CHAPTER VII

^{^{CHAPTER VII}

ETHICS AND POLITICS IN PLATO,}

TOMÁ GARRIGUE MASARYK AND JAN

PATOKA AS A TOPICAL ISSUE

MILOSLAV BEDNÁ

^{Xenocrates' division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics was
not unfounded, but it reflected a problem which obscures the nature of
philosophy. Cosmos, logos and ethos are fundamental and integrally related
philosophical terms. The difference between cosmos and logos is that of the
order of being and its conceptual representation. Ethos is human behavior
and action as it differs from the strictly physical natural order; ethos is
subordinate to logic as order is to physics. It was in this basic context that
Plato developed his conception of the relationship between ethics and politics.}

^{In The Republic a model of an ideal community is constructed in response to the ethical question: How is justice in the soul possible? The
portrayal of an ideal community serves as a vivid example of the harmonization of spiritual forces: the community is the human soul writ large. The
central task of a just community is to provide for the philosophical education of its citizens. Thus, for Plato the meaning of politics is ethics: as the
intended goal of politics, ethics is a responsible life in terms of logos, that
is, based on philosophical understanding. The depiction in Plato's Republic
of the principles of a just polis is a consciously ideal model which is unrealizable due to human nature. Therefore, in the Laws Plato introduced a
second model for a polis in which a realistic fulfillment of ideal principles
is worked out and which includes democratic elements.}

^{In Christian interpretation, Plato's philosophical foundation and the
intertwining of ethics and politics became manifest in the decisive European
conception of the Holy Roman Empire, which represented a spiritually
anchored political rule. The meaning of Plato's philosophical aims in
politics was transformed into a realized conception of European unity. Thus,
Plato's thought became one of the most important spiritual elements of
Europe, a cornerstone and at the same time a stumbling block. The modern
response to the Greek legacy, in particular that of Plato and Aristotle,
constituted in spiritual terms the insurpassability of the moral individual as
a key element of European spiritual life up to our time.}

^{TOMÁ MASARYK}

^{Plato: Ethics, Politics and Religion}

^{A special case of the modern European interpretation of the Platonic
ethico-political standpoint is the Platonism of Thomá Garrigue Masaryk.
Masaryk's second and more comprehensive study bears the significant title
Plato jako vlastenec (Plato as Patriot).⁽¹⁴³⁾ This work argues against Niebuhr's
charge that Plato was an unworthy citizen of Athens. In Masaryk's interpretation, Plato's patriotism rests on his attempts to achieve a philosophically
based radical reform of the polis. Masaryk emphasized Plato's philosophical
point of reference, the individual, on which he wanted to transform all of
human society; he did not yet separate ethics from politics. As a result
several shortcomings necessarily arose in his State. We would not say,
however, that politics should ignore morality. On the contrary, we are convinced that without the science of morality there can be no sociology; only
in systematically carrying out the two sciences should they be treated separately.}

^{Masaryk saw a parallel between the close connection between
morality and politics and that between ethics and sociology. He understood
sociology, like Comte senso lato, as a philosophy of society and of history.
Sociology as "the science of the existence and life of nations, of humanity,"⁽¹⁴⁴⁾
was, however, still in its infancy, even though Plato had laid ground work
for it. Masaryk considered this view of sociology to be absolutely essential
for the true politician, just as Plato had thought philosophy to be, so that
"statesmen would no longer think in terms of expediency, for their every
step will be aimed at the good of the whole."⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ Because of this ethical-political interpretation, philosophy was anything but academic for Plato: "Theory
and practice would not be at variance with each other."⁽¹⁴⁶⁾}

^{From Masaryk's philosophical standpoint, with its emphasis on the
integral connection between ethics and politics, his assessment of the Laws
is worth examining. Masaryk lays particular stress on the fact that, in this
late work, Plato,}

^{does not expressly demand that rulers be philosophers, but
does want them to be moral and of sound judgment; in general, positive religion plays the role philosophy once did. . . .
Plato admitted that his philosophy was not accessible for the
general public, which Comte conceded as well; both, however,
adhered to religious principles, Plato to mythology and Comte
to Catholicism. We are currently seeing that statesmen and
philosophers have no idea of the true nature of religion and of
the relationship between it and the State; they thus could learn
a great deal from Plato and Comte.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾}

^{Masaryk explored this relationship between ethics and politics in his
short study, "Politika vdou a umním" (Politics as Science and Art), written in 1906.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ Here Masaryk proceeds from the principle that every political
aim is subject to an ethical judgment.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ He points to the difference between
political activity and morality, between justice and charity, which, however,
rests on the essential connection between the two: "But justice is nothing
but the mathematics of love, and any kind of political activity is based in the
end upon the principles of humanistic ethics. Humanitas is just the Latin
term for charity."⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Masaryk here takes issue with the views of politics which
see a contradiction between political activity and moral principles:}

^{These extremist views are known as Machiavellianism or
political Jesuitism, which judge every political measure according to whether it advances the aim of the politician. One
can only reply that above all else the goal itself must be ethically founded, and further, that only those means are permissible which are also themselves based on ethics.⁽¹⁵¹⁾}

^{For Masaryk political values are derived from ethical ones; in this he
has taken over Plato's basic philosophical argument. The primacy of such an
ethics over politics is evident also in Masaryk's attitude towards the political
institutions of democracy aimed at creating the exterior framework for
positing democracy as a world view. In Masaryk's interpretation, Plato's
ethical political foundation is updated into a philosophical-religious view of
democracy as a goal of political action. From a phenomenological standpoint, Masaryk's basic concept of religious democracy can be understood as
intersubjectivity, resulting from the plurality of "worlds of life" aimed at the
meaning of their existence sub speciae aeternitatis.}

^{In light of his view that religion sanctions ethics, for Masaryk
religion is the guiding element of political action. Ethics is based on religion, which is embodied in Jesus Christ: ". . . theoretically theology and
ethics--in practice, ritual and morality--religion is in its dictates above all
moral behavior, . . . a combination and unity of religion and humanity."
Masaryk's ethical conception of religion as the real foundation of politics is
anchored in the philosophy of history and is closely linked to what he
understands to be the task of modern times. This perception of religion and
religious democracy represents his vigorous search for a post metaphysical
cultural approach with a legitimate European spiritual foundation. At the
same time he sought to surmount positively modern relativistic and
subjectivistic skepticism, as well as a widespread halfheartedness. "The
halfheartedness of our times is evident in that we are allegedly becoming
tolerant and liberal, but in reality we are indifferent. That is the real unbelief."⁽¹⁵²⁾}

^{A specific characteristic of Masaryk's thought and activity lies in his
radical Christian transformation of the Platonic ethico-political legacy into
the practical ideal of religious democracy. Masaryk is, therefore, bound up
with the tradition of Czech philosophy. Behind his ethico-political conception is a philosophy of history which plays a special role in his philosophy
of European and world history. The fundamental intention of world history
is a nonlinear, but nevertheless identifiable, orientation toward unsupportable individuality and inequality, on the basis of which organic link a
nonconformist, but all the more promising, worldwide democratic unity is
established. A major milestone on this historical path is the Reformation in
which the Hussites in Bohemia played a formative role with their insistence
on the authority of religious conscience over the institutionalized authority
of the Church.}

^{Comenius and Palacký}

^{The dominant figure of the Reformation in Bohemia is Jan Amos
Comenius (Komenský in Czech), whose goal of "emending human affairs"
constituted a democratic Christian reworking of Plato's ethico-political
philosophical project: "To enlighten all men through true wisdom, to bring
them back into order by means of a just State order (Vera politica), to unite
them with God through true religion so that no one can fail to realize the
meaning of his purpose in the world."⁽¹⁵³⁾}

^{With the Christian Platonism of Comenius begins the line of philosophical enlightenment that leads to Leibniz and Herder, a trend of thought
rooted in spiritually grounded ethics and placing clear emphasis on the
insupportability of the individual sub specie aeternitatis. Herder's philosophy of history had a formative influence on the Czech national revival.
Masaryk speaks of an historical reimbursement, which still infuriates positivist historians. Herder's philosophy of history was expanded upon by
Frantiek Palacký in advancing his ethico-political view of the laws of
global centralization and polarities. The trend towards global centralization
is based on the nature of modern means of communication which, to an
extent previously unimaginable, brings together all peoples and states,
including the best minds of the entire educated world, and thus facilitates
their feeling of community.}

^{According to Frantiek Palacký, another law of the spirit of world
history is that of polarity. This has the task of maintaining the equilibrium
of the world so that a unilateral shift does not throw off the course of world
events:}

^{The more all similar things come together, the more dissimilar
things move apart; the more people come together, the more
they see, feel, and recognize their differences; and the more
the uniting power works, the more stubborn the resistance to
it. One can safely claim that a uniform universe has never
been a divine law and never will be. Therefore, the national
principle has its role in the economics of the world and will
keep it for all time, and all the zeal expended and every battle
waged against this principle will always be so much tilting at
windmills."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾}

^{Masaryk fully accepts Palacký's philosophy of history, including the
importance the latter attaches to the earthshaking spiritual significance of
the Hussite movement. Masaryk is particularly interested in the fact that, in
contrast to contemporary German liberals, Palacký and his disciple Karel
Havliek criticizing the continental liberalism of 19th century did not see
the State as the primary instrument of social organization. Both Palacký and
Havlíek acknowledged the necessity of the State, including the physical
side of its power. However, they justified state power in terms of nationality, religion, and, its ethical and idealistic aims. What primarily divided
Palacký and Havlíek from the liberals of French style were their views on
the origin of the State in connection with its moral mission. In this respect
the two founders of modern Czech political thought are considerably closer
to conservative political science, which holds that only at a later stage of its
development does a State move away from its original order based on
ethics. When Masaryk consciously allies himself with the ethics-based conception of politics of Palacký and Havlíek he then is forced to challenge
the continental liberalism as ethically problematic and spiritually
superficial.}

^{Critique of Liberalism}

^{Indispensable for an understanding of Masaryk's philosophy of politics based on ethics is his definition of continental liberalism:}

^{Liberalism is in its essence a philosophical rationalism which
repeatedly and in a biased manner questions the religious and
ethical meaning of life and culture; in social terms it is a philosophy of aristocrats and plutocrats. Liberalism arose in the
eighteenth century, primarily in France, and led to the
outbreak of revolutions, in particular in 1789 and 1848. The
forces of reaction were not able to defeat it each time; at core
they were liberal themselves and aimed at a return to the
preexisting political order purely for reasons of outward
advantage. Thus they actually strengthened liberalism. . . . As
far as possible liberalism wants to keep society on the
crumbling foundations of the revolution, here and there
touching up the structure, perhaps at times laying a hand on a
foundation pillar--but just to touch it; no real revision or
reform--that is the motto of liberalism in any form.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾}

^{Masaryk's ethics-based approach challenges no less than the "current
philosophy of our century." The ethical-philosophical radicalism of Masaryk's standpoint, and his bold rejection of the old familiar paths of intellectual half measures, constitute a modern analogue to Plato's fight over principles against the claims of sophistry and rhetoric to be the basic pillars of the
Athenian polis. Masaryk holds up the significance of the authentic Czech
ethical tradition against the beaten track of political philosophy:}

^{This liberalism is by virtue of its origin irreconcilable with the
fundamental idea of our liberal renewal, namely, with the humanitarian idea, insofar as this arose from our Fraternity (i.e.
the Post-Hussite Czech Church of the Brethren). Our
Fraternity was something quite different from the "Fraternity"
of the French Revolution. Our fraternity was based on
religious feeling. . . . I value the good things liberalism has
done for mankind and for our nation, but I do not wholeheartedly embrace it, and especially not in the form in which it
appeared after 1848. . . . The humanitarian Czech ideal
historically and factually is rooted in our Reformation and not
in the French Revolution; liberal humanism is not the same
thing as the humanity of our Revolution. . . . The inability of
cosmopolitan liberalism to acknowledge the religious nature
of our Reformation is quite remarkable.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾}

^{Masaryk is clearly among those European thinkers with strong reservations about the nature of Europe's spiritual crisis in the transitional period
following the French Revolution. He says that the dominant element of the
period is its halfheartedness regarding the spiritual basis of the life of the
individual, of society and of political life. In Czech history Masaryk sees a
major portent of the later decline in Europe as a whole, but at the same time
an indication of a solution: "Our decline was first and foremost a moral
decline, we must above all renew ourselves morally--liberalism is unsuited
to this task."⁽¹⁵⁷⁾}

^{The Platonic inseparability of the spiritually based ethico-political
theory from its practice was characteristic for Masaryk. Until the First
World War he consistently strove for a just, democratic reform of Hapsburg
domestic and foreign policy, despite the increasingly dim chances of success. Because Masaryk viewed ethics as an indispensable basis for a
successful and forward-looking political life, he could not abandon the
existing legal framework. It was only after Austria-Hungary went to war
and mutinous Czech troops and civilians were brutally treated that Masaryk
became convinced that the Monarchy had to be challenged with force and
revolutionary means in defense of the ethical and political democratic
principles on which European civilization was based. Thus it came about
that Masaryk was the first philosopher in European history to found a State.}

^{In the closing part of the manifesto of Czech and Slovak independence, which he wrote and published in Washington on November 18, 1918,
Masaryk explicitly articulated his combination of ethics and politics through
the concept of religious democracy as an expression of the philosophy of
history: "mankind should be reorganized on the basis of democratic principles. The powers of darkness served the victory of the light--the longed-for
age of humaneness is dawning. We believe in democracy, in ever growing
freedom."⁽¹⁵⁸⁾}

^{JAN PATOKA}

^{Philosophically basing politics on the nonpolitical, Masaryk expanded Czech political thought. Its next towering exponent would be Jan
Patoka. Although he was critical of some of Masaryk's philosophical
views, Patoka regarded his predecessor's ethical-existential foundation and
the resulting political activity as a radical philosophical achievement, and as
a challenge with great significance for Patoka's own time.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾}

^{The Political Legacy of Platonism}

^{The admiration Patoka held for the philosophical-political aims of
Masaryk and his political accomplishment is connected with Patoka's
views of the political legacy of Plato. In his remarkable study "Negative
Platonism," Patoka offers an original interpretation of the Platonic idea as
a fact and experience of freedom: The idea is the true super-objectivity, a
pure call of transcendence; the Idea is imperative for an understanding of
human life, its experience of freedom, its inner historicity; it is and remains
a constant appeal to transcend objectivity.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ Patoka thus rejects through his
radicalization of the Platonic motif of the idea--in line with Heidegger's
phenomenological critique--the concept of the Idea as power. The germ of
this concept of the idea was already present in Plato.}

Patoka's negative Platonism is an analogue of Masaryk's philosophy-base ethical synergism: "The Platonism that is expounded here [shows] not only the dignity of man, but also its final limit; it sanctions the power which man has over objective Seiende, but shows that its use is not ruling, but rather serving." Patoka thus reveals the foundation of his philosophy of history: it is the philosophical pendant and extension of Masaryk's religious-ethical concept of politics. At the same time, it is a precondition for the author's subsequent engagement in political activity as the prime theoretician of the Charter 77 human rights movement in Czechoslovakia and its leading spokesman at its founding: ^{Patoka's negative Platonism is an analogue of Masaryk's philosophy-base ethical synergism: "The Platonism that is expounded here [shows]
not only the dignity of man, but also its final limit; it sanctions the power
which man has over objective Seiende, but shows that its use is not ruling,
but rather serving." Patoka thus reveals the foundation of his philosophy of
history: it is the philosophical pendant and extension of Masaryk's religious-ethical concept of politics. At the same time, it is a precondition for the
author's subsequent engagement in political activity as the prime
theoretician of the Charter 77 human rights movement in Czechoslovakia
and its leading spokesman at its founding:}

^{It [negative Platonism] shows how much truth there is in the
constantly renewed battle . . . against the relativism of values
and norms, and this in the simultaneous affirmation of the idea
of the fundamental historicity of man and the relativity of his
orientation in his environment, of his knowledge and practice,
of the impressions of life and the world.⁽¹⁶¹⁾}

^{Patoka discusses Plato's philosophy as the determining core of European history, as the explanatory principle of its development and its various
manifestations. Later he came to the realization that Plato's motif of "care of
one's soul" healing is the authentic Idea for the rise of Europe. Patoka
particularly emphasizes the ethical element in Plato's psychology:}

^{Plato proceeds from human existence in its fundamental crisis
and uncertainty, which is essentially moralistic, i.e., it is about
our own existence and nonexistence in partial dependance on
us, on our decision, on our heauto-kinesis. Plato's point of
departure is not cogito ergo sum, not a certainty, but rather the
primary confusion and uncertainty of existence and its movement. Because its meaning lies in its realization and comes
from itself, it will never become independent and definitively
clear.⁽¹⁶²⁾}

^{This spiritual-moral conviction, which is conscious of its uncertainty,
forms the major philosophical element in the later phase of the repeated
waves of opposition to the totalitarian system which prevailed in Czechoslovakia, almost without interruption, from 1948 to 1989. Patoka's Platonism
and later his existential Neosocratism had a lasting influence on the opposition movement after the founding of Charter 77. It also intensified a renaissance of the Czech and Czechoslovak tradition of the spiritual basis of
politics. It is indicative of Patoka, as of Comenius and Masaryk, that the
spiritual pedant with whom he constantly grappled was Plato. At the end of
his life Patoka concentrated on the connection between Plato's ontology,
his concept of care of one's soul, and his idea of the just polis. By clarifying
the structure and context of Platonism, Patoka gained a clear vision of the
prime meaning and tradition of European politics and its connection to
philosophy: "It remains Plato's achievement that . . . the State is still something separated from the rest of the world by a sharp dividing line, for the
State should belong in the context of the `true' world and from this create
the justification for its institutions and deeds."⁽¹⁶³⁾}

^{In his meditations on the philosophy of history Patoka comes to the
conclusion that divine transcendence in Christianity does not originate in
Judaism, but is instead "the legacy of the `true world' once beheld by Plato
and theologically transformed by Aristotle."⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ On the basis laid by Plato "a
new community . . . grows up . . . a community in which all members of the
human hierarchy are equal before the last, `true' reality, and thereby are real
participants in the meaning which they have not created, but which they
must help to put into effect".⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ Thus Platonism, according to a modified
Christian interpretation, is the defining feature and character of European
political history.}

^{In Patoka's view, the actual principle of modern technological civilization is explained by the fact that with time the Christian elements derived
from Plato "have given rise to a nonspiritual, fully `practical,' worldly and
materialistic understanding of reality as an object of guidance by our
thought and our hands." Man flatters himself that he "has taken his life into
his own hands and, thanks to the discovery of causes, he does in fact have
the means to achieve relief and the outward augmentation of life and its
material goods."⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ Patoka interprets this in principle as an ethical problem
of the individual regarding the spiritual foundation of European civilization,
the outcome of which in the form of technology and modern individualism
leads to a fateful tension with its roots:}

^{Man no longer is a relation to existence, but instead a force, a
powerful force, one of the most powerful of all. . . . The view
of the world as force makes the bare forces more than simply
a correlate of human manipulation. In force is hidden existence, which has not stopped being the light that illumines the
world, even if it is now an unholy light.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾}

^{Modern Technological Civilization}

^{Patoka's radical meditations on the nature of modern technological
civilization show the influence of Heidegger. However, unlike Heidegger,
Patoka sees the concrete and authentic possibilities contained in the technologically organized outcome of European metaphysics. These possibilities in principle point to the ethico-political alternative posited by Plato, the
modification of which presents itself as a consequence of the ontological
realization of the principle of force in everyday life. The possibility of understanding this now universally determining historical principle proves at
the same time to be a possible solution or way out:}

^{This civilization makes possible something which no earlier
human circumstances were able to do: a life without violence
and with wide ranging equality of opportunity. . . . But the
most important possibility which appears in the context of our
civilization is, for the first time in history, the chance of
switching from a rather arbitrary rule to the rule by those who
know what history is about.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾}

^{Patoka provides a purely existential basis for his conception of the
ethico-political Neoplatonic way out of the contemporary era. He puts forward the idea of "experience of the front". The opposite is daily life, "in
which war . . . unavoidably recaptures the individual."⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ This situation could
be overcome through solidarity on the part of the shaken:}

^{The solidarity of those who are shaken in their faith in the
day--in `life,' and in `peace,'--is especially significant precisely in the time of the release of force. Without the released
force the `day' and `peace' and that human life which is
produced in the world of an exponential rate could not exist.
The solidarity between the shaken is a solidarity between
those who understand. Understanding . . . must also imply the
understanding of the significance of science and technology,
i.e., that force we are setting free. . . . The solidarity between
the shaken has the ability to say `no' to all mobilization
measures that perpetuate the state of war. Rather than
presenting positive programs, it expresses itself, like Socrates'
daimonion, in warnings and prohibitions."⁽¹⁷⁰⁾}

^{Patoka's Platonism in this reflection on modern history refers to its
starting point with Socrates. Existential Neo-platonism is in fact an existential
Neo-Socratism. Patoka explicitly treats the phenomenon of the victim.
His seminars on the problem of Europe took Andrei Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn as examples. Regarding the former, Patoka explained that "here
something gains the upper hand over that which is viewed as force, power,
etc. And what is it that gains the upper hand? Not a thing!"⁽¹⁷¹⁾}

^{Patoka's late meditations strongly indicate that a totalitarian regime
is the explicit, programmatic manifestation of the nature of technology. The
victim and the solidarity of the shaken reveal its nature, and thereby point to
the possibility of a responsible solution.}

^{Owing to his radical philosophical insight into the true nature of our
time and of the specific period in which he found himself, Patoka was
extremely well qualified to lay the spiritual foundations for political action.
This exceeds the framework of totalitarianism and enables a philosophically
based democratic alternative solution which at the same time addresses the
democratic systems of the West. This spiritual-political action was the
philosophical and moral basis and definition which Patoka gave to Charter
77, and his own personal sacrifice.}

^{Charter 77}

^{As Charter 77 spokesman, Patoka thoroughly analyzed the relationship between morality and politics. His starting point was the non-technological nature of morality: "no one is capable of putting any kind of
morality into effect through technology."⁽¹⁷²⁾ Patoka conceives of morality as
an inner conviction:}

^{To develop smoothly the possibilities of instrumental intellect,
to enable progress in knowledge and skill, mankind must be
convinced of the imperative necessity of the unconditionally
binding, and in this sense `hallowed', principles. In other
words, to a certain extent something absolutely non-technological is . . . demanded; . . . salvation cannot be expected to
come from the State, from power and force, either exclusively
or primarily.⁽¹⁷³⁾}

^{Patoka is clearly aligning himself with the Czechoslovak tradition of
political philosophy which bases politics seemingly unpolitically on a
spiritually based morality, and thereby defines it. Like Masaryk, Patoka
wants the actual foundation and goal of political activity to be a life world
of inner ethical conviction. The currently ascendant technological world of
power and force could not bring about such a conviction. But the moral
basis of inner conviction is a precondition for the functioning of any
society, even one that is technically well-equipped.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ On the other hand, the
functioning of society is not the aim of morality. Its real purpose lies in
defining and representing the humanity of man: "It is not man who,
according to his own needs, wishes, and tendencies, arbitrarily defines what
morality is, but morality itself defines man."⁽¹⁷⁵⁾}

^{Ontologically, inner moral conviction is thus ethically based. Patoka then puts the concept of human rights on this philosophical level: this
means}

^{that States and social entities as a whole subordinate themselves to the sovereignty of ethical feeling, so that they acknowledge something unconditional above them that is binding, inviolable, and unassailable. This conviction lives in the
individual as the basis for the fulfillment of duties in private
life, at work, and in the public sphere. Only in accordance
with it is there a true guarantee that people will act not only to
secure certain advantages or out of fear, but rather freely,
spontaneously, and responsibly."⁽¹⁷⁶⁾}

^{In this Kantian phenomenological interpretation, Patoka defines the
community of Charter 77 signers, who}

^{are acting not on the basis of private interest, but simply because of a duty, a necessity which is higher than political
commitments and political rights; this is their true, sole, and
only dependable foundation. . . . They do not wish to be a
moral authority, the `conscience of society'; they do not place
themselves above anyone and also judge no one. Their efforts
are directed only at keeping alive and pure knowledge that a
higher authority exists and that individuals have obligations
towards it by dint of their consciences; that States are
obligated by dint of having signed important international
agreements-- obligated not simply out of opportunism, but
because their signatures on these agreements mean that politics is subordinate to the law and not the law to politics."⁽¹⁷⁷⁾}

^{Patoka defines the meaning of the work of Charter 77 as the establishment of a solidarity between the shaken: "The goal of Charter 77 is the
spontaneous solidarity, released from all outward commitments, between all
people who have understood the importance of ethical thought for society at
large and for its ability to function normally."⁽¹⁷⁸⁾}

^{Patoka sees the activity of Charter members as pedagogical in the
original sense of the Platonic paideia as education for the essential task of
the spiritual determination of politics: "Education means to understand that
there is more to life than fear and personal advantage, and that, where the
maxim `the end justifies the means' actually says 'an arbitrary end justifies
arbitrary means', there a yawning chasm opens up."⁽¹⁷⁹⁾}

^{This examination of the relationship between ethics and politics
according to Plato, Masaryk, and Patoka has shown how the two towering
figures of modern Czech philosophy are spiritual heirs to a tradition stemming from the interrelationship between philosophically based ethics and
politics put forward by Plato. They represent a continuation and extension
of the long tradition of Czech political thought, which has offered the world
a possible response to universal questions concerning the meaning of
democracy, of humanity and of history.}

^{Although the historically proven Czech tradition of political philosophy does not seem to be the explicit tenor of Czech political life some years
after the Velvet Revolution, with the important exception of Vaclav Havel
and the key law on the communist era, it could contribute to and influence
the contemporary Western debate on the legitimacy of democracy. The
present air of political dissatisfaction in Western Europe and North America
is explained sometimes as a result of a normal aging process^{.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ In this context, we should note Masaryk's observation that modern democracy is
young in comparison with authoritarian regimes which have a history of
development of thousands of years. Perhaps the correct interpretation of
contemporary Western democracy is that it is still immature, rather than
being in a state of decay.⁽¹⁸¹⁾}}

^{The weakening at present of faith in democracy readily suggests a
seemingly realistic and mature limiting of democracy to an adaptation of
democratic political mechanisms such that they be compatible with the
political virtues of the civic maturity of the governed. This defines democracy as a capacity for "maintaining a system of government for the relative
advantages it confers, rather than for the metaphysical and magical formula
its leaders dish out to prove its legitimacy." This, it is proposed, would
"make the democratic and the political more genuine as they should no
longer be mistaken for a secular religion". However, in reality, this would
seem to be a sophistic final solution to the "enigma of history", for the
spiritual and moral roots of democracy can hardly be refuted by the verbal
abuse of demagogues.}

^{Moreover, the complex definition of democracy as "the free choice of
a government which represents the interests of the majority and respects the
fundamental right of all human beings to live according to their beliefs and
basic interests"^{⁽¹⁸²⁾ can be taken in a positive way. It can be an "ideal model"
for defining an institutional environment which supports the uniqueness of
morally anchored souls and deeds. Such an approach to democracy could
overcome effectively contemporary inclinations to restrict the concept of
democracy to the research spheres of sociology and political science. In
reviewing critically the world of traditional democratic mechanisms in respect to its constitutive elements, because of difficult relations with the
"cult of objectivity and the statistical average . . . (these) can annul human
uniqueness".^{⁽¹⁸³⁾}}}

^{At this point when the world is trying to calm and settle itself as it
faces the proximate threat of its own doom, the time seems ripe for a radical
reversal of habitual political behavior of relying upon allegedly new and
better modes of social, economic, and world management. In contrast, the
condition for a genuine and hopeful political renewal is a radical change of
the foundation of political attitudes to a metaphysics of the individual soul
and the world, despite the fact that it has been so commonly denigrated, precisely because it is so disturbing. In other words, it is still possible to turn to
the deepest, non-arbitrary foundation of human life itself, that is, to the
nature of life in its very questionableness. This is the precondition, its
reality and any of its modes. Spiritual life, as the genuine ground of humanity appears to provide a basic level of concord in disagreement or, as Jan
Patoka put it, of unity without any firm soil.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾}

^{Such philosophical legitimacy for democracy may make it possible to
find hopeful bearings in the world after the Cold War. It was not accidentally that this philosophy of politics emerged in that part of Europe which is
the quintessence of pluralism, that is, in the region between Germany and
Russia where, for centuries, a number of small nations have tried to establish their lives in freedom. The organic unity of these individual diverse
nations is not only the precondition for a lasting unity of Europe, but also
the crucial prerequisite for solving the Eastern question--which implies
historically the problem of the unity of Europe, Asia and Africa. This fundamental challenge for Europe and all democracies cannot be solved without
appropriate spiritual and moral grounds. In terms of political philosophy,
this indicates the need for a profound and cogent legitimization of politics,
whose proper core is democracy, even though modern democracy has not
yet achieved its full and proper form. In this timely task, a and important
contribution should be made by the Czech and Czechoslovak traditions of
political philosophy, which gave birth to Czechoslovakia, the first European
federal unity,⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ and regenerated its democracy in 1989.}

^{Institute of Philosophy}

^{Czech Academy of Sciences}

^{Prague, Czech Republic}