CHAPTER IX

SLOVAKS ON THE ROAD TO
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

JANA BALÁOVÁ




INTRODUCTION

The complex problem of national identity including issues regarding the rights and status of nations, relationships between them on the level of nation states or within the frontiers of one state, and the nationalism remains despite their having been kept secret for decades in countries of the former socialist camp. With the weakening and final disintegration of political, ideological and economic ties between these states themselves in relation to the U.S.S.R., the semblance of the unity between the socialist countries as well as of the nations within particular countries has proven false.

The Marxist theory of the origin and development of nations and of national movements was based on an historical analysis which contained many stimulating ideas. But it did not succeed in explaining the tension and disagreements among nations; the Marxist practical-political program for overcoming national conflicts was a failure. It was apparently a case of erroneously replacing phenomena belonging to the national sphere with those of class struggle, dividing the people into two main antagonistic classes, the proletariate and the bourgeoisie. National identities and national interests were to have been replaced with an international or supra-national unity of the working class. National feelings and nationalism were considered strange and hostile to the idea of unity. T. Nairn, formerly a Marxist expert in the theory of nationalism, wrote:

`Nationalism' is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as `neurosis' in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a similar built-in capacity for descent into dementia, rooted in the dilemmas of helplessness thrust upon most of the world (the equivalent of infantilism for societies) and largely incurable.(159)

Nationalism was to have diminished in the historical process of unifying the world proletariate.

The socialist countries, whose policy was rooted in Marxist ideology, had originally been built upon national principles and the nations preserving the characteristics of their identity.(160) On the one hand, national feelings emphasized in internal affairs; on the other hand, manifestations of national identity were not acceptable from the Marxist ideological point of view. The national was understood to be a lower, earlier stage in the historical process--something that should be overcome. The national was interpreted according to its political-economic aspects. Such fundamental transformation of phenomena of one type into another formed the ideology of each socialist country and deformed the interrelations among members of different nations. Officially, national problems did not exist, but they were only hidden under the sediment of Marxist terminology; they existed latently and were growing to an explosive stage. The failure to resolve the problems in principle, and the responses which were only partial due to political-economic theory, constituted a time bomb for these societies. This exploded upon the loosening of political, ideological and economic ties, when the satellites broke free from the Great Power. This showed the Marxist interpretation of the fundamental antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariate, and its application to the problems of nations, to be deceiving. The emerging period of democracy provides an opportunity for nations to attain the natural aim of every national effort, the achievement of self-identity, self-determination, authenticity and sovereignty as a nation. On the other hand, the same process is perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of those nations which had the advantages of full national development connected with their own national statehood. These two contradictory attitudes towards the problem cause national tension, a growth of nationalism and the rise of related militarism.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE SLOVAK NATIONAL WAY

TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The world of the twentieth century is divided into nations and actual policy has been national in character; this is the reality. Theoretical attitudes towards the nation vary from the negative to the exaggeratedly positive, that is, from underestimating this phenomenon to dealing with it as something absolute. Many criteria, starting points, and intentions actually used in practice remain to be justified. We accept the real existence of the nation, with its specific role in the life of human beings. The complexity of the problem is suggested in A.D. Smith's definition:

National identity and the nation are complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components--ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. They signify bonds of solidarity among members of communities united by shared memories, myths and traditions that may or may not find expression in states of their own but are entirely different from the purely legal and bureaucratic ties of the state.(161)

Each of the components of this complex plays its role in the creation of the picture of the nation: historic territory (homeland), common history (including myths, memories), common culture (language, education), common economy, and the rights and duties of the members of the nation both legal and customary.

Every nation tends to self-determination, a fundamental phenomenon of which is political emancipation. The concept of nation is connected closely with the element of political power. M. Weber asserts that the national represents the specific stratum of pathos of a group of a people connected by a common language, religion, habits or destiny. It is connected with the idea of its own organization of political power, actual or desired.(162) There has been a natural tendency (since the French Revolution) for the nation to attain full emancipation and to exercise its right of self-determination:

Almost every year the United Nations admits new members. And many `old nations', once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by `sub'-nationalisms within their borders--nationalisms which, naturally, dream of shedding this sub-ness one happy day. The reality is quite plain: the `end of the era of nationalism', so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.(163)

Nationalism--a concept frequently used in the theory of nation--is the expression of national feelings, a developed consciousness of national identity. It is both weak and strong. It plays a positive role in that period of a nation's life when strong efforts need to be mobilized in order to defend national interests, mainly at the time of establishing the nation or when it is attacked from the outside. This finds expression also as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential `nation'".(164) The sensitive point in the working of nationalism as an ideology is the prevailingly negative, even militant attitude towards actual or supposed enemies when threatened with the loss of national freedom.

The world at the end of the twentieth century is relatively small and it is very hard to keep national conflict within the borders of the rival nations. Hence, the fragile balance among nations in a threatened area should be defended. One possible way to secure the stability of the political situation is to draw up treaties based on a non-national vision of world order, where the supranational would prevail over national tendencies, where the "national consciousness" would be replaced by a "consciousness of citizenship". Supra-national associations are based on the fact that each of their state members gives up part of its national sovereignty and transfers it to the supranational so that the influence of the nation states will gradually diminish.

On the one hand, the role of regions will increase in the future, mainly in the spheres of culture and education. Indeed, successful cooperation in economy, common attitudes towards important political events in the world scale and common decisions on global economic/political questions are evident in such associations. On the other hand, there are strong efforts to defend particular national interests, and generally there is strong resistance to threats of losing national identity, self-determination, and national sovereignty. Both nations which are only struggling for their rights and those which are fully developed tend to defend their sovereignty.

The period of democratic changes in the countries of the former socialist camp is also understood as a chance to realize the right of all nations to self-determination. For the Slovak nation, this means a fulfillment of the right to exist both de jure and de facto for the first time in its history.

Nearly 70 years of coexistence of the two state-nations, Czechs and Slovaks, document the complexity of the outer and inner influences and conditions which formed the actual shape of their interrelations. The complicated political situation in Europe and throughout the world deeply influenced the inner situation in the Czechoslovak republic and its national state policy.

The Czech and Slovak nations joined in a common state constituted upon the ruins of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, with the aim of realizing the goals of both nations. But, "in contrast to the Czech nation which in the Czechoslovak state found its full national and state realization and became a ruling nation, the Slovak nation in the common Czechoslovak statehood not only did not attain an equivalent position in the quilt of Czechoslovak national ideology, but saw its very existence to be threatened".(165)

The gradual development of mutual relations between Czechs and Slovaks in the independent Republic was deeply and negatively influenced by the idea of Czechoslovakism, which became a state doctrine. This was rooted in the historical Czech-Slovak interrelation which dated back to the period of "national revival" in the nineteenth century. One part of the nineteenth century Slovak national revivalists were Protestant intellectuals who endeavored to resist the Hungarian assimilationist tendencies through an orientation towards Czech lands. This reflected their deep ideological ties, rooted in the Reformation. The proximity of the Slavonic tribes offered mutual help and support to preserve the identities of both nations in a time of oppression. This appears even in the acceptance of Czech as the Slovak literary language. Thus, at that time, progressive ideas contributed to the mutual enrichment of the spiritual life of both nations. Sv. túr, the firm supporter of the idea of Czechoslovakism among the Slovak intellectuals, notes that "the Slovak revival movement is united with the Czech into a higher organic spiritual unity--Slovak revivalists are also Czech revivalists and vice-versa--they are completely synonymous: the general process has been based upon the same themes in both Bohemia and Slovakia."(166) The main representatives of those trends in the Revival Movement were Kollár, afárik (Slovaks), Dobrovský or Palacký (Czechs). The ideas of Czech-Slovak mutuality had strong influence upon the next generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and was transferred, as well, to the socio-political situation of the Czechoslovak republic. The most influential representative of modern ideas of Czechoslovakism in both the theoretical and the political spheres was the first President of Czechoslovak Republic, T.G. Masaryk,(167) whose views found their followers among both Czechs and Slovaks (e.g., V. robár and groups of intellectuals associated around the theoretical journals Prúdy and Hlas).

This idea played a quite positive political role in the very beginnings of the independent Czechoslovak state, when the national shape of the state took form, but it could not pass the test of time. The idea of Czechoslovakism was misused on behalf of Czech political and economic hegemony; it fully ignored the needs and interests of the developed national consciousness of Slovaks. It is not surprising that T.G. Masaryk was present at the preliminary negotiations between the Czech and Slovak participants and that he also signed the Pittsburgh Treaty (May 30, 1918), which followed the ideas of the Cleveland Treaty (Oct. 25, 1915), in which both parties were regarded as independent nations. On behalf of "higher interests", the idea of Czechoslovakism was deformed into that of one homogeneous nation with two branches, one of which, the Slovak, as weaker and underdeveloped depended upon the economic, political and intellectual strength of a self-appointed protector. In this light, the Slovak nation was understood to be an ethnicity with a specific language, particular habits and rural culture; but it was not understood to be a nation with its own homeland, history and culture, with a developed national consciousness which was embodied not only in literature, but also in policy (e.g., as with . túr generation in the middle of the nineteenth century).

Czechoslovakism, when transferred to the social-political order, led to a disproportion in the development of the two nations and to the hegemony of the Czech part. Though civil rights, worked out under the principles of democracy, were equal for all citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, and there were visible positive results from the new type of statehood as the rough national oppression no longer existed, other much more hidden mechanisms were at work.

From the philosophical point of view, the main negative feature of Czechoslovakism was that it deformed the attitudes of a great part of Czech society towards the Slovaks and led to a misunderstanding of the aims of the Slovak nation. The doctrine made impossible a sound coexistence of both nations. Falan characterizes the negative effect of Czechoslovakism as follows:

Czechoslovakism abused the close relationship of the Czech and Slovak nations. It endeavored to incorporate Slovaks into the Czech nation by force. It weakened and deformed the inner national development on both sides by searching for a common national progressive platform. The progressive Czech influence that had really helped Slovaks, lost much of its value and attractiveness because of ignorance of Slovaks as a nation.(168)

The mutual relationship of both nations was deeply influenced by: 1) a fundamental non-understanding of the claims of Slovaks, who were put into the position of chronic malcontent separatists and chauvinists in the prevailing estimation by most of the Czech nation; and 2) the feelings of ignorance of the interests and needs of the Slovak nation which prevails among Slovaks. Even now residues of Czechoslovakism and its negative influences are present in the social consciousness of both nations.

The other negative element was rooted in the mutual relations of both nations after World War II in the period of the socialist build-up when the interior and foreign policy of the state was fully dependent upon the decisions of the Soviet Communist party committee. Due to the Stalinist conception of the role of the center as the highest institution and of the supreme power of the state in the spiritual, political, economic and social spheres, the principle of centrism was introduced in Czechoslovakia. According to this, state and party policy grew together, creating an homogeneous center in Prague. This was the paradoxical solution of the potential Czech problem, whose core was the possibility of the Czech nation being tied to the Western democracies. To eliminate such a possibility, the Czech state and party representations were merged within the Czechoslovak one. With the lapse of time, as the central and particular representations merged in Prague, the Slovak representations acquired the characteristics of regional offices of no importance.

In the meantime the Slovaks had their representations in both state and party spheres but, paradoxically, disappeared from the epicenter of both state and party affairs. No fundamental changes took place in understanding the "proper place" of both nations. The center became a specific ruling body in the state, putting itself somewhere above national interests. So called Pragocentrism--the actual state and party policy--was dangerous both to the Czech and the Slovak nations, although in many mediate ways the Slovak nation felt itself to be attacked the more fundamentally. Pragocentrism held its power also after the declaration of the federal state settlement: the principles of federation were never realized, and representation of the nations' interests in state and party decision-making spheres remained asymetric.

The Pragocentric phenomenon reflected an independent supranational governmental and party decision-making body ruling both the state and party affairs of the republic. Its most important element was the merging of the central and the Czech. In fact, Pragocentrism served as a defence of the interests of a relatively narrow ruling group who maintained a center oriented towards the defence of the interests of the nation with which it was closely connected. In reality, Czechoslovakism and Pragocentrism played the same roles in relation to the Slovak nation. It can be said that the unpublished reactionary program of the Memorandum about Slovaks (worked out by Department of Scientific Policy of the Czech National-Socialist Party in 1946)(169) paradoxically found its expression in the actual policy of the Socialist country in home and foreign affairs as well as in the economy. Its aim was to make the Slovak nation fully dependent on the Czech one, to weaken Slovak national consciousness to such extent that it would be unable to develop a Slovak national policy of an authentic, self-determined, sovereign nation.

Democratic processes in socio-political life resulted in the differentiation in the political scene between the two parts of the republic. Due to political and economic interests, working out a national program became inevitable. The attitude towards the status of the modern nations in a common or divided republic was the core of the most important differences, disagreements and tensions in the broad political-ideological spectrum. This was affected by the heritage of Czechoslovakism and Pragocentrism both negatively and positively. A judgment upon their validity depends upon the aims and the analysis of that historical experiences. The Slovak political scene itself also includes different attitudes towards this crucial question, from federalist, through relatively cautious silence, to strong separatist views. Still, elements of Czechoslovakism and Pragocentrism have a negative effect upon the national consciousness of both nations, which in some cases are disposed to separatist tendencies. Czech premier Pithart admitted that the exasperation of some Czech people results from fundamental incomprehension of the Slovak nation's efforts to attain its authentic national identity and recognized this to be a consequence of the traditional Czechoslovakistic and centristic attitude towards Slovaks deeply rooted in the Czech consciousness.(170) In Slovak national consciousness, the same heritage has a negative effect, directing people to a negative search for some outer enemy responsible for all failures and misfortunes.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

The disintegration of the former socialist camp has freed the nations living in its states to search for their authentic national identity. The Slovak nation is one of those that confront the duty and right to delineate new limits of their self-identity and self-determination.

Over several decades coexistence in a common state with the Czech nation and a number of national minorities appeared unfavorable to the full development of the abilities and aims of the Slovak nation, which felt itself oppressed. Two main factors have deformed the mutual relationship between the Czech and Slovak nations: the ideology of Czechoslovakism and the policy of Pragocentrism, both of which till today have deeply influenced the coexistence of the two nations.

The revived national movement resulted in consequences which surpass the framework of nation and pose the question of how to establish a more sound interrelation between the nations and to secure fulfillment of national self-identity.

The new conditions of the split Czechoslovak Republic have given both nations the chance to develop independently due to their own aims and desires. On the other hand, the split shows the inability of the political representatives of both nations to search for and find positive solutions within the given framework. From this narrow point of view the split reflects a failure.

The Charter of Human Rights declares the right of self-determination or sovereignty for all nations to be among the most important human rights. Except for the special conditions of the six-year existence of the Slovak state during the World War II, the Slovak nation never had the opportunity to legalize this right and in this manner to attain its authentic national identity. Seventy years of coexistence with the Czech nation in a common republic did not provide the chance to realize the national program. The wrong national policy, both in the Czechoslovak republic represented by Czechoslovakism, and in the 40 years after the World War II, deformed by Pragocentrism, not only impeded the emancipation of the nation, but also served to spoil the sound relationship between the Czech and Slovak nations.

The democratic principles of the reconstruction of the new state expressed themselves also in democratic national movements aimed at full emancipation, self-determination and the attainment of authentic national identity. Democracy cannot be realized when nations are forced to surrender their rights to an idea. This is the case even if a nation surrenders a part of its rights in order to be better able to secure the full development of its members. From this point of view, the Slovak national movement can become a test of democracy.

The political situation has been rapidly changing, not only on the global world or European scale, but also in the case of the former Czechoslovak (Socialist and the Federal) Republic, which no longer exists.

It can be discussed whether the split of the Republic expressed a deeply rooted desires for self-determination on the part of the Slovak nation and the parallel desires of the Czech nation to restore its old historical independence, or, on the other hand, as a negative consequence of the hostile separatist tendencies existing equally in both nations.

The final conclusion here underlines the inability of the political representatives of both nations to search for positive solutions of the existing problems within the framework of a common state. This may be the local expression of a global process of disintegration of the greater units on the world political map. Only the test of time can prove the correctness of the chosen way. But it now is the time to prove the ability of the nation to develop in a democratic way by democratic means and in the new conditions of a sovereign state. It is the time to think about establishing a rightful civic society.

The Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences,

Bratislava