After graduating from the Theresianum secondary school for the nobility, Kazimierz Twardowski began his studies at Vienna University with Fr. Brentano. The title of his Ph.D. thesis, Idee und Perzeption. Eine erkentnistheoretische Studie aus Descartesas well as many of his assumptions show the considerable influence of Fr. Brentano. This is evident also in Twardowski’s qualifying lecture or assistant-professorship, "Zur lehre vom Inhalt und gegenstand der Vorstellungen." Brentano’s teaching on the intentional character of mental experience constituted the starting point for his considerations. The special way of cognition proposed by Brentano consisted in the rejection of subjective idealism, advocated by the nineteenth century philosophy, according to which the existence of things depends on mental operations (a lack of thoughts caused a lack of things and facts concerning these things). According to him things and facts were not conceived by mind, but learned by it. This new trend in philosophy initiated by Brentano opposed speculative metaphysics. In order to maintain fully the status of science, philosophy required a psychological foundation, that is, insight into inner experience. Descriptive psychology, constituting the foundations of Brentano’s philosophical investigations, was not based on experiment and observation, but on understanding of what occurs in our thoughts, that is on perceiving our acts of thinking. In spite of the fact that these acts are not observed, in Brentano’s view, they could be perceived by inner experience. In this case awareness was a set of acts and not contents. He distinguished the contents of psychological experience (physical objects, sound, color) from the acts of seeing or hearing.

In his treaty K. Twardowski followed Brentano, to state that awareness is constituted by a set of acts and not contents, and that every act of awareness is intentional, that is directed towards a transcendental object. By doing that he recognized the differentiation between an act and the object of presentation. However, he added also a third element, namely the contents of presentation, that is the form assumed by the intentional expression of an object.

Brentano’s conception distinguishing the act and object of presentation was not the only point accepted and developed by Twardowski. He also followed Brentano’s theory of truth.2 But being a supporter of absolutism he did not agree with Brentano’s view that in the case of propositions which are true when they are directly related to something real, the same proposition may change from true to false when this real object undergoes a change. According to Twardowski in such a situation only the sentences, which do not express clearly the content of a proposition, can be relative.3 The foundations of Twardowski’s philosophical investigations were constituted by the assumptions concerning the program and method of philosophical research. The program, which Twardowski intended to realise, was aimed first of all at establishing scientific philosophy. Although never presented comprehensively, it is beyond any doubt that its major inspiration came from Brentano’s philosophy.

Both philosophers claimed that to philosophy, as in the detailed sciences, should be applied criteria of rational formulation and justification of statements. They were convinced of the possibility and need for scientific philosophy, based on descriptive psychology and employing an analytic method.4 A detailed presentation of this method was later presented by T. Czezowski in his article "O metodzie opisu analitycznego" (On a Method of Analytical Description).5 He started from a certain example, which was to represent a typical case of a phenomenon. First an analysis and description of this should be carried out and on this basis a general statement formulated. It should be emphasized that this generalization did not come through induction, but was reached by intuition, revealing new facts and connections between these facts. The description obtained in this way was transformed into an analytical definition, thus introducing an assumption of its truthfulness as a certain metatheoretical directive. In this way a theoretical object, corresponding to the meaning of the name, was created.

Brentano’s considerable influence on Twardowski is evident in the latter’s ethical views. Brentano’s ethics was intuitionist.6 He employed the notion of true love, true predilection, when looking for a criterion of what is good or bad in the passions as a certain character of human desires. Brentano believed that evaluation is a phenomenon parallel to judgments and manifested in either negative or positive attitudes towards an issue. As in the case of judgments only one attitude could be possible. What gave rise to a true judgment was true and analogously what gave rise to true predilection was good. In Brentano’s view the only categorical imperative on which all other principles in ethics depend was to increase goodness in the world.7 Moral norms do not require justifications; it is obvious whether they are false or true, and it is not necessary to justify them. Hence the truthfulness of moral evaluations was, in Brentano’s belief, guaranteed by the truthfulness of certain experiences and suggested itself to man directly.

K. Twardowski, like some others of Brentano’s disciples,8 did not accept all the ethical concepts of his master. According to them9 ethics was to be based on the theory of values and, as a matter of fact, on the psychology of values.10

However, some solutions of ethical problems proposed by Twardowski turned out to be similar to Brentano’s. He followed Brentano’s conviction on the rule of the concept of truthfulness in ethics, similar to the role of propositions on existence in logic. Twardowski also developed the conception of true love, untrue love and hatred in a way approaching Brentano’s preferential theory. He discussed this problem in his article "Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji "/Ethics in Relation to a Theory of Evolution,11 and also in lectures on ethics.12 Twardowski followed his master, criticizing various forms of (relativism, subjectivism and nihilism) and ethical hedonism, attempting to reconcile determinism with freedom and moral responsibility. To complete the picture it should be noted that traces of Brentano’s influence are to be found not only in Twardowski’s views, but also indirectly in the views of his disciples.13 W. Witwicki developed Brentano’s (conception of descriptive psychology and in particular the problems of sense perception, performances and judgments.’14 J. Lukasiewicz, like Brentano and Twardowski, was a supporter of scientific philosophy, opposing speculative philosophy and irrationalism. He postulated the use of the analytical method and the construction of concepts based on modern logic. But he was not a supporter of psychologism, especially in logic; hence he questioned a central role of descriptive psychology in the philosophical sciences.15 Brentano’s axiological views influenced T. Czezowski’s conception of empirical ethics, based on the specific experience of values. Like Brentano, Czezowski perceived the connection between perceptive beliefs and axiological evaluations, and hence the connection between the existence stated in perceptive beliefs and goodness as well as beauty stated in evaluations. Judgments on values had analogous cognitive value as perceptive judgments.16

Brentano’s influence is also evident in T. Kotarbinski’s views. Around 1911 Fr. Brentano formulated the theses which initiated reism. It is true that he started his considerations on the existence of things from a question: ‘what are the only objects that can be conceived of?’ This was unlike Kotarbinski who would ask: ‘what are the only objects that exist?’, though he tried to answer the other question as well. Even Kotarbinski himself claimed that the similarities between Brentano’s doctrine and his theory are far-reaching and evident.17 Brentano’s philosophical views turned out to be essential for Twardowski to such an extent that he transferred many of them into Polish philosophy, developing them and encouraging his disciples to continue their research along this path. The popularity of Brentano’s philosophy was so enormous that many of his statements acquired the status of a kind of ‘opinio communis’.18

Therefore it is possible to say that Brentano played a very significant role in the history of Polish philosophy, and that was through his direct influence on K. Twardowski’s philosophical education. How can we account for this special aura surrounding Brentano, Roman Ingarden throws some light on, 19 noting that Twardowski caused many of Brentano’s statements to become a circulating medium among modern Polish philosophers, circulating and sometimes even worn out."

Was it but a legend without foundations which shaped Polish philosophical minds? Ingarden writes about Brentano without any particular enthusiasm, saying that nobody knows if it was his philosophy or his personality that exerted such tremendous influence on those academics. It is a fact that Brentano influenced a number of distinguished people. In spite of their own considerable scientific output, sometimes much more original and powerful, they eagerly acknowledged Brentano as their Master. Husserl and Stumpf claimed that this man believed that his philosophy was the only valuable philosophy, whereas all others should be treated with huge scepticism. Brentano had to be a very strong personality; he had many ardent followers as well as many fierce enemies. Today it is difficult to say whether Brentano’s views were so revolutionary and sensational, his argumentation so efficient and clever, his personality so fascinating. The only thing certain is that his influence on modem philosophy has been tremendous. Brentano’s views on inner experience and inner awareness constituted an attempt at explaining man’s cognitive foundations and the way of constructing knowledge on conscious experience. These considerations provided the inspiration for many philosophers including E. Husserl, M. Scheler, K. Twardowski, T. Kotarbinski and indirectly R. Ingarden, who did not admit Brentano’s influence. Twardowski was not only Brentano’s disciple, but also a friend. They often exchanged letters and Twardowski kept a photograph of his Master and friend on his desk. The First World War terminated their personal contacts.20

Twardowski maintained that a definite property of the objects with which philosophy deals makes all philosophical disciplines into one group of sciences. It distinguishing and at the same time common feature is that philosophy investigates objects either through external experience or through external as well as internal experience of the manifestations of mental life. Despite appearances it is not only psychology, but also other philosophical science that are to evaluate the three planes of truth and falsity, beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness. "Truth and the rules of evaluation, which is, of course, a mental process", writes Twardowski, "are the objects of separate philosophical sciences: logic and the theory of cognition, aesthetics, ethics and the philosophy of law."21 Following Twardowski we can say that if we were not given inner experience and if we did not know the manifestations of mental life there would not exist not only such sciences as psychology, but also logic, ethics, aesthetics, the theory of cognition and metaphysics.22

According to Twardowski the fundamental concepts of ethics and aesthetics are known to us thanks to psychology which tells us "what is moral responsibility, a sense of duty, compassion, incentive, intention, resolution, what is aesthetic satisfaction, ideal, fantasy and creativity."23

The fact that Twardowski attributed such a significant role to psychology in creating philosophical sciences manifests a psychologism which is not extreme, but moderate and genetic.24 Twardowski recognizes psychology as a starting point of theoretical and cognitive, logical and ethical considerations, since the objects of research of these scientific disciplines are given to us in mental experience. However, he maintains that only the contents of these concepts are mental, whereas an object of research as such is not. The act, i.e. a mental activity by which we present something is not identical with the object presented which is situated outside the cognizing subject. Thus an object of presentation as an object is distinctive from the act of presentation as an activity presenting the object through its contents.25 Twardowski would not say that goodness, truth or beauty are mental – objects are given to us only in mental experience, but are not mental themselves.

In spite of his view that in the theory of cognition and logic, the foundation of research was to be constituted by the psychological analysis of cognitive activities, in practice he did not obey this principle, but often bypassed psychological analysis in favour of semantic analysis.26 The evolution of Twardowski’s views was based not so much on a methodological psychologism (i.e. applying psychological methods in philosophy) but on an ontological psychologism, that is such objects of judgments as values and meanings were considered mental objects, and the sciences concerned with them, logic and axiology, were seen as branches of psychology.27 Probably his withdrawal from ontological psychologism was induced by E. Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen and J. Lukasiewicz’s critique of psychologism during the 10th Congress of Polish Physicians and Naturalists (the Philosophical Section) in 1907. This withdrawal generated his treaty "On Activities and Products," published in 1912. 28 Twardowski came to the conclusion that the content of presentation is a product of a conceptual act conceived of as an activity. "What thanks to an activity, as a result of an activity, that is through this activity comes into being, can be called a product of this activity."29 In this treaty Twardowski analyses some verbs like ‘to walk’, ‘to shout’, ‘to run’ as words denoting activities. Whereas nouns: ‘a walk’, ‘a run’, ‘a shout’ are considered as products of these activities. He maintains that they create characteristic pairs in a given language. The products of activities can be impermanent if they cease to exist when the activities stop. They are divided into physical (a walk), psychical (a thought) and psycho-physical (a shout). However, it may happen that, in spite of the fact that a given activity stops, its products still exists. Twardowski calls them permanent products and divides them into physical and psycho-physical. Permanent psychic products which are perceived by the senses, do not exist. Whereas psychical products (a thought) combined with a corresponding activity (to write) can bring about a psycho-physical product (a book). This relation can arise also in the opposite direction when psycho-physical products bring about psychic products. All this constituted for Twardowski a starting point to construct a new conception of meaning, different from the one he presented in "Zur lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstandt der Vorstellungen." For if a psycho-physical product (a book) is an expression of a psychic product (a philosopher’s thought) it becomes, at the same time, a sign of this product. The meaning of this sign (the psycho-physical product – a book) is a- psychical product (a philosopher’s thought) expressed by it. To one psycho-physical product (a sign included in a book) can correspond many psychic products (meanings – philosopher’s thoughts), but only under the stipulation that these psychic products do not differ greatly from one another, i.e. they are linked by a characteristic set of features. This set of features is constituted by the contents of a sign and defined by its meaning. A thought can be expressed by means of a written or spoken sign (a word). Speaking and writing are psycho-physical activities. Thanks to speaking and writing a philosopher (as a speaking and writing subject) expresses his thoughts (views) in the form of a spoken lecture, a book or an article.

It is difficult to decide if this new theory of meaning really constituted "the victory over ontological psychologism in Twardowski’s philosophy,"30 but it provides the basis for his conception of the humanities. The distinction between psychic activities and their products allowed him to avoid (ontological) psychologism in the field of the humanities. They investigated either psychic products, considered independently of the psychic activities (ideas) which produced them, or psycho-physical products (texts, works of art) considered as expressions of psychic products.31 In Twardowski’s belief this conception rendered marvelous results when applied to logic and mathematics where objects are their psycho-physical products. This approach leveled the differences between logic and mathematics, as well as between these sciences and the humanities. Twardowski maintained that each science should be treated as a complex psychic product whose fundamental task was to investigate the necessary connections between objects. Due to the fact that psychic products can be represented in psycho-physical products and that these psycho-physical products can be permanent products, the humanities can employ psychic products, making no mention of the psychic activities to which these products owe their existence, to such an extent that they treat these products as an independent object of their research.32

Approaching ethics from the point of view of these considerations one should recognize that it belongs to the humanities and can be analyzed as a psycho-physical product. Taking into account the systems of ethics created by philosophers, we can find there the thoughts on psychical products of these philosophers. Approached in this way ethics refers to certain objects existing outside itself or transcendent; therefore its character is intentional. At this level it is a description of what was grasped by philosopher in creating a given system of ethics.

However, apart from the fact that ethics can be a psycho-physical product, it can also be a certain cognitive activity, investigating psychical products. Such cognitive activity would result in judgments and ethical evaluations.33 Twardowski thinks that ethics, logic and psychology, from which this discerning analysis starts, are the humanities, as the main objective of their investigations are psychic products. However he sees a certain danger for the humanities.34 Namely, the humanities as psychic products acquire an autonomous status and are approached as if they existed independently of the psychic life of the subject that created them. Such an independent ontological status of products is an abstraction, because psychic products are the results of the corresponding activities of a subject having his or her own psychic life. Therefore Twardowski attributed a special place to psychology because in this science, in contrast to metaphysics, all the threads uniting the respective areas of human cognition come together into one whole.35 However, the very fact that Twardowski introduced the concept of an objective and permanent psycho-physical product, which is either an effect of psychic activities or reason giving rise to psychic activities, proves his withdrawal from psychologism. He suggests that the humanities should concentrate mainly on psychic products grounded in psycho-physical products, i.e. on the results of thoughts and not on thoughts themselves, as their scientific investigations do not aim at examining the inner reality.

Twardowski believes that the connection between philosophy and psychology went loose when psychology achieved the status of a science of man’s psychic life and stopped being a science of the human soul. But in spite of loosening the bond between these sciences, psychology still remained a philosophical science, fundamental for all disciplines of the natural science and the humanities. In the course of time Twardowski’s radical attitude towards the role of psychology in science diminished.

The above analyses concerning the relations between respective sciences served Twardowski as an instrument in formulating a general theory of sciences and cognition and, what is of a particular interest for us, in determining a place for ethics in the hierarchy established by philosophy. A criterion, according to which sciences are divided, is determined, first of all, by way of their justification, not by the way of investigating the truth. Twardowski claims37 that a priori sciences (for example mathematics) do not refer to experience (perceptive judgments) when they justify their theorems, as these theorems do not concern facts of the senses. Therefore he justifies them first of all by deduction, but he also arrives at them by deduction and induction. This fact would show that discovering laws in a priori sciences takes place in a rational way, whereas there exists also a possibility of intuitive discovery, as happened in the case of Archimedes. The final way of justifying a priori sciences is constituted by a set of definitions and axioms which organize argumentation of the truth. A posteriori sciences, on the other hand, (physics, psychology) are justified by induction. Therefore statements formulated by them can be called probability statements.

Twardowski does not agree that judgments in a posteriori sciences cannot be justified on the basis of an individual perceptive judgment, but only when many individual judgments are generalized. He thinks that since a priori sciences are based on axioms, then a posteriori sciences occasionally have to refer to perceptive judgments, stating individual facts.

A priori sciences as well as a posteriori sciences have their ‘final’ or ‘primary’ judgments which are not justified, but accepted without evidence. These primary judgments constitute the basis for justifying other judgments within a given science. They must start these justifications from something, or end them with something, for otherwise justification would go on endlessly, and without ending they would never complete their task. The justification of these final or primary assumptions – if the justification is considered to be necessary and possible at all – lies completely outside the domain and assignments of a given science. Thus the way in which it is carried out as the need and necessity arises, has no influence on the way in which the statements resulting from a given science are justified, and which only determines whether we deal with a priori or a posteriori science."38

Can ethics, according to Twardowski, be called a priori or a posteriori science? Analysing the object of the study of ethics, that is, what it wants to tell about reality or reveal in its statements, can be both a priori and a posteriori, for when Twardowski states that "love thy neighbor" is an evident axiom to organise our moral life, he considers it an a priori assumption that does not have to be proved.39

This does not mean that ethical empiricism is foreign to Twardowski’ considerations, as he also claims that theoretical statements are formulated by generalizing the facts that are given to us through experience. So in order to justify statements we have to make use of deduction as well as induction.

Ethics belongs to the humanities, because it aims at investigating the products of a human mind as well as evaluating these products. But in comparison to other humanities, the degree of subjectivity of ethics is greater than in the case of other sciences; therefore any attempt at objectifying its statements encounters numerous difficulties of which Twardowski is aware. He maintains that the scientific character of philosophical as well as ethical investigations is determined by their logical justification, thanks to which these investigations acquire objective properties. Philosophy could become a science only when its problems and statements are formulated on the basis of a strict and precise method, when terminological differentiation and clarity of a scientific reasoning are observed. He treats these issues in detail in his article "0 jasnym i niejasnym stylufilozofowania" (On a clear and unclear style of philosophising), published in Ruch Filozoficzny in 1919.

"A human speech," wrote Twardowski, "is not only the external expression of thoughts but it is also its instrument, making abstract thinking possible. We can easily assume that an author, who is not capable of expressing his thoughts clearly, also cannot think clearly, i.e. his thoughts do not deserve our efforts to guess what they mean."40 Twardowski’s negative attitude towards unclear expression in science is due to the close connection between thinking and speaking. This dependence is the greater the more abstract is the thought expressed. It is impossible to think about a philosophical subject first and then to express it in words; rather a thought, and in particular an abstract thought "emerges already in words, in the closest connection with the words of a speech." 41 Twardowski, as a supporter of clear and communicative expression in science, assumes that scientific texts, in order to be fully understood by their listeners and readers (competent within a given field) should be written in a common language for a reader/listener and a writer. This can be achieved by applying proper syntactic and semantic rules. He was one of the first philosophers in Poland who devoted so much attention to the semiotic analysis of philosophical language. This trend of research, initiated by the founder of the Lvov and Warsaw School of Philosophy, became the dominating direction over the course of time.

The term ‘clarity’, following the intentions of Twardowski and his disciples, referred to formal virtues like precision, logical correctness, and a lack of ambiguity. Hence clarity and a lack of clarity are absolute properties of texts, theories, notions. Assuming this approach the critique concerning clarity was logical and methodological, and the question about the connection between clarity and cognitive value concerned dependencies between this value and perfection from the point of view of logical and methodological norms.42

In practice the realization of this postulate of the clarity of philosophical style has to be based, first of all, on subjecting unclear and complicated texts to co-creative interpretation, and thereby penetrating into its author’s intentions and trying to express his or her thoughts more precisely and clearly. These results can be achieved by analyzing it in a group. "Common discussions on some textual problems were extremely helpful in explaining the difficulties which resulted from the ambiguity and lack of precision in a formulation. This practice was popular in Twardowski’s school.

If we want to know what ethics should be, first of all, we have to make its terminology precise, introduce an order into the views concerning this subject and critically analyze them. K.Twardowski discussed these issues mainly in his lectures, expressing his theoretical interests and his passion as a teacher. The ethical problems presented in his earlier works (1895-1899), published by "Turn" magazine in Vienna, "Przyjaciel Mlodziezy" magazine and "Irys" artistic-literary magazine in Lvov, which concerned mainly the area of normative ethics. The lectures on ethics delivered by Twardowski in 1905-1928 constitute the fundamental source on which we should base our research concerning his ethical views: they included almost all his publications on this subject.43

Twardowski starts his analysis of ethical problems by explaining the origin of the word ‘ethics’. He distinguished two forms of the word ‘ethos’ in Greek. ‘Ethos’ with ‘epsilon’ meaning habit, routine and ‘ethos’ with ‘etha’ meaning a permanent place of stay, which in the course of time started to mean a constant way of conduct or a custom. Twardowski considered these two words to be interchangeable. As ethics is not a science of customs, therefore there exists a close connection between the word ethics and the word ethos (written with etha). He writes "Ethics is concerned with investigating, formulating, justifying general human behavior. Ethics is not concerned with all behavior but, with a certain range of behavior. . . . It is interested not with whether someone is a good teacher, a good philologist or a good dancer, but with whether he is a good man.44

Twardowski also analyses the words ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’. According to him these words are synonyms, broadly speaking. They can be considered synonymous as they speak about the general views on behavior. Therefore we often use these words interchangeably and talk about ethical or moral problems, about a moral or an ethical level of a given deed, and finally about, for example, tradesman’s ethics or morality. However, it should be emphasized that using these words in these contexts we make no evaluations, we only make the range of the problems more precise.

The terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ can also occur in such a sense when they cannot be treated interchangeably. Twardowski thinks that this happens when these words concern definite properties of behavior and intention, and thus acquire a positive character in the respective contexts. Then the term ‘moral’ refers to a certain category of deeds which are considered positive and where opposites are ‘immoral’ The word ‘ethical’ itself means here a certain theory of behavior, a theory of morality.45

Twardowski aspired to treat ethics as a science, as "philosophia moralis’. It was to be a theory concerning morality, including also some normative instructions. Thus Twardowski’s aspiration was to acquire objective moral knowledge contradicting the statements of relativists and sceptics.

Ethics analyses man’s behavior, investigating, formulating, justifying and Systematizing such judgments. However, not all human behavior can be subjected to moral evaluation, because ethics evaluates them only with respect to whether it is good or bad. In his lectures on ethics Twardowski pays much attention to the basic division of the founders of ethical theories into two groups, one concerned with descriptive ethics and the other with normative ethics.

The representatives of descriptive ethics refuse normative ethics the status of a science, while representatives of normative ethics maintain that ethics investigates whether norms are justified, and deals with the evaluation of behavior. It is obvious that the germ of a norm or rule of behavior consists in evaluation. The representatives of descriptive ethics think that ethics as a science can speak only about what exists and any evaluation is beyond its competence. Many scientists tried to construct normative ethics, attempting at a scientific justification of what is good and what is bad.46

 

Ethics should include theoretical analyses in order to meet requirements of a science. But it is an extremely important discipline, pertaining to life, as it forces some ethical philosophers-theoreticians to formulate certain practical instructions, for there is no way to confine oneself to axiological judgments. One should also present some judgments concerning obligations. In this case Twardowski talks about ‘the philosophy of life’ and gives examples of Socrates and Plato, who combined their theoretical considerations with practical instructions. But this may threaten the scientific character of ethics because when, apart from theoretical assumptions, there appear also instructions concerning obligations, which depend on one’s outlook upon life, some irrational elements come to be included.47

Analyzing Twardowski’s ethical views, we can come to the conclusion that there is no way to construct an ethical system that is complete once and for all. For all systems pretending to be perfect and completed become dogmatic and Twardowski was adverse to all dogmatism. Therefore, in order not to lose its scientific character somewhere along the way ethics has to be an open system. This entails, first of all, the possibility of continuous, rational discussions on ethical problems, without falling into a trap of moralizing and uncritical subjection to the recognized authorities. In order to adopt to the requirements of rationalism "scientific ethics, like every possible system of scientific statements, has to follow the principles of logic, step by step investigating and continuously justifying."48 Thus scientific ethics is a theory in which judgments are formulated according to the principles of logic. It has to be objective, meaning that it has to employ statements which are absolutely true. A fundamental condition specifying the theory of ethics will be the clarity and univocous character of its formulations. These true, clear and univocal statements, constructed according to the principles of logic should also be equipped with a quality of universality. If these conditions are fulfilled, one will definitely be able to call ethics a science. But how to generate ethical statements fulfilling these requirements: is it possible, as in logic or mathematics, to construct certain basic truths or axioms and on their basis construct the theory of ethics?

In the beginning Twardowski considered the statement, ‘thou shalt love thy neighbour’49 as an initial assumption, the absolute moral truth. This axiom, which was to organize his ethical theory, was assumed without evidence and considered indisputable. According to Twardowski the difficulty in accepting this axiom, as with the differentiation between goodness and badness, is grounded either in mental immaturity or in an unsatisfactorily developed conscience.

The axiom ‘thou shall love thy neighbor’ is treated by Twardowski as obvious. He claims, however, that ethics approached in a scientific way should include the contents, reached either by logical reasoning, starting from axioms, or by inner experience.50 What is this inner experience can one look for certain analogies in the approach to this kind of experience by Twardowski and Brentano?

Brentano maintains that "beyond any doubt the presentation of good and better has its source in experience"51 and that the final source of our cognition of something good and better is always our inner perception of true acts of love or preferences directed at general objects. He defines this view as empirical: inner experience is direct general knowledge which has the quality of obviousness. It includes some already prepared contents, completely independent of the description of real individual facts. These contents are given as general a priori contents since they depend on individual perceptions and individual facts.52 In Twardowski’s considerations, apart from the concept of inner experience which, most probably, was taken from Brentano, there appears so-called moral experience. According to Twardowski the contents of ethics, apart from the fact that they are derived from axioms, have to refer to the facts of moral experience. The philosopher applies this term to bad conscience, sense of duty, etc., but at the same time the fact that human behavior is evaluated in various ways, being on one occasion considered good and on another bad, is also a fact of moral experience. Thus, the facts referring to morality, discussed by Twardowski, result from the data of inner experience, but also from the historical analysis, from the connections between, for example, the ethical views of a given society and the institutions functioning in it. Analyzing human behavior at the anthropological and ethnological level we can come to the conclusion that the views on morality of various nations and even within the same nation undergo change.53

However, Twardowski believes that it is not possible to derive the rules of behavior from the observed facts. And if not from the observed fact, then where? Is inner experience going to be this absolute source of moral norms? Twardowski is not fully convinced about that, since in his lecture on the tasks of scientific ethics he states that "the norms, that is, the principles of behavior do not result form theoretical investigations, but from applying the results of these investigations to practical purposes."54 On the basis of this statement we can assume that Twardowski does not make a clear boundary dividing ‘what is’ from ‘what should be’.

Twardowski maintains that the task of ethics as a science is to define an ethical criterion and justify it. Ethics deals with individual as well as social matters. That referring to individual matters should be called biotechnology; ethics referring to society is an extension and realization of instructions on behavior. These originally occurred at the pre-scientific stage of man’s evolution, in what we can call species instinct and social instinct. Hence, scientific ethics cannot begin from regulations, but has first to investigate certain facts, formulate certain laws and from these laws, as in mechanics or hygienic, derive regulations. Ethics is to investigate the conditions which are the most conductive to the reconciliation of an individual’s interest with these interests of all other individuals whom this individual encounters directly or indirectly. It can be assumed that this program assumption of scientific ethics consists in minimizing conflicts among individuals. This objective can be achieved in two ways, either we restrict our needs and interests to a minimum or we identify them with the interests of other individuals. This leads to the next significant problem for this theory, namely, the reconciliation of various interests. This can be done by imposing certain restrictions on the members of a given community to establish the principles of justice which is connected directly with a problem of order and safety. It is possible to reconcile various interests using a principle of identification with the objectives of another man. Law and religion can be helpful here since they can serve as an instrument of realizing specifically ethical objectives. In this context law serves the common good, introducing certain necessary restrictions, whereas religion is helpful inasmuch as it teaches love of one’s neighbor.

It should be clearly determined whether Twardowski believed that the legislators could be so effectively inspired by ethical ideals that they would recognize the minimization of social conflicts to be the main objective of law. And going further, that it was possible for theologians to treat the principle of love of one’s neighbor as a scientific norm rather than religious, that is inspired by love of God. I would like to emphasize once again that it is difficult to determine if Twardowski set his hopes on law and religion, or if his writing about these issues were purely academic speculations. However, we can believe that in these ethical considerations he included certain lines of thinking which should be called utopian or futuristic. In his much quoted lecture on the tasks of scientific ethics he states that the ideal would be to arrange for common world disarmament under the supervision of an international police and an army financed by all countries and organized and administered by international authorities. Twardowski calls this vision utopian, but he believed that it could be realized in the future.55

These views remain in conflict with his statements on ethics, when he claims that ethics does not improve or moralize anyone, but aims at showing what is good and what is bad. It seems that Twardowski could not resist the pleasure of imagining that the future political organization of the world would be subjected to the principles of ethics, minimizing conflicts between people. This brave vision was not at all a result of revolutionary leftist influences. Twardowski was not a supporter of revolution, which was to overthrow the existing social order. These changes should be realized in the way of moral evolution, not revolution. Governments were to resign from power, restrict repression and come to some agreement with respect to the general principles of maintaining order and a uniform legal system in the world. Were these hopes supported by Twardowski’s belief that people were guided, first of all, by moral considerations? We may assume that he believed that ethics, as a science, would itself provide us with a stimulus, necessary for this kind of actions. The proposed connection between the idea of freedom for every man, which can be reconciled with freedom for all people, peace and social order, based on participation in realizing the life plans of people who surround us, is also valid nowadays. J. Rawls defines in this way the idea of justice in his philosophical treaty A Theory of Justice. It is astonishing how little Twardowski’s views resemble other philosophers’ views at the turn of the nineteenth century and how much they correspond to those that are more contemporary. If we are to consider his views literally – and there is no reason to do it otherwise – we must admit that Twardowski proposes to undertake empirical research on the possibility of minimizing conflicts between individuals, in order to see what can be achieved by increasing the number of restrictions, and what can be achieved by popularizing an attitude of taking somebody else’s aims as one’s own. Empirical research of this type was carried out, among others, in game theory, in the psychology of small groups and in a theory of politics and sociology. The major problem of sociology nowadays is how to solve conflicts, we can say that on formulating his conception of scientific ethics Twardowski saw the importance of this problem very clearly. Apart from him another person who approached this problem seriously was his disciple, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, who formulated a theory of praxeology in which the minimization of conflicts became one of the determinants of effective acting.

In the cycle of his university lectures, delivered in 1901/1902, "Modern trends in scientific ethics" he mentions utilitarian ethics, ethics based on a theory of evolution, intuitive ethics (in various forms), ethics based on a theory of values, individualistic ethics and the official ethics of the Catholic Church (which is a slightly modified version of Aristotle’s ethics). None of these trends was fully accepted by Twardowski.56 However, in spite of his critical opinion of evolutionist ethics he also saw its advantages: "one who wants to work on introducing an ideal state of society effectively has to work on himself first of all. And although a scientific justification of one or the other direction of work can be imperfect, none of us doubts that man lives not only for himself."57 In the article "Ethical Culture", published in "Turn" magazine in Vienna much earlier (in 1895), he presented the main ideas of the so-called Ethical Movement. This movement assumed that ethics was independent from religion and from philosophical systems; only conscience was to determine goodness and badness. We can say that the concept of ethics proposed by Twardowski is an evident continuation of the view, which originated in the eighteenth century, described as a theory of moral sense. It was formulated by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, who postulated an autonomy of the sources of moral cognition. Twardowski was also much influenced by ethical intuitionism represented by F. Brentano and G.E. Moore, and considered the independence and autonomy of ethics to be necessary. "Scientific ethics is frequently defined independently. Some consider it a pejorative quality. But scientific ethics should be really independent from authorities, religious regulations, etc."58 Twardowski adds that ethics can be called independent when it justifies its criterion without referring to the results of other sciences, when it is self-sufficient with respect to a given issue. Thus, the way in which an ethical criterion is justified will determine the dependence or independence of ethics. Twardowski multiplies, sometimes unnecessarily, certain divisions. He introduces a differentiation between a prior ethics and empirical ethics, and mentions ethical views of Brentano and Hume as examples of empirical ethics. Though, of course, Brentano’s concept of moral experience is approached in a very specific way.59 Twardowski separates the justification of ethical criterion from the influence of authorities and religious assumptions. For if we want moral rules and prohibitions to operate everywhere, it is a necessary prerequisite to be egalitarian.60

What was the independence of ethics from other sciences to consist in according to Twardowski? Is it possible when ethics itself wants to acquire the status of a science? Does the scientific character of ethics not require just a rational attitude towards the facts described and discovered by other sciences? Twardowski is not fully convinced whether this independence is possible at all. "Does it exist, doesn’t it need psychology at least?"61

If ethics is to be an independent science, concludes Twardowski, this can take place only in the case of theoretical ethics (criteriological) and not descriptive ethics, because the latter has to take into account the results achieved by the historical, psychological and social sciences. Theoretical ethics can become autonomous only when it bases itself on specific moral experience in establishing an ethical criterion. This autonomy refers to a method which is not only characteristic of ethics; it is based on an axiological empiricism which would provide us with a criterion of goodness. In this case the proper empirical material would constitute the foundation for establishing an ethical criterion, on the basis of which it is possible to begin constructing a moral theory. Twardowski thinks that by a criterion in ethics we can distinguish goodness from badness. This is redundant when positive or negative value is given directly or intuitively, but in the majority of cases the presence of an ethical criterion is necessary. Here there arise such questions as: what is this criterions; and what distinguishes the behavior called moral from many others? According to Twardowski there are two possible answers to this question, from either the perfectionist point of view or the eudaemonistical point of view. Behavior which leads towards some ultimate goal will be good or moral. This kind of criterion can be called teleological, whose opposite is an ateleological or formal criterion, that is, the recognition of a certain principle, such as that saying: behave in agreement with your conscience. This liberates us from searching for the ultimate goal and in return inclines us towards finding what is important in our behavior, what is essential for man. What constitutes the foundations, that is, on what we base man’s moral behavior? Is the choice between goodness and badness made on the basis of reason or feeling?

It has already been mentioned before that in Brentano’s philosophy the justification of a moral choice was based on valuation, that is, on what we shall call goodness and badness. The truthfulness of moral evaluation was to be guaranteed by the legitimacy of certain feelings and suggest itself to man directly. Does Twardowski share this belief?

To begin with, Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, emotional and volitional acts62 was accepted by Twardowski. The only difference was that he went further and divided emotional and volitional acts into feelings and acts of will. Following Brentano’s way of thinking he claims that before we pronounce our judgment on a given object we have first to present it to ourselves.

"Psychology of desires and will" is the cycle of lectures he delivered in 1903/1904.63 In these lectures he referred to Brentano’s classification of feelings and on its basis he tried to offer an explanation of why he decided on a small modification of Brentano’s division.

Feeling is an important kind of desire. But these two mental phenomena cannot be identified, since feeling is a component of desire. Feelings are divided into: 1. sensual, 2. aesthetic, 3.intellectual, 4. altruistic, 5. ethical, 6. religious, and 7. idiopathic. This classification is based on the cause which evoke these feelings. Therefore sensual feelings are evoked by sensual impressions; aesthetic emotions depend on our likes and dislikes; intellectual feelings are positive (nice) when we learn the truth and unpleasant when we get lost in this search; altruistic feelings are placed between the two extremes: love and hatred, the opposite of altruism is egoism. Ethical feelings are based on the acceptance or rejection of our own or someone else’s conduct. Twardowski notes that the ability to experience such feelings is called conscience. Finally, religious feelings result from our attitude towards God, idiopathic feelings refer to our attitude towards others, but also to the feelings we hold towards ourselves. Twardowski claims that apart form ethical and altruistic feelings, which are particularly moral and creative, all other feelings, he distinguishes, can also constitute the source of moral feelings.64

Apart from this classification Twardowski divides feelings into feelings which are based on images only, and feelings which are based on presentation and judgment, that is they are feelings of belief. There are two kinds of feelings of belief: intellectual (logical) feelings and feelings of value. Logical feelings are characterized by their independence, whereas feelings of value are characterized by their dependence upon a judgment, which constitutes the foundations of this feeling. Twardowski comes to the conclusion that, in principle, logical feelings should also be considered feelings of value, while it should be added that knowledge is their object.

The belief, that an object of feelings exists, is a prerequisite for the emergence of a feeling of value. "A proposition A, stating the existence of a proposition B (knowledge) on any object, forms the foundations of a positive feeling of value, and a proposition A, contradicting the existence of a proposition B (knowledge) of any object forms the foundations of an unpleasant feeling of value."65

The fact that there emerged a belief concerning the existence of an object of feelings is not necessarily connected with an estimation of value. It may happen that value estimation is formulated in relation to an object that does not exist. Twardowski states that an object which evokes feelings in us by means of a pronounced judgments is valuable for us. Positive value arises when a positive feeling is a consequence of a proposition stating its existence; negative value when a feeling is negative.

In Twardowski’s considerations of feelings we can notice a substantial influence of Brentano. Let us recollect that Brentano claimed that a feeling constitutes an estimating act, whereas value itself attributes a name to the intentional directing of a cognizing subject towards an object. When we analyze the problem of value we have to take into account, first of all, the experience of a cognizing subject and not that of a thing. Subjects attribute qualities of goodness or badness to things by realizing their needs and feelings. The fact that positive value (goodness) or negative value (badness) depend on a subject does not have to lead to subjectivism, according to Twardowski. It rather proves the fact that a subject realizes the value of an object towards which his emotions are directed (cognitive attention).

Only those things that arouse certain sensations can be considered valuable (having value). Only a subject’s sensations are valuable or value creative. On the other hand, objects that are desired, wanted or dreamed about by a subject have to be equipped with the qualities attracting his cognitive attention. These objects under given circumstances are equipped with value or acquire value. Therefore Twardowski states that ‘only the person who knows the thing’66 can decide on its value. Thus he comes to the conclusion that external things have no value by themselves, but get it from cognizing subjects, thanks to the feelings that are directed towards them.67 Finally, just like Brentano, Twardowski says that value does not constitute a natural quality of an object, as it is a specific quality which an object gets from a subject as a result of an intentional act. It is the subject who decides that a given thing is desirable.

We call a thing true when the recognition of a cognizing subject, directed towards it, is true. We call a thing good when a subject’s love, directed towards it, is true. This thesis resulting from Brentano’s considerations had a tremendous influence on Twardowski. Inclination and desire are subjective reactions of a subject to an object of cognition. However, it has to be stated explicitly that a thing towards which we direct our admiration, love or desire exists objectively, independently from the feelings addressed at it.

Inclination, desire, passion, attraction are the terms, closely connected with man’s emotional dispositions. They are always directed towards something. Thus there should exist an objective for sending, emitting these inclinations or passions. Man has to desire something in order to be able to direct his emotional or cognitive attention towards it. This description is analogous to Brentano’s description of an intentional act. Twardowski adds that emotional acts of hope and fear form the basis on which we build our desires. Hope and fear are the feelings of belief. Having pictured an object, on which one’s hopes are focused, one has to enter upon the stage of a belief that if this object comes into being it will arouse nice feelings, and if it does not that will bring about unpleasant feelings. Then there should appear a supposition in our consciousness that an object of our hopes really exists and is accessible, that it will evoke a nice feeling.68

On the basis of this analysis of hopes and fears we can, according to Twardowski, foresee feelings of values that have not yet come into being and anticipate them. Thus we foresee theoretically a feeling which is given to us in a given experience at a given moment.

It can be assumed that Twardowski took from Brentano an expanded concept of feeling, and like him did not identify it only with pleasure. For Brentano feelings range "from the simplest inclination or repulsion at the very thought, to joy and sadness based on a belief and to most complicated phenomena of a choice of aims and means."69

Thus we can desire only those things which are not indifferent to us. We do not desire what we have, because only a lack of something can evoke a feeling of desire. We can desire not only what we can get or achieve, but also things that we cannot get. Desire can evoke a feeling of hope (perhaps we will get it) or fear (perhaps we will not get it), but also feelings which aim at avoiding something.

Twardowski ‘s consideration of feelings confirm Brentano’s thesis, the significance of which was compared to Copernicus’ revolution in the theory of values. Brentano claims that one can talk about values only in relation to consciousness. Thus value called goodness is a feeling directed towards an object; it is an intentional act. Goodness is a property of an emotional act, as the truth is a property of a judgment.70

Twardowski’s conclusion can be reduced to the statement that value does not depend on an object, because it is not embedded in it. An object is only a medium of value. Values are transcendent in relation to objects and therefore we can talk about the independence of concrete embodiments in objects. Values exist in the subjective world. We acquire knowledge of values intuitively thanks to inner experience. It is direct knowledge, obvious and absolute. In experiencing a thing as good, a subject experiences an act of direct approval of the thing or the qualities embedded in it.

Twardowski wanted ethics to become independent and refer only to axiological empiricism. This axiological empiricism requires neither an ethical criterion nor justification of this criterion, since we are directly aware of the positive or negative value of our behavior.

In his lecture "On Ethical Scepticism" he refers to G.E. Moore’s ethics and W. Tatarkiewicz’s treatise "On the Absoluteness of Goodness". He comes to the conclusion that if we define a color yellow, a taste nice, we do not think why and with respect to what we claim that. We recognize this color and taste directly. "It is possible in ethics that we are given directly the positive or perhaps also the negative value of certain behavior – (then) a criterion is not necessary."71

G.E. Moore assumed that the predicative word ‘good’ disposes him towards treating this word as a simple property of an object, not requiring a definition since ‘good is good’.72

W. Tatarkiewicz suggests that if we justify a judgment on goodness, we have to treat one of them as the first and accept it without evidence; otherwise justification would go on endlessly.73

Goodness can either be experienced directly as obvious, or we do not experience it at all. It can be recognized by intuition; judgments, which we formulate on it, cannot be verified, they are necessary and unquestionable. Twardowski never admitted clearly that he accepted Moore’s ethical views. Twardowski was a promoter of Tatarkiewicz’s thesis qualifying him assistant professor. Thus we can assume that they often discussed this concept of goodness. Should it be said that Twardowski’s views concerning the way of recognizing goodness incline towards intuitionism?74

In his lecture "On Ethical Scepticism" he states that "a true judgment which is once true, is always true." Taking into account the classical definition of truth he claims that all truth is eternal. But can the argumentation of this kind be applied to evaluations and moral norms? Is not the existence of scepticism justified to a certain extent, if the questioning of the existence of ethical norms operating always, everywhere and for everybody, i.e. universal norms, is so frequent?

Twardowski enters into a polemic with ethical scepticism. First of all he negates agnosticism as a specific case of epistemological relativism, maintaining that only absolute truths exist. Refutation of agnosticism eliminates ethical nihilism. Twardowski expresses his critical view concerning the relativity of truth in his treaty "On the So-Called Relative Truths."75 He believes that relativity is a result of mixing up judgments with their verbal expressions – sayings. It is not that judgments are relative, but by making use of ambiguous words these expressions become ambiguous.

Twardowski wrote:

The differentiation between the relative and absolute truthfulness is justified only in the area of sayings, to which the quality of truthfulness can be attributed only in a metaphoric and direct sense. As far as judgments themselves are concerned, it is not possible to talk about relative and absolute truthfulness, since every judgment is either true, and then it is true always and everywhere, or it is not true and then it is never and nowhere true.76

 

Twardowski comes to the conclusion that relativism in relation to ethical norms is possible, only when we speak about certain rules operating at a given time, in a given society, at a certain stage of the historical development of mankind. According to Twardowski, one should remember that in every ethical principle and in every norm there are included circumstances, in which the people are placed who observe this principle. The fact that certain norms and principles lose their actuality in the course of time is a result of a continuous development of human reality. Rejecting relativism, resulting from semantic and logical incomprehensibility, Twardowski offers convincing arguments in favor of his and relativist attitude. Apart from that, his negative attitude towards ethical agnosticism which radically discourages people from looking for a way out of the cognitive impasse in the area of goodness and badness raises the level of acceptance for his ideas.

Does Twardowski propose any concrete ways of overcoming numerous difficulties, apart from sheer criticism? He tries to question one more argument of an epistemological nature, used by subjectivists and agnostics in ethics. They claim that an ethical criterion cannot be recognized, for nobody knows how things really are. We base our judgments only on how a given thing or phenomenon appears to us.

Twardowski maintains that if the thesis pronounced by subjectivists was true, and we really could not get to know the truth as it is, but only inasmuch as it reveals itself to us, then this thesis would be equally false, for what a subjectivist states would refer only to what is revealed to us, and not to what it really is. Twardowski claims that the essential mistake made by subjectivists is to refer the presentations of reality to reality itself, whereas a true judgment and a judgment considered to be true are not the same. One can say that he makes a mistake of the same kind when he states that values exist in the subjective world. But one can say also, that in spite of the fact that subjectivity is a characteristic feature of value, since goodness cannot exist in the world of objects – but only in the world of subjects – subjectivism does not make these phenomena dependent on the mental processes of individual people and thus it does not lead to relativism. Why?

Defending himself against this accusation Brentano was talking about a specific co-creation of one whole by a subject and object of cognition. This can happen only in the case of an intentional act where, apart from referring to an object of cognition, we also analyze our cognitive act as such by inner perception (inner consciousness).

Twardowski as Brentano’s disciple, acknowledging the basic assumptions of his theory, should agree with this argumentation. I believe that my supposition is confirmed by the evident similarity which, in Twardowski’s opinion, occurs between the principles of logic and of ethics. Analogy accounts, to a certain extent, for a lack of acquaintance with moral principles, but it does not question that they exist.77 Twardowski believes that our situation consists in the search for the principles of ethics. People are capable of finding these principles. If, as relativists claim, there are no such universally accepted principles, it is high time, says Twardowski, for ethics to start formulating them.

Twardowski extended his polemics with relativists and sceptics to determinism. This excludes the possibility that ethical incentives and evaluations exist and operate, because a sense of responsibility or bad conscience when facing some necessity lose their essential meaning. Determinists claim that a person of a distinct character, when subjected to certain incentives, has to behave in this and not any other way. Thus he cannot be responsible for his deeds, as they are unavoidable and do not result from his free will and choice.

Twardowski wrote: " freedom of will is not necessary in order to justify, from a theoretical point of view, a reason for the existence of moral feelings and to call people to account. But do we not need to believe in free will to allow these moral feelings to emerge."78

Twardowski did not aim at refuting a determinist approach; he even claimed that he considered himself a determinist. However, he opposed the connection, seen by relativists, between determinism and the lack of any reason for the existence of moral feelings such as for example responsibility or repentance. Twardowski maintains that such moral feelings like responsibility are primary in relation to the attitudes of determinism. Thus determinism does not reject the existence and influence of ethical motives, because feelings concerning past resolutions are reflected in future resolutions in a better and more perfect form. Thus he believes that it is worth keeping up even an illusion of free will, for it is in the interest of ethics. Man has to believe in a possibility of his own moral behavior and self-improvement. Therefore the theses of sceptics on the impossibility of the existence of scientific ethics are not true.

Twardowski as a supporter of scientific ethics claims that it occupies the area between two extremes – a state of sanctity where it becomes useless, and a state of war with everybody where it is necessary.

We can say that although Twardowski, as Brentano’s disciple, bears the ‘stigma’ of intuitionism his views have very obvious elements of rationalism. For he states that it is man’s duty to rely on his reason, first of all, since the best guide in life is rational reflection. This belief inclines him towards advocating the postulate that ethics should be a science and towards the negation of relativism. However, these views are not so extreme as to make him renounce his earlier assumptions that we can differentiate goodness from badness as something specific. Twardowski approaches ethics as knowledge. He is a cognitivist and evaluations, along with moral norms, are the effect of cognitive acts. He is not fully satisfied with Brentano’s thesis on the evidence of evaluations, accomplished by intuition and therefore not requiring any justification. To the degree that he is an anti-relativist Twardowski is a determinist. He even claims that the laws of determinism do not destroy ethics but, on the contrary, the conception of moral necessity is meaningful only on the ground of determinism.

Twardowski’s ethical views underwent peculiar transformation from a priorism and intuitionism to empirism. In his treaty "Ethics in Relation to a Theory of Evolution"79 he writes that the postulate of loving one’s neighbor is an axiom as obvious as the laws of logic. On the other hand later, in his considerations on ethics, we can notice that he resigns from a priorism in favor of empirism. He proposes the formulation of theoretical statements in ethics on the basis of the generalization of facts provided by experience. Perhaps he came to the conclusion that a dictate of love was too demanding. He realizes that justice constitutes this rational minimum which could be achieved by applying the principles of scientific ethics. Here is a definition of scientific ethics formulated by Twardowski in his paper "On the Tasks of Scientific Ethics" which he read in the Lvov Scientific and Literary Society in 1907.

Attempting to be scientific, ethics does not dare to include contents, which would not be derived from axioms or facts by logical reasoning. But by doing that, it cannot reach norms, rules of behavior. Contrary to what we all used to think, no science can provide rules. Science only tells what and how, but it does not tell what should be there, scientific ethics can only instigate; it leaves deriving norms on the basis of its results to the factors aiming at certain practical goals. Scientific ethics will reach, and partly has already reached by analyzing and generalizing certain facts given in experience, a number of purely theoretical statements.80

 

But Twardowski does not say precisely what these purely theoretical statements are and what facts are given to us in experience.

Thus we can assume, on the basis of Twardowski’s other statements, included in his lectures on ethics, that ethics refers to human aspirations and contradictions; that ethics is a science on conditions and ways of the ultimate reconciliation of the individuals’ interests or relations."81 But the notions of ‘aspirations’ and interests are not precisely and clearly defined. We do not know if they are conceived as values which are manifested in the interests approached as moral objectives, or if they are purely empirical facts. In the quoted lecture Twardowski states that a method to be employed to investigate these facts is empirical. For if we approach man’s interests and aspirations in this way and experience empirically the conflicts which people encounter when their interests are contradictory to the interests of other people then we will be able to define a certain empirical criterion.

It can be said that two epistemological and methodological reasons meet in Twardowski’s ethical views. The first inclines us towards reaching the beliefs, which influence moral choices, by induction, through experience. The other demonstrates that there are some intuitively recognized, true principles, influencing the level and direction of reconciling people’s interests. Therefore his theory includes at the same time intuitive, empirical and rational elements.

The conception of ethics aiming at behavior which does not do any harm to oneself and others in settling contradictions which emerge between the interests of individuals and their relations to others is a peculiar combination of the empirically approached aspirations of men and the moral principles recognized as axioms. Perhaps Twardowski perceives moral reality as a structure that cannot be recognized so easily and explicitly. This reality has a certain objective and absolute principle of organization which one searching for ethics discovers step by step.

translated by Malgorzata Sady

1. At that time (1892) Brentano was deprived of the title of full professor because of his marriage and lectured as a private assistant lecturer. Therefore R. Zimmermann was the official promoter of Twardowski’s Ph.D. thesis.

2. Brentano presented this conception in this paper "Uber den Begriff der Wahrheit" in 1889.

3. Twardowski, K., "O tak zwanych prawdach wzglêdnych", in Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, pp. 319-320.

4. Compare: Wolenski, J., Filozoficza szkola Iwowsko-warszawska, (Warszawa 1985), p. 35.

5. Czezowski, T., ‘O metodzie opisu analitycznego,’ in Odczyty filozoficzne (Torun 1969), p. 136.

6. Compare: Buczynska-Garewicz, T., ‘Logika uczuc. Doktryna milosci i nienawisci Fr. Brentana,’ in Archiwum historii filozofii i mysli spolecznej, Ossolineum 1972.

7. Brentano P., Vom ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis, (Leipzig 1921). ,

8. Among others: A. Meinong, Ch. Ehrenfels, H. Schwarz, F. Kruger, A. Hofler. See Gromska, D., ‘Poglady etyczne K. Twardowskiego,’ in Ruch Filozoficzny, Vol. 19, 1959, book 1-2, p. 10.

9.Compare: Meinong A. Psychologisch-etische Untersuchungen zur Wertteorie (1884); Ehrenfels Ch., System der Wertteorie (1897); Schwarz H., Grundzuge der Ethik (1896); Kruger F., Der Begriffdes Absolut Wertvollen als Grundbegriff der Moralphilosophie (1898); Hofler A., Psychologie.

10. Gromska, D., op. cit. p. 10.

11 Twardowski, K, ‘Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji,’ in Rozprawy i artykuly filozoficzne, (Lwow 1927).

12. Twardowski, K., ‘Wyklady z etyki,’ in Etyka, ch.9, 12, 13.

13. Dambska, ‘Franciszek Brentano a polska mysl filozoficzna. Kazimierz Twardowski i jego szkola,’ in Ruch Filozoficzny, vol. 37, 1979, N. 1-2, pp. 7-8.

14. Witwickim, W., Psychologia, Vol. 1 and 2, (Warszawa 1962/63).

15. Lukasiewicz, J., ‘Logika a psychologia,’ in Z zagadnien logiki i filozofii (Warszawa, 1961), pp. 63-65.

16. Czezowski, T., ‘Etyka jako nauka empiryczna,’ in Odczyty filozoficzne, p. 40.

17. Kotarbinski, T., ‘Uwagi na temat reizmu,’ in "Ruch Filozoficzny", N. 1-10, vol. 12, 1930/31, p. 11.

18. Ingarden R., ‘Filozofia w rozumieniu Brentany,’ in Z badan nad filozofia wspolczesna (Warszawa 1963), p. 197.

19. Ingarden, R., ibid. p. 197-198.

20. Compare: Dambskam I., ibid., p. 7.

21. Twardowski, K., Wybrane pisma filozoficzne (Warszawa 1965), p. 110.

22. Twardowski, K. op. cit. p. 109.

23. Twardowski, K., ‘Psychologia wobec fizjologii i filozofii,’ in Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, p. 108.

24. Paczkowska-Lagowska, Psychologia i poznanie. Epistemologia K. Twardowskiego. (Warszawa 1980), p. 63.

25. Twardowski, K., ‘0 tresci i przedmiocie przedstawien,’ in Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, p. 4.

26. Luszczewska-Rohmanowa, S., ‘O program filozofii naukowej K. Twardowskiego,’ in ‘Studia filozoficzne’, 1967, N, 4, p. 155.

27. Wolenski, J., Filozoficzna szkola lwowsko-warszawska, p. 40.

28. Twardowski, K., ‘O czynnosciach i wytworach,’ in Wybrane pisma filozoficzne (Warszawa 1965).

29. Twardowski, K., ibid. p. 220.

30. Wolenski, ibid, pp. 41-42 and Dambska I, ‘Semiotyczne koncepcje w filozofii Twardowskiego,’ in Ruch filozoficzny, 1969, vol. 33, book 1.

31. Twardowski, K., ‘Opsychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju,’ in Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, p. 268.

32. Twardowski, K., op. cit., p. 268.

33. Czerny, J., Kazimierz Twardowski, wspoltworca brentanowskiego programu filozofii, (Wroclaw 1980); Jadczak R., Czlowiek szukajqcy etyki. Filozofia moralna Kazimierza Twardowskiego, (Torun 1993), p. 23.

34. Twardowski, K., ‘Nauki humanistyczne a psychologia,’ 1912, ed. I. Dambska, in Ruch filozoficzny, vol.34, 1976.

35. Twardowski, K., 0 psychologii i jej przedmiocie . . ., pp. 269-271.

36. Twardowski, K., ‘Wyklady z teorii poznania (1924-25)0, Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli spolecznej, vol. 21, 1975, pp. 246-251.

37. Twardowski, K., ‘O naukach apriorycznych czyli racjonalnych (dedukcyjnych) i naukach aposteriorycznych czyli empirycznych (indukcyjnych),’ in Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, (Warszawa 1965)

38. Twardowski, K., op. cit; p. 369.

39. Twardowski, K., ‘Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji,’ in Rozprawy i artykuly filozoficzne, (Lwow 1927).

40. Twardowski, K., ‘O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym,’ in Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, pp. 347-348.

41. Twardowski, K., op. cit., p. 374.

42. Luszczewska-Rohmanowa S., ‘Program filozofii naukowej K. Twardowskiego’, in: ‘Studia Filozoficzne’, N.4, 1967, p. 161.

43. Gromska, D., ‘Poglady etyczne K. Twardowskiego,’ in Ruch Filozoficzny, vol.19, 1959, p. 10.

44. Twardowski, K., "Glowne kierunki etyki naukowej,’ in Etyka, vol. 13, 1974, p. 202.

45. Twardowski, K., op. cit. p. 202.

46. Twardowski meant here a concept of a scientific ethics in a sense of descripive ethics. He discussed this problem in more detail in his lecture ‘O zadaniach etyki naukowej’ (Etyka, 1973, vol.2). The above quotation comes from his lecture ‘Glowne kierunki etyki naukowej’. Etyka, vol. 13, 1974, p. 206.

47. Twardowski, K., Glowne kierunki etyki naukowej, p. 206.

48. Twardowski, K., op. cit., p.205.

49. Twardowski, K., Rozprawy i artykuly filozoficzne, p. 356.

50. Twardowski, K., Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji, pp. 353-354.

51. Brentano, F., Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 4th ed. Hamburg 1955, p. 109.

52. Twardowski, K., ‘O sceptycyzmie etycznym, Wyklady z etyki,’ part II, in Etyka, N.9, 1971, p. 177.

53. Twardowski, K., Etyka wobec ewolucji, p. 345.

54. Twardowski, K., 0 zadaniach etyki naukowej, p. 416.

55. Twardowski, K., op. cit., p. 151

56. Archiwum Kazimierza Twardowskiego. Biblioteka Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, Warszawa P. 14. 2, pp. 2-3

57. Ibid, p. 204

58. Twardowski, K., Glowne kierunki etyki naukowej, p. 205.

59. Comp. an introduction about Brentano

60. Twardowski, K., O sceptycyzmie etycznym, p. 199

61. Twardowski, K., Glowne kierunki etyki naukowej, p. 217

62. Brentano, F., Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 109.

63. Comp. Archiwum, K. Twardowskiego, p. 43

64. Twardowski, K., ‘Zycie umyslowe czlowieka,’ in Rozprawy i artykuly filozoficzne, p. 433.

65. Twardowski, K., ‘W sprawie klasyfikacji uczuc,’ in Rozprawy, p. 412.

66. Twardowski, K., ‘Etyka,’ in Archiwum K. Twardowskiego, p. 155.

67. Twardowski, K., op. cit., p. 187.

68. Twardowski, K., ‘Psychologia poznania i woli,’ 1906-1907, in Archiwum K. Twardowskiego, p. 29.

69. Brentano, F., Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, p. 18.

70. Brentano, F, Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, p. 144.

71. Twardowski, K., Glowne kierunki etyki naukowej, p. 213.

72. Moore G.E., Principia Ethica (Warszawa 1919), p. 6.

73. Tatarkiewicz, W., ‘O bezwzglêdnosci dobra,’ in Droga do filozofii i inne rozprawy filozoficzne 4 (Warszawa 1971), p. 269.

74. Twardowski, K., O sceptycyzmie etycznym, p. 186

75. Twardowski, K., O tak zwanych prawdach wzglêdnych (Lwow 1934).

76. Twardowski, K., op. cit. p. 43

77. Twardowski, K., Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji, p. 349

78. Twardowski, K., O zasadach etyki naukowej, p. 132

79. Twardowski, K., ‘Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji,’ in Turn 1895

80. Twardowski, K., O zadaniach etyki naukowej, pp. 416-417

81. Twardowski, K., op. cit, p. 141.