In the chapter on T. G. Masaryk it was indicated that positivism became one of the most prominent trends of modern Czech thought and strongly influenced the consciousness of Czech society from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. More than any other trend, it aspired to gain a dominant position in the Czech national thought of its time. The preceding, dominant philosophy in our countries had been herbatianism, a product of the post-classical evolution of German philosophy which was accepted particularly in the Austrio-Hungarian Empire and enjoyed as well a firm position during the nineteenth century in Prague at the University, which was then German.⁽¹⁷⁾ In comparison, positivism represented a more complete form of "post-revolutionary" thinking. Its insertion into the consciousness of Czech society represented an attempt to "open the window" to West Europe, i.e., to overcome a certain provincialism in thought, to bring the Czech philosophical culture to a "contemporary level" and to incorporate it into the evolutionary logic of European philosophizing.

In this sense, it joined the European turn to positive philosophy begun in mid 19th century (Comte, Mill, Spencer). Without this as its theoretical and ideological basis and model, the Czech phenomenon would be incomprehensible. This was not a direct reception of any concrete system, but rather of a pervasively positivistic atmosphere. In Czechoslovakia, the positivistic tradition developed in a relatively specific manner, different from the evolutionary logic of Western European positivism. In Czechoslovakia the evolution can be divided into three historical epochs.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CZECH POSITIVISM

This took place in the last third of the nineteenth century. Compared with the classical positivistic countries this was late, but was not without certain domestic presuppositions and antecedents. These beginnings form a freely associated line of earlier Czech thought: the Enlightenment, whose immaturity and incompleteness invited positivism to substitute to a certain extent some of its functions; philosophy of common sense, with its empiricism and rejection of German speculation; English and French philosophy of experience, as formulated particularly by Karel Havlíek Borovský or Vilém Gabler around 1848 in the disputes about "the existence or non-existence of German philosophy in Bohemia;⁽¹⁸⁾ the tendency towards a natural-scientific Weltanschauung, which appeared in the 60s and 70s along with the first reviews of Darwinism; and finally, some attitudes of Czech herbartianism in the 1860s through 1880.

The beginnings of Czech positivism itself not only were delayed but also were very inarticulate. The Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia were retarded in their social development due to the failure of the revolution of 1848, the inability to realize Czech national demands within the Habsburg Monarchy, etc. This meant that the revision of the traditional picture of philosophy in the positivist spirit of scientism, etc., was asserted only gradually and with continuous delays. It is true that the consciousness of the Czech society began to feel the need for positivism, but for a certain period it was not able to accept it fully and so was unable to formulate a comprehensive theory.

In this first stage then, positivism appeared only in the attitudes of some Czech herbartians (Josef Durdík, Gustaf Adolf Lindner) as certain positivistic and positivising tendencies. This concerned the conception of philosophy as based on the special sciences and based upon some knowledge of West-European positivism. At about the same time, extensive information appeared in periodicals about West-European positivism, along with extracts and translations of some of its texts. In contrast to herbartian contributions, these works of Josef Miks, Emanuel Makovika, etc., were positivistic and aimed at its propagation. But this did not constitute positivism as an explicit philosophical school.

After the 1880s, positivism was implicitly contained in the work of the special sciences which, having been nourished by the reopening of the Czech university in Prague in 1882, had entered a new stage of development overcoming the previous provincialism, "patriotic character", etc. The "positivist spirit" of this science, drawn rather from the spirit of scientism of the nineteenth century, than directly from some positivist doctrine, appeared rather negatively in the natural sciences, rejecting speculation and the romantic conception of knowledge, etc. It is manifested also in critiques, reviews and essays appearing in the critical periodical of Czech science, Athenaeum, founded in 1884 mainly through the initiative of T.G. Masaryk. The positivist spirit was more ambiguous in the humanities, particularly in the traditional (and thus also the most advanced) disciplines of Czech modern science, linguistics and historiography.

In the 1880s, Czech historical science laid out a program with an essentially positivistic methodology against the already degenerating politically liberal historiography and against romantic historical speculation. In the late 80s the article of Jaroslav Goll, who later became one of the prominent Czech historians, Djiny a djepis (History and Historiography) had the character of a manifesto. This was not a lineal transplant of a finished positivistic conception of history into historiography; the author was inspired more by the conception of the German historian Leopold von Ranke. Nevertheless, it constituted an emphatic rejection of the philosophical and educational importance of cognitive facts, stressing unengaged objectivism, etc., and thereby voiced the principles of the "positivistic spirit" of Czech science.

At that time, similar changes also took place in other branches of the humanities, for instance, in the legal sciences and somewhat later in literary science and literary history, etc. Some disciplines were only just being constituted in this new spirit, either by exiting the herbartian framework (as with psychology and pedagogics) or by being newly formed (for instance, sociology).

The beginnings of Czech positivism culminated in this "positivistic spirit" in which the modern Czech scientific activities were organized. At the same time it was symptomatic of Czech development that in its beginnings Czech positivism did not reach an explicit philosophical formulation. This may be due also to the ambiguous role of T.G. Masaryk in the preparation of Czech positivism. In the milieu of that time, some of his studies could have been accepted as promoting positivism. At the same time however, Masaryk's own philosophical attitude was basically non-positivistic, even anti-positivistic. Masaryk criticized positivism as a type of scientistic thinking and reprimanded it strongly from the position of a life-philosophy and man-centered position. Thus it came about that positivism in Czech thinking was subjected to massive criticism even before it was philosophically formulated. To a certain extent this stigmatized the development of Czech positivism, especially as its decisive representatives were close politically to Masaryk.

EXPLICIT THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIVISM

In the early 1890s this philosopher, psychologist and ethician became such a dominant figure in Czech thinking that his contemporaries, Frantiek Drtina and Frantiek áda, who, together with Krejí, were the founders and editors of the first Czech professional philosophical periodical, eska mysl (Czech Mind), receded into the background. Let us introduce first Drtina and ada.

Frantiek Drtina (1861-1925), first docent and after 1899 professor of philosophy and pedagogy at Charles University, differed from the stringent, positivistic attitude of Frantiek Krejí, particularly in striving to overcome agnosticism. He attempted to include in his work a strong humanistic orientation and devoted attention particularly to the history of philosophy and pedagogy. During his studies in Berlin in 1885 he attended the seminar of Eduard Zeller, historian of ancient philosophy. He also became acquainted with Friedrich Paulsen and was influenced by his effort to lay a philosophical foundation for pedagogy and his pantheism.

In his book, Mylenkový vývoj evropského lidstva (The Intellectual Evolution of European Mankind, 1902), later published under the title Úvod do filosofie (An Introduction to Philosophy), Drtina attempted to explain his conception of the development of European philosophy in a way comprehensible even to a philosophically untrained reader. He sought to make evident that the birth of philosophical conceptions and their mutual encounters had always been in response to the historical experiences of man which led to ever deeper knowledge. He concluded that European philosophy aimed, from ancient rationalism and naturalism through medieval suprarationalism and supranaturalism, to a new, more critical and more profound rationalism and naturalism, accompanied by a humanist idea and belief in evolution and progress.

He considered philosophy itself as a homogeneous system of scientific knowledge and, at the same time, as a view of the world and of life (with metaphysics, noetics and ethics). The culmination of the metaphysical endeavors of philosophy for Drtina is the question: "what is the world and being, what is the purpose and aim of its existence?" He himself assumed that philosophy cannot end in "a blind recognition of matter as the substance of being", that the world is not only a res extensa but also a res cogitans. Nevertheless, the greatest problem of philosophy remains "man himself with his soul", i.e., the understanding of man and his existence in the world. That is the reason why one of the important themes of Drtina was religion, which he considered to be a manifestation of the human spirit's dimensions of freedom in response to such feelings as astonishment, fear, and one's own insufficiency. He considered as important for modern man only such religion as is without dogmatic rigidity, prejudice and superstition, a religion primarily emphasizing moral values. The value of Christianity remains the idea of loving one's neighbor, understood in the sense of effective social duty.

The humanitarian ideas which Drtina professed as a philosopher were the starting point for his pedagogical works published in the books: Ideály výchovy (The Ideals of Education, 1930), Reforma kolství (The Reform of the system of Schools, 1931), and Univerzita a uitelstvo (The University and the Staff of Teachers, 1932). It must be added that Drtina participated not only in the foundation of the eská mysl (Czech Mind), but also of Athenaeum (1884), Nae doba (Our Times, 1899)⁽¹⁹⁾ and the Books of Pedagogical Classics. He was also the founder of the Comenius Pedagogical Institute in Prague.

Frantiek áda (1865-1918), a colleague of Drtina and Krejí, was a theist by confession, but a relativist and probabilist in his theoretical work. He was interested mainly in psychology (especially infant psychology) and the theory of knowledge. He was well-known among his students for his excellent survey of the world movements in those fields. Nonetheless, as Král wrote in eskoslovenská filosofie (Czechoslovak Philosophy), áda "published very much but, except for Noetická záhda u Herbarta a Milla (The Noetic Mystery in Hebart and Mill, 1894) and monographs on Hyna and Zahradník, and perhaps his paper on the language of infants, his writings were scattered among a great number of pioneering, stimulative and mainly informative papers and articles."⁽²⁰⁾ áda's "Rozhledy po systémech filosofických" (Outlines of the Systems of Philosophy) in eská mysl (1906-1910) dealt mainly with current noetic conceptions and were referred to even by anti-Krejí critics.

The influence of Frantiek Drtina and Frantiek áda in Czech philosophy should not be underestimated; nevertheless, the position of Krejí was so outstanding that the entire second stage of Czech positivism may be called the epoch of Frantiek Krejí. It extends to the early 1920s.

Frantiek Krejí (1858-1934) was docent from 1898 and from 1905 professor of philosophy, specializing in psychology. Initially, he started from herbartism (as Durdik's pupil), as is reflected particularly in his psychology. At first, Krejí drew also from the so-called folk psychology (Völkerpsychologie) of Lazarus and Steinthal. The development of his own six-part system extended nearly 25 years, from 1902 to 1926. After finishing his system he revised the basic starting points of his system in Základy vdeckého systému psychologie (Foundations of a Scientific System of Psychology, 1929). In principle, however, Krejí's psychology remained the same: it wished to be empirical and developmental, was based on biology, and rejected the concept of the soul (Krejí's opposers called it "psychology without a soul"). Krejí considered mental phenomena to be conscientious responses of the organism, and he explained them using the theory of psychophysical parallelism (whose content he considered to be a scientifically verified fact). He presumed a so-called tripartition of all mental phenomena into the imaginative, emotional and free, which rendered the empirical character of this psychology very problematic.

Filled with the spirit of West European positivism of the nineteenth century, Krejí wanted to construct his philosophy upon psychology conceived on a scientific empirical basis, probably closest to the conception of Herbert Spencer, though there was no direct relation. It was to be a scientific philosophy in the sense that it was limited to experience and "excluded all metaphysics". Krejí formulated it in such a way that he made questioning the concept of transcendence (in many ways analogous to Spencer's conception of the "unknowable") to be the center of his philosophy. He considered knowledge of such a transcendent to be impossible and unnecessary for the construction of a philosophical view. this presumption that the transcendent was unknowable enabled Krejí--with a

certain affinity to Spinoza, whom he highly respected--to formulate an essentially monistic position. This was neutral to the dualisms of the body and soul, matter and consciousness--a neutrality based on a psychophysical parallelism. At the same time Krejí assumed that he was beyond the onesidedness of "metaphysics" and he did not mind (though he was non-religious, even anti-religious) coming very close to the clear consequences of pantheism. The agnostic scientism and "neutral monism" of Krejí implied a conception of a strictly determined reality which admitted neither indeterminism and teleology, nor the possibility of the active intervention of man upon reality--though Krejí would have liked to deny this.⁽²¹⁾

Indeed, Krejí never did formulate systematically his philosophical views, though they penetrated all his work. This is indicated most distinctly in his essays on contemporary philosophy, in the works Filosofie pítomnosti (The Philosophy of the Present, 1904), and Filosofie posledních let ped válkou (The Philosophy of the Last Years Before the War, 1918, second impression, 1930). He also defended it vehemently in numerous polemics. Towards the end of his life he even radicalized some of his theses, being convinced that he was defending the scientific Weltanschauung.

Krejí's explicit philosophical formulation of positivism can be classified with European naturalizing positivism of the nineteenth century, which still had a synthesizing scope and aspired to provide a Weltanschauung. Krejí, however, wanted to revise some of its parts under the influence of Masaryk's antipositivistic arguments, particularly by exceeding positivism's strict objectivism and lack of engagement. European positivism at the turn of the century veered towards empiriocriticism, abandoning the construction of a Weltanschauung in favor of a clear-cut orientation to gnoseological and methodological problems. In contrast, Krejí took his positivism as a world and life view which, along with reason, should satisfy also "the heart of man" and should represent a kind of "humanistic" version of positivism.

What has already been stated generally for Czech positivism holds true for Krejí as well: the "positive", i.e., post-revolutionary, cannot be expressed completely because at the time of Krejí (at least till the constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918) the goals and demands of the Czech society had not yet been fulfilled, in particular, national demands for a democratic society (after 1918). This is why Krejí emphasized the social importance of science (to a great extent an Enlightenment belief), i.e., its role in solving the problems of the Czech national existence. He was much less interested in the inner mechanisms of knowledge, specific methods of sciences and their valence; indeed, his conception of

science or reason was somewhat archaic when compared with their evolu

tion in Europe. That is why Krejí wanted to stand resolutely with his positivism--and again with a quasi-enlightenment pathos-- against extra-rational knowledge in science, theoretical thinking and general consciousness.

He was very enthusiastic in his struggle against irrationalism and "idealism" (his conception being rather confused), when, for instance, he argued with the philosophizing physiologist Frantiek Mare or fought for his "scientific psychology". He stood against religion and clericalism, using a radicalism probably evoked by a symbiosis of the throne and the altar in the old monarchy, though this had no analogue in Czech intellectual culture. Krejí understood the program of laicization or scientification of general consciousness (again a more or less enlightenment program) mainly as the dissemination of a positivistic Weltanschauung and "natural, or lay, morality".⁽²²⁾

The endeavors of Krejí to establish a personal philosophy for an active human life, which would become a truly personal confession as a kind of scientistically based humanism, had to fail (as indicated above) if this philosophy were to be based on an impersonal observational conception of the world without mankind. The conflict of scientism and humanism which should be overcome within the scientistic system appeared insuperable. This made both the scientism and the humanism of Krejí illusory. Even so, at least in his intentions, Krejí overstepped the old West European positivism, indicating what positivism lacked and the direction of the further development of positivism in Czechoslovakia.

Despite these discrepancies and weaknesses, the philosophy of Krejí was at first well accepted. This was also because Krejí did not cultivate philosophy in a merely academic manner, but had a great sense for problems of his time and nation and dealt with them as if applying only his own theoretical principles. Nonetheless, after 1918 (though the works of Krejí were not yet concluded) the situation began to change. In the new conditions after the constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic and with the coming of new generations, Krejí's philosophy--and with it the positivistic tradition as such--was felt to be out-of-date from the viewpoint of various non-positivistic and even anti-positivistic tendencies.

The dominant role in this critique seemed to be played by a group of philosophers associated with the periodical Ruch filosofický (Philosophical Action) which aimed to contrast with eská mysl, which was still controlled by the positivists. As will later be mentioned in detail, this indeed represented a relatively wide scope of attitudes formed by the "opening of windows to Europe", but to non-positivistic European thinking. Hence, we find here attitudes of irrationalism and intuitivism, inspired by philosophies of life, for instance of the Bergsonian type, idealistic

interpretations of modern exact science, the humanities and philosophical interpretations of mystical conceptions; also found are intuitive realists from among the Russian emigrants, etc. Positivism (which at that time was politically situated in the "center", i.e., in what was called the official "castle" of Masarykian democratism) was frequently attacked politically by the right wing.

Criticism of positivism (or the creation of non-positivistic models of philosophizing) was also evident in the group of thinkers frequently quoting Masaryk, particularly those who stressed the religious aspect of Masaryk's thinking (for instance, Emanuel Rádl and Czech Protestant thinkers).

The positivism of Krejí was somewhat isolated after the year 1918 even within its own positivist group. In philosophy Krejí had virtually no pupils. What he had stated as being a negative character of pre-war European positivism, i.e., "the dissection of positivistic thinking" into particular specialized disciplines, befell his own school: his pupils became scientific specialists, namely psychologists, for instance, Vilém Forster, Frantiek eracký, estmír Stehlík. Not only did they not continue in the general philosophical endeavors of Krejí, but--being instructed abroad and observing the developmental rhythm of their disciplines--they did not remain orthodox positivists even methodologically. So not even Krejí's own group continued in the intentions of its teacher.

A new situation, unfavorable for Krejí's positivism, arose in the sciences. In the nineteenth century the special sciences had been in close contact, even in alliance, with the positivistic attitudes to such an extent that at a certain stage the special sciences were, in their "spirit", able to substitute for positivism which was not yet theoretically and philosophically formulated. In the 1920s there began a gradual process of limiting, if not overcoming that model of science. This appeared, for instance, in the disintegration of the prior methodological unity of science which had been provided by positivism in the nineteenth century absolutizing the methodology of the natural sciences. The inclusion of the so-called humanities and the reconstitution of their specific methodology may be understood as an overcoming of positivism based upon conscious contacts with eminently non-positivisitic, even anti-positivistic thinking, for instance, the irrational life philosophy and the German humanities. Since this movement was found not only in the representative disciplines of Czech science, i.e., in linguistics (which took up a structuralistic orientation) and historiography, but also in several other disciplines, for instance in psychology, legal science, aesthetics, etc., it became clear that positivism was losing its former strength in a very important group of sciences, that is, in those where at the beginning its position had been strongest.

THE THIRD PERIOD OF CZECH POSITIVISM

The third period began in the 1920s. At that time, the Czech positivistic traditions seemed to disintegrate but, in spite of this fact, positivistic activities continued throughout the whole period between the two wars. The positivistic group continued to dominate within Czech thinking (which was now more differentiated) and maintained its position in university life. In addition, at this time, there were attempts to create new or modified positivistic traditions. This third stage in the development of positivism in Czech thinking can thus be indicated as the disintegration of Czech positivism and attempts to regenerate it.

Frantiek Krejí continued to publish and to polemisize till the mid-30s, frequently radicalizing his attitudes and shifting to the left and even opening new subjects as in his attempt to cope with phenomenology. In the period between thee two wars, several authors belonging to the positivistic group maintained the tradition, even though freely, e.g., philosophizing natural scientists, such as the "mechanistically" oriented biologist Vladimír Úlehla, Otakar Matouek and some others. The positivistic tradition was supported, to some extent, by the Czech minority in Vienna in the work of Jiljí Jahn (1883-1947), organizer and inspector of Czech schools in the period between the two wars. His "superhoministic", i.e., anti-anthropomorphic philosophy, formulated in his books Stíbrný svt (The Silver World, 1938) and Poznání a ivot (Knowledge and Life, 1948) which were written abroad, was less known in Czechoslovakia. There were some "defenders of positivism": Václav Sobotka (1887-1947), a typical but not very deep polemicist, and Frantiek Fajfr (1892-1955), philosopher and sociologist. He was a theoretician of broad interests and a pioneer in the history of Czech thought. Both its academic representatives, Josef Král and Josef Tvrdý, worked at the university in Bratislava in the 30s. Perhaps confronted with the less laicized Slovakian consciousness, even clericalism--the theoretical work there maintained its scientific priority.

Josef Král (1882-1978), philosopher and sociologist, later professor at Charles University, initiated the Prague Sociological Group. This had a strong objectivist orientation and in this sense was against the "insufficiently objective" Brno sociological school of I. A. Bláha; it published the revue Sociální problémy (Social Problems). Kral devoted his research activities particularly to the history of Czech and Slovak thought and is the author of the first objectivistic account of this in his book eskoslovenská filosofie (Czechoslovak Philosophy, 1937). After World War II he criticized Marxist philosophy, which was on the way towards its hegemonistic position, in his essay "Positivism, Dialectical Materialism and Philosophy" in eská mysl, 1946-1947.

Josef Tvrdý (1877-1942) is undoubtedly the most important figure of the period between the wars, linking up the positivistic tradition with a renewal of positivism on different bases. Before World War I he published only a few articles devoted to special psychological problems, studies on Moravian folk ceramics and an essay on the philosophy of J.M. Guyau. He entered Czech philosophical life with his book, Filosofie náboenství (The Philosophy of Religion, 1921). The year of this publication is significant in that it marked the culmination of the conflict between positivism (represented by Frantisek Krejí) and the "younger idealistic generation" which declared a "fight for the freedom of Czech philosophy" in its revue Ruch filosofický (Philosophical Action). Tvrdý's compelling idea for creating a "Weltanschauung for the modern Czech man" was polemically directed against those tendencies of "idealistic" criticism of positivism, which latently supported not only theology, theosophy and spiritism, but also the "present conservative and reactionary socio-political orders". He attempted to provide new evidence of the viability of scientific philosophy, referring to both the domestic traditions (namely Masaryk's realism) and to information from the "enormous stream of the realistic world philosophy which arose as a reaction against idealism and pragmatism". However, he was not motivated merely by a desire for a critical dialogue with irrational conceptions. His attempt was an effort to overcome the backwardness, frequently attacked by the critics of positivism, of the conception of scientific philosophy which led to prohibiting going beyond the phenomena to the substance of the reality so that many problems of the Weltanschauung with which man at that time was faced were ignored.

Tvrdý saw philosophy as the "endeavor for a uniform Weltanschauung" in an independent cultural formation similar, for example, to the arts or religion. But wanting a scientific philosophy does not mean considering philosophy to be a science. The specificity of its subject matter implies some peculiarities in its procedures: "It will not be able to deal with everything in such a minute manner as a science, but will have to keep to mere probability in those instances where a science would call for more accuracy and certainty"; its method "will not be so strictly scientific as the methods of the particular sciences". The philosopher will have to bear in mind not only the results of scientific knowledge, but also what the arts and religion have to say about the world and about man, as well as his experience of his personal and social life. The philosophical picture of the world and the answer to the question of the sense of life ("what man is to do") are formed on the basis of a personal synthesis of the philosopher, exceeding scientific facts and material scientifically verified and verifiable at the given time.

In this release of the philosopher from the close bonds of the special sciences, Tvrdý approaches the problematic regions hitherto taboo or ignored by Czech positivism, namely, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of values (Tvrdý may be considered one of the founders of Czech axiology), the philosophy of history and metaphysics which he considered to be the specific core and culmination of philosophy. In contrast to Krejí, he objected that philosophy must set aside "its hermetic robe of resignation" and courageously create the metaphysical picture of the world. Only then will it be possible to confront a metaphysics which will be, in fact, heir to the old theology and the narrow scientism moving merely within the range of a special science. In his Vývoj filosofického mylení evropského lidstva (The Development of Philosophical Thought of European Mankind, 1923), Moderní proudy ve filosofii (Modern Trends in Philosophy, 1925), Úvod do filosofie (Introduction to Philosophy, 1928), and in his Prvodce djinami evropské filosofie (Guide Through the History of European Philosophy, 1932) and in other historical material, he showed that "the basic task of philosophy had always been called metaphysics". In his book Nová filosofie. Analýza dnení filosofické situace (New Philosophy: the Analysis of the Present Philosophical Situation, 1932), he finally came to reject the central notion of positivism, i.e., the unknowableness of the transcendent. He dealt with the noetic aspect of the problem of the possibility of scientific philosophy (after the philosophy of cognition, nature and values) in his works Problém skutenosti u Davida Huma a jeho význam v djinách filosofie (The Problem of Reality in David Hume and his Importance in the History of Philosophy, 1925), Teorie pravdy (The Theory of Truth, 1929), Logika (Logic, 1937) and the unfinished Indukce a její význam (Induction and its Importance).

Tvrdý considered the problems of monism-pluralism, body and mind, to be the principal metaphysical problems. In the first circle of problems he considers whether the world in which we are living and of which we are part is consistent or consists of some "independent centers". Tvrdý considered both extreme positions to be unacceptable (extreme pluralism leads to determinism). Each individual element of the world has two sides: on the one hand, it differs from the other and the world aims towards differentiation; on the other hand, it joins up with other elements so that the world aims towards continuity. World unity is a unity in diversity; it is an internally differentiated whole. In this "monopluralism" Tvrdý also laid the basis for inclining to the theory of emergent evolution which he indicated in his Nová filosofie (New Philosophy) as the best answer to the philosophical difficulties of current developmental theories. However, this was not yet accepted univocally.

He agreed with the English emergentists that emergence cannot really be anticipated in the true sense of the word; however, he did not explain it by referring to mysterious spiritual powers, but by a structural determinism: the qualities newly emerging in the process of evolution are given by the mutual association of the components of the structure. In his conception of emergent evolution Tvrdý advanced beyond the common positivistic quantitative conception of evolution and mechanical causality, and thus participated in the formation of Czech structuralism.

Tvrdý's solution of problems of relations between body and spirit (matter and consciousness) had its source in his conviction that the mind forms a specific layer of reality with specific regularities, but that the mind cannot be admitted to have an existence independent of matter (body). The well-known difficulties of the dualistic conceptions and some experiments in psychology led Tvrdý to a conception of the mind not as a self-sustaining substance, but as a special kind of energy. He also referred to Whitehead. If the electrons and protons, as Whitehead assumed, are the lowest carriers of organic activities, then, Tvrdý added, they might also be the carriers of the lowest forms of mental activities. Inorganic matter may contain the germ of what develops as mental energy, "which could be called mental elements". According to the concept of emergence, "conscious mental energy" could also originate through the synthesis of these elements.

Josef Tvrdý, in this way, exceeded the current Czech positivism (and in its way also positivism as such), but in a way that was not, in essence, contradictory to the polemic and unrealizable efforts of Krejí. (Some efforts of the sociologist I.A. Bláha and the axiologist Blahoslav Zboil can be seen as loosely in the line of Josef Tvrdý.) In spite of all the above-mentioned reservations, Tvrdý remained tied to the domestic positivistic tradition in his emphasis on its democratic and social engagements, and on the Weltanschauung in philosophy as the source for the cultivation of a national consciousness.

In the period between the two wars, particularly in the 30s, there arose another tendency which would contribute in its way to the renewal and even modernization of the positivistic tradition. It was a tendency towards higher evolutionary degrees of European positivism. This was not, of course, a clean-cut trend or group, but a few authors who worked in the sphere of epistemology, methodology of sciences or (modern) logics. They thus came into contact with problems and aspects of neo-positivism, and either adapted them or referred to them in scientific periodicals. Among these authors were Milo Materna, Otakar Zich and Vladimír Tardy who promulgated neo-positivism most sedulously and extensively.⁽²³⁾

The Czech propagators of neo-positivism did not join the neo-positivistic movement immediately. Their activities can hardly be considered as an act which would bring the Czech positivistic traditions--despite the attempts at modernization--above the standard of European positivism of the 19th century. Their endeavors, even though prospective, did not evoke much interest within Czech spiritual life, especially as later historical development made these efforts impossible. After the war, the tradition of Czech positivism ended when, after February 1948 as the Communists came to power, the existence of positivism, as of all the other non-Marxist philosophical movements and trends, was administratively terminated.

CONCLUSION

That the positivistic orientation left certain traces in the theoretical thinking of Czechoslovakia and that the issues and attitudes represented in positivism are inescapable in modern thinking was mediately proven by the fact that even in the ruling Marxist thinking of post-war Czechoslovakia, if not positivisitic, then positivizing or scientific tendencies were found to appear again and again. They were, of course, indicated as "scientistic, positivistic revisionism" and, as such, rejected and pursued. These tendencies (as were the attempts to draw nearer to other movements of western thinking) were very strong in the late 60s. However, it must be mentioned that this was not any linking up with the original Czech positivistic tradition, which was too strongly anchored in aspects of the 19th century. Rather it emerged through modern positivism, analytical philosophies, philosophy and methodology of science, mathematical logic, etc., in short, in all modern reflexions of science. This process continues.

But what of the original Czech tradition of positivism which had accompanied Czech spiritual life in its gradual development throughout nearly a century (if we understand the adjective "Czech", not as a mere indication of the national environment in which it originated and acted, but as its true specificity)?

Positivism in Czech thinking represents an irreducible, non-interchangeable and inseparable tradition which substantially contributed to the formation of this thinking, as explicitly philosophical. It was positivism which, as had already been indicated, incorporated Czech theoretical work into the logic of European development, even though it did not share, for instance, the shifts in the development of European positivism. Positivism brought out many philosophical problems which were legitimate both from the necessary internal development of the domestic philosophical culture, and from the requirements of the consciousness of the Czech national community, even though solving them from its own, somewhat one-sided, point of view. Among these problems were, for instance, the relationship between philosophy and special sciences, the balance of science and humanism, the postulate of the creation of scientific philosophy, the demand for the democratization of thinking, the cultivation of general consciousness, etc.

In this manner it became the tradition of rationalism and democratism, in many instances with some enlightenment tonality only somewhat sensitive to the problems of the transcendent and the demands of the non-rational and irrational, of religiosity and mystery. Nevertheless, this rationalism and democratism was able to form the consciousness of the society and theoretical thinking in such a way as to make it--for instance, in the period between the two world wars--resistant to the influences of the irrational ideology and myths of Nazism. Indeed, it appears to have closely approached, if not the "Czech national nature", then at least the spiritual situation of the wide national strata being formed at the very end of the last century (Jiina Popelová).

If not national, it was a widely spread and deeply felt mentality of the so-called Czech sobriety which as an ideal type may be reconstructed in the following way: a sober matter-of-fact aversion to illusions and reluctance to succumb to them; a realism and certain earthliness suspicious of everything transcendent and irrational, be it presented in a religious or metaphysical manner; subordinating the validity and usefulness of speculation and fantasizing and putting in its place respect for facts, for knowledge and activities (even if only "small work"); comprehending values and life goals without pathos; remaining "with both feet firmly in this world" and being completely secular.

But this mentality has also another face. Its sobriety and realism may very easily and seemingly imperceptibly change into an incapacity for emotional animation, into overcautiousness, suspiciousness and skepticism; earthliness may change into lack of inspiration, unwillingness to make sacrifices (even as concerns one's own comfort), cowardice and denial of noble ideal motives and of ideals as such; the reverse of aversion to speculation and fantasizing is the superficiality of "common sense", incapability of transcending the given palpable reality and situation towards the future; earthliness of values and targets may be seen as greed and egoistic exploitation, as the absolutization of material, i.e., consumer values, as utilitarianism, practical pragmatism, careerism, etc.

Of course, it cannot be assumed that between this mentality and Czech positivism there exists a causative bond: it was formed in the same way that it was not possible to create positivism as a theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, "Czech sobriety" and Czech positivism belong to each other; in a certain way they complement each other and they strengthen each other. Positivism became useful to this mentality making it feel justified and theoretically legitimate; conversely, this mentality also became useful to positivism because by referring to it positivism could be considered as a "national philosophy", corresponding to the interests of all ranks of the society.

From this parallelism of Czech positivism and the "mentality of sobriety", some summary advice about the character and function of Czech positivism can be drawn. In its range and value, Czech positivism is as ambivalent as is this mentality. Any further development of this tradition on the level of theoretical philosophy will have to take this fact into account.