PRINCIPLES AS PERSONAL RULES
Modern moral philosophy presents both meta-ethical and normative challenges to Confucian ethics. The meta-ethical challenge may be met by a reconstruction of a coherent conceptual scheme, with the ideal of taoa (the Way) as a unifying perspective for viewing the interdependence of basic aretaic notions (notions of virtue), i.e, jena (benevolence), lic (propriety), and id (rightness).1 Given this scheme, one may proceed to deal with questions concerning ethical language and justification via a conception of argumentation as a cooperative enterprise aiming at a reasoned solution to a problem of common interest among concerned and responsible members of a moral community. Recently, based on Hsün Tzue, I offered a profile of Confucian argumentation, consisting of a characterization of desirable qualities of participants, standards of competence, phases of discourse, diagnosis of erroneous beliefs, as well as uses of definition in overcoming difficulties in communication.2
According to that account, justification is a phase of discourse, a reasoned response to a challenge to the acceptability of one's thesis. This response is chiefly anchored in ethical knowledge, that is, in the participant's "understanding of an ethical tradition's significance for coping with novel or exigent circumstances. Since there are no formulas or rules for resolving these hard cases, the task of justification in the final analysis lies in the unification of the participant's understanding of the actuating force of his ethical knowledge with judgment arrived at through a critical and informed deliberation of matters at hand. This judgment is essentially the product of the reasoned exercise of one's sense of rightness in response to changing circumstances (yi-i pien-yingf), and not derived from the application of so-called principles of conduct.3 While there is indirect guidance provided by knowledge of accepted applications of li (ritual rules) and other aretaic notions, it is the special function of i (sense of rightness) to interpret and judge their relevance or irrelevance in a concrete and ethically perplexing setting.4
This conception of justification does not appeal to the notion of principle that possesses the status of objective validity and universal applicability, an appeal that is deemed requisite by most contemporary ethical thinkers (e.g., Kantian, utilitarian, and contractarian). Nevertheless, it seems proper to me that when principles are construed somewhat along the line of Kant's notion of maxims or "subjective principles of volition," i.e., as personal rules of conduct, they can have an important role to play in ethical deliberation and/or justificationindeed, even for the conception of justification sketched in the preceding paragraph. These personal rules of conduct may be called "perceptive principles" or "first-personal precepts." As Aiken points out, their authoritative status is "contingent entirely upon the conscientious submission of the persons who adopt them."5 More importantly, for a reflective Confucian agent, the adoption of such principles involves a reasoned assessment of his purposes, preferences, and desires in relation to the ideal of tao, the vision of the good human life. The Analects (Lun Yüg) provides an ample source for the adoption and development of personal rules of conduct. Most of the recorded conversations of Confucius and his students may be viewed as counsels to doing one's best (chungh) in the pursuit of the realization of tao. For example, one may recall his stress on respectfulness, courtesy, trustworthiness, kindness, generosity, and concern for, and consideration, of the well-being, feelings and desires of one's fellows. These remarks are more than mere counsels of prudence in the Kantian sense; they are intended notably as pointers to the constitutive means for the realization of tao.
Perceptive principles, though dependent on personal acceptance, may serve to articulate the significance of the agent's commitment to tao in his or her own life. When habitually adhered to, they may even be considered as a counterpart of the li (ritual rules) of the ethical tradition. In other words, these personal principles are rules of self-discipline and may well be quite in accord with the spirit of Confucius' teaching that to attain jen, the person must possess the ability to overcome or restrain those seemingly ungovernable passions that obstruct the compliance with li (ritual rules) (Lun Yü, 12:1). Possessing such personal disciplinary principles entitles the person to commendation. Indeed, self-mastery (k'e-chii) is a Confucian virtue. But as Mencius points out, there are many paths to jen. If one attends to the difference in personal circumstance, it is unreasonable to expect all agents, particularly the paradigmatic individuals (chün-tzuj), to behave in the same way (Meng Tzuk, 6B:6).6
As personal rules of conduct, principles can also have a valuable role to play in representing a committed agent's interpretation of the perceptive import of particular aretaic notions. Conceptually considered, Confucius's use of such notions as trustworthiness (hsinl) and respectfulness (chingm) are open to individual interpretation regarding their practical import. Since tao is the unifying perspective, these principles, as the outcome of the exercise of reason (lin), may properly be construed as ethical principles, as suggested by Wang Yang-ming's notion of tao-lio. In the light of tao, these principles are ideal-embedded, oriented toward the actualization of tao in human life. Again, they make no claim to universal validity nor to prescription of absolute or fixed rules of conduct. In elucidating Mencius's saying that "holding the mean without allowing for special circumstances is like holding on to one particular thing," Wang Yang-mingp remarks that "the mean is nothing but the change. It changes according to the time. How can one hold it fast? One must have a sense of timing in determining what is the appropriate thing to do. It is difficult to fix a pattern or action in advance."7
Of course, when the agent is acknowledged as a paradigmatic individual by his fellows in the community, his principles can have a projective significance for others. But whether his perceptive interpretation of aretaic notions deserves attention from other agents remains an open question. An agent may publicly advocate his principles, but this advocacy is subject to critical consideration and acceptance by others. These principles cannot be proffered as self-certifying, authoritative pronouncements.
In argumentative context, personal, ideal-embedded principles may also be an articulation of the participant's understanding of the inherited core of common ethical knowledge, that is, the knowledge of those operative standards of conduct plausibly presumed to be a matter of conventional wisdom. Since such a presumption is defeasible, each participant carries a burden of reasonable persuasion in advocating his or her principles as "the" correct or sound interpretation of what is deemed implicit in common ethical knowledge. It is to be expected that there will be an absence of agreement or even disagreement among competent participants in their understanding of the import of ethical knowledge for a case at hand. Given that argumentation is a cooperative undertaking to resolve a problem of common interest, the absence of agreement should provide an occasion for transforming it into one of agreement. In the larger view of the ennobling function of li (ritual rules), i.e., the promotion of the virtues of nobility and goodness,8 a Confucian would endorse Collingwood's view that "being civilized means living, so far as possible, dialectically, that is, in constant endeavor to convert every occasion of non-agreement into an occasion of agreement."9
In the case of disagreement, a concerned and responsible participant would adhere to the cooperative spirit in investigating alternatives congenial to the pursuit of a common enterprise, rather than hold on tenaciously to his own view. For his view may be the product of obscuration of mind (piq), rather than an impartial exercise of reason (li).10 While disagreement may not be transformed into agreement, personal principles, when sincerely espoused in argumentation, are not without value, for they can function as critical instruments for the transformation of the ethical tradition. They provide a range of possible options in interpreting the living significance of tradition in dealing with present problematic situations. As one eminent historian of the Christian tradition puts it, "Ultimately, . . . tradition will be vindicated for us, for each of us as an individual and for us as communities, by how it manages to accord with our deepest intuitions and highest aspirations," which are themselves "imbedded in the tradition."11 A living tradition is enriched by its historical past and interpreted by members of the community as having a present significance.
Seen in this way, Confucian argumentation may be considered properly as an exemplification of a Roycean community of interpretation, an ongoing dialectical process that has no terminus.12 While the goal is to seek agreement, the claim to the interpersonal significance of personal principles is essentially contestable by fellow agents. The exercise of li (reason) has no single voice that commands allegiance of all agents. The search for a monolithic account of the use of reason appears to be a delusion (huor), a condition to be rectified by cultivating the clarity of mind (mings) to dispel the varieties of factors that obstruct the mind's cognitive task. I suggest, then, that in argumentation, the claim to interpersonal significance for personal principles is best construed as a claim to an experiment in moral change, as an attempt to endow renewed significance to ethical knowledge. Were such a claim accepted by all the participants and become a basis of teaching, personal principles would acquire a de jure status and become part of the content of an established tradition. In this manner, personal principles may be transmuted into impersonal principles. But they remain subject to further critical interpretation of their significance in dealing with future issues of human conduct.13
The preceding observations on the role and status of principles as personal rules of conduct presuppose a critical appreciation of the internal point of view of Confucian ethics as an ethics of virtue that stresses the value of principles in contributing to the cultivation of the virtues of self-discipline and of cooperation.14 Notably, it is an ethics that is preoccupied with cultural renaissance or the continuing vitality of a cultural tradition, but makes no claim to certainty nor universality in interpretation. As set forth in Chang Tsai'st powerful essay entitled "Western Inscription" (Hsi-mingu), the vision of tao. or jen in the broad sense, is indeed universal, in that it expresses an ideal of human care and concern for the well-being of all existent things, an ideal of the unity and harmony of humans and all things in the world. Implied in this vision is not a norm to be spelled out in terms of a set of universal principles of conduct, but something more like a theme that admits of a diversity of interpretations of its concrete significance and crucially depends for its realization on a serious regard for an operative ethical tradition.15 Moreover, in this tao-oriented conceptual scheme, the application of aretaic notions and their correlative principles is essentially culture-bound.
For a philosopher who does not share this orientation and is impressed with ethical objectivism, doubts may be raised on the plausibility of Confucian ethics as a universal ethics. Although its vision is universal in the sense that it encompasses all things in the universe, its focus on the continuing significance of a living tradition smacks of provincialism or relativism. Also, the implicit conception of practical reason as an exercise of i (sense of rightness) in dealing with exigent situations suggests that some ethical judgments are ad hoc judgments. It may be questioned whether such judgments are rationally defensible without an appeal to principles that have the status of moral truths, truths independent of human thought and interest. A Confucianist may rejoin by pointing out that such a critique is proffered from the external point of view of an observer. It is not denied that an observer can have an insight into the merits and defects of Confucian ethics, but such an insight must be based on an appreciation of what it means to take the internal point of view of Confucian ethics, rather than on a deduction from an abstract doctrine such as objectivism, which is itself a product of a philosophical tradition, and thus can hardly be said to be representative of consensus among moral philosophers.16 Arguably, by imaginative anticipation of the evaluative purpose of the use of a Confucian concept, an observer can have an insight into its use without endorsing it. But in so doing, "He cannot quite stand outside the evaluative interest of the community he is observing and pick up the concept simply as a device for dividing up in a rather strange way certain neutral features of the world."17
Nor can an observer understand practical reason in Confucian ethics without appreciating the internal point of view of those operative standards of argumentative competence and the guidelines provided by language and culture. Or more generally, it is plausible to maintain that there is a "social practice of reason" that comprises such activities as deliberating, explaining, justifying, reasoning, and choosing. Associated with this practice is a set of general guidelines provided by tradition and culture. The aim of these activities and guidelines is to enable the members of the community "to achieve better solutions to their problems than would be possible without the help of these publicly available guidelines."18 Any claim to the acceptability of a thesis may be challenged and assessed in terms of its being a good or adequate solution to a problem at hand, with due regard to the operative standards of argumentative competence. The appeal to moral truths does not shed much light on this use of practical reason.19
In sum, a just critique of Confucian ethics presupposes an appreciation of its internal point of view. This does not mean that the external point of view is irrelevant or unworthy of attention from sincere and critical adherents of Confucian ethics. Indeed, for a reflective Confucian agent, the shift from the internal to the external point of view is indispensable, if he is interested in improving or reforming current practices. His position here is analogous to that of a reviewer of a court's decisions, who asks external, critical questions, not merely for the sake of obtaining an accurate description of an operative legal system, but for the purpose of advancing proposals for the change of legal rules and rulings.20 Perhaps it is in this context that the challenge of ethical objectivism, quite apart from the issue of philosophical plausibility, is valuable as an external challenge, when this challenge is construed as a reasonable demand for a statement of principles that have the status of objectivity independently of personal commitment. A rationale for changing a current practice has a greater persuasive force when it employs the language of objective principles. When seriously entertained in Confucian discourse, these principles, unlike the conventional li or rules of proper behavior, are emphatic, i.e., they present claims to priority of attention in resolving a problem of common concern among participants in ethical argumentation.21
Of course, these principles have to compete with those of others that have a similar claim to objectivity, and thus cannot be considered self-evident. In this way, the language of objective principles performs a valuable service to understanding individual efforts at modification or qualification of the substantive content of an existing Confucian practice. Like those personal principles that acquire interpersonal significance, these objective principles, when accepted, may become a part of the Confucian tradition, and again be subject to critical interpretation of their import in exigent situations. For a contemporary Confucian philosopher, the major challenge of normative ethics is the problem of objective principles.22 This is the problem of incorporating objective principles within Confucian ethics, compatible with its emphasis on the centrality of virtue. In the remainder of this paper, I give a tentative exploration of this formidable problem.
OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND CONFUCIAN VIRTUE
For pursuing this problem, some remarks must be made about the concept of objective principle and the absence of this concept in Confucian ethics. I assume that an objective principle is a basis for evaluation, invested with a privileged status or authority, quite apart from personal endorsement.23 This suggests that the concept is a context-variable concept. Different spheres of human activity, whether thought or action, will have distinct objective principles relative to the purpose of the enterprise. In an ethical context, one primary employment of an objective principle, in contrast to that of personal precepts, consists in the aim of arriving at a conclusive determination or settlement of disputes that arise out of human conflict. While any determination may be a subject of further dispute, the invocation of objective principles, say, of moral obligation or of rights, serves as a purportedly impartial means for dispute-resolution. Underlying this use of principles is a legalistic model of ethical discourse. In this model, ethical disputes are to be adjudicated by principles which play the role of an impartial judge, deciding the right or wrong of the conduct of contending parties.24
The lack of Confucian concern with objective principles may in part be explained by its attitude toward legal adjudication. Recall Confucius's saying, "In hearing litigation, I am no different from any other man. But if you insist on a difference, it is, perhaps, that I try to get the parties not to resort to litigation in the first place" (Lun Yü, 12:13).25 A person genuinely committed to jen is one who finds repose in abiding by jen, one who cultivates virtuous dispositions, not for self-glorification, but for bringing peace and security to his fellows.26 Implicit in this attitude toward human conflict is a model of personal relationship, wherein disputes are seen to be a subject of voluntary arbitration or mediation, rather than adjudication, within a moral community.27 At issue in arbitration is an impartial resolution of disputes, oriented toward the reconciliation of the contending parties in the light of the concern for harmonious human intercourse. The arbitrator, chosen by the parties in dispute, is concerned with repairing the rupture of human relationship (lunv) rather than with deciding the rights or wrongs of the parties. The task of an arbitrator is not only to interpret the meaning of a current practice,28 but also to shape the expectations of the contending parties along the line of mutual concern, to get them to appreciate one another as interacting members in a community. An appeal to objective principles, just as an exaggerated emphasis on li (ritual rules) as mere formal prescriptions, is likely to alienate people from one another, instead of encouraging them to maintain or develop relationships.29 For a Confucian philosopher, the translation of "ethics" as lun-li hsüehw is quite apt, for it conveys the Confucian conception of ethics as an inquiry into the li (rationales) of human relations, leaving entirely open the question whether the li are to be construed as objective or personal principles.
Closely tied to the Confucian attitude toward human conflict is its focus on the exercise of i in particular circumstances, rather than on compliance with rules or principles. For Confucius, a well-cultivated person (chün-tzu), "in dealing with affairs of the world, does not form any preconceived opinions. He simply acts in accord with i" (lun Yü, 4:10). Confucius said of himself, "I have no preconceptions about the permissible and the impermissible" (lun Yü, 18:8).30 This attitude of neutrality is essential to appreciating the nature of a concrete situation prior to judgment and decision. In the context of arbitration, it is especially important for the arbitrator to preserve her independent sense of i. An appeal to objective principles may distract the arbitrator from a careful examination of the merits of a particular case and thus may lead to a failure in rendering an equitable decision. If objective principles were acknowledged in Confucian ethics, there would be a danger of "the tyranny of principles" over the exercise of i. Even in a case where general rules are deemed relevant, we would expect an arbitrator to be reasonable and sensitive to the demands of the parties before applying these rules to a case at hand.31
The above preliminaries serve as a basis for construing the problem of incorporating objective principles into Confucian ethics as an ethics of virtue. The problem of objective principles is to be viewed against the background of the concern with adjudication rather than arbitration of human conflict. The difficulty is to develop a thesis that is compatible with the emphasis on the exercise of i and with the spirit of the Confucian doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action. As a matter of abstract theory, there are at least four different options: (1) subordination, (2) double-language, (3) coordination, and (4) complementarity.32
For a Confucian theorist, the subordination thesis, i.e., subsuming objective principles under aretaic standards, is not an appealing option. For it is unclear how such a subsumption can be explicated without collapsing the distinction between arbitration and adjudication. A Confucianist is likely to approve the latter process only when arbitration has failed to achieve the desired result. Quite properly, aretaic notions have an essential role in arbitration as a reminder of the importance of maintaining personal relationship. But when the parties in dispute cannot agree to the arbitrator's recommendation, a recourse to adjudication is necessary in order to obtain an authoritative decision that settles the conflict in issue. And here objective principles can play a crucial role quite independently of the characters of the parties. Moreover, embracing the subordination thesis would amount to a dogmatic rejection of the independent role of objective principles in the justification of those moral rules which cannot plausibly be reduced to aretaic standards. On the contrary, it is arguable that the interpretation of the content or concrete significance of some aretaic notions in part depends on an acknowledgement of relevant moral rules and their justification. Consider Mencius's remark: "It is contrary to benevolence (jen) to kill one innocent person" (Meng Tzu, 7A:33).33 This suggests that jen cannot be properly understood without paying heed to the moral injunction against killing the innocent, an injunction that has force and justification independently of the concern for cultivating jen-disposition.34 Of course, jen is open to non-perceptive interpretation, e.g., kindness (huix) and generosity (k'uany), but such interpretation can hardly be said to be consistent with the reasoned exercise of i (sense of rightness) if it ignores the injunction against killing the innocent, against cruelty, or against ruthlessness.35
The double language thesis maintains that the notions of virtue and objective principle are alternative expressions of the same ethical concern. But this thesis pays no serious attention to the distinction between the concern for human relationships (lun) and the concern for impersonal human intercourse. As in the case of the subordination thesis, it fails to recognize the divergence of purpose in arbitration and adjudication. Also, as earlier noted, adopting this thesis may lead to "the tyranny of principles" over the exercise of i in doing justice to the merits of the claims of parties in dispute. It is difficult to see how an appeal to aretaic standards can help toward the resolution of human conflict that constitutes the subject matter of adjudication.36
In stressing the irreducibility of the concepts of virtue and objective principles and their equal importance in ethical inquiry, the coordination thesis is an attractive option. For these concepts are, so to speak, partners in the same enterprise of conflict-resolution. However, for a Confucian theorist, this cannot be taken to imply an exclusiveness on the part of independent unrelated concerns, which hardly comports with the notion of tao as a unifying perspective of ethical discourse or as a vision of things in the universe as forming a moral community (t'ien-jen ho-iz). Perhaps even more important, the suggestion of a conceptual dichotomy forecloses the inquiry into the possibility of establishing the connection between virtues and objective principles. As earlier remarked (Part I), there is a likely historical scenario according to which personal principles, representing perceptive interpretation of aretaic notions, become transmuted into impersonal principles through communal acceptance, whereby these principles may contribute to the promotion of the virtues of cooperation, and may also be rationally justifiable from an external point of view. If this possibility obtains, impersonal principles in an established practice may properly be regarded as objective principles that are intimately connected with the cooperative virtues. Likewise, the virtues of self-control can also contribute to the performance of duties which may be deemed justifiable in terms of objective principles. The conceptual dichotomy inherent in the coordination thesis implies an a priori injunction against the pursuit of the reasonable question concerning the relation between virtues and objective principles.37
I believe that the complementarity thesis is the best option to explore, and, to some extent, may be elucidated by pondering a hint in Hsün Tzu. I have in mind this passage: "Tao embodies constancy (changaaaa) and embraces all changes" (chieh-pi p'ienab). The notions of virtue and objective principle may be viewed as complementary ways of interpreting the concrete significance of tao. The former expresses a steadfast concern with the promotion of virtue in arbitration, the latter with adjudication, with those problematic cases that cannot be handled by arbitration. Nevertheless, the ultimate aim of both arbitration and adjudication, in the light of tao, is the same. It is to inculcate an attitude of mutual care and concern among conflicting parties as members of an ethical community. While objective principles have their proper function in adjudication, they subserve the same end as that of arbitration in promoting a constant concern for jen in human intercourse. From the Confucian point of view, the acknowledgement of the propriety of adjudication, in the event of failure in arbitration, does not entail the irrelevance of the primacy of concern for jen. Rather, adjudication is considered to be a complement of arbitration. Likewise, the failure of adjudication is deemed consistent with a renewed effort at finding further objective principles that have the promise of securing agreement or at urging the conflicting parties to transcend their private stations for the sake of harmony implicit in the ideal of tao. Also, in the case of successful adjudication, a Confucian would remind the parties that the agreeable settlement of an issue at stake may well be an occasion for developing personal relationship within a moral community. Of course, we have no assurance that acceptable objective principles are forthcoming, nor, when these are found, that they will always promote jen-realization.
Nonetheless, the complementarity thesis is worthy of further investigation. As compared with other options, the thesis provides a viable avenue for incorporating objective principles in Confucian ethics. The thesis, unlike that of subordination, calls for no subsumption of objective principles, for these principles are accorded a status independent of aretaic standards. Nor does it abolish the distinction between the two concepts as in the case of the double language thesis. And unlike the coordination thesis, there is no suggestion of two exclusive and unrelated goals of ethical inquiry. The complementarity thesis is, so to speak, a yin-yangac thesis. In arbitration, aretaic notions play the role of yang, and objective principles the subdued role of yin, and the reverse in adjudication. The primacy of either depends on the nature of the human conflict at issue. And it is the reasoned exercise of i that determines the appropriateness of the desirable process in conflict-resolution. Since the yin contains a seed for the generation of yang, and conversely, the dominance of either virtue or objective principle is not a question to be determined in advance of confrontation with particular circumstances. In the words of Wang Yang-ming, "The significance of tao cannot be exhausted with finality."38
ARBITRATION AND ADJURATION
Suppose we adopt the complementarity thesis, how can we develop this? What more can be said about the nature and status of objective principles? How do we formulate these principles in a manner that is coherent with the Confucian conception of ethical argumentation as a cooperative enterprise aimed at securing agreement among participants, and yet at the same time avoid the pitfalls of the subordination and double-language theses? In what follows, I offer a clarification of these vexing questions with the intention to suggest a direction for further inquiry, rather than conclusive solutions to these questions.
As a first step, let us take note of the consequence of accepting the complementarity thesis. It is entirely unproblematic to incorporate objective principles for the purpose of adjudication within Confucian thought and practice, quite independently of critical challenges from an external point of view based on a different ethical tradition. These principles provide an impartial method for settling disputes within Confucian argumentation. We can now broaden the context in which these principles function, independently of the issue of plausibility of Confucian ethics. I suggest that we regard this broader context as the context of conflict between peoples belonging to different cultural, ethical traditions. In this way, objective principles may be conceived as ground rules for intercultural ethical discourse, wherein conflicting ideals of the good life or substantive normative proposals compete for universal acceptance, and thus call for adjudication. Differently put, these principles are transcultural principles serving as ground rules in impartial adjudication. The basic function of these principles, in fact, corresponds to the delimiting function of Confucian li as a system of formal prescriptions of proper conduct.39 They serve the purpose of defining the boundaries of proper behavior, without prejudging the value of the content of different ethical traditions or ways of life. In this respect, they are like the negative precepts of the Decalogue in providing limiting conditions or constraints upon human action. But unlike these precepts, they imply no value judgment on the desirability of the conduct of contending parties.
At issue in intercultural ethical conflict is not the convergence of substantive values, and thus the irrelevance of any appeal to culturally specific aretaic standards. Rather, the issue is the problem of accommodating diversity of goods, the problem of striking a balance between the claim to justice or fairness in adjudication and the claim to the integrity of contrasting ways of life.40 While our approach presupposes the existence of cultural diversity, it does not deny that there is a common human nature; nor does it embrace the view that distinctive cultural ways of life are incommensurable.41 On the contrary, a Confucian theorist can accept the idea of a common human nature in the sense that all humans possess the same natural capacities, e.g., those capacities that underlie feeding, locomotion, and mating; but these capacities are developed "and exercised in specific cultural contexts and forms."42 Even more important, from the ethical point of view, our basic motivational structure, comprising native feelings and desires, as Hsün Tzu points out, constitutes the "raw materials" for transformation (huaad), much like the potter's clay or the carpenter's wood in making vessels or utensils (hsing-o p'ienae).43 These elements of common human nature are historically shaped and reshaped by different cultures in different ways; and in themselves, they can hardly serve as impartial determinants for conflict-resolution in intercultural intercourse. This does not mean that different ethical, cultural traditions are incommensurable. Appreciation of cultural diversity is consistent with the acknowledgement of transcultural principles of adjudication.44
The deeper Confucian problem is to specify these principles in a way that is consistent with the Confucian conception of ethical argumentation as a cooperative venture. The general and more difficult philosophical problem is the ancient Greek problem of nature versus convention. In the language of Aristotle, our problem pertains to the specification of the idea of universal political justice, of what, in contrast to convention, is "Just by nature," viz, it has "the same force everywhere and does not depend on what we regard or do not regard as just."45 Without joining in the issue over the adequacy of some version of the Natural Law Theory, I think we can appropriate this notion of political justice in the present context. Natural Law theory can be taken as embodying the idea that any system of positive law or morality is subject to an external critique, i.e., a critique of its limitations which are, in some sense, reasonable to accept regardless of the culturally specific demands of different ways of life.46 In this light, the problem of specifying transcultural principles is a problem of seeking consensus among reasonable peoples with their distinctive and cherished ways of life.47
By reflecting on the style of performance, that is, on the main desirable qualities of participants in Confucian argumentation, it is possible to find a guide to dealing with the problem of formulating transcultural principles. According to Hsün Tzu, it is expected that a scholar or a superior person would manifest three qualities in discourse: (1) "a humane mind" (jen-hsinaf), (2) "a receptive mind" (hsüeh-hsinag), and (3) "an impartial mind" (kung-hsinah) (cheng-ming p'ienai).48 Typically, a humane (jen) person has an active and affectionate concern for others, but, more importantly, he respects others regardless of whether they are worthy or unworthy of personal association. A desirable participant is also one who is "receptive" or open-minded in displaying a willingness to listen to other's normative claims and impartial or fairminded in his judgment or decision, who seeks to achieve consensus rather than to attain personal gain or glory.
These characteristics of desirable participants suggest that a Confucian theorist can expand and deepen some indigenous notions such as jen (humaneness), hsüehaj (receptivity), and kungak (impartiality or fairness) in formulating certain transcultural principles consistent with its conception of argumentation.49 I suspect that any list of transcultural principles would include integrity or non-prescriptivity, reciprocity or mutuality (shual), and justice as fairness or equity (kung). The principle of integrity would focus on one's unwavering commitment to respect for the significance of one's ethical tradition and enjoin the parties in dispute to respect differences in living traditions without pronouncing any judgment on their worth. In other words, it is a principle of respect for the diversity of goods, for various experiments of living in different cultural forms of life, thus encapsulating an aspect of humaneness (jen-hsin). The principle of reciprocity (shu) expresses another aspect of jen as mutual regard or consideration (Lun Yü, 6:30), enjoining the disputing parties to exercise sympathetic imagination in appreciating the internal point of view of an alien ethical tradition and to endeavor, whenever opportunity arises, to transform disagreement into an occasion for exploring the possibility of convergence of values. Consistent with the notions of kung (fairness) and hsüeh (receptivity) is the principle of justice, which may be elucidated along the line of, say, the notion of procedural due process in American constitutional law and the idea of rectification (chengam) of wrong conduct. The former focuses, for example, on fair hearing of grievances, the latter on compensating the aggrieved party in impartial adjudication. It is obvious that these brief remarks amount to no more than a sketch of a line of exploration in developing a Confucian moral theory. As to the question of incorporating other substantive normative principles, the task is not just a matter of critical reshaping of Confucian notions, but also of introducing new ethical concepts, for example, moral rights or fundamental human rights.50 While this task is difficult to carry out without engaging in contemporary discussion, I do not think it insurmountable. For the introduction, even invention, of new concepts is quite consistent with the exercise of i implicit in the Ancient Confucian doctrine of rectification of terms (cheng-mingan).51
In this paper, I hope that I have succeeded in showing that principles can be incorporated into Confucian ethics without leading to internal incoherence. Other Confucian thinkers would perhaps propose quite different directions for further inquiry in the light of their interpretations of the spirit of Confucian ethics. Nevertheless, on the basis of the considerations presented here, the complementarity thesis appears to be a viable option in the development of Confucian moral philosophy. Moreover, the thesis has also practical import for the issue of intercultural conflict today. The thesis suggests that failure in adjudication via objective principles should not be regarded as a deadlock, as an insoluble problematic situation that inevitably calls for the use of might. Rather, the situation is best viewed as an occasion for renewed effort in arbitration, in seeking possibilities of reconciliation. Given the Confucian emphasis on jen, concern for coexistence and harmony of diverse ways of life, and the reasoned exercise of i in coping with changing circumstances, there can be no absolute or fixed determination of the priority of either adjudication or arbitration. In the end, which approach is the most effective in intercultural discourse depends on the situation at hand.52
School of Philosophy
The Catholic University of America
Washington,D.C.
*Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 16 (1989), 273-296.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, jen is used in the narrower sense of extensive benevolence, and not in the broad sense of jen as functionally equivalent to tao, the ideal of the good human life as a whole. In this narrower sense, jen, along with li and i are the specific terms (pieh-mingao) or fundamental specifications of the concrete significance of tao as an abstract, generic term (kung-mingap) Since this distinction, adopted from Hsün Tzu, is relative to the purpose of discourse, in context, jen, li, and i can also be regarded as generic terms amenable to specification, say, by way of particular aretaic notions such as filiality, loyalty, courage, etc. Note also that parenthetical terms are convenient focal indicators of meaning rather than translations, and occasionally are used for distinguishing homophones, for example, "li (ritual rules)" as distinct from "li (reason)." For further discussion of tao as a generic term, see A. S. Cua, "The Problem of Conceptual Unity in Hsün Tzu and Li Kou's Solution," Bulletin of Chinese Philosophical Association, 3 (1985), 465-495; (also Philosophy East and West, forthcoming); and "Hsün Tzu and the Unity of Virtues," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 14 (no. 4, 1987), 381-400; Chinese translation by Hsü Hanaq 12, no. 12 (1985). For the distinction between the two senses of jen, see Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept Jen," Philosophy East and West 4 (no. 4, 1955).
2. See A. S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). Hereafter cited as Ethical Argumentation.
3. This is one reason for my preference of "reason" rather than "principle" for capturing the epistemic significance of li in the works of Hsün Tzu and Wang Yang-ming. See Ethical Argumentation, pp. 20-24; The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming's Moral Psychology (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982), pp. 28-30. Hereafter cited as The Unity of Knowledge and Action.
4. The foregoing merely highlights certain aspects of the complex activity of justification. For detailed discussion, see Ethical Argumentation, pp. 51-101.
5. Henry David Aiken, "On the Concept of a Moral Principle," in The Isenberg Memorial Lecture Series, 1965-1966 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1969), p. 114; I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), pp. 16-17; and J. Kovesi, Moral Notions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 93.
6. For the notion of paradigmatic individuals and its application to chün-tzu, see A. S. Cua, Dimensions of Moral Creativity: Paradigms, Principles, and Ideals (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), chap. 3-5. Hereafter cited as Dimensions of Moral Creativity.
7. See Wing-tsit Chan (trans.), Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Essays by Wang Yang-ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), sec. 52 (with minor emendation). For further discussion, see The Unity of Knowledge and Action, pp. 35-45.
8. See my "The Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory," in Robert Allinson (ed.), Understanding Chinese Mind: Philosophical Roots (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).
9. R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan: or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 326.
10. See Ethical Argumentation, pp. 138-59.
11. Jaroslav Pelican, The Vindication of Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 60. See also, Alastair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). chap. 14.
12. See Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, Vol. II (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1968), esp. Lectures IX and X.
13. See note 10 above. Also, Hsün Tzu, chieh-pi p'ien.
14. This discussion of the status of principles is a restatement and elaboration of the terse remarks in The Unity of Knowledge and Action, pp. 36-37; and Ethical Argumentation, pp. 100-01.
15. For the distinction between ideal norm and ideal theme, see Dimensions of Moral Creativity, chap. 8. Also, Dorothy Emmet, The Moral Prism (London: MacMillan, 1979), chap. 1.
16. Perhaps, more strongly, a Confucianist can rejoin that the external critique presupposes an internal point of view of a different philosophical tradition. Consequently, it can claim to be no more privileged than the internal point of view of the Confucianist. For further discussion, see A. S. Cua, "Morality and Human Nature," Philosophy East and West 32, no. 3 (1982), pp. 379-82. Chinese translation by Li Teng-hsin in Che-hsüeh yü wen-hua 13, no. 7 (1986).
17. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 141-42. For the distinction between internal and external point of view, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); and my Dimensions of Moral Creativity, chap. 6; cf. Royce's "Provincialism," in John McDermott (ed.), The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce, vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 1067-88.
18. Kurt Baier, "Rationality, Reason, and the Good" in David Copp and David Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason and Truth (Totawa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), p. 200. This appropriation of Baier's insight is independent of his controversial thesis on the unity of practical reason. For a critique see Kai Neilson, "Must the Immoralist Act Contrary to Reason" (ibid., pp. 222-23).
19. For further discussion on this issue regarding explanation and justification of ethical theses, see my "Some Aspects of Ethical Argumentation: A Reply to Daniel Dahlstrom and John Marshall," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14, no. 4 (1987), pp. 501-516.
20. In an earlier work, the importance of this shift from understanding creative agency was discussed in general terms apart from Confucian ethics. Also, the notion of moral principles, in the non-personal sense, was used in the sense of basic and superordinate rules of a moral practice. This use is indicated by italics. "In this sense, a moral principle may not be accepted by an agent as his moral principle." My present remarks, though making use of the same analogy with judicial review, pertain to the issue of the objectivity of proposals for moral change in Confucian ethics and should not be construed as a thesis on the nature of all ethical systems. See Dimensions of Moral Creativity, pp. 83-86, 160nll.
21. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 26; and Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 81.
22. See my "Reflections on Moral Theory and Understanding Moral Traditions" in Eliot Deutsch and Gerald Larson (eds.) Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Chinese translation by Li Teng-hsinas in Che-hsOeh yl wen-huaat, 13 (no. 8, 1986). See also my "Tasks of Confucian Ethics," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 6 (no. 1, 1979).
23. Cf. Aiken, "The Concept of a Moral Principle," p. 107. Note that in adopting Aiken's notion of principle, I do not embrace his controversial thesis that all moral principles are first-personal precepts (ibid., pp. 122-23).
24. For an explicit avowal of the legal model in defense of universal prescriptivism, see Bernard Mayo, The Philosophy of Right and Wrong (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), chap. V. Cf. R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); and Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
25. D. C. Lau (trans.), Confucius: The Analects (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).
26. See Lun Yü, 4:2 & 14:42. For an insightful discussion of this Confucian theme, see Ch'en Ta-ch'iat, P'ing-fan te tao-te kuanau (Taipei: Chung-hua, 1976).
27. For further discussion, see my "Confucian Vision and the Human Community," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 11 (no. 3, 1984).
28. Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 228.
29. In this connection, one may also understand why traditional China failed to develop laws based on the idea of human rights. As Hsu points out: "In the Chinese philosophy, the interpretation of law is based upon human feelings and situations, not upon absolute standards. Disputants do not turn to lawyers who argue a client's case in abstract-terms joined with appeals to legal precedent. Instead, they look to a middleman or peacemaker. . . . The Chinese middleman does not uphold one party against another or insist that one is completely right and the other wholly wrong. His mission is to smooth ruffled feelings by having each disputant sacrifice a little, whether the sacrifice involves principles or not." See Francis L. K. Hsu, Americans and Chinese: Reflections on Two Cultures and Their People (Garden City: Doubleday Natural History Press, 1970), p. 361. For this danger in exaggerating the importance of li (ritual rules) and the possibility of accommodating the notion of human rights in Confucian ethics, see my "Li and Moral Justification: A Study in the Li Chi," Philosophy East and West, 23 (no. 1, 1983).
30. Lau, The Analects of Confucius. For the notion of chün-tzu, see Dimensions of Moral Creativity, chap. 5.
31. For an insightful discussion of the importance of equity in law, ethics, and public administration, see Stephen Toulmin, "The Tyranny of Principles" in Norman Bowie (ed.), Making Ethical Decision (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); and Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 168-69.
32. For suggestions of these options in contemporary moral philosophy, see (1) Harold Alderman, "By Virtue of a Virtue," Review of Metaphysics, 36 (1982); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 105-106, 145-146; (2) G. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 86-88; (3) H. A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake," Mind, 21 (1912); and Robert B. Louton, "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (no. 3, 1984). We may note that our problem of the connection between principles and virtues does not occupy the center of attention of most recent works on virtue ethics, see for example, the lack of this concern in the instructive survey by Gregory E. Pence, ""Recent Work on Virtues," American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (no. 4, 1984).
33. See D. C. Lau's translation, Mencius (Baltimore: Penguin books, 1970), p. 189. For the same theme in Hsün Tzu, see ju-hsiao p'ienav.
34. More generally, as Gewirth points out, "When the criterion for a quality's being a virtue does not include the requirement that the virtue reflect or conform to moral rules, there is no assurance that the alleged virtue will be morally right or valid." Alan Gewirth, "Rights and Virtues," Review of Metaphysics, 38 (June, 1985), p. 752. For the priority of moral rules in the pursuit of ideals, see Dimensions of Moral Creativity, pp. 116-17, 135-36.
35. See Mencius, 4A:3, 4A:8, and 7B:l. For the role of i in understanding the ethical significance of particular aretaic notions, see the insightful discussion in Ch'en Ta-ch'i, Kung Tzu hsüeh-shuoaw (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1964).
36. Perhaps the double language thesis is a misleading, compendious statement of two other, not necessarily connected, theses: correspondence and logical equivalence; and both seem to be suggested in Warnock's The Object of Morality. The correspondence thesis would hold that "for every virtue of character there is a corresponding principle of duty." To the principle of beneficence, for example, there is a corresponding virtue of benevolence. The equivalence thesis, on the other hand, would hold that any statement of virtue is logically derivable from a statement of principle, and conversely. For the reasons stated in the text both the correspondence and equivalence theses, as in the double language thesis, are not viable options for a Confucianist. Cf. Tom L. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 163-66.
37. Cf. John Waite, "Virtues and Principles," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48 (no. 3, 1988).
38. Chan, Instructions, sec. 64.
39. For further discussion, see my "The Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory."
40. Cf. Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods" and Stuart Hampshire, "Morality and Convention" in Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
41. Cf. Renford Bambrough, "The Scope of Reason: An Epistle to the Persians" in S. C. Brown (ed.), Objectivity and Cultural Divergence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), esp. pp. 22, 223, and 278.
42. See Ted Benton, "Biological Ideas and Their Cultural Uses" in Brown, Objectivity and Cultural Divergence, p. 122.
43. For further discussion, see my "Morality and Human Nature."
44. More likely a Confucian theorist may consider the issue of commensurability as a purely speculative question; focus, instead, on actual differences between particular ways of life; and explore areas of common interest as a basis for developing the ground rules for resolving intercultural conflicts. This inquiry is consistent with accepting Ruth Benedict's view, apart from her incommensurability thesis, that cultural diversity is a diversity of configurations. In understanding a culture, she urges us "to imagine a great arc on which are arranged possible interests provided either by the human age-cycle or by the environment or by man's various activities. . . . Its identity as a culture depends upon the selection of some segments of this arc. Every human society everywhere has made such selection in its cultural institutions. Each from the point of view of another ignores fundamentals and exploits irrelevancies." See Benedict, Patterns of Culture, p. 24. See also her paper entitled "Configurations of Culture in North America," in Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
45. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 1134b.
46. Cf. Paul Forrier and Chaim Perelman, "Law, Natural and Natural Rights," Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Volume III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), esp. pp. 23-26.
47. In terms of normative ethics, the Confucian task, though not designed to yield a general doctrine, may be seen as a contractarian rather than utilitarian problem. As Scanlon has incisively shown, any account of moral wrongness must appeal to some notion of reasonableness in the sense that excludes "rejections that would be unreasonable given the aim of finding principles which could be the basis of informed, unforced general agreement." A similar theme is found in Rawls' emphasis on exploring "overlapping consensus" in seeking a conception of justice that will provide "a reasonable way of shaping into one coherent view the deeper bases of agreement embedded in the public culture of a constitutional regime and acceptable to its most firmly held convictions." This notion of reasonableness and focus on overlapping consensus is congenial to the Confucian notion of reasonableness. See The Unity of Knowledge and Action; T. M. Scanlon, "Contractarianism and Utilitarianism," in Sen and Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond, p. 111; and Rawls, "Justice and Fairness: Political and Not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (No. 3, 1985), p. 229.
48. Note that these qualities of participants can also be used as themes guiding arbitration. For further discussion, see Ethical Argumentation. pp. 11-13; and my "The Possibility of A Confucian Theory of Rhetoric", presented at NEH Conference on "Rhetoric: East and West", East-West Center, June 12-17, 1988.
49. See Hsieh Fu-jaax, Lun-li hsüeh hsin-lunay (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1973), pp. 185-86.
50. For a tentative approach, see my "Li and Moral Justification," pp. 5-7.
51. See Ethical Argumentation. pp. 101-37.
52. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Philosophy Seminar, Wake Forrest University, on April 23, 1987 and at the International Symposium on Confucianism and the Modern World, in November 12-18, 1987, Taipei, Taiwan. In preparing this final version, I am grateful to Daniel Dahlstrom, David Wong, and Win-chiat Lee for valuable suggestions on earlier versions.