The aim of the present paper is to clarify the scientific inadequacy and practical failure of the conception of nation within the theory and practice of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1949. The application of these theories did not lead to an end of the struggle of the Slovak nation for its identity and sovereignty, but complicated the entire process. Instead of granting equal rights to the Czechs and Slovaks, it made their mutual relations worse.

Even experts on the so-called socialist countries were surprised by the unexpected extent, dimensions and intensity the of national movements and conflicts in East and Central Europe. Later they were surprised also by the crisis of "perestroika" in the Soviet Union after the fall of many Communist regimes. The surprise was all the greater, because it followed a half century of proclamations by the official voices and the highest representatives of these countries that national problems had been definitively settled. Eternal friendship and brotherhood among nations and nationalities in their countries, it was claimed, had been established upon socialist internationalism.

The proclamation of the renowned Yugoslavian Communist politician, J. Broz Tito, is typical: "We have solved the question of nationalities so fundamentally that it really can be an example, not only for countries with unsettled national questions, but even for the Soviet Union." He went on to say, "In our country, we have solved the question of nationalities in the best possible way, in accordance with Marxist principles."⁽¹³⁰⁾ The above statements are remarkable in that they were pronounced by a communist leader who officially broke with Stalinism immediately after World War II. Further, he had oriented the political, economic, and cultural development of his country in a "distinctive socialist" way. This militates against reducing contemporary national processes in the post-Communist world to "Stalinist deformations", rather than being connected with authentic Marxist or Leninist teaching.

Earlier political attempts to interpret the new ethnic problems in Central and Eastern Europe, however, are more symbolic than theoretically adequate. Jacques Rupnik is often cited in this respect, comparing the totalitarian Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes to an icebox in which ethnic problems and contentions were frozen, so that now, after its breakdown, we again have everything before us, only all is spoiled.⁽¹³¹⁾ Adam Michnik notes that the urgency of human rights, mainly that of equality, results from the fact that the Communist system was a barbarian form of feudalism in the twentieth century and made apparent the need to struggle to establish democracy.⁽¹³²⁾

Such views, however, reflect only some events rather than the essential and genuine reasons. First among these reasons derived from Communist political and socioeconomic practice itself is the implementation of the Marxist-Leninist theory and formulation of national relations. This practice not only froze contemporary problems and conflicts among nations in several countries, but also founded and developed many of them in such a way that they could not be settled for a longer period. Numberless and endless campaigns against bourgeois nationalists and separatists were provoked through an internally conditioned centralism resulting in open oppression of national identity and sovereignty in the name of universal and international interest. An explanation of contemporary national processes in the Central and Eastern European countries in the postCommunist period must be sought first of all in Communist theory and the practice of the past decades. This not only put national hatred and xenophobia under taboo, but, ironically, often committed these "sins" by offending national self-conscience, by oppression in various forms, by direct physical persecution, and by liquidation of individual nations.

Hence, the life of the Slovak nation under the conditions of the Communist Party government for nearly half a century can be qualified as a further unsuccessful stage of a difficult, hard, complicated, and until now, unfinished emancipation process. During this time, mistrust and conflict increased in relations with the Czech nation, but were muffled and concealed in various ways by official agencies.

Where does one seek the reasons for the failure of the Marxist-Leninist model for settling national problems in general and, in Czechoslovakia, in particular? Which aspects of Communist theory and practice merit special attention in this respect?

INSTRUMENTALISM: THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE

OF MARXISM AND LENINISM RESPONSIBLE FOR

THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL PROBLEMS

From the very beginning of Marxism, the historical materialist interpretation of society and its history led its followers to a general conclusion regarding the historical character of nations, national movements and values. On the basis of its historical, economic, anthropological and other scientific theory, all nations, national movements, ideas, and feelings were considered to be historical phenomena and products of modern history, i.e., the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The more recent history and practice of the Communist movement, however, showed that a critical view is necessary not only of the general Marxist explanations of national conflict, but of the Marxist program for overcoming them and of settling relations among nations. The statement that "as soon as contradictions among classes disappear within a nation, mutual hostility among nations will disappear as well,"⁽¹³³⁾ sounds at the very least, utopian today. But it was the basic Communist policy for settling ethnic problems for decades. A definitive settlement of the national question was tied tightly in Marxism to the assertion of proletarian dictatorship and the definitive introduction of Communism.

A second, and even more essential aspect specified the position and function of nationality within the process of social change: this is the reduction of nationhood to politics and its subordination to the idea of a proletarian revolution and dictatorship. In this light, the value of nationhood was a direct or indirect function of its role in the preparation of the proletarian revolution. This reflects the instrumentalism of the Marxist approach to communities, nations and individual lives. Hence, national questions were never seen as able to be settled independently of basic political aims, but were, at most derivative of the proletarian and socialist revolution, the conquest of power and its preservation. There are many such examples in history, beginning with Marx and Engels' negative evaluations of the national liberation movements of the Slavic nations in the middle of the past century and extending to Communist involvement in the emancipation efforts of colonial nations in this century.

The basic principles of national policy in the Communist movement were expressed unambiguously by J.V. Stalin. In spite of certain differences with Lenin, due to his opinions in this very sphere, he was rightly regarded as the official interpreter of Lenin's opinions on nationalities. His speeches teem with characteristic statements in which even the implementation of the right of nations to self-determination, which was recognized and propagated by Communists, was made conditional, not only upon strategic but also upon tactical political considerations:

It is necessary to keep in mind that besides the right of nations to self-determination, there exists as well the right of the working class to the reinforcement of its power, and that the right of self-determination is subordinated to this right. The right of self-determination must recede before the rights of the workers' power. Such a situation obtained in 1920, when we were forced to send an expedition to Warsaw in order to defend proletarian class power.

When analyzing Marx's letter on national questions in an article on selfdetermination, Lenin concluded: "For Marx, the subordinate significance of the national question is indisputable in comparison with the `workers question'" which determines "the decision in all questions."⁽¹³⁴⁾ This standpoint reflects not only Marxist instrumentalism in settling national problems, but even the claim of a right "to export revolution", as applied practically by the Communist movement without respect for state sovereignty.

National movements lack a characteristic requirement for a Communist movement, which gradually makes them into its own instrument of revolution and power. It finds rich sources of energy for its political and class struggles in a justified displeasure and embitterment of oppressed nations; but this often is connected with vehement fanaticism.

Thus, the most noble-minded proponents of the national rights of oppressed nations, who appeared under its banner, experienced dramatic disappointments and frustrations. For pragmatic and instrumental reasons, they are required to make sudden and unforeseen reversals in national policy, often at variance with genuine and evident national interests.

At the same time, there are cases in history when the Communist movement became a support for nationally and politically oppressive movements and regimes. Stalin explained that, "The struggle of the Afghan Emir for the independence of Afghanistan is an objectively revolutionary struggle in spite of the Emir's monarchistic opinions and those of his followers, because it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism."⁽¹³⁵⁾ This standpoint confirmed Marxist instrumentalism in the settlement of national problems and provides a key for understanding the activities of Communist states once they conclude alliances.

In our opinion, a deeper explanation of the lack of success of Communist theory and practice in the sphere of national relations is to be sought primarily in an inadequate reduction of nationhood to political and economic elements. One can say truthfully that the Marxists never got rid of certain economic rules of thumb in spite of frequently declared efforts to settle problems on both levels by chosen political means.

In this connection, Lenin's interpretation of the well-known thesis in the Communist Manifesto: "Workers have no country" is significant. He writes in a letter to Iness Armand: "A worker has no home country--this means that his economic standing is not national but international, his class enemy is international and likewise the conditions of his liberation; the international unity of the worker is more important than the national one."⁽¹³⁶⁾

Consequently, the preparation of the revolution and for the "dictatorship of the proletariat", etc., is international in substance according to Marx and Lenin. This is why international considerations were always further reaching and were weighed as more important than national ones. It was the basis of the instrumentalization of national movements in the interest of attaining Communist aims. Accordingly, members of the Communist movement in individual nations were advised alternately to promote national movements and to be indifferent in order to weaken and oppose them. Such is the judgment of several political scientists, historians and philosophers.⁽¹³⁷⁾

In view of the "whole-part" relation, in which all is mainly a function of a whole, Marxism interpreted nations as functions of the international order, rather than as independent, free active subjects developing a whole by their activities. The national was reduced to the political and economic, as was noted by T.G. Masaryk in his critique of Marxism. He pointed out that Marx and Engels had subordinated ethnic reality to economic conditions from the standpoint of historical materialism, just as the Jewish nation had been reduced by Marx to a special economic egoism. Differences among nations were reduced to economics; the notion of nation had been understood by Marx in a solely political sense.⁽¹³⁸⁾ Such a stance results from a philosophical underestimation of the nation as a value in its own right. This existential value is described by D. Tatarka: "A nation, however, is a vivid organism, a superstructure. It is like a leaf of a tree or a human body. That is why a nation behaves and reacts as an organism, in a sort of quiet mutual understanding with all differences in manifestations in various historical situations."⁽¹³⁹⁾ In contrast, in the Marxist understanding, the nation is mainly an instrument to achieve the political aims of Communist movements.

Depending on circumstances, such instruments can be national movements and programs of oppressed nations as well as those trying to attain independence. These instruments can be used also for suppression of differences and conflicts as required by the unity of the proletariat. The pragmatic standpoint of its authors and partisans results shape the instrumental grasp of the international relations as well as of questions of organization and state law.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾-⁽¹⁴¹⁾

Just as it postpones the settlement of all social problems, Marxism postponed the settlement of the national question as well, until the time of a so-called proletarian, socialist and Communist democracy. This was to be embodied in one political party, namely the Communist party, whose operation could be expressed best by the notions: monolithic, monopoly and monologue. "It is a monolith because of its internal structure based on strict discipline, a monopoly in view of its claim to exclusive political power, and a monologue in view of the structure of its rhetoric."⁽¹⁴²⁾

On the basis of historical facts, from the "socialist" stage of development of several countries, the above attributes of their former political systems appear historically to have been the main reason for their failure to settle national problems in their territories. They often led to the elimination of proven constitutional practices or to calling federations "pseudo federations", and the like. "Since this party was strictly centralized, there was no context for a practically functioning federalism that supposed political pluralism, because that would mean a `unity of the different'."⁽¹⁴³⁾

The analysis of Slovak national history in the years of Communist totalitarianism leads to similar considerations and conclusions. National problems in Czechoslovakia and relations between the Czechs and Slovaks in particular were settled at that time by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in accord with its principles.

THE PRIMACY OF THE CENTER IN THE ORGANIZATION

OF A MULTINATIONAL TOTALITARIAN STATE

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) always approached the settlement of relations between the Czechs and Slovaks and the situation of the Slovaks in the republic according to its long-term aims for political power.

Although it recognized the existence of the Slovak nation as early as 1924, it refused the ideology of Czechoslovakism, and its representatives called for the equality of both nations. Yet for decades it did not manage to prepare a consistent national program which would guarantee equal standing for the Slovak nation under constitutional law. The "Slovak question" had to be settled mostly by overcoming economic and social problems, limiting bureaucratic activities of the unitary state, etc. This can be explained by the ethnic composition of the Communist party and its leaders, and by its central organizational structure in which, for a long time, national and territorial principles were not applied. Nor can the policy of the international Communist movement, or of the Communist Internationale be forgotten. As late as the 30s, especially in connection with the growing danger of German Fascism, there was an essential change in the attitude towards national movements at the heart of the world Communist movement: henceforth, these movements were to be used for the defense of the Soviet Union. That is why great attention was paid by the Communist parties in individual countries to national factors during World War II. In time this would lead to the dissolution of the Communist International.

The coquetry of the Soviet Union and personally of Stalin with the Slavs and Slavic idea fits well into this description, as is illustrated by a purely rhetorical statement of Stalin: "We bolsheviks, or we can say Communists, have a different view of the Slav. We wish for all to be allies regardless of being small or large and for each of them to preserve their independence, shape, and internal life according to their ideologies and traditions--whether well or badly."⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ The Panslavic Committee began to act in the spirit of this proclamation in Moscow, and the Soviet press began to publish many articles on the heroism and bright future of the Slavic nations. As we know, this train of thought came to a grinding halt quickly after the war, as soon as European non-Slavic nations, especially Hungary and Romania, set out to found peoples' democracies. The idea of Slavism then was replaced by that of proletarian and socialist internationalism.

The change of the Comintern's attitude towards national movements and its attention to the creation of "national" programs within the Communist party was expressed in the aims of the Czechoslovak Communists during and after the war. Such phenomena as the rise of the Communist party in Slovakia and the political slogan "For Soviet Slovakia" during World War II are understandable against the background of these aims. Their common denominator was a marked effort to make use of national efforts for the political aims of the Communist forces. The Comintern's leading representative, G. Dimitrov, advised Czechoslovak Communists in 1944 in accord with the overall interests of the Communist movement. He wished, also, to satisfy Slovak Communists who were worried by the irresolution of their Czech partners regarding a settlement of the Slovak question, especially of the constitutional relation between the Czechs and Slovaks, because this interfered in their effort to attain a dominant position in Slovak political life:

I think that the best relation between Czechs and Slovaks in the liberated Czechoslovakia would be an equal position of the Czechs and Slovaks, a Czech government in Bohemia, a Slovak government in Slovakia, and a common federative Czechoslovak government; the existence of a Czech parliament, of a Slovak parliament, and likewise, a common Czechoslovak parliament.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

Kl. Gottwald, as the head of the Moscow CPC center, accepted the idea of a federation after certain hesitation. Allegedly, he could not decide whether he wanted a federation or Slovak autonomy in February 1945, but as we know, he postponed the concrete regulation until a later time when the whole country would be liberated and the Slovak National Council would already be exercising its legislative and administrative duties. The hesitant manner of Kl. Gottwald and of his Czech and CPC agents to the solution of the key national problem in Czechoslovakia resulted from the accustomed pragmatic Marxist-Leninist interference in national issues, as G. Dimitrov states.

While Dimitrov dealt from the universal interests of the Communist movement, Gottwald and his leading group within the CPC were already having difficulties in their own country. Significantly marked by Stalinism, they also acted under pressure from the Czech national socialists and populists. According to J. Fierlinger, Stalin advised Czechoslovak forces, including Dr. Bene, in December, 1944 that "it will be necessary for the Slovaks to be firmly held in hand."⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ All these circumstances surely prompted Kl. Gottwald to oppose a federation in the future Czechoslovak republic in April, 1945. "He no longer wanted to support a federative settlement. . . . On the one hand, he apprehended a break with circles around Bene, on the other hand, he supposed that such a standpoint of the CPC would be misused by Bene' followers for nationalist agitation against the party among the masses of the Czech people."⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ The instrumental Marxist-Leninist element in nationality issues decided the fatal question for the Slovak nation in a single moment which echoed for a very long time. It pragmatically subordinated the nation to the aims and interests of the Communist movement in general, especially in Bohemia which became the deciding power in the CSR after World War II.

Under such circumstances, the settlement of relations between the Czechs and Slovaks became a chain of contentions and conflicts on various questions of constitutional law, the respective competencies of the center and the parts of the country, between the central government and the Slovak National Council, and even between the central committee of CPC and that of Slovakia (CPS). All this concealed a deeper struggle of the Communist party for power and for the dictatorship of the proletariat in the shape of a people's democracy. This framework also hid the penetration of Stalin's concept of socialism in Czechoslovakia with its typically centralist form of social life connected with oppression and terror. This was the painful birth of the political system headed by the Communist party.

This raises the question, "What actually is the above mentioned center and how was it formed?" First of all, it was the Czechoslovak government that defined itself as central in its relation to the Slovak National Council. The Czech National Council never "tried to become an organ similar to the Slovak National Council, for its representatives preferred getting into the government." When formulating the functions of the central government the voices that came from Slovakia were not taken into consideration. "Like the Slovak nation, the Czech nation too should have its legislative and governmental organ; the central legislative and governmental power should clearly differ from the representations of national organizations `by its central and state character.'"⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ That is why it was soon dissolved and replaced by regional national committees similar to those previously constituted for Moravia. Since these committees had neither legislative nor governmental power, an asymmetrical state organization came into being. In a certain way, it had already been founded in the Koice Governmental Programme according to which relations between Czechs and Slovaks were shaped until 1968. Whatever the reasons and aims of this act may be and whoever the author, the significance of this event lay in the fact that the statehood of the Czech nation merged into Czechoslovak statehood from that moment and increasingly influenced it.

This was due to some further circumstances: the central government increasingly formed political policies on the basis of the experiences and needs of the more numerous and influential Czech nation, whose center was in Prague, and the dissension with the Slovaks took on a CzechSlovak character. This new situation closely resembled that in Czechoslovakia before the war: Slovak participation was modified and reduced, not only in the Czechoslovak government but also in other state institutions. This is confirmed by the data published by S. Falan.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ A similar situation arose within the Communist party as well, where there was inadequate representation of Slovaks at the highest level, etc. As a consequence of these conflicts in the political sphere, conflicts between the Slovak Communists and the central government, which was formed mostly of Czech Communists, were frequent.

Two historical events, one from 1945 the other from 1946, were characteristic. The first serious conflict between the central government and Slovakia arose in July, 1945. In the CPC Central Committee, fear of certain successes of the democratic party (i.e., in its inner consolidation and organized resistance to the Communists in Slovakia) evoked a sharp criticism of Slovak Communist activities. At a common session of the CPC and CPS, the representative of CPC, V. Kopecký, resolutely asked his partner in Slovakia to lean on "the progressive policy of the central government." The discussion stressed the need for consequent implementation of the formerly agreed upon measure, which meant practically the first weakening of the Slovak National Council. After the Communists won the election in Bohemia and the Democratic party won the election in Slovakia in May, 1946, the conflict between Prague and Slovakia became more sharp. It had far-reaching effects, weakening the competency of the Slovak national organization in view of the needs of the Czechoslovak communist movement. V. Kopecký described V. Lettrich's request in October, 1945, to establish a Czech National Council as a form of separatism and proclaimed, "The Czechoslovak government, in fact, reigns in Czech countries only; Slovakia is governed by the Board of Commissioners representing a certain continuation to J. Tiso's regime."⁽¹⁵⁰⁾

As a consequence, the Slovaks were punished for their resistance to Communist pressures in the realm of constitutional law. The Slovak National Council was restricted in fulfilling the functions of a national organ and its national significance was diminished. From then on, it could no longer make important decisions without the consent of the central government. The need of the council's consent on nationwide decisions was abolished, and the activities of the Board of Commissioners and individual commissioners became directly dependent on the Prague government and its ministers. The whole series of events and their culmination is a lapidary example of the reduction and sacrifice of Slovak national rights to the interest and aims of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A paradigmatic example of the situation was increasing domination by the central government, not only of Communist, but also of Czech forces in general, including Czechoslovak forces with their characteristic negation of the independence of the Slovak nation. The central government became more or less the only place for the formation of natural Czech statehood and also the place of the formulation of nationwide politics, marked more by the perceptions and aims of the Czech nation than by a grasp of the needs of Slovaks.

Both of these events were not only a beginning, but also a pre-figuration of what would happen on a domestic as well as an international scale in the whole of Central and Southeastern Europe. The way for a settlement of the nationality problem, including the relation between Czechs and Slovaks, by the typical methods of the Communist totalitarian system, opened in Czechoslovakia after the coup d'etat in February 1948 when a proletarian dictatorship was introduced and Czechoslovakia became a part of the "socialist block."

The extreme centralization of political, economic, and social processes projected its characteristics over the whole process on the international and domestic levels. All local and national differences were wiped out on the basis of the application of the "general legitimacy of socialist construction" and in the interest of the "unity of the people", "blocks" and individual countries. An ideological aspect of this process is the rejection of "bourgeois nationalists." The bearer and supporter of unification is a special social power which, after having been trained in socialist conditions, takes its place above the society. The party-state bureaucracy gradually comes to direct all events in society. "History changed this party from the reigning one into the only one and contributed to the coalescence of the party apparatus with those of the state and the economy. There arose a great independent force in the society."⁽¹⁵¹⁾

This power was to secure the interests and hegemony of the Soviet Union in individual countries in the name of internationalism. It formulated the universal Communist interests to which all was subordinated, including the national issue. Historical facts show that this took place in multinational states at the center of the party-state bureaucracy. The formulation of national politics consequently was situated at the seat of the politically, economically, and culturally most influential nation.

Under these circumstances, when issues arise from the interests and needs of a given nation in the formulation of national policies especially when social control is weakened by restricted parliamentary activities--the whole process takes on the concrete form of a conflict between the center and parts. This creates the basis for an endless "struggle against bourgeois nationalism," separatism, etc. Such a situation was found not only in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In past decades, national politics was formulated mainly on the basis of the needs and experience of the Czech nation and subsequently asserted in Slovakia. The phenomenon was present in a marked form in the above-mentioned asymmetric model, but it existed in a more veiled form in the federation, because it had its continuing basis in the activities of the ruling CPC.

INEQUALITY IN THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND

THE BACK OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SLOVAK NATION

The approach to settling national problems between the Czechs and Slovaks according to methods typical of Communist totalitarian systems began in Czechoslovakia mainly after the coup of February, 1948. The dictatorship of the proletariat then took specific form and Czechoslovakia became a part of the "socialist block."

The pragmatic and instrumental approach of the Communist party to the issue of nationhood took on a new form in Czechoslovakia after its rise to power. No longer was it seen as a source of social energy and means for the class struggle; rather it appeared as something negative, a barrier to be identified and surmounted as quickly as possible. The settlement of national problems through an overestimation of the economic factors in social life can be formulated as follows: "The equality of rights of both nations consists in creating conditions for the economic, cultural and social life of both Czechs and Slovaks."⁽¹⁵²⁾ In a matter-of-fact way, this is defined as the cultural and economic compensation of Slovakia mainly by its industrialization. The concrete form of this activity, its management and effects were conditioned by two circumstances, the process of a general and strict centralization of the country and the fusion of Czech statehood with Czechoslovak statehood.

Slovak politics was reduced to directives formulated at the center regarding Slovak conditions. Slovak politicians participated in discussions on directives in central organizations, it is true, but their influence in decision-making was small due to their small numbers. As a consequence, the main principles and directives were transferred through collective organizations where the Slovaks could give their comments, but to a decreasing degree. The social and economic structures of both parts of the republic, their traditions, psychological and political experiences were different. National politics was asserted in the two parts, but it was formulated on the basis of the conditions of its most influential part. Slovakia was taken into consideration only in looking for methods to realize principles already approved and based upon Czech conditions even in the eastern part of the republic.⁽¹⁵³⁾ It is even possible to say that the Communists, while recognizing the existence of the two nations, created, by their centralist practices, the space for the revival of Czechoslovakism.

In such a situation, what happened to Slovak political organizations and the constitutional sphere? National emancipation processes culminate there because that is where a nation attains or loses the means necessary to make decisions regarding its lot. Thus, Bolshevik centralization of the whole of Czechoslovak social life naturally started at the source of power, the CPC. The Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) had been constituted during the war in view of the new situation of the communist movement after the rise of an independent Slovak state and the abolition of its independence.

The chairman of the CPC central committee decided on July 26 and 29, 1948: "On the principle that the working class and working people of Czechoslovakia should have sole political leadership in the sole nationwide CPC, the presidium of the CPC central committee decides:

1. The next session of the CPC Central Committee will decree that the Communist Party of Slovakia cease to exist as an independent party and become a part of the CPC.

2. From now on, the party organization in Slovakia will bear the name of the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS).

3. The CPS Central Committee will be subordinate to the central committee of the CPC and will follow its directions and carry out the policy of the CPC in Slovakia.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

Towards the end of September, 1948, the CPC central committee decreed that "CPS become a part of the CPC." Since that moment, the function of its central committee was reduced to enforcement of Prague central policy.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾

In the following decades, Slovak governmental and legislative organizations were objects of incessant pressure and manipulation; instead of being representative of their own nation, they became instruments for the implementation of central policies, which often did not respect important Slovak interests. The result was a limitation of Slovak rights for twenty years. The Marxist-Leninist way of settling problems between the Czechs and Slovaks culminated in the liquidation of Slovak national organizations.

This process was often justified by such paradoxical arguments as both the jeopardy and the success of socialism. The constitution of May 9, 1948, which was issued immediately after the Communist rise to power in the Slovak National Council, restricted many activities of a national and regional character. The position of the Board of Commissioners and of the Commissioners themselves in relation to the Prague government was partly strengthened after the twentieth convention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But the rigged process against Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" in the Communist party was a warning and punishment for resistance of some Slovak Communists to the disrespect of Slovak national interests. The competencies of the Slovak National Council were again reduced to predominantly normative activities in the 1960 constitution which proclaimed the victory of socialism in the country. After the fusion of legislative and governmental powers in the national council and the disestablishment of the Board of Commissioners, the Slovak National Council ceased to fulfill national functions and became only a regional executive organ within the unitary state.

Slovak historians, political scientists and economists provide many facts leading to the conclusion that the way of dealing with the Slovak question in the Communist totalitarian system could not and did not lead to equal status for the Slovak nation in Czechoslovakia. Let us note the most important of these facts and conclusions:

1. Economically, there was a lessening of equality of Czechs and Slovaks in the economic sphere. Overcoming backwardness in Slovakia offered possibilities for willfulness on the part of the central government, especially when the identity and self-respect of the Slovak nation were fundamentally challenged.

2. Economic activities, beginning with industrialization and aimed at economic balance between Slovakia and the Czech areas, were not effective since they were directed by the central government according to its own interests and without a sufficient consideration of the Slovaks. Even when a certain constructive effect cannot be denied, Slovakia as a part of the Czechoslovak economy was not made sufficiently autonomous, but remained often a source of raw material for the more developed Czech economy, with great sacrifice and loss to Slovakia. In many cases out-ofdate technologies were transferred to Slovakia restructuring Czech industry according to the needs of the "socialist block." When deciding on the sites of new production plants, the interests of the Czechs were often hidden behind the interests of the central government.

3. A frequent reduction or cancellation of power in Slovak national organizations, and at times even their liquidation under various pretexts, led to a permanent elimination of the hope of Slovak national sovereignty, accompanied by oppression of national self-confidence and pride, e.g., in the campaign against Slovak "bourgeois nationalism," etc.

4. The nation and national values underwent a characteristic "ideologization" in cultural events, frequent falsification of recent historical facts (e.g., the Slovak National uprising during the World War II, where the Slovak nation specifically expressed its identity and its decision to be the architect of its own in democratic life), a pragmatic selection and interpretation of national traditions, and an ignoring of the national-religious tradition.

Finally, the federal organization of the country was at variance with the wishes of the Czechoslovak-oriented powers and with the wishes of the Soviet political leaders in the reformation of 1968. This was developed especially under the pressure of Slovak Communists striving to strengthen their positions in the Slovak environment, but it was not a form of genuine sovereignty for the Slovak nation. In the very first years of normalization, this federal organization of the country was formally negated by several laws and caricatured by the renewal of the activities of the centralized Communist party whose efforts at "symmetrization" were "nipped in the bud" after 1969. The disestablishment of the bureau of the CPC central committee for party work in the Czech nations followed.

In sum, the emancipation of the Slovak nation, even after one hundred and fifty years, did not reach its natural culmination as a democratic state of its own during the years of Communist domination. Nor did the next generation experience well-rounded national development. Disappointment and disenchantment often were experienced by those who had related the attainment of national aims to the implementation of Communist social changes. The Slovak nation experienced a double pressure at that time: "the twin influence of Stalinist dictatorship in Slovakia,"⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ and of Communist dictatorship in general.

In view of the above internal situation, the different conditions of the Czech and Slovak nations in relation to the central government and to internal and external events, such as the rise and reinforcement of the Communist dictatorship, affected both nations in different ways and to different extents. Although Communist oppression befell both nations, the Slovak nation "did not obtain the minimal space of independence possessed by the Czechs,"⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ and consequently suffered a double oppression. The noble mottos of proletarian internationalism and the brotherhood of nations hid a division of nations and a double oppression of one of them; its consequences were distrust and even hatred. This came fully to light after the fall of the regime when the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia not only artificially froze the existing national problems and conflicts, but also significantly contributed to their inflammation.

Earlier, it was mentioned that the inadequacy of the Communist attempts to remedy national problems resulted mainly from its pragmaticinstrumental underestimation of the nations, their national movements, and national values in general. As can be seen from the second part of our considerations, Marxism ignored also such values and principles of society as plurality, freedom and equality. That is why it was not able to formulate and implement the genuine interests of a multinational whole. Hence, the present renewal of modern democracy in post-Communist countries takes place in the name of human rights and the renewal of values in civil society. In these circumstances, national movements are to be understood as deeply human and democratic, as directed against phenomena of hegemony, and as aimed at restoring the identity and independence of nations which previously had been denied full rights.

What can be deduced from these reflections upon nations, and what are the possibilities and suppositions of peaceful coexistence?

1. Because hegemony can become a basis of malignant nationalism, a nation should not be considered the highest good. However, it is not possible to ignore, underestimate or negate in the name of some higher interests the phenomenon of nation or that the national feelings of citizens are an important quality of their life. We witness a surprising resistance on the part of national identities which even the brutal oppression during Communist regimes could not liquidate. This is because nations are the optimal form of human existence at this stage of human development. The following view can be accepted in this context without the slightest reservation:

A nation is human flesh; it is a natural organism, as self-evident as mountains and rivers, as people and life itself. No one had devised a more suitable environment for communication among people, for social coexistence and the rise of cultural values. These are the only imperishable values proper to civilization. The world of feeling and the awareness of nationality are as unique and unrepealable as are one's identity and individuality. There always comes a time--usually one of anxiety--when subterranean rivers burst to surface, when a nation breathes in one breath and sounds in one sound, when the awareness of a common fate is so mighty that under it all barriers break down, when deposits of dogma and fabricated values are washed away and the depths are laid bare: there is something in these depths that unites all members of a nation.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾

The present time of the collapse of totalitarian Communist regimes seems to be such a time.

2. Historical experience shows that the peaceful coexistence of nations can be attained only under the conditions of a modern civil democracy: the classical motto: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, expresses its essence, namely, that the bearer of political power is a free citizen, that law does not recognize "higher" and "lower" strata or classes, and that the national social dimension be respected. Brotherhood is the basis of contemporary national feeling, expressing a close spiritual connection of citizens in language, culture and history. Civil society makes this possible by projecting the civil and national into state-forming action in order to obtain the desired harmony between the state and the nation.

Such a harmony could not be attained in the former Communist states, because their creators were not citizens fulfilling the double task of citizens and members of national communities in a multinational state, but a centralized social power, the Communist party, pushing through its ruling interests. Stagnation in the development of the structures of civil society is usually a basis, not only for tensions and conflicts among citizens, ethnic communities and state, but also for inequality and conflict among nations. This is because the absence of the civil dimension leads to the end of the nation and, hence, to the loss of connection with the other nations which partake in the creation of a world culture.

The Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences,

Bratislava