Since the recent increase of the influence of various relativistic doctrines which at times reach a total destruction of truth it seems necessary to reconsider the philosophical bases of these attitudes. For this purpose – yet only as a foreword or introduction to a full discussion – I should like: first, to renew particular arguments quoted by 20th century critics of the concept of a relativist truth (especially Twardowski and Tatarkiewicz); second, to differentiate clearly this relativism from other theories with which it is often unjustly confused; third critically to consider the effects of criticism of the relativism by Twardowski and Tatarkiewicz; and fourth to present the absolute character of truth also in a context broader than the logical, one that is strictly axiological, but which usually is altogether omitted by 20th century critics of logical relativism (including Twardowski). All these factors are necessary to broaden the theoretical self-awareness of both the adherents and the opponents relativism.

1. What is meant by truth as an absolute value? Are certain theses, especially logical judgements, absolutely true? It seems that absolute truth may be discussed in a double sense: first – when we talk about truth in the logical meaning, second – when truth becomes a value for its own sake (autotelic value).

In a parallel manner, however, as Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938)1  argued in his renowned dissertation, "hardly anyone questions the existence of relative truths". Since the conviction of truth’s relativity (at times the whole of human truth is included here) is really so widely spread, as Twardowski suggests, it is worth considering the foundation of the conviction. Popularity is not decisive for reliability, although undoubtedly it creates a useful starting-point for reflection on the nature of truth.

On the other hand, it should be realised that the absolute character of certain phenomena (features, qualities or states) is manifested when we qualify them by use of the adjective true, for instance: true friendship, true love, true gem, true wisdom, etc. The use of the word true in the above examples is certainly only loosely connected with the strict sense, accepted in logic or philosophy and referring most often to judgements, more rarely to thoughts and language, and in one case stressing absolute, categorical and non-problematic values.

2. From the viewpoint of formal logic, which, among its primary principles, includes the principles of (in)consistency and of excluded middle, the differentiation of relative and absolute truths is nonsense, and every groundless and unacceptable. It destroys the rationality of the human efforts for it involves us in a conflict with what has been considered the canon and main measure of rational activity, thinking and learning.2  So far, any endeavour to question the principles of (in)consistency and excluded middle has always ended in a similar way: to the extent that it was consistent in its radicalism or nonchalance, it was at the same time theoretically destructive, fruitless in cognition, and in extreme cases totally nihilistic.3 

Despite this perspective, which can hardly be deemed as encouraging in any sense including the psychological, the theory of the existence of relative truths has somehow always found its spokesperson. Even today, especially today some say that relativism possesses a considerable circle of admirers, and an even wider circle of covert, silent and, so to say, shy followers.4  For, at least at first glance, the claim that there are no "eternal truths", "supreme truths", "unchangeable and unquestionable claims" (scilicet dogmas) generally sounds sensible and evokes sympathy and favourable interest.

In the dissertation O bezwzglednosci dobra (On the absolute of truth) Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz (1886-1980), characterizing the twentieth century relativist and subjectivist trends in ethics and axiology stated: "Fake arguments and fake subjectivist theories create an atmosphere of sympathy and adulation for subjectivism. … Subjectivism in general, and ethical subjectivism in particular, reflect a state of mind perceived as being critical; while the objectivist stand is marked by dogmatism. And yet, there is no constant relation between subjectivism and being critical; indeed, there have been periods of human thought when, on the contrary, the subjectivist stand was perceived as lacking in criticism".5 

3. Although it is significant, let us omit the broad cultural and social context which fuels the creation and dissemination of views expressing a favourable understanding for all relativity, including relativity of truth. Inclusion of that context is rather the task of a sociology of a culture, knowledge, or social psychology. Here following the example of our Polish twentieth century philosophical classics (Twardowski, Tatarkiewicz, and Ingarden), let us consider only the purely theoretical context. In their footsteps let us begin from introductory, yet basic, terminological propositions.

Firstly, truth will be understood here according to its classical concept found in Isaac ben Salomon’s (IXth century) formula, reinforced by Saint Thomas Aquinas (Contra Gentiles I, 159; De veritate 1,2). This may be defined generally as follows: Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. Secondly, such conceived "truth" (to be more exact: the feature of "truthfulness") will be related exclusively to judgements in the logical sense, where the word "truth" will mean the same as "truthful judgement". Resulting from this, thirdly, "relative truth" is "relatively true judgement", while "absolute truth" is "absolutely true judgement". Fourthly, following Twardowski, and also in accordance with the traditional meanings of "relative" and "absolute", let us assume that the absolute truths are those judgements which "are true absolutely, with no objections, irrespective of any circumstances, which are truths at any time or place".6  Accordingly, relative truths are those judgements, "which are true only under certain conditions, with restrictions imposed, due to certain circumstances: and judgements are not true irrespective of time and place".7  The basic meaning of the words of "relative" and "absolute" can be proved by the same reasoning, not only in logic and theory of knowledge but also in ethics, aesthetics and customs, i.e. when, for instance, talk about the relativity or absoluteness of good, beauty, or obedience.8 

4. The most frequently applied method of philosophical reasoning is the elenchus, which is often known as "indirect proof" or "reduction to the absurd" (reductio ad absurdum). This method is especially useful for criticising, but not only that. Also when trying to prove the primeval character of a value or argument, the so-called "first laws of thinking", we are usually forced to use the elenchus method to prove their truthfulness as was well understood by both Twardowski and Tatarkiewicz. They thought that, at least for those who do not question the principle of (in)consistency and excluded middle, this way of proving is equally as effective and valid as other classical ways of proving, especially the deductive one. At first glance it can be perceived that, as they argued, in the dispute on the nature of truth there are three possibilities: ether [1] the nominalist stand, i.e. assume that truth and fallacy do not exist, or [2] the relativistic thesis, that is, that truth and fallacy are merely relative features of judgements in the logical sense, or [3] truth and fallacy are the absolute features of judgements. Hence to reject nominalism and at the same time we prove the irrationality of the relativistic thesis, we must consent to righteousness of the anti-relativistic stand or, if one is not afraid of being straightforward , the righteousness of absolutism.9 

5. Twardowski may be said to have argued against the followers of relative truths by what some call relativism, by others say is epistemological relativism,10  and in four basic manners.11 

Firstly, he pointed out the lack of differentiation of judgements in the logical sense (Latin: propositum, German: Urteil) from their external verbal expression, i.e. sayings or utterances (Latin: enuntiatio, German: Aussage).12  However, only the perception of the difference between a tangible utterance (enuntiatio; Aussage) and a judgement which it expresses (propositum; Urteil) makes it possible to avoid a series of disastrous misunderstandings and to support the rationality of material argumentation. The fact of multiple meaning words and expressions in every language is well known. The same is true of expression which probably stem from the fact that language serves first of all practical needs: communication in the simplest possible way, using the smallest number of lexical items.

In this situation it seems obvious that a particular linguistic expression may represent many different judgements in the logical sense – both true, and false. Relativists are therefore wrong in considering the sameness of external expression to entail the sameness of the judgement based on it. For, although there are close relations between the linguistic expression and the relevant judgement in the logical sense (scilicet: the matter of the expression), the sameness of the external expression or utterance only (saying – as used by Twardowski) of a judgement has never been a sufficient guarantee of the sameness of the judgement (propositum).13  Hence, when they state that certain claims are true at a particular time, but false at another, and they do not prove that "a true and false judgement expressed by the same saying is indeed one and the same judgement", then we can expect that we are not dealing with one and the same judgement, but with two different ones, although expressed with exactly the same lexical items (or equally shaped expressions). All the examples of so-called relative truths favoured by relativists (e.g. "The flower smells nice", "It is raining", "Father is alive", etc.) – after application of single meanings to the lexical items composing the sentences and elimination of ellipses – are by no means true at one time and false at another (depending on the circumstance); on the contrary, either they are always true, or always false. The claim cannot be supported that – resulting from the sameness of linguistic utterance: identical phonetic aspects or equally shape expressions (or inscriptions) – the same judgement turned from true to false (or the reverse), when at closer analysis it may be proved that an expression which is apparently identical (the same inscription), in reality expresses totally different judgements. Obviously, in accordance with the principle of excluded middle, the judgements may be either true or false, yet never (against the [in]consistency principle) both true and false.

Secondly, Twardowski proves, although in a modest way, that the adherents of the relativist theory of truth confuse the logical value applicable to judgements (their truth or fallacy) with the knowledge of the value, i.e. its cognition.14  The most frequent and striking example of this are the attempts to make truth and fallacy relative to the current level of human experience and the development of general knowledge.

Indeed, the view is often disseminated that truths included in scientific theories and hypotheses drawn inductively also possess a relative character. Above other things it must be realised that those theories and hypotheses are characterised by greater or lesser degrees of probability, yet they are never certain. Thus it would seem improper to interpret them as absolute judgements. This happens often in everyday life, but is not a rarity in science. We are fully convinced that "In a week’s time we are going to Cracow" or that "The Earth revolves around the Sun".15  However, such hypotheses cannot be defined as true, but only as probable.16  This means that the judgement included in a particular hypothesis cannot be defined as true or false, though at present level of knowledge we are inclined to treat it as true. In spite of this, it may not be ruled out that some day it will not turn out false with full certainty.

Twardowski writes "If we encounter a case that a particular hypothesis or theory was – as the relativists say – true only for a certain scope of experience, the fact is that the hypothesis or theory was not true at all, but was false from the very beginning. However at the time when it was accepted some facts proving its fallacy could not be perceived, and it was accepted, for at that time the hypothesis/theory was deemed more probable than all the others.17 

Thirdly, as some authors try to deduce the relativist thesis from the epistemological subjectivism – Twardowski invariably proved such a foundation to be a total delusion. Indeed, this is a very effective direction for criticism. No subjectivism has ever proved that considering a judgement as true makes it true. For at least on the grounds of the classical theory of truth – which is presupposed, at least tacitly by any other so-called "non-classical" theory – its truth is proved by the existence or non-existence of the object of a judgement, not simply the consideration of it as true. And this regardless of the person considering, even God! Thus the problem comes down not to considering (or not considering), but to the righteousness or validity of the considering (or not considering). From this point of view – following F. Brentano, and in opposition to Pythagoras – it may be said that man is the "measure of everything" only if indeed s/he measures righteously (correctly, resp. validly). In other words, except when it is a poor "measure", even though human.18 

Relativism based on subjectivism was born – as Twardowski claims – on the basis of judgements of the external world, which seems its best chance of acquiring a large number of arguments. It stems from the conclusion that the picture of the external world perceived by man is a kind of illusion, or to put it straightforwardly an hallucination. Anything we try to conceive or image will always stay within our human conception or imagination.19 Only naive realism identifies those conceptions or imaginations directly with external objects. All other epistemological stands clearly differentiate the world itself from the world imaged by man.

Do the foundations of subjectivism really provide us with arguments for the relativists’ thesis? Twardowski replies as follows: "As our judgements on the external world are applicable only to the objects we image, and cannot reach the world which possibly exists independently of our imaginations, subjectivism is supported as far as it makes the features of the external world imaged by man dependent upon human organisation and claims that judgements about the world depend on the way of imaging the external world. However, relativism is wrong in concluding that truths applicable to the external world are therefore relative. For if a cause R, existing independently of us – which may be an object itself, atoms and their movements. God, etc. – creates in man the object image r, and in another being the object image r’, if, resulting from this, man creates a judgement on this object r-p, and another being a judgement r’-p’, there is no basis for claiming that the judgement given by man is true only to himself, and untrue for another being. This different being cannot realise the same judgement that the man gives at all, since the being’s data consist of r’ and p’, not r and p".20 

As we can see, only following the naïve realists’ identication of objects r and r’ with object R existing in itself can one come to a conclusion that man is right in giving the R-p judgement, and similarly the second being is nonetheless correct in giving the R-p’ judgement on the very same object. When we endeavour to make the naive realist’s stand agree with relativistic view of truth we indulge in an evident inconsistency. This kind of reasoning cannot accord with the canon of rationality put forward by the logical principle of (in)consistency.

Finally and fourthly, Twardowski undermines the sceptical stand. According to the sceptical point of view, man is not able to reach the world of "objects themselves", for as the sceptics’ argument supports subjectivists, one has always fake images (illusions), symptoms (phenomena), and only certain representations (visual, notional or symbolic). However, as Twardowski claims,21  this proves only (and at most) the limits of our knowledge, not the relativity of truth. The fact that the way man images objects, and hence the way he judges them, are inevitably dependent on his/her psychic and physical organization. This is at most the cause for man giving more false than true judgements. But once a judgement given by man proves to be true, it will never cease to be true for everyone. At the same time, lack of agreement between two or more object images (including judgements) most often does not prove their inconsistency. The inconsistency does not necessarily happen for every such image (or judgement) could possess its own distinct object. On the other hand, in the situation in which the object is indeed one and the same, and the images are still in disagreement, then, according to the (in)consistency and excluded means principles only one of them (at most, and also at least!) is true.

Let us notice that, against all pretence, the very disagreement of judgements given by man (or even their inconsistency) count towards cognitive optimism and proves the possibility of discarding extreme scepticism and cognitive nihilism.22  For inconsistent judgements can still generate the certainty that according to the fundamental principles of rational reason one of them is absolutely true.

6. In the last paragraphs of the dissertation On So-called Relative Truths, Twardowski – clearly approaching a general conclusion – poses the following question: "If relativism indeed lacks any basis, if the view sanctioning the existence of only relatively true judgements cannot be argued, how can the fact be explained that the view is so widely spread and appears often even in everyday speech and reasoning?"23 

Searching for the explanation of this puzzling state of affairs, Twardowski notes that this is fueled by an unreasonable identification of judgements in the logical sense (propositium; Urteil) with their external expression, i.e. utterance or saying (enuntiatio; Aussage). This trend is visible even in Plato and today we use such locutions as "sentence", "statement", "negation", "thesis", etc. at one time to mean only the products of certain psychic acts and at another time their verbal expression. What is more, even such key categories as "subject", "predicate", and "copula" are related both to judgements in the logical sense and to verbal utterances. Due to this, it is easy for misunderstandings to appear: what applies to judgements only we state in utterances, and vice versa. This situation appears especially often when features of truth and fallacy are concerned.

If then it is the case that we subscribe the truth feature to utterances, the next feature of truth or fallacy will be relativity, for it may be claimed about utterances that they are "relatively true", or "relatively false". Twardowski argues, "the truthfulness of a saying depends on the judgement expressed with this saying being true". Since one and the same utterance may usually express many different judgements (both true and false), the utterance is only relatively true, or true only under certain conditions: i.e. as much as it is the expression of a true judgement. In opposition to relatively true utterances, utterances which are absolutely true may exist only when they are formulated strictly enough, so that it is impossible to find a false judgement among them.

Principally then, "the differentiation between relative and absolute truthfulness exists only in the area of sayings, to which the truth feature applies only in a figurative indirect sense. When the judgements themselves are concerned we cannot talk about relative and absolute truthfulness, for each judgement is either true, and then it is true at any time or place, or it is false, and also false at any time or place. The existence of relative truths may be sustained only thanks to the lack of differentiation between judgements and sayings and loses its basis when the difference between judgements and sayings is strictly and systematically observed".24  This is the final conclusion of Twardowski’s argumentation against the theory of so-called relative truths, scilicet logical or epistemological relativism.

1. Relativism in the form defined above was the object of fierce criticism also from other twentieth century Polish philosophers. As this criticism was often undertaken independently from Twardowski’s interpretation, it made crucial additions. Special attention is due to the analyses many years ago by W. Tatarkiewicz in his dissertation On the Absolute of Good (1919). It demonstrated, among other things, that relativism broadly understood – both common and partial (e.g. only ethical or logical) – is often, though unjustifiably, confused (scilicet joined or even identified with) epistemological theories, whose connection with relativism is purely superficial and accidental (e.g. purely psychological). In fact, the theories are vastly different. Undoubtedly, some present common usage of the terms is an encouraging factor for this state of affairs, as well as certain psychological links (most often differing from the logical ones), which may be frequently detected between some epistemological stands (e.g. subjectivism or rationalism) and a relativistic view.25  Probably, great importance may be given also to the mixing of terms that is typical of relativists (of various levels and subjects) as well as theoretical nonchalance, bordering on disorder (mental and linguistic). A good illustration of all those trends and preferences is not only the epistemological and methodological anarchism of P. Feyerabend or the so-called sociology of knowledge, but above all the perfectly eclectic post-modernism and deconstructionism, promoting (in J. Derrida terms) "deconstruction without reconstruction".

Obviously, when Tatarkiewicz launched his criticism of modernism and in defence of the absolute nature of truth and the good, the phenomena mentioned above has not yet known, and he himself did not predict them. Nevertheless, it does not seem that, as a result of the transformations which took place in the twentieth century philosophy, his findings (similar to those of Twardowski) have lost their instructive quality, explanatory power or theoretical significance. Hence there are strong reasons to note, consider, and, perhaps, appreciate his findings.

As a result of the existing terminological chaos Tatarkiewicz considered it necessary to differentiate all relativistic theories – including the ethical and logical (resp. epistemological) – from the empirical fact of the lack of agreement in people’s convictions: lack of accord on good and evil, truth and fallacy, beauty and ugliness, etc.26  Without going into great detail, the differentiation should be implemented on exactly the same basis used for the differentiation of theories from facts. It is even better grounded, as the scope of our interest includes truth and fallacy (i.e. logic and epistemology research objects), as well as the facts of the discrepancy of people’s convictions (i.e. psychology, sociology, history and similar so-called "factual sciences"). Moreover, the mutual discrepancy of people’s convictions and judgements, which must also to be taken into account, lends itself to easy explanation in other than relative manner. Nominalists provide us with different interpretations of the fact (truth is only a metaphorical definition of psychic states of particular individuals found in different people), and so do sceptics (truth cannot be found, but only inferred; hence the natural discrepancy of judgements) as well as provenancialists, fundamentalists (truth is a cognisable feature of judgements, yet as the human mind is limited and often erroneous at times discrepancies appear).

2. Naturally, no probabilistic concepts constitute relativism of the type considered, for it concerns the probability of claims and theories, not their truth or fallacy. According to the concept, all sentences and theses of science are neither true nor false – in any sense of those words – but are more or less probable. In the field of ethics the concept is parallel to the comparative theory of good and evil (ethical comparativism), according to which there are no good or evil objects in the moral sense, but only "better than", and "worse than".27  Subsequently, in art theory the theories will be parallel to – per analogiam – aesthetic comparativism, according to which no artist creates objects which are absolutely and finitely beautiful (or ugly), but only "more beautiful than" (or "uglier than"). The need to keep true sentences apart from probable or hypothetical sentences was already mentioned by Twardowski.28  To maintain order, let us note that as it is not allowed to confuse truth and probability – correlatively – for similar reasons it is not allowed to confuse: truth theory with probability theory, moral goodness theory and ethical comparativism, and the theory of beauty with aesthetic comparativism.

3. Following point 2, in general it becomes clear that epistemological relativism does not include the so-called approximative theory of truth. Its adherents – e.g. F. Engels29  – use the term "relative truth", but with a particular meaning. Firstly, they do not question the sense of evaluating particular statements from the point of view of truth and fallacy in their classical sense. What is more, some such as F. Engels allow the possibility also for logical and mathematical statements, which proves that they consider science of this kind as synthetic, not only analytical as, for example neopositivists assume.30  Secondly, they are ready to accept as "eternal truths" or "supreme truths" some catalogue of truths collection or entry statements which are the simplest and most basics.31  W.I. Lenin is a representative of the same stand within Marxism. It seems that the stand of Lenin himself is even clearer and more definite. He states unambiguously that all objective truth (truth in the classical sense) is always absolute. "The relative element – as he writes in Materialism and empiriocriticism – may be negated in different, human representations, which not negating the existence of objective truth".32  Thirdly and finally, the notion of relative truth – most often understood as an infinite series of approximative links, none of which may claim to be full, finite and complete knowledge – does not seem to be a third logical category in competition with the two traditional values because it applies either to "the total of human knowledge of a certain epoch", or to a "certain comprehensive domain", e.g. a certain science or at least scientific theory.33 

To put it simply, the approximative theory of truth cannot be synonymous with the type of relativism discussed because the object of its assessment are larger theoretical entities (theories, scientific disciplines, science, and finally the entire human knowledge at particular stages of its historical development), not particular claims, scilicet judgements in the logical sense. According to the approximative theory of truth, relative truth equals truth which is limited, partial, changeable in the historical perspective as it is constantly updated and perfected, never complete and absolute. Clearly, the term "relative truth" is used here in a specific sense which stresses the incompleteness both of our (human) knowledge about the world and of our knowledge about knowledge (resp. truth).

4. As Tatarkiewicz notes, the relativistic concept of truth is most frequently confused with epistemological subjectivism,34  though they are two separate theories. The first states that truth and fallacy are relative features of judgements, thus features not applicable at any time or place. The second states that truth and fallacy belong to the same category of features which depend on a certain object, thus are subjective. At most a psychological relationship exists between relativism and subjectivism, while the logical relationship (in the sense of relation: if S then R or – if R then S) cannot be detected, for a relative feature may be objective, and a subjective feature may be absolute.35 

5. According to Tatarkiewicz, relativism and subjectivism are also divided by another important issue. If all sentences and theories (including primarily scientific sentences and theories) may be divided into two basic groups – [1] sentences about state particular states of affairs on the basis of direct data and [2] sentences (resp. theories) which are deduced from other sentences or theories, then relativism is a theory belonging to the first group, while subjectivism is a theory belonging to the second group.36  The fact that truth and fallacy are relative or absolute features can be detected directly on the basis of the analysis of the very features themselves. It is impossible to determine in a direct way (scil. without using reasoning or some form of discourse) if truth and fallacy are subjective features. The relativist’s task is only to show – scil. reveal and assert – a particular state of affairs, i.e. that truth and fallacy are relative features of judgements and sentences in the logical sense. Hence, the natural tendency of relativists to quote various examples of so-called relative truths – examples illustrating only the postulated relativity of truth and fallacy. On the other hand, the subjectivist’s task is to prove the righteousness of his/her thesis. The above difference is found also when theories opposite to relativism and subjectivism are concerned, that is, in the case of epistemological absolutism (resp. fundamentalism) and objectivism (resp. realism). Absolutism and fundamentalism only reveal, show, illustrate and assert certain states of affairs; objectivism, on the other hand, proves its claims, and thus asserts their importance in an indirect and discursive way (e.g. deductively).

As is easily seen, Twardowski’s observation just quoted disagrees with those relativists who try to show the rightness of their thesis on the existence of relative truths by deducing the thesis from the assumptions of epistemological subjectivism, which would have to mean the primaeval logical status of the latter. In fact, there is no logical relationship between subjectivism and relativism. Relativists simulate the relationship by trying to prove, on the basis of the discrepancy of judgements given by man, that any truth is always and only a truth for someone, and thus something relative, and not obligatory always, everywhere, and for everyone. Yet they do not take into consideration the fact that the starting point of their reasoning – the discrepancy of people’s views – may be, and is, explained other than relativistically. Thus they cannot treat the fact of discrepancy as an argument for their stand.

6. In the dissertation On the Absolute of Good Tatarkiewicz also proposes that ethical relativism to which his dissertation basically is devoted should be clearly differentiated from the theory stating that "Every good object is also evil, and every evil object is also good".37  Tatarkiewicz writes that the theory has not much to do with ethical relativism, for stating that objects possess mixed features – i.e. good and evil – is not equal to the thesis that good and evil are relative. They would be relative only when the appearance of a feature of good or evil in an object was dependent upon the relation of this object (P1) to another object of the same or different type (P2). According to Tatarkiewicz, this does not take place in the case of good and evil. According to him, good and evil in the moral sense (as well as all other ethical values) possess an absolute character because of the fact that they are applicable to different objects independently of the relation of these objects to any other objects.

At this point a question appears: Is this kind of absoluteness, which according to Tatarkiewicz is the feature of good and evil, also characteristic of truth and fallacy? If we keep to the terms "relativity" and "absoluteness", which were formulated by Twardowski, the answer is negative. In other words, truth and fallacy – as distinct from good and evil, as well as other ethical values38  – do not possess absoluteness in the sense of non-relationality. The reason for this is simple. Truth and fallacy, according to their classical definition, are by nature relational: for a judgement in the logical sense to be true, there must exist, apart from the very judgement (object P1), some other object (P2) to which it is in some way related. The relation, or reference, can be named differently: adequateness (adaequatio), similarity (conformitas), correspondence (correspondentia), conventionality (convenientia), overlapping (German: Deckung) or something else. Generally the view prevailed that only its appearance causes a certain category of objects (thoughts, sentences, or judgements in the logical sense) to have the feature of truth. Thus the classical definition treats truth as a specific type of relation – i.e. the relation between a judgement (resp. a thought or sentence) and a certain state of affairs (to which the judgement is applicable).39 

The relativity of truth does not discredit its absoluteness in the sense discussed by Twardowski. That is because relationism and relativism in Twardowski’s sense are two distinct matters. It may be agreed that the latter, in opposition to Tatarkiewicz’s stand, may be equalited with a particular, specific variant of the theory stating that objects possess mixed features (e.g. at one time they are true, at another time false),40  but relativism in the sense of relationism excludes this kind of connection. To put it briefly, for Tatarkiewicz relationism is relativism par excellence, while for Twardowski relationism is not relativism and does not have to lead to relativism. In Twardowski’s view relativism includes the view that one and the same object (e.g. a judgement in the logical sense) – depending on various circumstances – at one time possesses a specifically defined feature (e.g. it is true) and at another time does not possess that feature (scil. it is untrue).

1. The arguments presented by Twardowski (vide part A) and the differentiation made by Tatarkiewicz (vide part B), may give the impression that both logical relativism and ethical relativism are completely groundless and based on a confusion of notions, distinctions and entirely divergent areas of theoretical reflection. I do consider this impression to be correct, namely, that indeed all relativism (both comprehensive and partial, e.g. only logical or ethical) originates only from (or above other things from) a lack of clarity, precision and discipline of reasoning. Perhaps to avoid difficulties and theoretical traps to which different "relativisms" lead, it is enough to follow the route of differentiation set by Tatarkiewicz or to create such subtle differences for oneself. Perhaps. However, despite all the advantages which Tatarkiewicz’s and Twardowski’s criticisms of relativistic doctrines provide, at the same time they create many doubts and reservations. I would like to present briefly some of these reservations and doubts. Due to the thematic limitation of this paper (vide title), the only addressee of those doubts and provisions will be Twardowski.

2. As we already know, Twardowski is a strong adherent of the anti-relativistic (resp. absolutist) concept of truth and fallacy. This means that truthfulness and fallacy are considered as absolute features of judgements in the logical sense. However, even if we skip the argument on the nature of truth and what constitutes its dwelling place (thought, the matter of thought, or appropriate linguistic expression?) and agree with him that the feature of truthfulness belongs only to judgements in the logical sense, still a most important question remains: what is a judgement in the logical sense?

Judgement is not the same as a linguistic expression or utterance, saying that this is what we know. In this area Twardowski does not leave a hint of doubt. We do not know, however – for the problem was not solved by Twardowski in a definite and clear way41  – the status of judgement: if and, if so, to what extent it is a creation of the psychic act of judging, something subjective or (despite genetic dependence from psychic phenomena and processes) something objective? In case of the latter – which can be supported by significant hints in Twardowski’s reasoning42  – the question remains: are those judgements what Husserl calls "ideal meaning" (ideale Bedeutung), or what K.R. Popper included in the so-called "third world"? Perhaps they should be provided with the purely intentional existence which, according to R. Ingarden, is characteristic of all works of art?

It seems that before we decide if truthfulness and fallacy are relative or absolute features of judgements, we should understand what a judgement itself is, as well perhaps as other objects which may be declared true or false. Twardowski did not fulfill this duty for he did not set what other features – necessary and possible – are applicable to those objects being declared true or false.

3. In connection with that is the following doubt: Does Twardowski’s concept of judgement, as a creation of certain psychic activities, lend itself to being interpreted in a purely anti-psychologist and objectivist spirit? This worry results from, among other things, Twardowski’s psychologistic language and way of thinking. One thing is certain here: Twardowski never questioned the psychic genesis of judgements (in the sense that their origin is a psychic act of judging by a particular empirical human being). On the other hand, his openly declared anti-psychologism in the theory of judgement was never sufficiently radical to place it, without a shadow of doubt, in the mainstream of theory-cognitive concepts developed by such fierce anti-psychologists as B. Bolzano, G. Frege or E. Husserl. If so, what constitutes the distinctiveness of Twardowski’s anti-psychologist proposition? The answer to the question will be achieved only when Twardowski’s view on the character and level of autonomy of judgements in the logical sense is defined. However, today that task is extremely difficult, if at all possible.43 

4. Thirdly, Twardowski – according to the methodological manifesto of the Lwow-Warsaw school – is a representative of the optimistic view (later characteristic of British analytical philosophy) that it is possible to make people’s utterances clear by simple analytic and linguistic activities to such an extent that the multi-meaning feature of common language, as well as ellipsis, may be avoided. Admittedly Twardowski makes attempts in this direction, but at the same he does not note that the result of each of those attempts is far from the assumed ideal. It seems then that, at least on the grounds of colloquial language (from which certain disciplines such as the humanities will never be able to set free) the ideal possibility pointed out by Twardowski may not be achieved. For, as it seems – without mentioning all the technical difficulties: heavy, long sentences, multitude of expressions and discourse markers, etc. – it usually occurs that either we say less than we realise, or we realise less than we say. Analogical phenomena happen also in interpersonal communication; e.g. the interlocutor infers more than we have said, and we have a clear feeling that although we have produced a large number of words we did not state much. As a result a question appears: When and what utterance (enuntiatio, Aussage) adheres to particular judgements in the logical sense? When is a particular utterance an absolutely unambiguous and full external representation of a particular judgement in the logical sense? In other words: Is, and if so in what situation (under what conditions), the language able to fulfill the role of a "transparent medium" – i.e. constitute a medium quo, and not only, always and exclusively, medium quod?44 

5. Fourthly, Twardowski did not explain the axiological status of truth. Truth is most often declared to be a logical value. This common (at least among logicians and philosophers) use of the word "value" in connection with truth shows that it is something which we crave, that we want to reach and obtain. Fallacy, on the other hand, is something we try to avoid, to overcome, or by pass. Twardowski either does not see the perspective, or intentionally skips it. He says that truth is a logical value, but in a very peculiar axiologically neutral sense of the word "value". Truth, as he writes, is a true judgement, and truthfulness is a feature (which is absolute and cannot be rejected) of a highlighted group of judgements in the logical sense. The assessment of judgements from the viewpoint of truth and fallacy is not, however, an axiologically valid assessment. It means an ordinary statement of a certain state of affairs, as when we try to set a particular mathematical (numeric) value, a particular physical value or an economic parameter. Twardowski does not endeavour to analyse the circumstances in which truth and fallacy appear as non-logical values: once as an instrumental value that is only relative, and at another time as an autotelic and absolute value ("in itself and for itself").

To complete the philosophical perspective in which truth appears as an absolute value and at the same time as value in the full meaning of the word, being the subject of axiological as well as logical or theory-cognitive analysis, I will allow myself to formulate several ideas on the context avoided by Twardowski. The ideas are to a great extent inspired by the axiological considerations of Roman Ingarden, yet today it is difficult to separate what is my own from what is Ingarden’s.

1. In fact truth (resp. true knowledge) appears as a direct utility value, and the necessary condition for is existence is commonly known (and appreciated). Hence, there is no need to convince anyone that truth (true knowledge, especially science) is often an instrumental value: it is appreciated for its importance to the life (utility) of a particular subject of activity – whether individual or community. Such conceived value of truth is obviously only a relative value. The knowledge of value in this sense is not always and everywhere of value, but only as much (then and there) as is important for life as it justifies particular activities and makes these activities empirically possible.

Without going into full detail here, I will but mention that – firstly – truth may, but does not have to, serve the utility function. The possibility or fact of empirical usefulness of certain knowledge is not a necessary marker in order for the knowledge to be true.45  Secondly, in order for some purposeful activity to appear at all it is necessary (obligatory, though not sufficient) for the subject of the activity to possess true knowledge. The knowledge may be useful in certain situations, and useless in others. Yet for any activity to be effective, some true knowledge must be possessed by the subject (although at the same time one does not have to realize that it is possessed). True knowledge is then the basis and necessary condition of any life-supporting activities, but not vice versa.

This claim may seem to be a paradox. It is obvious that to know something one first has to live and undertake activity; primum vivere, deinde philosophari as the ancient wisdom claimed. Undoubtedly, they were right. However, I suppose they were perspicuous enough to see that this is only a genetic relation. I shall repeat: to acquire knowledge you need to live first. However to quote E. Husserl’s metaphor: "As for the value of the gold we possess it is unimportant what way we have achieved it, for the value of knowledge which we have at our disposal its origin is equally insignificant".46 

2. Returning to the temporarily forsaken subject of absoluteness of truth in a non-logical sense, firstly I would like to note that it would be difficult to talk about the absoluteness of this value (as difficult as in the case of other senses: both cognitive and non-cognitive) in any radical sense, for example: that it is directly an ideal object, or something existentially dependent from objects of this type (Platonic tradition, and in the 20th century probably most clearly represented by N. Hartmann, and less clearly also by M. Scheler). The circumstances that all values (including truthfulness and fallacy) are always values of something, e.g. a feature of judgements in the logical sense, determines it beyond doubt. This means that to exist values need some existential foundation: a basis or carrier. At the same time this circumstance determines that they are somewhat instrumental and made more or less objective: independent (transcendent) of accidental psychic states of the subject of the activity and cognition; irresponsive to the relation of the subject to the state of affairs assessed. In this sense there is some truth to claim that sometimes (and Ingarden was just one to hold such conviction) man only discovers values, that is, according to his/her abilities uncovers their objectively conditioned presence and then reacts to it. Truth and fallacy would be such values.

In extreme cases human reactions to the revealed presence of truth or fallacy may be strong and powerful to the extent that in the name of the need to provide "evidence of truth" (or fallacy) people tend to devote a great deal: at times even their own or someone else’s lives. Examples of this kind, though they happen sporadically, prove strongly that truth is being regarded (also de facto) as an absolute value. Thus the order mentioned in the old Latin proverb is sometimes reversed (primum philosophare...).

3. Some may notice that the absoluteness of truth has been confused here with the absoluteness of its worship, which in certain situations widely known may easily transform into, e.g., mindless fanaticism. Indeed, this remark would be fully correct if the example given (of life because of truth, and hence in its shadow) was to be treated as an argument for the thesis of the absoluteness of truth. However, this is unnecessary and was not supposed to be so. I quoted the example because it can easily lead us to a different understanding of the absoluteness of truth. Namely, certain judgements (e.g. scientific claims, especially mathematical) are true or false irrespective of the fact that man realises their truthfulness or not. They are true or false also irrespective of the fact that one is or is not able to prove their truthfulness or fallacy (e.g. to prove the Pythagorean theorem). If so, truth is also absolute in the sense that it exists irrespective of human knowledge about it. In its truthfulness a judgement is also completely independent of the fact of people wanting it to be true, or the opposite – wish it to be false. No human power – whether authority or community such as a president, parliament, nor even a genius such as A. Einstein – is able to alter anything in the matter of mathematical theorems, e.g. cause 2+2 to be equal to the pi ratio. No dictator or authority, even the General UN Assembly is able to render the Pythagorean theorem from the third millennium AD false or half-true. Wishes, orders, decrees, sentiments and the usual lack of consciousness (no mind and no decree) will be able to alter the fact that certain thesis are really true and others are really false. In this domain any dictator or authority individual or collective is indeed powerless: whether Nobel prize winner, Sophist, or even Providence.

4. Finally, we can discuss the absoluteness of truth also in the sense that it is independent of the fact of existence (or lack of existence) of other values: both cognitive and semi-cognitive (ethical, aesthetic, economic, customary, etc.) The fact that between some values there exist certain relations – both crucial as well as insignificant (accidental) – cannot be questioned; often they are functional in character. Some value may appear only "at the expense" of another, but the appearance of one value may be a necessary condition for another value’s appearance (or strengthening). Relations of this type may easily be observed among aesthetic, ethical and utilitarian values.

There also exists a certain category of values which seem to be definitely insensitive to the presence of other values of the same or different type. Truth belongs among them. The truthfulness or fallacy of a judgement does not change in respect to the company of any other values: ethical, aesthetic, or utilitarian – whether positive or negative. It cannot be claimed (except metaphorically, or in a non-precise, colloquial sense) that as a result of the appearance of some other values truth "goes pale" or, on the contrary, that it glows or becomes more intensive. In colloquial language we find this kind of expressions, yet strictly speaking people stating such opinions usually mean only (or first of all) the degree of popularity or common use of some knowledge. Perhaps they mean also the level of readiness to admit something to be true, but probably nothing more.

5. An additional question appears, however: is truth insensitive to the fact of appearance or lack of appearance of values from the same purely cognitive family values? It seems so. Such cognitive values as logical consistency (coherence), certainty, communicativeness, generality, ability to be proven, strictness, clarity (simplicity), completeness, and others are either fully independent of truth, or its consequence. If some relations between truth and the rest of cognitive values may be detected, it is equally visible that the relation is not a symmetrical (soil. mutual), but one-sided or non-symmetrical. It leads from truth to other values, not vice versa. To put the issue differently it would seem to confuse the cause and the effect (the right with the consequence), and to take the symptom for the nature of the object.47 

1. The dissertation mentioned is O tak zwanych prawdach wzglednych (On-So-called Relative Truths), written between 1899 and 1900, published first in Ksiega Pamiatkowa Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego ku uczczeniu piecsetnej rocznicy Fundacji Jagiellonskiej Uniwersytetu Krakowskiego (The Lwow University Memorial Book to Celebrate the 500th Anniversary of the Jagiellonian Foundation), (Lwow, 1900). In 1902 a German translation of the dissertation was published (transl. by Prof. M. Wartenberg). The Polish second impression was released in K. Twardowski. Rozprawy i artykuly filozoficzne. Zebrali i wydali Uczniowie (Philosophical Dissertations and Articles. Gathered and Published by the Students), (Lwow, 1927). The third Polish impression released during Twardowski’s life, in 1934, is used here. Cf. K. Twardowski. O tak zwanych prawdach wzglednych (On so-called relative truths) (Lwowski Oddzial PTF, "Ksiaznica – Atlas", Lwow, 1934). This dissertation was also included in the post-war edition of Wybrane Pisma Filozoficzne (Selected Philosophical Works). (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), pp. 315-336.