts.

Ingarden pays much attention to theoretical ethics, because it is the foundation of other sections of ethics, but at the same time, has not provided us with satisfactory solutions. He walks along two paths here: on the one hand he refers to the experience and the intuition present in it (although he admits that they are unclear and that we can make mistakes in experience); on the other hand he would like to make precise conceptual designations and carry out a theoretical analysis. What is the status of theory and experience; what plays a leading role here? I would incline towards interpreting Ingarden’s approach as an attempt at the reconciliation of theoretical requirements and experience. These two areas are to control each other. If axiological experience does not confirm theoretical conclusions, then the theory should be modified. But science cannot stick to obscure intuitions; it has to undertake the burden of research and define concepts accurately.55

The philosopher presents himself as a supporter of material ethics; he assumes the qualitative determination of values and situates his considerations on qualities on various levels of generality. These can concentrate on:

- the quality of concrete moral values (for example ‘justice’);

- the quality which determines attributing the previous qualities to moral values (‘morality’ as the quality of quality); or

- the quality which determines ‘valence’.56

 

The theoretical order is clear here. General research into values constitutes the ontological foundation of ethics. The difficulties result from the fact that the definition of the most abstract quality, i.e. ‘valuableness’, cannot be accepted in an arbitrary way and without any connections with axiological experience, for there is no guarantee that we shall recognise concrete moral values adequately if we have not reached theoretical conclusions. This is an intellectual trap into which one is led when rejecting deduction as well as induction in science. In his research on ethics, Ingarden oscillates continuously between various planes of generality. He assumes theoretical hypotheses which he confronts with moral experience. The experienced moral facts are supplemented by a question of the ontic conditions determining their possibilities.

He starts from the analysis of such intuitively accepted moral virtues as justice, courage, responsibility, solidarity, compassion, honesty, faithfulness, modesty, disinterestedness, inner control, nobility, and forgiveness. Then he confronts them with their opposites, perceived as moral vices.57

These analyses lead to the presentation of conditions that have to be fulfilled to make possible the realisation of moral values.

They are:

participation of the conscious subject;

this subject’s conduct;

with respect to conduct, values (non-moral or moral) have to be taken into consideration;

the subject’s responsibility;

the subject’s freedom of decision and conduct;

a person has to be the source of decision and responsibility in the course of performing some actions.58

 

The problem of disinterestedness, as a condition of realising moral values, remains unsettled. He holds that a carrier of moral value can be a person as well as an act of will and his conduct.

Ingarden is inclined towards attributing to every positive value moral nobility as a determining quality. Nobility assumes various degrees of intensity, rising as high as dignity. Positive moral values fulfil a transformative function in relation to a person, whom they integrate internally. The main characteristic of morally valuable conduct is the motive of multiplying values in the world.

What attitude towards time should be attributed to values? This problem is particularly significant in relation to moral values, as it is connected with an issue of one’s responsibility for his own deeds. Ingarden points to the fact that values appear in time; they may be destroyed or not undergo any change. He emphasises that value does not pass away with the deed which realises it, but it lasts somehow if the identity of its carrier is maintained. "With regard to this aspect, one would have to attribute to moral values not only the capacity of outlasting the lapse of time, but also the capacity of not succumbing, within this flux of time, to any changes in their nature or rank."59

The challenge of the annihilation of values in time is not an empty statement in the light of Ingarden’s treatise On Responsibility. Apart from morally positive and negative values, the philosopher enumerates in relation to them the values of indemnity, repentance, award, etc.

The value of justice stands above all these other values with their existential and material interconnections. It can be realised by fulfilling the demands which are imposed upon the agent by the responsibility he bears. We can also say that justice sets up the demand for all those ‘equalisations’ which are supposed to come about between the negative values effected through the evil deed and the positive values realised owing to the reparation required by responsibility.60

The ethical analyses carried out by Ingarden confirm the connections between values, suggested in his general axiological considerations. The philosopher accepts original and superstructural values, but he does not explain the direction of this dependence. Probably it results from the unresolved problems, connected with the ranking of value. The multi-levelled construction of a system of values and their gradation61 supports the idea of an axiological order. Ingarden does not exclude moral conflicts, because discovering the axiological order we are enabled to make the necessary changes in the world. However, being a human being demands continuous effort in ever undertaking new challenges.

Ingarden’s axiological investigations gave rise to a wide spectrum of opinions, ranging from apologetic to crushingly critical. Some people consider it panaxiologism: "His whole philosophy is a specific, perfectly constructed axiological system,"62 while others approach it as axiological minimalism.63 He is admired for his courage in acknowledging his ignorance; at the same time, he is criticised for his excessive reserve. The evaluation of Ingarden’s thinking depends to a considerable extent upon the concept of philosophy held by his interpreters. The results of his research are exposed to the objections of extremist scientists and essayists.

One thing remains unquestionable. Without Roman Ingarden the landscape of the Polish and world philosophy would be completely different and much more desolate. One cannot overestimate the inspiration contributed by his thinking to philosophy64 and the humanities. In the area of the humanities in Poland, Ingarden’s aesthetic categories often are used without any reference to him. Not only literary references, but also critical reflection prove his intellectual influence.

Ingarden’s style of philosophy is based on his conviction in the value of knowledge. Philosophizing was for him a way of life, adding sense and dignity. It was an axiological choice, of which Ingarden was fully aware and fully accepted, quoting a maxim: primum philosophari, deinde vivere. Having made this choice he had the right to state that a theory is not as far from life as people tend to think. The axiological horizon of Ingarden’s philosophy, situates it in the intellectual spirit of modern times.

His belief in the possibility of constructing scientific philosophy in the context of the most recent philosophical trends seems to be an anachronism. However this optimism can constitute an antidote for spreading disbelief. Ingarden’s criticism of axiological relativism can turn out to be a refuge for those who in the present ‘value crisis’ look for stable orientation.

Ingarden instilled in his pupils a strong belief in the need and sense of practising philosophy. In the area of aesthetics Maria Golaszewska,65 in the area of ethics and anthropology Jan Pawlica66 and Adam Wegrzecki67 develop and even ‘surpass’ the ideas of their master. Jozef Lipiec68 often refers to Ingarden’s concept of purely intentional being in the philosophy of culture and axiology. He considers this concept to be one of the most significant categorical achievements of twentieth century philosophy and at the same time he introduces terminological modifications. He undertakes existential problems of values unsettled by Ingarden, presenting an ingenious typology of values and employing various criteria. Jozef Tischner69 situates axiological issues in the perspective of the philosophy of meeting and dialogue. The centre of gravity of his considerations moves on the basis of axiological experience. We can find a continuation of the classical concept of philosophy and Ingardens’ axiology in Wladyslaw Strozewski’s work.70 Karol Wojtyla’s anthropology is called a ‘Thomistic phenomenology’.71 Having rejected a transcendental and ontological dimension of phenomenology, Anna T. Tymieniecka turns towards its cosmic dimension.72 The phenomenology of life, which she investigates, takes into account also the problems of moral acts and reflection on art as the area of spontaneous human creation.

In the last few years several penetrating metaphysical interpretations of Ingarden’s philosophy have been published.73 The philosopher did not build his own metaphysics, but outlined its conception. It was to be a science of the whole of actually existing being. Ingarden’s interpreters see in the axiological elements a pathway to metaphysics and attempt to transcend Ingarden’s reflection. This they build upon his formulations of metaphysical qualities, and approach the problem of metaphysical experience.

The so-called Polish school of phenomenology, initiated by Ingarden, is distinguished by its ability to benefit from various philosophical traditions. The open character of Ingarden’s philosophy, the fact that his hypotheses had many versions, allows us to carry the investigations further. If we see the inspiring power of philosophy in formulating problems and not in offering solutions, we can say that Ingarden left enough ‘underdefined places’ for his followers to find. However, it would be a simplification to reduce the achievements of Ingarden’s students and his followers only to the ‘concretisation’ of various dimensions of his considerations. While admiring his contribution, they maintain a critical distance–some are even courageous enough to question his way of philosophizing.

To be faithful to Ingarden does not mean to agree literally with his propositions, but to transcend his reflection in a creative way. Ingarden stated: "Whoever wants to be a philosopher has to start to live intellectually, and take responsibility in doing so; otherwise it does not make any sense to begin to deal with philosophy."74

The importance of Ingarden’s axiology is revealed in what grows out of it. Ingarden says himself: "I am not a faithful phenomenologist."75 One should hope that his readers will be ‘unfaithful’ Ingardenists, for they will find in his thought the stimuli to do independent and creative philosophy.

translated by Malgorzata Sady

1. Comp.: Antoni B. Stepien, "O filozofii Romana Ingardena (w 70-lecie urodzin)," Ruch Filozoficzny, 2-4 (1964), pp. 153-159; Anna T. Tymieniecka, "Editorial: The Second Phenomenology," For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 1-5.

2. Roman Ingarden, Spor o istnienie swiata, vol.1, Ontologia egzystencjalna (Warsaw: PWN, 1987), p. 12.

3. Helen Michejda, "Whitehead i Ingarden," Szkice filozoficzne Romanowi Ingardenowi w darze (Warsaw-Cracow: PWN, 1964), p. 15.

4. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, "Roman Ingarden," Fenomenologia Romana Ingardena: Studia Filozoficzne, Special Edition (Warsaw:1972), p. 55.

5. Danuta Gierulanka, "Filozofia Romana Ingardena. Proba wnikniecia w strukture calosci dziela," Fenomenologia Romana Ingardena, op.cit., pp. 71-90.

6. Spor o istnienie swiata, vol.1, op.cit, pp. 33-41, 45-57, 68-72.

7. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

8. Roman Ingarden, Man and Value (Munchen-Wien: Philosophie Verlag, 1983), pp. 119-130. Comp.: "Roman Ingarden: International Bibliography (1915-1989)," Analecta Husserliana, Ingardeniana II, 30 (1990), pp. 231-296.

9. Studia z estetyki, vol.3 (Warsaw: PWN, 1970), pp. 258-265.

10. Ibid., pp. 153-164.

11. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 4 (1964), 3, pp. 198-213.

12. Studia z estetyki, vol.3, op.cit, pp. 288-315.

13. Man and Value, op.cit., pp. 131-164.

14. Ibid., pp. 165-178.

15. "On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations, ibid., pp. 53-117.

16. O dziele literackim. Badania z pogranicza ontologii, teorii jezyka i filozofii literatury (Warsaw: PWN, 1988); The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Bordderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973).

17. Man and Value, op.cit., pp. 25-31.

18. Studia z estetyki, vol.1 (Warsaw: PWN, 1957), pp. 3-251.

19. Roman Ingarden, Wyklady z etyki, ed. A. Wegrzecki (Warsaw: PWN, 1989).

20. Id., Wyklady i dyskusje z estetyki, ed. A. Szczepanska (Warsaw: PWN, 1981).

21. "Man and His Reality," op.cit., p. 30.

22. "Man and Nature," Man and Value, op.cit., p. 20.

23. Comp.: Studia z estetyki, vol.1, op.cit., pp. 249-250. Comp.: Rolf Fieguth, "Einleitung," R. Ingarden, Gegenstand und Aufgaben der Literaturwissenschaft (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1976), pp. X-XLIII; Zofia Majewska, "Roman Ingarden’s Philosophy of Culture: An Attempt at a Reconstruction," Analecta Husserliana, 55 (1998), pp. 177-191; Edward M. Swiderski, "Between Meaning and Value: The Problematic Unity of Culture in Ingarden," Roman Ingarden a filozofia naszego czasu (Cracow: PTF, 1995), pp. 133-148.

24. Wyklady z etyki, op.cit., pp. 349-350.

25. Adam Wegrzecki, "The Function of Ontology and Experience in Roman Ingarden’s Axiological Investigations," Kunst und Ontologie. Fur Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburtstag (Amsterdam-Atlanta), Elementa, 62 (1994), p. 226.

26. "Remarks on the Relativity of Values," op.cit., p. 127.

27. "On Human Nature," Man and Value, op.cit., p. 22. Comp.: A. Wegrzecki, "On the Absoluteness of Values," The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 6 (1975), 2, pp. 109-115.

28. "What We Do Not Know About Values," op.cit., p. 136.

29. Ibid., p. 137.

30. Ibid., pp. 137-138.

31. Ibid., p. 142.

32. Ibid., p. 143.

33. Ibid., p. 151.

34. Ibid., p. 144.

35. Ibid., p. 149.

36. Ibid., pp. 150-151.

37. Ibid., p. 153.

38. Comp.: Robert Sweeney, "Axiology in Scheler and Ingarden and the Question of Dialectics," Dialectics and Humanism, 2 (1975), 3, pp. 91-97.

39. "What We Do Not Know About Values," op.cit., pp. 157-158.

40. Ibid., p. 156.

41. Ibid., p. 160.

42. O dziele literackim, op.cit., p. 456.

43. Ibid., p. 369.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., pp. 370-371.

46. Ibid.

47. Spor o istnienie swiata, vol. 2, Ontologia formalna, p. 2, Swiat i swiadomosc (Warsaw: PWN, 1987), p. 105.

48. Comp.: Roman Dziemidok, "Romana Ingardena teoria wartosci i wartosciowania dziela sztuki," Sztuka, emocje i wartosci (Warsaw: Wyd. Fundacji dla Instytutu Kultury, 1992), pp. 168-186; Maria Golaszewska, "Aesthetic Values in Ingarden’s System of Philosophy," Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics: Essays (Warsaw: PWN, 1975), pp. 47-68; Jerzy Kmita, "Work of Art–its Concretization. Artistic Value–Aesthetic Value," ibid., pp. 109-128; Katarzyna Rosner, "Ingarden’s Philosophy of Literature and the Analysis of Artistic Communication," ibid., pp. 191-221; Anita Szczepanska, Estetyka Romana Ingardena (Warsaw: PWN, 1989), pp. 194-216; id., "Perspectives of the Axiological Investigations of the Work of Roman Ingarden," The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 6 (1975), 2, pp. 116-125; Danuta Ulicka, Ingardenowska filozofia literatury. Konteksty (Warsaw: PWN, 1992), pp. 221-241.

49. Wyklady i dyskusje z estetyki, op.cit., p. 377; Studia z estetyki, vol. 2, (Warsaw: PWN, 1966), pp. 363-364.

50. "Artistic and Aesthetic Values," op.cit.

51. Comp.: "Wartosc estetyczna i zagadnienie jej obiektywnego ugruntowania," op.cit., p. 261; "Zagadnienie systemu jakosci estetycznych donioslych," op.cit., pp. 289-293; Wyklady i dyskusje z estetyki, op.cit., pp. 412, 415.

52. Ibid., p. 426.

53. Roman Ingarden, "O estetyce filozoficznej," "O estetyce fenomenologicznej," Studia z estetyki, vol. 3, op.cit., pp. 9-41; "On Philosophical Aesthetics", Dialectics and Humanism, 10 (1983), 1, pp. 5-12.

54. Wyklady z etyki, op.cit., p. 14; Comp.: Maria Golaszewska, "Roman Ingarden’s Moral Philosophy," Analecta Husserliana, 4 (1976), Ingardeniana, pp. 73-103.

55. Comp.: "An Analysis of Moral Values," op.cit., p. 170.

56. Comp.: Wyklady z etyki, op.cit., p. 131.

57. Ibid. pp. 245-255.

58. "An Analysis of Moral Values," op.cit., pp. 165-166.

59. "What We Do Not Know About Values," op.cit., p. 70.

60. "On Responsibility," op.cit., p. 70.

61. Wyklady z etyki, op.cit., pp. 266, 326-327.

62. Andrzej Pytlak, "Propozycje aksjologiczne Ingardena," Studia Filozoficzne, 2 (1968), p. 210.

63. Barbara Kotowa, "Ingardenowski minimalizm aksjologiczny," Studia Metodologiczne, 21 (1981), pp. 49-65.

64. Comp.: Barry Smith, "Historicity, Value and Mathematics," Analecta Husserliana, 4 (1976), pp. 219-235.

65. Maria Golaszewska, Czlowiek w zwierciadle sztuki. Studium z pogranicza estetyki i antropologii filozoficznej (Warsaw: PWN, 1977); Istota i istnienie wartosci (Warsaw: PWN, 1990); Fascynacja zlem. Eseje z teorii wartosci (Warsaw-Cracow: Wyd. Naukowe PWN, 1994).

66. Jan Pawlica, O konfliktach i postawach moralnych (Cracow: 1992); "Axiological Properties in the Centre of the Human Person," Roman Ingarden a filozofia naszego czasu, op.cit., pp. 161-164.

67. Adam Wegrzecki, O poznawaniu drugiego czlowieka (Cracow: 1992); Zarys fenomenologii podmiotu (Cracow: Ossolineum, 1996).

68. Jozef Lipiec, Podstawy ontologii spoleczenstwa (Warsaw: PWN, 1972), pp. 87-102, 170-185; W przestrzeni wartosci. Studia z ontologii wartosci (Cracow: HOW, 1992); Wolnosc i podmiotowosc cz³owieka (Cracow: Fall, 1997). The author is also an editor of several volumes on ontology and epistemology of value.

69. Jozef Tischner, Myslenie wedlug wartosci (Cracow: Znak, 1982).

70. Wladyslaw Strozewski, Dialektyka tworczosci (Cracow: PWM, 1983); W kregu wartosci (Cracow: Znak, 1992); "Art and Participation", Kunst und Ontologie, op.cit., pp. 167-181.

71. Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, Analecta Husserliana, 10 (1979).

72. Anna T. Tymieniecka, "Beyond Ingarden’s Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husserl–the New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology", Analecta Husserliana, 4 (1976), pp. 353-368; "Roman Ingarden’s Philosophical Legacy and My Departure from It: the Creative Freedom of the Possible Worlds", ibid., 30 (1990), pp. 3-23; Logos and Life, ibid., 24, 25 (1988).

73. Andrzej Poltawski, "Roman Ingarden–metafizyk wolnosci", W kregu filozofii Romana Ingardena, op.cit., pp. 137-149; Edward M. Swiderski, "Individual Essence in Ingarden’s Ontology", Kunst und Ontologie, op.cit., p. 205; Andrzej Tyszczyk, Estetyczne i metafizyczne aspekty aksjologii literackiej Romana Ingardena (Lublin: Wyd. KUL, 1993).

74. Cited after Danuta Gierulanka, "Filozofia Romana Ingardena", op. cit., p. 90.

75. Roman Ingarden, Wyklady z etyki, op. cit., p. 336.