Henryk Jozef Maria Elzenberg was born on September 18th, 1887 in Warsaw. His family was Catholic, but his grandfather Jakub Elsenberg was a member of the Jewish community in Warsaw, an author and pedagogue, who also taught at the rabbinical school. Henryk’s father, also named Henryk (1845-1899), was a lawyer, publicist and active member of the Warsaw Positivist circles. When Henryk Elzenberg was nine his father sent him to Switzerland to learn foreign languages and related knowledge in an atmosphere of freedom. He passed his examination for the secondary school certificate in Geneva in 1905 and in 1909 received his doctorate at the Sorbonne (Le sentiment religieux chez Leconte de Lisle). In 1910-1912 he read French literature at the Neuchatel University in Switzerland and in 1916 he was invited to write a thesis qualify as assistant professor at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. In 1921 he obtained the title of an assistant professor in ethics and history of philosophy (his thesis was entitled Marcus Aurelius: From the History and Psychology of Ethics). When he moved to Warsaw University his qualification was extended to the whole area of philosophy and in 1936 he moved to Vilnius where he was a junior lecturer at the Philosophy Chair of the Stefan Batory University. After the Second World War he was repatriated to Poland (its boundaries having been moved towards the west) and in April, 1945 arrived in Lublin, where he stayed until autumn, delivering lectures in French literature at the Catholic University as an assistant lecturer and teaching French at the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University. Than he moved to Torun, where he worked as a full professor at the Philosophy Chair of the Nicolaus Copernicus University.

His rich didactic activity was broken by an administrative decision of the Communist authorities on the basis of which Henryk Elzenberg, along with a group of other professors, was barred from working with students because he was judged to be "an incorrect idealist". He was allowed to lecture again by the decision of the Humanities Department Board on November 13, 1956. He used the period of suspension for very intense academic work, carrying on research in Plato and Berkeley, accompanied by active involvement in "Library of Philosophy Classics" publishing series. On October 1st 1957, Elzenberg was appointed chairman of the Philosophy Chair at the Torun University tell his retirement on September 30th, 1960.

Suffering from incurable illness, he spent the last years of his life writing and editing his three masterpieces: A Trouble with Existence. Aphorisms in the Time Order, Krakow 1963; Attempts at Contact. Essays and Critical Studies, Krakow 1966; and Value and Man, Torun 1966. He died on 6 April 1967.

Elzenberg’s close connections with philosophy started with his interest in aesthetics. A desire to discover the essence of reality and reflections on the cognitive abilities of the human mind directed him more and more towards philosophy. As his philosophical knowledge increased, Elzenberg was increasingly reluctant to enter into considerations of an ontological nature. Finally, as a result of some personal misfortune, he moved towards Stoicism. Elzenberg’s attitude towards the world was formed mainly by pessimistic visions of reality, arising from his conviction that nothing has sense, and his sense of the decadence of our civilization.

Feeling intuitively an affinity, and even a unity, of aesthetics and ethics, Elzenberg concluded (around 1908) that a common factor connecting the two areas is a value constituting "the first and final source of the instructions for life". In 1910 under the influence of Sobeski’s book On an Objective Method in Aesthetics, he realized clearly that there existed a separate area of philosophy dealing with the problem of value, namely, axiology.

Elzenberg’s mentality found its ultimate reflection in the general theory of value, which he used to call general axiology. In the early thirties he started working very intensely on formulating and developing the main thesis of this theory. General axiology was to prove that Henryk Elzenberg’s beliefs were not only individual, but that his claims were true. It is surprising that Elzenberg’s philosophical approach, which originated from the beliefs he formed in his youth, remained almost unchanged until his death. The changes he introduced into his theory did not result from any essential changes of his views, but rather from the advancement of his thinking and the philosopher’s need to increase their logical clarity.

Elzenberg’s persistent aspiration towards building his own philosophical system distinguished him from the background of Polish philosophy at that time. He did not, however, follow the path of Leibniz. He resigned from solving questions of a metaphysical nature, confining himself to the theory of value, conceived of as general axiology. General axiology consisted of two basic parts: formal axiology, called also the philosophy of value; and substantial axiology, divided into aesthetics and ethics. His system of general axiology was never completed. The majority of Elzenberg’s published works were concerned with the problems of substantial axiology and therefore it is possible to combine his remarks included in various articles into one consistent whole. This allows us to isolate and define his system of ethics, as well as aesthetics, but it is relatively difficult to render and interpret the principles of Elzenberg’s philosophy of value.

We can distinguish three stages in the development of Elzenberg’s philosophy of value. The first stage, arose when the issues occuned to Elzenberg, as he started his introductory investigations on possible solutions. This stage lasted from 1908 to 1930. The second stage was when Elzenberg’s system was formulated and lasted from 1931 to about 1947. The year 1939 was the culmination of this period, when "Value and Obligation" was written in manuscript form. This stage ended with his lectures delivered in Torun in 1946/47, entitled "Basic Concepts of Axiology" (based on this manuscript). The last stage of Elzenberg’s research was the period from the late forties until the philosopher’s death in 1967. This stage can be described as the process during which he developed critical distance towards his system as he became aware of the difficulties embedded in his views. Elzenberg was also occupied with the problems of substantial axiology alongside formal axiology.

Elzenberg’s system of the philosophy of value was built on three pillars. The first is a clear differentiation between two concepts of value: utilitarian and perfect; the second pillar connects the concept of perfect value with that of obligation by definition; the third approaches obligation pertaining to being as oppose to deed.

The difference between utilitarian value and perfect value, proposed by Elzenberg, was not a new idea. It occurred in Seneca’s philosophy; in his Letters to Lucilius Seneca distinguished and opposed two categories of good things: those which have pretium (price, utilitarian value) and these which have dignitas (dignity, personal value). This opposition was repeated by Kant in the Justifications of Metaphysics.

Elzenberg did not aim at the analysis of the term value in order to discuss all its meanings. His main objective was to define and analyze the term of perfect value. But he could not begin to work on this task directly, because first he had to isolate a certain group of the meanings of the term "value", which–as he defined them – "are of particular interest for those concerned with human duties and obligations". This group of meanings is constituted by utilitarian values. According to Elzenberg an analysis of this kind of value is necessary in order to reveal the groundlessness of all endeavors aiming at situating utilitarian values in the area of formal axiology (the philosophy of value). "Utilitarian value" and "perfect value" are two completely different concepts, as are the disciplines relating to them.

A concept of value is a fundamental concept not only in axiology but also in the whole philosophy of Henryk Elzenberg, "the arranger of value tables", as he used to call himself. Thus the problem of defining the term ‘value’ was a fundamental problem for him. The first step taken by Elzenberg was to differentiate between the axiological meaning of this word and many other meanings. Elzenberg assumed that in an axiological sense value is a certain property of objects:

1. it happens to be for me an object of positive reactions: mental (approval) and emotional (inclination, respect, adoration) and I am inclined to think that it should be such an object for others as well;

2. its presence or absence seems to provide me with certain directions, instructions concerning man’s behaviour. In the sense that a certain object (or a state of affairs?) is valuable, the other is not, when ‘creating’ analogous objects or states of affairs people try to create an object like the first one, and not like the second one;

3. beauty and goodness are its variants;

4. it has its pole, negative equivalent: ugliness, evil.1 

 

The formulation of a definition including all these requirements was not an easy task and it demanded concrete methodological assumptions. Elzenberg refers to a traditional, although not a particularly effective method, employed by Plato in Sophist, that is, the method of approximation. This consists in a logical division of individual meanings of the term "value", followed by the rejection of meanings that do not fulfill the requirements of a definition of axiological value. The final stage of this method consists in narrowing the range of terms to the range of the term we search for, the result of which is an approximation of this term.

Elzenberg believes that it is possible to separate two meanings of the words: "value" and "valuable", which are basically different . The term "valuable object" in one sense is used to describe an object corresponding to "somebody’s needs, desires etc.; such value is always value for somebody (in case of a broadened interpretation possibly also for something) and it is relative from its very nature. It could be called utilitarian or, following Laird’s proposition, the value of election. The second meaning as some kind of ‘dignity’, ‘perfection’, ‘respectfulness’ or something similar; then we can talk about perfect value."2 

Value in a utilitarian sense includes a certain group of meanings. Generally, the valuable is mainly what is desirable and attainable, what is capable of satisfying somebody’s desire. As an example of such value Elzenberg gives a drink to a thirsty person or a ball to a team that wants to play a football game. Value in a utilitarian sense does not have to be what is desirable in current experience, but what happens to be desirable for someone: tobacco for a smoker, although at the moment he does not want to smoke, can serve as an example here. There are also theoretical possibilities of another approach to a problem of this type of value. Hence we can get rid of a requirement of attainability and what remains is a formula of satisfaction: "for an ambitious lame person to win the high jump at the Olympic Games can have value".3  However, on the other hand what is necessary can also be valuable "that without which a being can be harmed, that is, that without which he suffers or ceases to exist, or at least experiences the reduction of his existence: for example sun and fresh air for somebody living in the forest: and for everyone, food."4  Analyzing these examples we can assume that what is necessary can be at the same time desirable, but it is also possible that a need occurs without a desire and vice versa. Thus, it is possible to talk about two close, but different meanings of value. The difference between these two meanings can be made even more profound if we take into account the theoretically possible extension of the concept of a need to inanimate things. Then we could say that a fur coat needs naphthalene for summer and a crystal needs some dry air. Naphthalene and dry air constitute conditions of existence for a fur coat and crystal.

Talking about the needs of inanimate objects we should take into account, first of all, the fact that a need conceived in this way is an objective state of affairs, whereas in relation to people a need is also an objective state of affairs which can, but does not have to, include subjective elements.

The definition of utilitarian value cannot be reduced to a need only. Of course, a need seems to be a very significant element defining such value, but it is not the only one. When we attempt to define the concept of "utilitarian value" apart from the term "need", there can appear two other categories, namely "pleasure" and "desire".

Elzenberg says correctly "that utilitarian value cannot be always defined in the categories of ‘a need’. It should be added that sometimes ‘utilitarian values’ refer to what we consider nice. Following Perry’s way of thinking it would be possible to introduce the term ‘interest’, and say that value is what constitutes the object of somebody’s interest. Our interest involves:

1. behaviour

2. lack of displeasure

3. pleasure"5 

 

In this way the definiens of the definition of the term ‘utilitarian value’ was extended to a new category of ‘interest’6 , closely connected with pleasure. Hence there exist, in Elzenberg’s view, four related groups of meanings connected with value in a utilitarian sense:

1. Desire (value is the real or alleged ability of a given object P to satisfy the desires of a subject):

a. what is desired now;

b. what happens to be desired;

c. what is desired and attainable;

d. what is desired and unattainable.

2. Need (when somebody or something is harmed without it, it is a need)

a. a lack that causes suffering;

b. without which somebody or something cannot exist;

c. the without which existence is ‘diminished’.

3. Pleasure

4. "Expanded existence".

 

Utilitarian values defined by desire and need are negative in character, which means that they can only neutralize or eliminate certain negative states of affairs, but do not lead to the emergence of any other goods or positive states of affairs. A certain variation of goods, on the other hand, constitute utilitarian values defined by pleasure and expanded existence. Trying to introduce some order in these four ways of approaching utilitarian value, Elzenberg came to the conclusion that there are practically no obstacles to reducing all utilitarian values to either desire, need, pleasure or ‘expanded existence’. At the same time he did not determine which of these concepts were to be privileged, that is, which were to constitute the foundations of a definition of utilitarian value. He saw the biggest chances in ‘the way towards need".

What distinguishes utilitarian value is, according to Elzenberg, that it is "from its very nature relative (feature); it is always, a value for somebody (or something) and the same thing can be valuable for a person who desires it, needs it or finds pleasure in it, whereas for another person it is not."7  Do utilitarian values, conceived in this way fulfill all introductory requirements for the concept of value in an axiological sense? To put it differently: can utilitarian values be an object of axiology? First we have to solve the following problem: whether they are and whether they should be, an object of positive rational and emotional reactions, and therefore an object of approval and respect, veneration or love? Elzenberg’s answer is negative and results from the very essence of utilitarian value, its relativity, that is from the fact that it is always value for somebody or something. If emotional states (desires, pleasures, needs) are often contradictory when referring to different people, then assuming that "A should exist" we also have to assume that "B (contradictory to A) should not exist". Hence we cannot formulate a judgement: "A is useful, therefore it should exist". Secondly, utilitarian values, from their very nature as relative in character, cannot give instructions related to behaviour in situations which require choice of an axiological nature. Therefore, they do not fulfill the second requirement either. As a matter of fact neither is the requirement that beauty and goodness be variants of value fulfilled. In Elzenberg’s opinion the third requirement is fulfilled, i.e. it is possible to state that there exists values opposite to utilitarian value. There are no premises to state that utilitarian values are values in an axiological sense, because by definition such value is only value that fulfills all the introductory requirements.

Utilitarian values do not fulfill the requirements imposed by Elzenberg on the concept of value in an axiological sense. Thus they are not values in a strict sense of this word, capable of constituting the basis for the philosophy of values (formal axiology). Contrary to relative utilitarian values, these should be absolute and objective, enabling us to formulate a true judgement on reality: first of all, they should fulfil the requirements already discussed.

In order to understand fully the essence of this kind of value, it is necessary to reconstruct the way of thinking which led Elzenberg to the concept of value in a perfect sense. The analysis of a proposition: "Spirit is worth more than the matter" constituted its starting point. Of course this analysis does not focus on the fact of whether the sentence is true or false. It is important that it was really formulated and that the person who uttered it was convinced that it made sense. According to Elzenberg, whether we are dealing here with a judgement of value is determined by the expression "is worth more", which can mean "is more valuable". We are not dealing here with utilitarian value since it is not communicated that somebody desires spirit more than matter, or spirit gives someone more pleasure than the matter. The terms "spirit" and "matter" are not here approached in the same way in which judgements of utilitarian value are approached (spirit and matter are not values for somebody or something). They are the terms conceiving values in complete isolation, in an absolute sense. Let us consider the example, expressed in a proposition about the pleasure derived from reading a poem is worth more than comparable pleasure derived from eating a dozen oysters. It is true that one can desire more or one can desire less reading a poem than eating oysters, but it is not possible to desire more or need more the pleasures offered by these acts, since we assume that they are equal with respect to quality. On the same basis it is possible to say that a man is more valuable than a dog, that a dog is more valuable than an earth-worm, and that the state of civilization is more valuable than the wild state.

These judgements on value are, in Elzenberg’s view, comparative judgements and the comparative character determines their essence. The fact that a dog is less valuable than a man and more valuable than an earth-worm does not result from the fact of comparison, but from the fact that it has a certain value, which differs from utilitarian value. If we want more clarity on this new concept of value, we can compare it with its partial synonyms. These synonyms can be nobility, dignity, respectfulness. Now we can say that spirit is more noble than matter and the pleasure derived from reading a poem is more noble than the pleasure derived from eating oysters.8 

"The ‘Value’ in question is as if taking a certain place in a hierarchy; the hierarchy which is not arranged according to a certain point of view or with respect to a certain specific property, but is as if par excellence, independent from any respects and points of view."9  Just as in the case of utilitarian value, Elzenberg faced the problem of attributing a name to value conceived in this way. Neither "nobility", "dignity" nor "respectfulness" were suitable as technical terms. He decided that the most proper term would be an equivalent of the Latin word perfectio; thus he proposed the term "perfect value".

Elzenberg maintains that value in a utilitarian sense, and value in a perfect sense with sense of perfectum, are not values within the range of one type, as it is not possible to point to a superior notion which would include, on the one hand, usefulness, and on the other hand, dignity, noble-mindedness and perfection. They are totally different concepts and therefore sciences dealing with these values are separate sciences.

The former explanations referring to perfect value, based mainly on the analysis of various examples, are not sufficient. It does not seem sufficient to point to the notions that are partial synonyms of the term ‘perfect value’. A fundamental question that should be asked here, according to Elzenberg, is whether a definition of perfect value is possible at all.

Before formulating the definition of perfect value, Elzenberg analyses the attitudes according to which it is not possible to define this notion because it is considered an empty notion. Elzenberg does not agree, for if we are able to give approximate synonyms of perfect value, this means that this term can be compared with other terms in relation to it and their meanings. He comes to the conclusion that this meaning has to be known. To those who say that they do not understand the term in question, Elzenberg proposes "to use this questioned term in ever changing contexts in which, in our opinion, it can be done in a sensible way, until perhaps after all an obstinate mind gets acquainted with its content and feels like recognizing its existence"10  . Approaching perfect value in such a way, one has to take into account that either "noble-mindedness", "respectfulness", and "dignity" are not its synonyms (as also their synonyms and synonyms of "perfection")–I believe that they are rather variants of perfect value–or they are empty terms themselves. Assuming that they are not synonyms, but as a matter of fact they define variants of perfect value and are understood in some way, is it possible to find a definition of this value by comparing its variants? If the list were completed, then perhaps such a definition would be possible, but the belief that it is unfortunately an incomplete list is equally justified.

Elzenberg’s attitude towards the indefinibility of perfect value is unquestionably positive. But it is connected with the awareness of the essence of a difficulty which results in the fact that the formulation of the definition should be proceeded by respective preparatory considerations. The difficulties in question are of two kinds: the definition itself contains a difficult notion and therefore it is not possible to clarify this term in a conclusive way, unquestioned by all; the definition cannot be fully understood because of the application of words with which not everybody is familiar in such a context. Therefore Elzenberg tried to bring closer the discussed notion, first applying other ways of explaining it. His way of constructing the definition itself of perfect value was equally cautious. The fact that he adopted such a method was due, first of all, to his desire to emphasize that the definition corresponds to the contents which had been outlined in his introductory considerations. "In order to do it", writes Elzenberg, "we shall introduce a certain intermediary notion which, on the one hand, has some discernible connection with the notion of perfect value; on the other hand it is directed and points towards what we shall propose as a defining formula: thus it will play the role of an intermediary link which facilates the passage from definiendum to definiens. This intermediary link will be the notion of approval.11 

Elzenberg maintains that according to the popular understanding of words, all positive states apropos of value are approved of , and all negative states are disproved of. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings he explains what the notion of ‘approval’ means to him. This notion does not denote, with reference to a judgement on value, a certain emotion experienced by a subject pronouncing the judgement: it means rather that the judgement on value is an approving judgement, that it is just an approval. To approve and value positively in a perfect sense is basically the same, with one exception; when approving we take into account additionally a certain aspect of an act of evaluating. Hence Elzenberg writes: "Each judgement on perfect value is an approval and each approval is a judgement on perfect value. Approving judgements other than positive judgements on perfect value cannot be quoted: an approval uses itself up in a judgement on value just like a judgement on value uses itself up in an approval."12  The reason why Elzenberg introduced the term ‘approval’ into his argument, aims at establishing a definition of perfect value, is a particular semantic shade of this term, which he describes as satisfying some requirements. Later he reduces this qualification to the expression ‘as it should be’. Therefore a thing satisfying some conditions imposed on it, is simply a thing as it should be. Having accepted the definition of approval, which is an intermediary notion serving to formulate the definition of perfect value, Elzenberg was able to give a qualification of the latter: "A valuable object in a perfect sense is an object as it should be."13 

In the definition of perfect value the term ‘obligation’ is a fundamental notion. Thus obligation is a key category in Elzenberg’s theory of value. According to Elzenberg when practising axiology one has to look, among other things, for an answer to a question: how should one behave in a concrete individual life situation, as well as in all possible circumstances? Axiology cannot be a guide leading you by the hand through your life. It cannot provide you with a catalogue of all possible duties that can be encountered by every individual. It can provide you only with "certain very general, binding rules of behaviour, rules constituting a framework within which the choice of behaviour would be determined by other factors, which are not revealed by axiological speculation."14 

As in the case of the definition of value, when describing ‘obligation’, used acceding to the definition of perfect value, Elzenberg referred to a method of approximation. There are several groups of the usage of the term ‘should’. The first group uses such denotations of ‘should’ which cannot be applied in the definition of value. It is possible to distinguish three basic denotations of the term in this group:

1. A statement of probability (for example "Tomorrow should be a nice weather").

2. A statement expressing that a certain feature is a common feature shared by all members of a given class (for example I want to describe a plant which seems to be a buttercup, therefore I state: "This plant is not a buttercup, because it has four petals and a buttercup should have five.").

3. An imperative statement in two variations:

a. propositions stating obligation are synonymous to orders (for example a proposition "You should apologize to your friend" is equivalent to "Go and apologize to your friend!").

b. propositions stating obligation are synonymous to propositions saying that an order was pronounced (for example "Jan told you to apologize to your friend").

 

The second group of denotations of this term is constituted by conditional denotations connected with utilitarian value. Elzenberg gives several examples to represent this group of meanings: "a penknife should be sharp", "food for people should contain vitamins", "an Alpinist should have a strong heart". In these examples "should" has no specific meaning as can be observed by the fact that replacing it with ‘must’ does not change the whole expression semantically. In these examples the state of affairs being obligatory is essential, but not necessarily satisfactory in the case of some other states of affairs. A characteristic feature of this state of affairs is that somebody is really concerned with it, which means that it is a state needed or desired by somebody.

A formula ‘as it should be’ is, in this case, synonymous to the term ‘valuable’ not in a perfect sense, but only in an utilitarian sense. Hence the denotation of the word ‘should’, qualified in this way, cannot be of any use in defining perfect value.

Finally, the third group of the usage of the term ‘should’ is constituted by a true deontological meaning (Elzenberg also used the expression ‘proper axiological’ meaning). Having considered simple denotations of the term ‘should’, occurring in these two groups and having concluded that the term ‘should’ applied there cannot be used in the definition of perfect value, Elzenberg faced an alternative: either it is necessary to resign from a separate notion of perfect value or one has to admit that the word ‘should’ has a different meaning, which cannot be defined in such a simple way as the one presented. He rejected the first possibility categorically. Thus he was left with the second possibility, that is he was forced to define a true deontological sense of the term. This meaning of the word ‘should’ was used to introduce the term ‘deontology’ to denotate a discipline which dealt with obligations.

Elzenberg refers to the examples expressing a conditional-utilitarian denotation such as: "A thief should be clever", "A tyrant should be cruel". In both sentences a subject (a thief, a tyrant) is something morally disapproved; a similar situation occurs with the ‘should’ quality. The word ‘should’ is used here in an unnatural and revolting way. It seems that in a natural way this word can be used only in a situation when a subject and the ‘should’ quality can be approved of in a moral sense. Elzenberg justifies it in the following way: "the use of ‘should’ with reference to a thief’s cleverness or a tyrant’s cruelty disagrees with a different meaning of this term, strongly embedded in our consciousness, which is none of the denotations discussed above (but it is this deontological sense). In that sense, which strongly suggests itself, a thief should not be clever and a tyrant should not be cruel, because firstly it would be better if a tyrant got overthrown, secondly nobody should be cruel."15 

This analysis is not sufficient to define a true deontological meaning of obligation. It is quite difficult to present clear and obvious examples illustrating this meaning. One of the difficulties consists in the fact that almost every state of affairs can constitute a condition of another state of affairs which could serve to satisfy somebody’s need or desire. Therefore the interpretation of a conditional and utilitarian character is possible for almost every state of affairs. If we want to give adequate examples, says Elzenberg, we have to find the ones in which the ‘should’ state of affairs could not be considered at all as a condition of the state which would satisfy anybody’s desires or needs, that is it cannot be a means for reaching a certain goal. We should find such an example in which obligation would not be a mean but an ultimate goal. Having such an example we can say that ‘should’ occurs in a true deontological sense and not a conditional or utilitarian sense.

Elzenberg thinks that the following sentence can be used as such an example: "All my needs and desires should be satisfied". For it cannot mean "If I am, then my desires will be satisfied etc."; that would be a tautology. Thus here ‘should’ certainly does not mean "If, then..."; and because it certainly has none of the other meanings, we have still another meaning: our deontological meaning."16 

Elzenberg believes that having this fundamental example it is possible to find this meaning in other examples, in which it would be possible to apply an utilitarian interpretation, but it would be unnatural. To justify his opinion he gives the following examples: "No being capable of feeling should suffer". "Every man should have a need of disinterested knowledge", "Every man should be rational". It is true that the last sentence could be interpreted in the following sense: "If a man is not rational then either some of his or somebody else’s needs or desires will not be satisfied", but it would be a specific interpretation, suggesting itself only under certain circumstances. However, the sentence: "Every man should be rational’ is used in most cases in a different sense, namely, that the reason is the ‘should’ quality of man, a quality attributing perfect value to it. Elzenberg subjects other examples to a similar analysis and comes to the following conclusion: "If we recollect this in more distinct examples and if we train our feeling of deontological sense on them, we shall see that this sense occurs in a quite natural way and in a number of other sentences, which can be interpreted later from an utilitarian point of view (a rose should have a fragrance, a little hand of a beautiful woman should be white and fragile, a poem should be rhythmical, a judge should be just, etc.)"17  On the basis of these considerations Elzenberg comes to the conclusion that we can assume that the use of ‘should’ in a conditional-utilitarian proposition in a probable, imperative and resolving way is possible only thanks to the fact there exists a certain common element, linking such different ways of using the term ‘should’. This common element is inherent in a certain shade of deontological meaning: "namely, when it is ‘as it should be’ then it is somehow ‘according to law’ or to a rule (and if not, there is a conflict with law or a rule) , it is ‘in order’, and if not, it is not. And this shade can be found to various degrees in all those meanings."18 

When we approach the deontological meaning of obligation in such a way, then doubts can arise if it can be applied to things or only to rational beings. According to Elzenberg this meaning can be applied also to things. It can be accounted for by the already mentioned examples but, first of all, we should refer it to the area of aesthetics. When one refers to this area, one should answer the question whether aesthetic value, that is beauty, conceived of in a broad traditional sense, is a variant of perfect value or not. Elzenberg’s attitude is as follows:

A positive reasoning is essential: that ‘beautiful’ is perfectly valuable in some variant. ‘Beautiful’, as we have already said, is not at all a statement on some external and natural property. It is like a valuable and good, in a perfect sense, purely approving word, the immanent-objective meaning of which is exhausted in approval–like a valuable word. (Beauty is a variant of this noble-mindedness, dignity, etc.). What does a difference between it and the term ‘perfectly valuable’ consist in? Only in distinguishing a state of contemplation.19 

 

Having isolated a deontological sense of obligation, Elzenberg wonders if it is possible to formulate a definition of the word ‘should’. In his belief one cannot state categorically that it is not possible to give a definition of the term. He proposes the following method: to examine all proposed definitions, then to reject them and by elimination to arrive at a conclusion that the matter evidently cannot be formulated in a satisfactory way. But also then one should be cautious in expressing his final settlements, as you cannot be absolutely sure, that at least one of the proposed definitions cannot be maintained. According to Elzenberg caution is even more advisable for a statement saying that the notion of obligation, as a simple notion, which cannot be analyzed, is of a great importance from the point of view of some philosophical attitudes.

Elzenberg rejects in advance all the interpretations, which are concerned ex definitione with human obligations only. The philosopher pays more attention to justifying the interpretation which consists only in misunderstanding, expressing itself in a tendency aiming at basing the notions of "goodness" and "obligation" and, as a matter of fact, the whole ethics on quasi-logical relations. According to this interpretation one talks about the "should" state of affairs when it is justified, i.e. when it has some rational grounds. The sentence: "A judge should be just" in the justifying interpretation is equivalent to the sentence "There exists a rational reason for a judge to be just". Without getting to the core of the terms "justified" and "rational grounds" one can ascertain intuitively that if the first sentence is true, then the second should be also true. Do these sentences have the same meaning? Elzenberg thinks that they do not and he justifies it in the following way: "If we start looking for what could constitute this rational justifying reason, then we discover that it is just obligation: the fact that a judge should be just constitutes grounds and justification for the fact that a judge is just. Thus obligation (the "should" state of affairs) is not, as the definition wanted it, the fact that (this) state of affairs has a rational reason, but it is this reason itself. The relationship of the sentences ‘there exists a rational reason for a judge to be just’ is the following: the first results from the second (on the basis that obligation is a rational reason)–it is not a relation of equivalence (significance)–which would be required by the definition. (Obligation provides justifications, but to be obligatory and justified is not the same). (Therefore we have not formulated here the definition of obligation, the notion of which has not been touched by the analysis)."20 

This leads to the conclusion that a justifying interpretation cannot offer a satisfactory definition of obligation. Justification is not the essence of obligation, but only its function. Here we are dealing with a problem of the obligation of being and the obligation of act. Elzenberg’s obligation is the obligation of being, referring to things themselves, to the states of affairs. The obligation of being is a primary state. At the moment when this primary obligatory state of affairs can be realized, the obligation of an act appears, but it is immaterialized and unaddressed. The materialization of the obligation of an act takes place in substantial axiology, and more precisely in ethics. Thus–according to Elzenberg’s suggestion–we should ascertain that there is no obligation of act without obligation of being. Aiming at explanation of such an approach to obligation he introduced a certain conceptual construction–a meta-empirical will, which is different from empirical will: "there is constructed a notion of such will in man that would not ‘ be subjected to motives" (from emotional side)–but to reasons; it would be ‘autonomous’ and as a result of this unchangeable and identical with various subjects. This will opposes our will which depends on motives (‘heteronomic’) and is changeable, strictly individual. And it is said: "I should" equals "I want the other will".21  Approaching this problem in a slightly different way we find that an obligatory state of affairs is such that every subject would like it to be, if it had an autonomous will. What is this autonomous will? In Elzenberg’s conception it is a certain creation, the task of which consists in making our intuition concerning the objectivity of values–rooted in the obligation of being–rational. In other words the autonomous will is wishing, in a way that is not determined by anything apart from rational reasons.

The second type of the interpretation of the meaning of deontologically distinguished obligation, discussed by Elzenberg, is made by relating to the notion of perfect value. This interpretation is basically inconsistent with the earlier formulated definition of perfect value, but in further analysis it turns out that it can constitute a specific counterproposition to this definition. In the late thirties Elzenberg defined value referring to a category of obligation and then he asked whether it was not possible to define obligation, using the term "perfect" and accepting a belief, which he had rejected earlier, namely that value is an elementary notion, and therefore indefinable. In this case we would deal with something like reversing the earlier definition, in which the term "valuable" and the term "should" constitute a combined pair, of which one of them is primary, whereas the other is defined by terms applied to define the first one. Elzenberg believes that both terms are sufficiently simple, and that it is only a matter of convention, which of these terms will be recognized as primary, and which will be defined by referring to the notions, defining the other term. However, making such a choice one cannot be guided by a pure coincidence. The philosopher thinks that these are intuitive beliefs, which speak in favour of considering obligation a primary term by means of which perfect value can be defined.

Elzenberg was never free from doubts evoked by the fact that the definitions of the terms obligation and perfect value were connected. The difficulties caused by it led him to a theoretical crisis in the late forties, proved by his notes for the Torun lectures of 1948/49: "One can try to reverse the relation and define obligation by perfect value. It does not work (in my opinion), but again the possibility of such an attempt throws light an the notion of obligation. (They account for each other). What is not satisfactory here is that there are only two notions used in relation to each other: it is a deficiency of this system".22  Elzenberg got very close to solving this difficulty, which was made possible by giving up defining value by means of obligation and obligation by means of value, and recognizing their relationship as an axiom characterizing both concepts as primary concepts at the same time.

Elzenberg’s definition of perfect value generated quite some difficulties because in fact not every state of affairs is as perfectly valuable as it should be. If we accept the fact that a certain state of affairs is perfectly valuable, i.e., that it is as it should be, we have to accept that another state of affairs, constituting a prerequisite for the first one to come into being, should also take place. As an example of this situation Elzenberg gives a civilized human life, which can be recognized as perfectly valuable. At the same time it seems that such a life can exist only in a given climate. We can conclude that if a climate is a prerequisite for the civilized development of a human life, then it is as it should be. Would it be perfectly valuable then? According to the linguistic convention, a climate fulfilling the described function can probably given a name of a certain value. But is it value expressing this "nobleness", "dignity" or "perfection"? In this case only a negative answer is possible. Thus not everything which is as it should be is valuable in a prefect sense. Therefore either the definition formulated before has to be modified or it has to be admitted that not every perfect value is a synonym of "nobleness", "dignity" or "perfection". This being so, Elzenberg states that we have two kinds of objects as they should be and both are denoted by the term "valuable"‘ The first type is of objects as indirectly valuable objects, meaning that they have a certain property without any further reason for itself. The second type of objects are objects should be such and such, in order for the first ones to be valuable in a perfect sense. The second type is not indirectly valuable; their objects are as if directly valuable. In the case of the first one we deal with ultimate value and in the case of the second one we deal with derived value: to be more precise, with its main variant–instrumental value.

If we approach the definition of perfect value rigorously, saying that a perfectly valuable object is an object as it should be, both values (ultimate and instrumental) should be treated as variants of the same value. At the same time it would not be possible to state that perfect value and nobleness, dignity or perfection are synonyms.23 

Elzenberg rejects this solution and claims that not every thing which is as it should be is perfect value. A thing which has only instrumental value is not perfectly valuable. Such value does not constitute a variant of perfect value, but is something else. In Elzenberg’s notes we can find a slightly more developed approach to instrumental value. He writes about value as a means to something (Mittelwert). There is a certain group of objects which, not being values themselves, are means to valuable aims. As examples of such objects, Elzenberg provides a mill, which has value, since it serves the purpose of grinding corn as well as producing flour; and words which have value because they serve the purpose of communication between people. The contents of these examples can be reduced to a formula: "If A is valuable and if B is a means to A, then B is valuable,"24  while B can have other positive or negative values, not related to A. However, defining derived value one cannot confine oneself to characterizing only instrumental value because there is no relation of equivalence between these concepts, for instrumental value is only one type of derived value.

At the final stage of explaining the meaning of the term ‘derived value’, Elzenberg gives a number of suitable examples, illustrating various cases in which derived value manifests itself. The first case is when the value of the effect turns into a reason, and value of a conditioned thing turns into a condition, for example the presence of iron ore in the earth is valuable as it is a condition of producing steel, and this is in turn a condition of building machines (although iron ore is not present in the earth in order to allow men to build machines). This case can be reduced to a formula: "If A is valuable and if B is a reason or one of the conditions of A, then B is valuable."25 

In the second case, the value of a part is moved onto the whole, and the respective formula is: "If A is valuable and B is the whole of which A is a constituent, then B is valuable".26  It would be possible to formulate an objection saying that if only one element of a certain whole is valuable, it does not mean that the whole is valuable. However, it seems that this objection can be overcome, for if we deal with a valuable constituent, then we are right to believe that the whole is valuable.

The third type is so-called memory value, which according to Elzenberg consists in the fact that "if an A is valuable and a B is closely connected with it, then a B also becomes valuable."27  An example of this type of value could be the pen which belonged to Mickiewicz, a great Polish Romantic poet. That pen is more valuable than the one with which Elzenberg writes.

The fourth type of derived value, discussed by Elzenberg, is value of national emblems, such as flags etc., or generally speaking, the value of symbolic objects. Value of this kind consists in the fact that its objects symbolize something what is of some value, but the objects do not have this value themselves. This type of value is closely related to memory value.28 

Comparing the above cases and the verbal formulas corresponding to them, Elzenberg comes to the conclusion that in each of them there are two conditions determining that B is valuable. One of these conditions is changeable and characterizes values as, for example, means, reasons, conditions, containers or symbols of valuable things, whereas the second one is constant and common for all cases (an A is valuable). "Attempting to create a superior notion, including all others, one should take into account this common condition. Derived value is value which is dependent on fulfilling this condition and the variants thereof will be the values which have been enumerated so far. It can be defined as follows: an A has a derived value if one of the conditions of its value is the value of a certain non-A; or, an object has a derived value if one of the conditions of its value is the value of a certain non-A."29  Or in a slightly different way: " As a ‘derived’ value of an object one can define such a value as one part of the reason for which another object is of value. For example, an A would be valuable because a B is valuable, and because either an A is in a relation to a B or having a property by an A is in a relation to the value of object B, e.g., in a relation of a means to an end. Then ‘ultimate’ or ‘proper’ value will be value for which a part of the reason is not the value of any other object".’30  In a special case of instrumental value the notion of ‘a part of the reason’ turns into the notion of ‘a means’, and thus ‘a part of the cause’. According to Wolniewicz, Elzenberg’s definition of the notion ‘a means’ is the best in comparison to all others found in the publications. A similar definition can only be found in Tadeusz Czezowski’s works: "A relation of a means to an and is a relation related to causative relation; a means is a cause; or a part of a cause; an and, which in order to be achieved reached, makes one use a given means partly or completely, is a result".31  It should be clearly emphasized that in this case Czezowski formulated his definition under the influence of Elzenberg.

Sometimes it happens that instrumental value (derived from perfect value) is taken for utilitarian value. This results from the fact that an instrumentally valuable object, like an object that is valuable due to its utility, can be treated like one which derives its value from the fact of serving a certain purpose. The difference consists in the fact that an instrumentally valuable object is a means to realize a certain perfect value, for example, a brush used by an artist who paints a picture, whereas an object valuable due to its utility serves to satisfy a certain need, for example tobacco which serves to satisfy a desire to smoke is valuable because the state of affairs it makes possible is the satisfaction of someone’s need. The next characteristic differentiating these two values is that "utilitarian value itself can be either ultimate or instrumental. What is desired, needed or pleasant, either itself or indirectly because of itself, has an ultimate utilitarian value; without this ultimate utility a utilitarian value has instrumental value."32  The last source of sometimes mistaken identification of instrumental value (derived from perfect value) with utilitarian value is that "a given ‘utilitarily’ valuable object can–thanks to its utilitarian value–acquire instrumental value directly from perfect value. Thus, for example generally we tend to consider a human being as such an object endowed with a certain perfect value. It follows that everything that serves to satisfy its basic needs–everything that is a condition of existence–as related to a means towards a end is the same as a perfectly valuable object, equipped with certain perfect value. (For example all food keeping human beings alive). However, one should not surrender to confusion. On the one hand, food is valuable in a utilitarian sense, whereas, on the other hand, it has instrumental value. These two things should not be identified."33 

In his 1934 article of On a Difference between ‘Beauty’ and ‘Goodness’ Elzenberg wrote: "Then ‘ultimate’ or ‘proper’ value does not have part of the reason it is such in any other object."34 This is value would be inherent in an object if it were the only one existing in the whole world. In this conception perfect ultimate value is absolute and objective value. It depends neither on a subject nor on a relation between a subject and an object. A significant issue concerning ultimate value, discussed by Elzenberg, is the possibility of justifying it. He distinguishes two kinds of propositions concerning ultimate values, corresponding to the following formulas:

1. An object A has ultimate value.

2. A property c is connected in a necessary way with a property of ultimate value.

 

Elzenberg believes that the propositions of the first type can be proved and he justifies his belief in the following way: "it is stated that an object A has a property c. Then we have two premises: (a) an object A has a property c, (b) a property c is necessarily connected with a property of ultimate value and the conclusion is that an object A has ultimate value. In a pluralistic variant A has one or several properties c1, c2, c3... cn and each of them is accompanied by a property of ultimate value; therefore an object A is ultimately valuable."35 

Elzenberg doubts that it is possible to justify propositions of the second type. He claims that it is not possible to justify them if we apply the popular modes of justification, i.e. deduction and induction.

Derived value as well as ultimate value constitute an object of research for another section of axiology. Derived value always depends on certain ultimate value and on actual states (on an object being a means, cause, constituent etc. of another object), because of which it is just an object of substantial axiology, whereas ultimate values belong to the range of the interests of formal axiology and in connection with it one can distinguish two phases in axiological thinking:

1. Statement that an object A and B and C ...and N are valuable with ultimate value

2. Search for a property, which apart from a property of value was common to objects A and B and C... and N.

 

This property is searched for in the following way: "by touching, guessing on the basis of comparing valuable objects we are familiar with." The recognition of this property takes place, according to him, "not on the basis of a statement that all valuable objects I am familiar with have it, but on the basis of some illumination: this property cannot be unconnected with value; a relationship between them is necessary."36 

In Elzenberg’s considerations presented here, the essential thing is the introduction of differentiation between objects as they should be, that is as valuable objects. Some objects are valuable as if by themselves, their value is ultimate value; others are valuable inasmuch as they ensure perfect value to the first ones. Thus their value is instrumental as derivative. As already mentioned there can arise reservations from the justifications of the propositions on ultimate values. At the same time it should be remembered that Elzenberg did not settle these problems as is established by the fact that Elzenberg left in manuscript the notes on the propositions concerning the solutions of the problems of ultimate value.

Within the framework of "the architectonics of value" Elzenberg indicates the need to distinguish various kinds (variants) of perfect value. Formulating a proposition: "The state of affairs r is valuable" he expresses a judgement "The state of affairs r is as it should be". This evaluation is only an evaluation stating the value of a given state of affairs; it is a pure evaluation. In practice, however, we do not deal with such pure evaluations but with their concretization. One does not state simply that "The state of affairs r is valuable" but one says that it is either beautiful or good or sacred, etc. What criterion one should use if one wants to make such a differentiation? Elzenberg claims that this criterion cannot be constituted by any objective properties of perfectly valuable objects. The differentiation between respective types of perfect value can be made only on the basis of the processes of mental changes taking place in a subject who adopts an evaluating attitude. I consider an object P beautiful; when considering it valuable I also contemplate it subjectively or experience it contemplatively. I consider an object P good; when considering it valuable I also subjectively want it to be a reasonable individual with a free will. However, here it should be asked whether beauty and goodness as perfect values occupy the same place in the hierarchy. Only once does Elzenberg writes about it expressis verbis , but he formulates his thesis in a way which leaves no room for doubts: "there exists in the world value of a higher order than goodness, it is beauty; considering goodness an ultimate measure on any occasion is disloyalty to an ideal." Later he adds that "independently of beauty I have always had an intuition of some value higher than ethical value, some greatness, buoyancy, divinity of spirit that could walk hand in hand with extreme immorality, and in relation to which applying a measure of ‘evil’, ‘good’ seems to be a despicable narrow-mindedness."37 

Does Elzenberg think that beauty and goodness are the only kinds of perfect value? They are definitely the kinds which absorbed his attention most frequently, but were they the only ones? In this case Elzenberg avoids univocal settlements. He believed that sanctity could be considered a variant of perfect value, but he did not settle this problem definitely. "Sanctity? A very unclear issue, to be considered later."38  He moved economic values outside the range of perfect values. "An economic value? I deny categorically. Axiological ‘value’ and economic ‘value’ are only pure homonyms with different meanings."39 

There is still one more problem to be explained. What status did he intend for truth? Is truth a variant of perfect value? According to Elzenberg truth is not a variant of value, it is not value at all. Truth is defined as the correspondence of a judgement to reality; value is defined as a state of affairs as it should be. As the meaning of these two terms is different, truth is not value. Truthfulness as a property of judgements is of a value creative character; one can say about true judgements that they are as they should be. Thus Elzenberg thinks that by its truthfulness a judgement becomes something beautiful or good: that is, he reduces truth to one of these two variants of value.

Finally we can say with him "that only good and beautiful things are objects of absolute approval. Good and beautiful things are the only valuable objects; expressed in words: goodness and beauty are the only kinds of value."40 

Having analyzed the notion of "perfect value"; we should ask a question: does value conceived as (primary, absolute, autotelic and independent) in this way, fulfill the conditions which, according to Elzenberg, value in an axiological sense has to fulfill?

The first condition, assuming that value should be identical with intellectual approval, is fulfilled with such an approach to perfect value. Perfect values, being absolute values, that is the ones which cannot be reduced to anyone’s desires or interests, are ultimate aims in themselves. The second condition is also fulfilled as perfect values provide a subject with instructions regarding one’s behaviour. This is possible thanks to the fact that perfect values are always defined by obligation determined by the autonomous will of an absolutely instructive character. Although obligation is always theoretical, obligation can still be derived from it, namely, the obligation that it be been done. I shall discuss this in more detail when considering the problem of an axiological choice. Finally, perfect value fulfils the third and fourth conditions as beauty and goodness are its variants ; it also has its opposite (negative value). Thus perfect values are values in an axiological sense and therefore they are the values we look for.

There have been presented here–according to Elzenberg–two fundamental types of values: values in an utilitarian sense and values in a perfect sense. In Elzenberg’s system perfect values are more significant than utilitarian values and this in at least a double sense. Firstly, contrary to utilitarian values, they are absolute by definition. A thing does not become valuable, noble, perfect depending on who evaluates it. It is simply valuable, irrespective of whether somebody considers it valuable or not. Secondly, utilitarian values, consisting in the capability of satisfying desires or needs cannot justify obligation. They do not lead and they cannot lead to a formula: ‘it is needed so it should be, whereas the propositions on perfect value constitute a satisfactory justification that it ‘should be like that’. The order to realize it is as if inherent in perfect value. The superiority of perfect values to utilitarian values consists simply in the fact that they exist and are in force. According to Elzenberg this superiority of perfect values entitles us perhaps even to call them values in a strict sense of this word.

The problem of culture is a significant issue directly connected with the philosophy of value. Elzenberg did not approach culture as a certain sociological phenomenon. For him culture is "a sum of things, the creation of which is within the range of man’s possibilities, and these things are valuable". Values exist in an objective way and are independent of man and independent of any relations between man and an object. Value is something which is inherent in an object objectively and independently of any conditions, even–Elzenberg believes – "if it were the only one existing in the whole world"‘. One of the most significant functions to be fulfilled by culture is to build and establish the systems and the hierarchies of values. A fundamental offence against culture and humanity is an attitude of indifference towards values. The major task of substantial axiology is not the problem of goodness, but goodness to be realized. The realization of goodness and values is humanity’s obligation and nothing can free humans from fulfilling it.

Adopting the objectivist theory of value in ethics Elzenberg became a declared enemy of hedonism, utilitarianism and practical realism. Opposing hedonism, he maintained that a thinking person cannot follow a desire to attain the greatest possible pleasure in evaluating other people and even events. For human being, in a moral task which one has to fulfill, self-improvement should be the guiding principle. "The only task of person is to rise above one’s current human status". He called such an attitude perfectionism. Apart from this, one of the fundamental ethical issues for Elzenberg was that of salvation. This term cannot be conceived of in a religious or religio-metaphysical sense, but only in an ethical sense, namely, as a salvation from moral evil. This ideal is to be realized by a certain type of a person, called by him homo ethicus. Persons realize themselves as a meliorist and as soteric. The meliorist’s attitude is characterized by the fact that working towards becoming better persons, considering goodness as one’s aim, they notice that certain things inherent in them interfere with their aspirations. What distinguishes a meliorist’s attitude is their approach to evil. The meliorist has no particular problems with expressing a positive moral judgement, but expresses it as if ‘directly’. Due to the fact that their axiological attention is directed towards positive values, they as if loses the ability to evaluate directly what is evil. As a result of this attitude a meliorist does not feel a threat from what is evil, because they are deprived of intuitive directness in evaluating evil. On the one hand, a soteric person aims at absolute liberation from evil, that is as in Elzenberg’s approach – a soteric person aims at salvation. Although a meliorist aims at absolute goodness, which cannot be really attained, they are happy even with a small improvement of it, whereas a soteric person cannot think about a partial disposal of evil. The soteric person has to be a maximalist; one cannot talk about partial salvation: either we get rid of evil and attain salvation or we shall remain at the starting point of this path. Thus in a soteric attitude attention should be focused mainly on evil and the obstacles one notices in oneself. Such an attitude is very rare and it seems less natural than a meliorist attitude. Following Elzenberg we should ask a question: is salvation an attainable aim? There are no a priori evidences to contradict it. However our experience seems to contradict a positive answer as it is difficult to expect that such a human nature exists which will be always and everywhere guided by a principle of loving goodness. Even if we assume that somebody attains salvation, still we cannot say that they will attain it, as future wishes are difficult to foresee.

Just as in ethics, also in aesthetics, Elzenberg was a declared enemy of relativism and formalism. His theory of beauty is a maximalist theory, characterized by objectivism, absolutism, aestheticism, and axiological and aesthetic monism. In aesthetics his attitude was that of perfectionism, assuming that every human being is obliged to create and perceive beauty. Following the suggestions of Külpe, Scheler and Ingarden, he demonstrated that such emotional qualities of a landscape, human faces, pieces of music, works of architecture, etc., like ‘sad’ or ‘happy’, ‘gloomy’ or ‘cheerful’ are perceived by us directly in these objects and we do not reach them by inference. Elzenberg supported axiological and normative aesthetics, claiming that only such aesthetics is worth practicing.

Elzenberg was a recluse. He was a philosopher for whom one of the most significant tasks he set for himself was to maintain his intellectual and political independence. In 1960, when the Minister of Science did not approve of his lecturing plans, he wrote a letter to Irma Radoska: "I do not know how much time is left, but if it were only ten days there is one thing I would have: I shall not die as a dog on a chain." Not to become ‘a dog on a chain’, to remain faithful to himself and his ideals–was Elzenberg’s life motto. He was faithful to it and applied it consistently, many a time entering into open conflicts. He never took the side of those who were supported by the authorities and who, in his opinion, did not act properly. But he never hesitated, putting his own life in danger, to support a cause which he considered valuable. As a volunteer he joined Pilsudski’s Legions in the World War I and took part in the Polish-Soviet war in 1929.

These features of character exerted undoubtedly a tremendous influence on the shape of Elzenberg’s philosophy, so much isolated against the background of Polish philosophy before and after the Second World War. What determines this isolated position? The simplest answer would be that it resulted from his different views and the different problems he dealt with. But such a statement would be too general and it would not explain anything. Therefore it is necessary to look at this problem in a more detailed way.

Elzenberg wanted to build a philosophical system in which the central place was to be occupied by the philosophy of value. It is true that many distinguished philosophers like Ingarden, Tatarkiewicz, Wallis, Czezowski, and S.I. Witkiewicz were concerned with the problems of value at that time. But none of them aimed at building a system of axiology grounded on perfect ethics. None of them restricted philosophy to general axiology, with formal axiology (the philosophy of value) and substantial axiology, aesthetics and ethics as its main domains. For Elzenberg, philosophy de facto started and finished with value. In order to define philosophy, approached in this way, he was probably the first to introduce the term ‘axiology’. The term ‘value’ was for Elzenberg a fundamental and primary concept, to the analysis of which he devoted most of his attention. It was characteristic for his attitude that he examined not the conditions but the very essence of the phenomenon of getting to know and realizing ‘Service in the world of values’, as the only acts worthy of man. The world in which no proper care is taken of values is a barbarian world. Therefore one should revolt against such a world, one should start ‘arranging the tables of value.’ This work should start from oneself, according to an instruction: "To care less for how we shall be and more for what we shall be".

Elzenberg’s attitude is distinguished by his extraordinary emotional engagement in his views and his belief in their rightness. This was to be proved by Elzenberg’s own original axiological system. In spite of the unquestionably distinctive character of this system, it is not difficult to notice certain similarities with the solutions offered by other philosophers at that time. This is particularly evident with respect to aesthetic values. Like Ingarden, Czezowski and Tatarkiewicz he was a supporter of axiological objectivism, initiated in Antiquity by the Pythagoreans and Plato, continued and developed by the stoics, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Albert, Hegel, Hartmann, and Scheler. As in the case of the dispute on the way in which values exist so in the second fundamental problem of value theory, namely in the dispute between absolutism and relativism, Elzenberg supports, as do Ingarden or Tatarkiewicz, the thesis that aesthetic and ethical values are independent of the individual predilections presented by individual people, as well as class or cultural predilections. Elzenberg does not accept the solution according to which the divergence of judegements concerning values can be accounted for by external circumstances. He maintains that in spite of these circumstances one can and has to reach these judgements.

One should not confine Elzenberg’s affiliations only to Polish philosophy of the interwar period. There are much more evident connections with the twentieth century Western European philosophy and also, to some extent, with Platonism, stoicism, Buddhism and Christianity. This does not mean that because of its references to other philosophical orientations his conception is less original or that it is eclectic. Elzenberg found particularly familiar the trend in philosophy which recognized the objective existence of values. It resulted in connections with the philosophy of Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann or even the British Analytical School (especially Moore and Russell). These connections were also a consequence of a similar approach to an issue of the recognition of values. Like Scheler and the British philosophers he believed that values were recognized directly and intuitively. The sense of incommensurability between an intellect, discursive thinking and reality is present in the philosophy of Bergson (Elzenberg listened to his lectures at the College de France). He shared with German phenomenologists the conception of value as an obligation of being (Seinsollen). This conception constituted one of the foundations of Elzenberg’s general theory of value, but at the same time it brought about his theoretical crisis in the forties.

What elements of Elzenberg’s theory of value constitute a positive contribution to the heritage of the philosophy of value, aesthetics, ethics and on the other hand, when does Elzenberg get caught by the difficulties he cannot really overcome? The answer to the second question should not be difficult, whereas the answer to the first cannot be fully univocal. I shall start with what in Elzenberg’s theory, in my opinion, was never finally settled. The most unclear and understated places can be found in formal axiology, that is in the part of Elzenberg’s system, which was to constitute the foundations of the general theory of value. What are the reasons for the lack of clarity? Probably the main reason consists in his problematic approach to perfect ethics connected with a concept of obligation. This connection brought about two theoretical crises, one in the early thirties and the other in the late forties. He was never fully decided as to whether value was to be explained by obligation or obligation by value. At that time he stopped within a step of solving the problem, that is withdrawing from defining value by obligation or obligation by value and recognizing their relationship as an axiom referring to these two primary notions at the same time. But he did not take this step.

The best evidence of the doubts that Elzenberg faced is the fact that he did not decide to publish all the materials dealing with a system of formal axiology, because he thought that there were too many gaps in his considerations. The situation looked much better in ethics and aesthetics where his propositions are mature and elaborated. Of course, one can discuss them, but on another plane. We should ask: does Elzenberg’s theory of ethics and aesthetics provide us with the possibilities, if we may say so, of ‘arranging’ and ‘describing’ the world of beauty and goodness? The answer to this question may seem obvious and its obviousness should have been proved by the analysis presented above.

When positivist philosophy dominated the scene, Elzenberg proposed the defence of absolute and objective values conceived in an almost Platonic manner. This modern supporter of Plato’s philosophy was a representative of radical, ontic, axiological objectivism in an idealistic form. In this respect he was an extraordinary, even unique, thinker, not only in the Polish twentieth century philosophy, but on the European scale. He was a supporter of the view that aesthetic value can be cognisable and that it takes place in the course of contemplative experience and by expression.

In the realm of ethics he was a supporter of perfectionism, originating from stoicism. He did not recognize setting partial aims and solutions, but was an ethical maximalist. "If you want people to follow you, make the greatest possible demand". These ‘greatest possible demands’ he made in relation to himself. One cannot leave the path of inner perfection, one cannot stop aspiring towards salvation, meaning ethical salvation. One has to try to be always and everywhere homo ethicus, aiming at the cognition and realization of values. Elzenberg was such an ‘ethical man’, while at the same time he estimated realistically that it is difficult to get rid of the undoubted inconsistency between the ideal he proposed and life. Therefore he wrote in 1942: "only aspiration towards value is ‘justified’ and objectively ‘right’ and in a way ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’. However, aspiration towards happiness is a fact and this aspiration is justified, there is no evil as such in it. It is difficult or hardly possible to demand from man the whole of behaviour which, in his view, would not be directed towards happiness; only happiness (for the whole of behaviour) has, as an aim, a satisfactory motivating power. To demand from person to act only an axiological motive, a desire of realization and nothing else (as in Kant’s ‘obligation’) is a utopia".41 

Elzenberg’s attitude is extraordinary due to one more reason. He was a rare example of combining two very fundamental elements. He attempted, very successfully, to realize his theoretical postulates in practice. In aesthetics his practice consisted mainly in essays and critical works on literature. In his essays and critical works he was able to realize his youthful dreams of becoming a writer. His essays, simple in form, were truly beautiful works, filled with delicate lyricism, bordering on philosophy, literature and literary criticism. Elzenberg tried to write poetry, which played an enormous role in his life. Unfortunately in this case the dreams and concrete attempts differ considerably. Whereas the standard of Elzenberg’s achievements in the area of philosophy is very high, his poetry proves that creative aspirations are not always realized in their most sublime forms.

translated by Malgorzata Sady

1. Elzenberg H., Podstawowe pojecia aksjologii–wyklady torunskie 1946/47, "Materialy Henryka Elzenberga", Archiwum Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Warszawie, III-181, file 77.

2. Elzenberg H., Autoreferat z odczytu Pojecie wartosci i powinnosci, in Ruch Filozoficzny, 1937, vol. XIII, p.147b.

3. Elzenberg H., Wartosc i powinnosc, Tekst Zemloslawski, MHE, file 16a, pp2-3

4. Ibid., p.3

5. Elzenberg H, "Do kwestii potrzeby i pozadania’," Etyka, 1988, N.24, p.260

6. Referring to Perry’s concept we can talk about interest. According to Perry a definition of a valuable thing should be: a thing–any thing is valuable in the original and generic sense when it is the object of an interest–any interest," R.B. Perry, Realms of Civilization. A Critique of Human Civilization, (Cambridge 1954), pp.2-3.

7. Elzenberg H., Wartosc i powinnosc, p.5.

8. Ibid., p.8.

9. Ibid., p.10.

10. Ibid., pp 17-18.

11. Ibid., p.19.

12. Ibid., p.12.

13. Ibid., p..22.

14. Elzenberg H., Konstrukcja pojecia wartosci, MHE, file 16, pp. 3-4.

15. Ibid., p.54.

16. Ibid., p.56.

17. Ibid., p.58.

18. Ibid., p.75.

19. Ibid., p.76.

20. Ibid., p.65.

21. Elzenberg H., Wyklady torunskie 1948/49, MHE, file 77.

22. Ibid..

23. Elzenberg H., Warosc i powinnosc, pp.34-40.

24. Elzenberg H., Ustalenie pojecia wartosci pochodnej, MHE, file 21, p.1.

25. Ibid., p.2.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. The basic types of derived value in Elzenberg’s approach are: "instrumental value", "value by reason or condition", "valuable part", "commemorative value" and "value of symbols".

29. Ibid., p.5

30. Elzenberg H., Wartosc i czlowiek, pp.12-13.

31. Czezowski T., Glowne zasady nauk filozoficznych, Wroclaw 1959, p.187.

32. Elzenberg H., Wartosc i powinnosc, pp.28-29.

33. Elzenberg H., Wartosc ostateczna i pochodna, in: Studia Filozoficzne, 1986, N.12, p.21.

34. Elzenberg H., O roznicy miedzy ‘pieknem’ a ‘dobrem’, in: Wartosc i czlowiek, Torun 1966, p.13.

35. Elzenberg H., Mozliwosc uzasadniania sadow o wartosci ostatecznej, MHE, file 48.

36. Elzenberg H., O pojeciu wartosci ostatecznej, MHE, file 21.

37. Elzenberg H., Personalia stoickie i "ascetyczno-moralizatorskie", MHE, file 46, part 13.

38. Elzenberg H., Pojecie wartosci, p.41.

39. Ibid., p.39.

40. Ibid., p.41.

41. Elzenberg H., Zbawienie i ideal w moim zyciu, MHE, file 46.