IN CZECH ETHICS

This chapter will not attempt to present a well-rounded picture of the development of modern Czech ethics. To accomplish that, much more work will have to be done. We will concentrate on the positivist tradition in the humanistic social orientation of Czech social thought (noting what preceded and prepared it). In chapter III of this volume, it was shown that positivism had an important position in the Czech philosophy of the first half of our century.

The nature of national philosophical thinking cannot be explained solely on the basis of the specific historical conditions of a given nation, but neither can these be ignored. This applies particularly to ethics which is closest to the day-to-day life of people and reflects not only the actual situation of any given society, but also its needs and aspirations. It applies even more to a small nation which has lived under national, political and social oppression for long periods of its history, and has to struggle for its cultural, political and social rights, and even for the preservation of its existence as a nation. This situation influenced, both positively and negatively, the moral life of the society and had an impact on its thinkers.

THE CZECH ETHICAL TRADITION

The overall conditions for the development of the Czech community help us understand why, in Czech philosophical and religious thinking, the practical orientation was more pronounced than the theoretical. They explain why Czech ethics, whether it has flourished in the context of religious movements, pedagogy, historiography, political movements, philosophy, or moral teachings, has had a conspicuously democratic, humanistic, social and socially critical character. This basic tendency had formed as early as the Czech Reformation (Jan Hus, Petr Chelický) and continued in the teachings of Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius), as well as in the works of Czech Humanists, National Revivalists and Czech Revolutionary Democrats.

Although ethical thinking has had a long tradition in Czech lands, ethics in the narrowest sense of the word began to be cultivated only in the first half of the nineteenth century. The first original treatise in ethics was published by the Catholic theologian and philosopher Vincenc Zahradník (1790-1836), who supported Bolzano's liberal Catholicism. Zahradník associated the Roman Catholic ethical teachings with socially eudaimonist values (its highest ethical principle being the expansion of the general welfare). Some of his works were not published because they did not receive the church's "imprimatur".

In the 1840s, Czech philosophical thinking was influenced to a certain degree by Hegelianism. Ignác Jan Hanu (1812-1869) published his German textbook Handbuch der philosophischen Ethik in 1846. The first systematic Czech ethics was written under the title Dobrovda (Knowledge of the Good, 1847), by Frantiek Matou Klácel (1808-1882), a free-thinking Augustinian friar who introduced socialist ideas to the Czech public. He attempted to found a brotherhood that would follow principles of mutual love, but was deprived of his professorial position in an Episcopal seminary and in 1869 departed for the United States where he had found more understanding for his utopian social ideals.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ The ideal of a society governed by love played an important role in the historical and philosophical treatises of the most renowned Czech Hegelian, Augustin Smetana (1814-1851), who was excommunicated from the Order of the Knights of the Cross.⁽¹⁹⁷⁾

The anti-absolutist, democratic, humanistic and socially critical pathos of the stormy 1840s and `50s expressed itself more in the political writings of the Czech Radical Democrats than in ethical and philosophical treatises. National, social and ethical views were integrated during this period and Czech thinking absorbed ideas from the wider European realm, particularly from the German and French Enlightenment and, to some extent, socialist ideas as well.

After the decline of the revolutionary wave of the `40s and the rise of a strong absolutist reaction, it was necessary to find different foundations for life. Instead of the humanistic orientation of the Enlightenment, historical, religious and philosophical hope for the improvement of social conditions was anchored in the ethical perfection of man. We have said earlier that this transformation was mediated by ideas of Herbartism, which was most influential between the 1860s and 1880s. Josef Dastich, in his book Základové praktické filosofie ve smyslu veobecné etiky (Foundations of Practical Philosophy in the Sense of General Ethics) 1863, took over almost completely Herbart's conception of practical ideas. Gustav Adolf Lindner, the most influential representative of Herbartism in Bohemia, associated his teacher's viewpoints with the new influences of Darwin, Spencer and Mill. In his most important work, Das Problem des Glücks (The Problem of Happiness, 1868, and in Czech in 1931), Lindner criticized the conflict between the generally proclaimed "idea of love" representing "the center of gravity of the ethical world system" and the social situation characterized by a "battle for survival" stemming from uncontrolled wants and egoism. He saw the solution of the "social question" primarily in overcoming egoism by love, in strengthening the moral character, and in personal emancipation: "social freedom can grow only from internal, spiritual liberation".

This turn from the political and legal conception of the democratic humanist ideas of the Enlightenment to the idea that human and social progress is possible primarily through moral revival needed a more general philosophical support. Ethics pointing to the supernatural and the absolute could no longer suffice. At the end of the century, the deeply religious Frantiek Drtina expressed it in this way:

People of our era are turning most of all to naturalism.Even though they may think as Christians, they no longerlook toward life after death beyond this world. They donot expect help and support from a supernatural blessingbut rely on their own strength, wanting to find realization and bliss in this world.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾

This change in the understanding of the world found its expression in the ethical content of religiosity. We can find it in the philosophy of Czech history (Frantiek Palacký, T.G. Masaryk), in which the foundation of typical humanist efforts for the Czech nation lie in essential religiosity. This was understood primarily as an effective love of neighbor and derived from the religious and ethical tradition of the Czech Reformation. Masaryk's assertion that the specific Czech form of the general humanist ideals lies in their "religious character" evoked both agreement and disagreement. In Czech philosophical thought, however, this concept is traceable to an ethically understood religion. Masaryk himself is proof that, even for those thinkers who considered religious faith necessary for an anchoring of ethics, traditional metaphysics no longer sufficed; they searched for a foundation in empiricism and evolutionist science. Masaryk also provides evidence that pure positivism could not satisfy our philosophers either. J. Popelová expressed it pointedly:

Everybody here talked so much about the division of theCzech philosophy into positivism and idealism perhaps because many of our important thinkers do not fit either definition. We have always had a positivism nostalgic for idealism; they cannot give up certain idealist preconceptions, but neither can they organically integrate them intothe nucleus of the positivist system. This dual root of Czech thinking was integrated in Masaryk more through thepower of his moral personality than in his theory. Masarykpoints a way toward the positivist orientation which diverges from myth toward scientism, sociology, and in politics toward democracy and socialism, as well as toward an accentuation of the religious.⁽¹⁹⁹⁾

These characteristics of Czech philosophical thinking apply to ethics which, on the one hand, is strongly and extensively influenced by positivism and, on the other hand, transcends its basic principles. It can be said that various transformations of "inconsequential positivism" represent one of the main lines of Czech ethical thinking that reaches from the end of the past century until today. It seems that it was exactly this need for ethical discourse that opened wide the door for positivism.

THE TURN TO POSITIVISM AS HUMANISM

Let us repeat again then that during the period of strong absolutism, national oppression and growing social conflicts in the last third of the nineteenth century, the Czech intelligentsia needed some philosophical anchoring for their hope in the gradual improvement of national and social life. Because they could not see the solution in a revolutionary change of social conditions, they sought philosophical support against pessimistic thinking, as well as a philosophical support of ethics for the gradual moral cultivation of individuals in their every day life. For the following reasons these needs hardly could have been satisfied by anything other than a positivist orientation.

1) Positivism, with its ideas of evolution and progress, supported Czech ethical thinking against pessimism. The strong influence of evolutionism on the Czech ethics had been apparent from the 1880s. In this connection, at least Emanuel Makovika and Petr Durdík can be mentioned. It is worth noting that one of the most influential representatives of "inconsequential positivism" in ethics, Arnot Inocenc Bláha, was fascinated by the idea of "Evolution" at the beginning of our century.⁽²⁰⁰⁾

The potentialities of a philosophical guarantee of moral, social and political progress offered by evolutionist positivism were most extensively and effectively manifest in the ethics of Frantiek Krejí, the most important representative of Czech positivist ethics in the interwar period. His unfathomable "transcendental" presents "the sole primal cause of everything", e.g., "cosmic law" and, at the same time, "historical justice-Nemesis". According to Krejí, societal development conforms to this law. Everything that disagrees with it must bring itself, ad absurdum, to collapse and fall apart. Because this law is expressed in moral norms, everything that conflicts with the ethical law is abolished by natural development, for nothing that conflicts with moral principles can last. A politics that is in disagreement with the moral point of view must be bankrupt: goals cannot be attained by ethically unacceptable means; everything built on lies must collapse; dictatorship and terror must lead ad absurdum. "The transcendental", the unknown cause of morality, fulfills the role of power that realizes moral principles and provides guarantees for their inevitable victory.

The ethical ideas of Krejí are examples of two relatively general and lasting tendencies in Czech ethical thinking that are probably associated with the above-mentioned specific conditions within Czech society. These are, first, the tendency to search for "metaphysical guarantees" of progress, evident even among thinkers who otherwise have rejected metaphysics. Second, there is a general and constant tendency toward an ethical view of society, social relations and societal events. Both these tendencies apparently were present in the perception of Marxism in the Czech lands after the Second World War. The moral evaluation of social conditions also played a decisive role in November, 1989. The dominant role of moral attitudes toward social reality is no less apparent in the post-November developments.

2) The reception of positivism in Czech ethics was relatively strongly motivated by the need to develop, next to religious ethics, also an ethics based on nonreligious philosophical foundations. Development toward nonconfessional "natural" religion, toward anti-clericalism, free thinking, and to a certain extent even atheism, can be observed in Bohemia as early as the last third of the nineteenth century. This development was stimulated not only by philosophy and science, but also through the leftist activism of the Young Czech Party and the Social Democratic Party.

The young Czechs saw in the Roman Catholic Church the main defender of the reactionary conditions in the Austrio-Hungarian Empire. Among German and Czech workers in urbanized industrial centers, atheism was quite extensive. One the other hand, there was considerable impact from the foundation of the Czech section of Free Thought (1906), from the publication of the proceedings of the Free Thought Congress in Paris (1905) devoted to questions of lay ethics, as well as from the intensive activity of the free thinking movement in the prewar and postwar periods. We cannot ignore the French example of the secularization of schooling and the Czech translations of French writings concerning lay moral education.⁽²⁰¹⁾

Attempts to develop nonreligious ethics and to implement lay moral education in the schools have a long and extensive tradition in Czech society. In the interwar period they gained much support in pedagogy, and among teachers. Although they cannot be associated only with positivism, that philosophy did play an important role in their development. Perhaps the most lasting influence was exerted by Spencer's evolutionist and organic ideas, Mill's utilitarianism, the German positivist ethics (Friedrich Jodl for instance) and also the French positivism of Durkheim's sociological school.

From among the most important positivist adherents of nonreligious ethics and moral education let us mention at least Frantiek Krejí and his Filosofick základy mravní výchovy (Philosophical Foundations of Moral Education, 1920), Positivní etika (Positive Ethics, 1922), and Politika a mravnost (Politics and Morality, 1933). Despite his inclination toward Catholicism, Frantiek áda based his Etika individuální (Individual Ethics) 1920, on a positivist approach. Arnot Inocenc Bláha was influenced by Masaryk and the French sociological school in his Mravní výchova se stanoviska sociologickho (Moral Education from the Sociological Standpoint) 1921, Filosofie mravnosti (Philosophy of Morality, 1922), and Vdecká morálka a mravní výchova (Scientific Morality and Moral Education, 1940). This was true also of Miloslav Skoepa, Úvod do pirozené morálky (Introduction to Natural Morality, 1922), Jiljí Jahn, Stíbrný svt (Silver World, 1931) and Emil Svoboda who sought the foundations of morality in feelings of human solidarity, justice and love in Mylenky o právu, etice a náboenství (Thoughts about Law, Ethics and Religion, 1920), lovk a spolenost (Man and Society, 1926), and Demokracie jako názor na ivot a svt (Democracy as Ideas about Life and World, 1927). Among teachers of pedagogy should be mentioned at least Otakar Chlup in his Rukov pirozené mravouky ve kole (Handbook of Natural Moral Education for School, 1922), along with Otakar Kádner and Václav Píhoda.

The proponents of positivist scientific ethics, natural morality and nonreligious moral education did not have the same attitude toward religious morality. Some considered it outdated and unsuccessful; others valued its contributions while stressing the need for a morality which would be valid independent of religious faith; still others understood morality as a form of religion.

Parallel to this development and in sharp opposition to the positivist conception of scientific ethics and natural morality, there was another tendency stemming from the Catholic philosophical tradition and from Protestant philosophy. Among Catholic authors let us recall at least Jan Stárek, Katolická mravovda (Catholic Moral Teachings, 1884), Eugen Kadeávek, Morálka filosofická (Philosophical Morality, 1906), Josef Vrchovecký Pirozená mravouka (Natural Morality, 1929), and, in particular, the Dominican Metodj Habá, Pirozená etika (Natural Ethics, 1944) and R.M. Dacik, Mravouka (Moral Education, 1946). Among Protestant authors, there are at least Josef Lukl Hromádka, Základy teologick etiky (Foundations of Theological Ethics, 1929), Emanuel Rádl, whose religious and moral credo is most consistently expressed in his tcha z filosofie (Consolation in Philosophy, 1946), Jan Blahoslav Kozák and Alois Spisar.

RELIGIOUS AND NONRELIGIOUS ETHICS

The development of Czech ethics cannot be expressed only in terms of the differentiation between religious and nonreligious orientations. Within both, one encounters many nuances in the solution of philosophical and ethical problems. It can hardly be predicted how these two tendencies will continue to develop in the future. The conflicting process of current social change will undoubtedly bring with it a great disequilibrium of moral consciousness among many citizens, with tendencies toward individualism and egoism, moral relativism or moral skepticism. Sooner or later however, there will appear attempts to restore moral certainties and to develop a generally acceptable conception of moral education for the schools. The role of religious ethics and morality undoubtedly will grow.

In the Czech lands, however, there is a large number of irreligious citizens. The fifty-year old argument of A.I. Bláha will arise once again: "What are we going to do with those who do not believe and cannot believe, because to believe, after all, means, as Masaryk used to say, to believe in somebody? Everybody can be moral, irrespective of whether he believes or not. It is, therefore, necessary to base morality on such principles which would bind even those who do not believe and cannot believe."

The most important role in this sense has been played by the positivist ethics. But a simple return to it is no longer possible, because the development of philosophy and ethics has progressed a great deal since the ascendency of positivism. It is a tradition from which Czech ethics, however, can draw even today because the main representatives of Czech positivism did not remain bound to an uninvolved neutral science of morality.

F. Krejí denied the possibility of a science of values, but did not concede that norms could be established scientifically. A norm to him was an "apodictical imperative expression of law", allowing one to design a relatively detailed normative ethics. I.A. Bláha, who otherwise defended a positivist sense for facts, reality, sobriety, discipline, patience and responsibility, was not satisfied with the "extreme objectivism" of the French sociological school and strove to overcome the passive "pure science of morality" with his "philosophy of morality". In it, he stressed the role of values, ideals and norms as order-giving spiritual principles, and conceived the "realm of man" as the "realm of creation, constant re-creation, constant self-creation and self-improvement." Morality for him was a "conscious, joyful, spontaneous creation of the spiritual ties in society, the creation of a spiritual atmosphere in society in the name of truth, love, and justice."

Czech positivist ethics wanted to anchor morality in the authority of science, but the means by which its different representatives wanted to achieve this were quite dissimilar. F. Krejí, in his Positive Ethics, wanted to substitute the one authority (religion) by another (science) in the relationship "scientific law--norm". Later, in his Politics and Morality, he became skeptical regarding the practical importance of ethics and leaned toward the Durkheim conception of ethics as a non-normative, non-evaluative science, although he himself never fully accepted this approach. In contrast, A.I. Bláha, due to the influence of Durkheim's sociology, became aware quite early that ethics as a science of morality does not have immediate meaning for practical morality. This meaning is mediated, on the one hand, by philosophy and, on the other hand, by the most complex illumination of the origin, character, elements and functions of morality. For this reason Blaha's approach is methodologically more acceptable today than Krejí's. These great personalities of Czech ethical sensitively reflected the moral problems of the social and political developments in the young Czechoslovak Republic, although from different positions: Krejí from a social democratic ideology, Bláha from a "personal humanism" inspired by Masaryk. We can draw many important lessons from the work of both. Even the most critical opponents of positivism have not denied the democratic and humanist social concern of the positivist writers.

At present, Czech ethical thinking is reexamining its historical roots and looking for a new philosophical anchoring. The development illustrated above can be neither revived in its original form nor ignored.