In this brief work I should like to ask whether the main traits of the present situation are due to the Czech national character and whether our further development is bound up with its traditional traits. For in seeking the optimum direction for further Czech development the question of the factors which influence jointly its development becomes central, and among these factors its so-called national character usually is included.
NATIONAL CHARACTER
Shortly after the political changes in November 1989, the pages of the press, especially in the West, were full of conjectures on the comparative advantages of Czechoslovakia which could enable a rapid and painless transition from socialist totalitarianism to representative democracy and a market economy. The basis for these conjectures was in particular the profound impression made by the speed with which the political changes took place and also, of course, by their peaceful nature. Repeated often was the more witty than exact bon mot ascribed to Timothy Garton Ash, that what took the Poles ten years the Czech managed in ten days.
The priority most emphasized was the balanced nature, peacefulness and non-violence of the political changes in Czechoslovakia, which contrasted so strongly with the bloody events in Romania and certain parts of the Soviet Union. This equanimity was identified with a rational approach to politics and a general political culture.
A second key to Czechoslovakia's rapid and successful transition to democracy was identified as the experience of the practical functioning of a democratic state, the democratic tradition. In Czechoslovakia it was sufficient to renew what other states, especially Russia or the Balkan states, must laboriously construct.
These optimistic estimates, mainly by foreign observers, were willingly accepted at home. On the one hand, they became cheap arguments to convince wavering citizens. On the other hand, and in particular, they corresponded to the traditional Czech idea of their own exclusivity which had been prevented from realization only by external unfavorable influences.
Political and economic developments in Czechoslovakia did, of course, throw considerable doubt on these optimistic forecasts, for in spite of the clear and undoubted results and successes on the path to democracy, there were also inexplicable complications, difficulties and slow downs in development. The basic forms of democratic life were established: the first free elections took place very successfully and in a very orderly fashion after more than fifty years; the basic civic and political freedoms are guaranteed; a pluralist society has been formed. On the other hand, however, we come up against what are at first glance inexplicable national conflicts about competence, mutual intolerance of parties, minority parties and their representatives, and especially political irrationality and the inability to settle political problems effectively. Upon evaluation of our development, optimism is replaced by disappointment, surprise and amazement at why, due to their irrationality, Czechs are unable to utilize their gifts.
The newspaper commentaries already mentioned stress two analyses of this difficult and long-term concrete task: one, it is possible to achieve a certain overall view by the study of cultural and artistic works, especially literature, drama and films; two, it is possible to carry out a comparison of the reactions of society in similar historical moments. The first method is necessary in stable times; but in times of upheaval and change, such as the present in Central Europe, the second method can be used, for reaction to basic social changes renders the national character more transparent.
Therefore, I have elected the second method. This is rendered easier by the fact that Czechoslovakia has experienced in the 20th century alone a series of similar decisive social changes: the establishment of the independent Republic in 1918, the occupation by Nazi Germany in 1938, the communist coup in 1948, the Soviet occupation in 1968, and finally the "revolution" in 1989. I shall concentrate in particular on the comparison of the present situation, as I see it today, with the situation in 1918 as captured by the philosopher journalist Ferdinand Peroutka in his monumental work The Building of the State.
His work is not strictly historical in nature, like a chronological catalogue of events. It is at once a description and a commentary; it does not succumb so much to frequent idealization, but maintains a sympathetic but critical distance. In Peroutka's work we therefore find a number of very valuable observations which concern the national character.
However highly hypothetical may be the conjectures on the national character, their importance for the analysis of the political reality is significant. They indicate possible structures and formulae essential for understanding apparently contradictory events and point out wider interconnections of facts.
First, they point to the widespread belief that Czech behaviour in a "revolutionary situation", differs considerably from that of other nations in similar situations, that this is an expression of a more general approach by the Czech nation to political events, and that there exist nationwide behavior determinants which continue to influence the political situation.
Second, they point to the problem that either the above attitudes and traits of the national character were mistakenly captured and described, or else that these traits cannot serve in an explanatory and prognostic role for political development. I wish also to contribute to the solution of this problem with my considerations.
I take it to be a fact that there exist certain typical attitudes, stereotypes of behavior, expectations and evaluation in certain situations. For the sake of simplicity we can describe this mutually interconnected complex as the national character. By this concept I do now wish to introduce some metaphysical entity. The national character seems to be a useful concept for the description of attitudes and stereotypes of behavior which have been formed historically during the clashing of national interests and efforts with external conditions. Historically conditioned or even enforced solutions to situations, whether advantageous or the only one possible, become traditional or stable in time. A solution which has arisen in this may be implemented even when it is neither the most advantageous nor the only one possible. The national character, though historically formed, can be influenced by the temperament of the nation or ethnicity.(186)
To submit the national character to a rigorous scientific analysis can also signal the dangers which may threaten rational social development in the future. This brings us to the basic questions: What national character is indicated by a comparison of the present situation with similar situations in Czechoslovak history in the 20th century? Does this character correspond to the above-mentioned conjectures by journalists regarding Czech priorities on the road to democracy? And finally, does a thus-defined national character enable a sensible explanation of the present situation, and particularly a prognosis of future development?
NON-VIOLENCE AND RATIONALITY
Let us look at the first mentioned priority of the Czech national character as it appeared to Western correspondents after the revolution of 1989, namely, equanimity, peacefulness, non-violence, and perhaps also reasonableness in behavior. The proof was the absolute peacefulness and calm of the demonstrations, the marked self-discipline on the critical days when situations were dealt with calmly and dispassionately.
There is, of course, another explanation for the same behavior. What appears to be political maturity, equanimity and reasonableness can quite easily be extreme caution, perhaps even fear. It can be a matter of weighing things or hesitation leading to entering the political struggle only once everything actually has been decided.
What was the situation like at the moment of the disintegration of Austro-Hungarian empire? Was the "coup" the result of uncompromising political struggle and pressure, or was there rather the above-mentioned caution? Ferdinand Peroutka points to the profound difference between the pro-Austrian opportunism of part of the Czech politicians in 1917 and the strong anti-Austrian opportunism of the same politicians in 1918. As an example, he mentions the Deputies Stank and Tusar:
Both those Deputies were just as convinced opportunists in 1917 as they are now (1918) convinced radicals. Is it possible that the change in them took place only through events inside themselves? . . . This is somewhat unlikely. The change in the speakers corresponds completely to the change in the situation.(187)
In 1989 it was not the leaders of the opposition who acted in a peaceful way, but the broad masses. The demonstrations against communist totalitarianism on October 28, 1989, a mere three weeks before the start of the November events, disappointed everyone by their weakness. Even the famous demonstration on November 17 was officially permitted. The mass demonstrations expanded later when the police no longer took any action and those in power showed increasing signs of weakness. Did the people change, did their patience run out, or did the situation change? I feel it was the situation which changed.
To speak of caution is, however, somewhat vague. Caution can be coolly calculating, emotionally terrified or indecisive. It does not seem that any of this is characteristic of the Czech nature. When a suitable time comes, when a suitable situation develops, caution vanishes and is replaced by flaunted enthusiasm, gestures and the already mentioned radicalism. After caution there appears euphoria based on a romantic sense which often passes into sentimental emotionalism. Considered political action is replaced by celebration of the idea that historical justice has once again been victorious.
Anyone who saw pictures of the Prague demonstrations in November, 1989 and the days and weeks following and compares them with similar actions elsewhere in the world will know what I am talking about. In the hands of the Prague demonstrators stones are replaced by candles, angry slogans are replaced in their mouths by the National Anthem, and clenched fists are replaced by fingers raised in the V for victory sign. The Prague demonstrations were not a sign of decision to take political action, but a celebration acclaiming a great idea. They are enthusiastic and spontaneous acts of a special type, but they are decidedly not a sign of cool calculation.
Czech caution is unquestionable. One can agree in full with Josef Kroutvor that, "In Bohemia there can never be caution enough; caution is the mother of Czech wisdom".(188) It is, however, a special kind of caution. It is not cool calculation of profits, nor indecision signalling uncertainty of arms. Under an external caution is hidden clear political conviction, historically formed, that it is not worth starting anything which one cannot win in any case. The political act does not take place until the situation is favorable.
We have here caution and also ceremonial sentimental enthusiasm; these two properties or traits of the national character are contradictory and paradoxically complementary at one and the same time. What is important is the relation of these traits to social and political development. To be able to consider the influence of the national character we must relate both mentioned traits to an historical act aimed at the realization of desirable social changes. We are interested, then, in the standing of a political act in the intellectual and practical life of society.
The political act as an expression of basic intellectual value and political orientation has a long tradition in Bohemia. In Czech history there appear as feature examples: Jan Hus, Han Amos Comenius (Komenský), Karel Havlíek Borovský, and, in the 20th century, T.G. Masaryk and V. Havel. Acclaiming the heritage of T.G. Masaryk used to be, and again is, part of the basic political stance of the majority of political parties and of political manifestations of the population. Masaryk was an exceptional case where practical-political and philosophical opinions influenced each other, integrated by a moral attitude.(189) The German writer, Qil Ludwig, described this moral and practical integrity of Masaryk in The Spirit and the Act.(190) Acclaiming Masaryk as a civic and political ideal is, of course, far from practically continuing his heritage. In contrast to Masaryk, political action in the Czech nation rarely represents the realization of a social or political idea.
This splitting of the ideal vision of a just and optimally arranged society from the practical political struggle for its realization lies, in my opinion, behind the already mentioned contradictory nature of the Czech national character. The strong proposal of the idea of a just society, whether from a national, social or political point of view, is not backed up by action aimed at its realization. The political act is replaced by faith in the just course of history and in historical necessity.
Romanistic patriotic emotion, full of strong gestures and poses, is then a mere placebo for decisive political action. The more radical it is, the less it is capable of drawing satisfaction and self-confidence from the successful act. The Czech national character thus floats between egoistic caution, arising from the belief that a just historical necessity will come to the fore even without our help, and brazen radicalism which comes late on the scene, usually in the place of creative work for the state.
We have already said that the realization of great values, aims and ideals in the Czech lands is traditionally not seen as a long-term and difficult struggle, but as the realization of historical necessity. The struggle is understood rather in the spirit of Kafka. Peroutka, when he makes little of the armed preparations for the struggle for independence, writes: "faith in the progress of history was greater."(191) And Josef Kroutvor describes it even better: "Truth will conquer. What else is there for a small nation to rely on?"(192) In the course of the "velvet revolution" no barricades were built, the party secretariats were not occupied, nor was there a disorderly and mass deposition of compromised figures. Instead of this, resolutions were written and individuals or collectives put their names to one or another of them. Historical action was replaced by ceremoniously sentimental and proud emotion of participation in an important step in history. Instead of the ability to fight for this "step in history", there is the ability to register that the long-desired, but not much fought-for, idea has attained its realization.
The Czech nation approached important historical moments in the past too in a similar manner. These historical moments were not the expression of the historical will of the nation to achieve something, nor the expression of the patience and self-sacrifice of the nation, but rather the acceptance and confirmation of the order of history. The first Czechoslovak republic was constituted on the basis of historical rights. Similarly, 1948 was often understood as a necessary development leading to supplementing political democracy with a social element, and 1968 as the result of an historically necessary attempt to humanize and democratize socialism. None of these events represented the result of a long struggle and repeated defeats.
The practical political act is replaced by faith that the desirable state will be realized by historical necessity without any great personal contribution. The smaller the determination to act, the greater and stronger the experience of the idea. Faith in historical necessity is linked with faith in general humanist values.
In 1918 it was the idea of the national state and liberation from the economic and political dominance of another state. After the second World War there was the broadly-conceived faith in human progress, understood not only in the communist sense, but also in the sense of Bene' idea of supplementing political democracy with social aspects. In 1968 it was faith in rejoining the social to the democratic and intellectual. In 1989 it was faith in freedom and democracy. As the subtext of all these visions, one finds the idea of justice which must vanquish simply because it is justice.
I have tried to show that these ideas play only a motivating and stimulating role and to a limited extent, that they are not a trigger for action. I am even tempted to say that they are merely a romantic accompaniment to practical life. But if the desired political change is first and foremost the result of external influences and not of one's own political action, then the necessary result is great openness with regard to the world. Reserve and introspection, so frequent for instance among the Germans, are lacking in the Czech character. Openness towards the world means looking at the world through the prism of accepted national values and ideas. Looking around the world through these ideas means looking for forces which realize these ideas and can therefore help to realize these ideas also in the little Czech Republic.
In the past this outward view was represented by idealizing Slavonic Russia in the time of the revival, or mass listening to Western radio at the end of the World War and in the recent past. In its practical form it is a search for a friendly savior, often considerably idealized. In the past this was Russia, France or England, now the USA, Germany or the European Community.
This phenomenon also has its positive side, however, namely a developed sensitivity to justice in the world, the interpretation of a political action as just or unjust, moral or immoral. The separation of the desired political change from one's own efforts and the replacement of political action by faith in the implementation of historical necessity has significant effects on a number of attitudes. The main ones would seem to be those toward the defense of achieved political results, to shortcomings and economic reform, and to the economy in general.
What is this attitude to the defense of political results? The desirable political and social situation achieved is not welcomed with the pride of a victorious warrior, but with the emotion of the deliberator who knows that something of the sort should have happened long ago. This feeling also acts on the will and on determination for defense. There is a different relationship to that which is achieved after a long struggle and at the price of sacrifice from that which just happened on its own. This is still the case when what has happened has been long expected and is welcomed
Historical progress in the realization of the national and political idea was recently achieved in the Czech lands after decisive interference by external forces. Consequently, the will to defend it is also traditionally weak and wavering. In 1938 no defense was made against Nazi Germany. After the occupation by the Soviet Army in 1968, after the first week of heroism, the will for defense on a mass scale very quickly vanished. When the will of history was not implemented, what can an ordinary person expect!
The attitude to shortcomings in the new political reality is formed in a similar way. Connected with pride in something which has been fought for, there is also the willingness to overlook the initial imperfection of the work and to defend it even when it is not perfect. The result of the long-term struggle for a thing is also patience to wait for its formal completion. Easily won freedom, considered in addition as a matter of course, opens the doors to mass petty dissatisfactions and criticism--criticism which does not concentrate on the fundamentals, but reflects the fact that the new situation is not ideal. That it cannot be ideal is somehow overlooked. The new situation is not understood as the result of the efforts of imperfect individuals, but as the product of perfect history.
The political development in the CSFR after 1989 has been characterized by just this dissatisfaction and impatience. This appears also in the paradoxical situation where, disregarding the quality of health, environment and free time, the relatively high level of consumption, though not in keeping with the efficiency of the economy, is regarded as insufficient and its rise is considered the main aim. The undoubted results which have been achieved, especially the elimination of fear of State Security, and freedom of expression, belief, assembly and the press, are considered to be a matter of course. In other words, they are seen as something which should always have existed and did not exist due only to an unpleasant coincidence, or rather due to negative interference from outside.
Lack of confidence in the strength of one's own will and in one's own action, and reliance on an automatic process of external aid appear not only in politics, but also in the economy. The economic results of such attitudes are pointed out by Miroslav Petrusek in his essay, "Are We Really Out of the Cage?", when he writes about the faith:
in the almightiness of impersonal mechanisms which it suffices to set in motion in order for the desired aim to be achieved, by which is meant--best of all, of course, once more and as soon as possible--the achievement of paradise.
In the communist system the role of such self-saving mechanisms was played by central planning or scientific management. In the post-communist society this is taken over by the market economy, interpreted not only trustingly as Adam Smith's famous invisible hand which will lift us all quickly out of the economic desert into a flowering oasis of well-being, but also as an impersonal "scourge of God" which in itself, by the mere fact of its existence, will teach us or force us (the end result is the same) to work, to conduct business, make decisions, take risks and undertake responsibilities.(193)
If we add to this tendency the well-developed sense of justice, which due to its vagueness is understood in Bohemia mainly as equality, then dismal prospect opens up before us for the course of economic reform. There is an evident connection to the idea that history is not an accumulation of purposeful political actions, but an anonymous necessary process, and that the economy and the market are the result not of the business efforts of individuals, but of an anonymous mechanism.
I have tried to show in this analysis that the national character cannot be described by one trait, and that its future development cannot be forecast on the basis of this one trait. The characteristic caution which was discussed acts on behavior only in a context with other traits and under the influence of external circumstances.
STABLE POLITICAL CULTURE
Let us pass now to the second of the priorities mentioned in the introduction, namely, according to the Western press, the high political culture and practical experience of democracy. Special emphasis is placed on the fact that the first Czechoslovak Republic was the only democratic state in Central and Eastern Europe.
Democratic experience can be understood also as a democratic attitude, as acclamation of the values of democracy, freedom and pluralism. Democratic experience understood in this sense is quite widespread in Bohemia. The given values have a high positive emotional charge among the people. Is this, however, a sufficient prerequisite for desirable and stable political development?
The Czech democratic attitude undoubtedly contains some important positive elements. In the first place there is resistance to the enforced solution of problems. Further there is the ability and willingness to compromise and reach agreement in really serious situations. There is also the almost unequivocal acclamation of the ideals of freedom, democracy and pluralism. It is important that there is also a dislike of fanaticism.
But for a truly democratic functioning of the state all this is far from enough. What probably is most lacking is tolerance. The basis of democracy is respect for others as equal to oneself. For this respect to exist there must be a willingness to listen to the other, an effort to understand him. This respect and tolerance traditionally is in short supply in Czech lands. Connected with this is distrust of the democratically expressed wishes of the majority, and little regard for the rights of the minority.
What seems most serious, however, is the political dispersion, the inability to agree and compromise when it is not actually a question of life and death. A traditional trait of the political life of the Czech nation is this very dispersion, the mutual intolerance of the various groups and parties, and the precedence of narrow party and particular interests over general ones. The result is an inability to deal effectively and rapidly with problems which occur.
But this is not a new phenomenon. Ferdinand Peroutka refers to it in detail when he describes the unrestrainable onslaught of the professional parties after the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and the vain struggle of the national democratic party to maintain its ideological principles in politics. National democracy, which "as a nationwide party does not wish to limit itself to the defense of the interests of a certain class, but wishes to balance the variety of interests, to give that which is general priority over the particular, and to carry out all its political activity from a higher nationwide point of view," as stated in its program,(194) was not successful.
The supposed stability and security of the state replaced the celebrated national unity from the time of the establishment of the Republic with battles between contesting parties. Ferdinand Peroutka writes of the rapid disintegration of the national unity as follows:
In the spring (1919) it could already be observed that national
unity, the fruit of the coup, had undergone definitive disintegration and that now only the nationwide government maintained this illusion. In place of voluntary national organization
there appeared disorganization. Each group pushed forward
under its own power. The demagogy of the socialist left called
forth equally gross demagogy in the other parties. The
newspapers willingly supported every conflict.(195)
In the days of the coup the nation acted as an entity. Now it has broken up into parties where each wishes the other's political defeat. The affairs of state were considered--mistakenly--to be already completely assured. Now the parties have begun to fight in particular over their share of internal power. There was no hope that, being so abhorrent to one another, they would be able to maintain peace and the polite relations necessary for cooperation. . . . The disintegration did not arise only in the heads of the politicians: it corresponded in general to the disintegration which took place among the people. The deep rift went right through the centre of the nation. The politicians were driven from the rear, they merely reproduced the general mood. The states and classes, fearing for their place in the sun, ordered their political representatives to be angry and intolerant. . . . The formerly clear question of general good and general evil dissolved into a melange of separate interests.(196)
The short period of the Second Republic after the Munich Agreement shows similar developments, although under other conditions. The collapse of unity and the prevalence of particular interests can also be observed in the infamous period of "normalization". Finally, 1990 gave free reign to this tendency. Basically all the unsuccessful parties, instead of trying to give critical support to the ruling Civic Forum, began a disintegration campaign and a series of unrefined attacks, as can be seen from the statements of politicians and an analysis of the press. Similar developments, even though more muffled with regard to positions of power, took place also among the individual streams of the Civic Forum. As F. Peroutka says: the affairs of state (and democracy, we might add) were considered--mistakenly--to be completely assured. The world and the domestic political and economic situation, however, give no grounds for a carefree attitude.
A non-violent nature and the acclamation of the values of democracy are not sufficient in themselves for democratic experience to shape political development. Instead of rational democratic behavior and political culture, there appear repeatedly considerable political irrationalism and a tendency to anarchism. Again there is here a conflict between strong pro-democratic feelings and verbal support for democracy, on the one hand, and a lack of positive action in support of the democratic state, on the other. In such a situation it is exceptionally difficult to achieve the social and political consensus essential for a rapid and successful passage to democracy and a market economy. A democratic attitude is then not an unequivocal trait enabling clarification of the political situation and a prognosis of future development.
CONCLUSION
The basic question in this text has been whether the Czech national character is a factor determining further political development, whether this development can be explained by the national character.
The discussion of superficially optimistic views that the properties of the national character were sufficient factors for successful and rapid political development in the direction of a functioning democracy concentrated on two traits of this character--caution and political experience and culture. What has come to light is that the national character is not determined by these traits or properties, but is a more complex combination of mutually conflicting, but also mutually supplementary motives and determinants.
The framework of the 20th century which I used is too narrow for any far-reaching conclusions, but the importance of conjectures on the national character is undoubted. They have indicated the one-sidedness and fruitlessness of the concept given in the introduction, which sees some isolated properties as determinative of further positive development. From the sketch made of some character traits there emerge numerous critical areas and potential dangers for Czech political development.
The Czech national character has not shown itself to be unequivocal and monolithic. It contains various traits and attitudes which at times come to the fore or, at other times, retire into the background under the influence of various external forces. The national character appears, then, to be undefined, variable and determined by external circumstances. Even though individual traits can be defined, it is not possible, due to their contradictory nature, to judge which will be the determining trait at a particular time. We can reply to our question that it is not possible from the Czech national character to reliably foretell behaviour and development in the future. If the character is ambiguous, then its manifestations also are ambiguous.
The national character is thus one of the factors creating the context of future Czechoslovak policy. It is possible to define possible individual reactions to the political situation. Due to their contradictory nature and external determination, however, it is not possible to estimate which reaction will prevail. The national character helps to influence political development, but is not in itself decisive.
I have tried to show that there are not many reasons for optimism. Political development in Czechoslovakia will not be any faster or easier than in many other countries. Here, too, many concealed dangers threaten to overturn democratic development, dangers whose roots lie both in ourselves and in external causes.
It was not the aim here, however, to draw a pessimistic picture of the future, but it is well to know the possible dangers and obstacles. This makes it possible to prepare for them and to avoid surprises and disappointments. It is good to see reality in all its complexity. Apart from the danger points, there is much that is hopeful in our nature. There is no need to fear an outbreak of violence and there is a great inventiveness and ability to improvise in the Czech nation. One can afford then to be optimistic, but--how else in Bohemia--also cautious.
Institute of Philosophy
Czech Academy of Sciences
Prague, Czech Republic