The sources and origins of totalitarianism have been investigated quite thoroughly, as, e.g., in the works of K.R. Popper¹, Hannah Arendt² and F. von Hayek³. Some results of these investigations may be called classic, for example Popper's conclusion that Plato's notion of the perfect state planted a seed from which the idea of totalitarianism has grown.

Of course, one may attempt to refute this conclusion and claim that totalitarianism is the product of the twentieth century. It was not until 1923 that the term "totalitarianism" occurred in Italy to describe specific political developments taking place in that country that had little in common with Plato's political ideals; the political leaders of the Fascist movement were not philosophers. The movement sprang out of realities peculiar to post-World War I world; and the fact that it developed especially rapidly in war-ravaged countries speaks for itself.

Further, one may say that from the fourth century B.C. till the twentieth century European civilization covered an enormous distance. Hence, to speak about a close link between Plato and the views of a Mussolini, Hitler or Stalin, is rather strange. Even more, it is a sacrilege, for what can the greatest philosopher of all times for whom the Good was the highest value have in common with these evil demons? And does not Plato stress the superiority of law against political power, whereas in a totalitarian state political power dominates the law?

One may go on with the objections, but for all such arguments one can find serious counterarguments. One can explain how Plato proceeds from the notion that the aim of society is to strive for the Good to the notion that all forms of social activity must be regulated and controlled by the state. One can show how Plato's ideas moulded various social utopias, then demonstrate how totalitarian theories grew out of these utopias.

We know how military, economic and political crises affect the readiness of the masses to accept the totalitarian ideas of a perfect social order, and the kind of personality required to put such ideas into practice. We know (or at least imagine that we know) a lot about the philosophical, psychological, economic and political origins of totalitarianism, but the causes of the decline of totalitarianism are not so clear.

The idea that the state is to be governed by the wisest and the most reasonable, i.e., by philosophers, is probably the most dangerous idea ever born in a philosopher's head; nevertheless, it is really exciting. Totalitarianism has plenty of real or seeming advantages over democracy and liberalism, for at first glance a totalitarian society seems more integrated and viable. The strength of totalitarianism arises from the devotion of men to the Great Idea. This is much more important than anything else for the individual who is captured by the Idea; it enables him to endure all burdens and calamities. Devoted soul and body to the Idea, they have enormous advantage over those who do not want to risk losing everything in a political struggle. They do not want to sacrifice themselves to any Idea, the more so to the struggle against some Idea. Under circumstances of deep crisis when society is ripe for a radical change, a quite small group of fanatical proponents of the new Idea can overcome the traditionalists' resistance, because this is not a real resistance but rather sluggishness, indifference and some kind of apathy born out of frustration. In such a situation a very important role is played by the sociopsychological phenomenon of belief in the miracle: that the Great Idea can save the nation.

Devotion to the Idea enables its supporters to create hierarchically organized and very disciplined structures which are much more effective in the struggle for political power than democratic political organizations. They are more effective because they are created especially for struggle and only for struggle--they are not similar to the organizations peculiar to a stable society. Democratic organizations are not adjusted to the situation of crisis and violent struggle.

For that reason the proponents of totalitarianism seek not to cure, but to deepen the crisis and, if this is impossible, to create at least an atmosphere of danger. They stress that the danger is caused by external and internal enemies and demand mobilization of society for the fight against them. Supporters of totalitarianism always treat society as a dynamic process, development and progress being very important to them: the slogan "forwards" is very characteristic of totalitarianism. In stressing the importance of movement, L. Trotsky expressed the very essence of the totalitarian outlook. The negative programme offered by proponents of totalitarianism is always more elaborated than the positive one. They first seek to destroy the old world using the well-proven means of fear and terror.

If one agrees with N. Machiavelli that fear is the strongest and most stable foundation of political power then it is difficult to explain why totalitarian states regularly using terror and repression collapsed so rapidly. To answer this question correctly it is advisable to treat separately totalitarianism in the West and in the East.

The causes of the collapse of totalitarianism in the West are rather clear. In the very nature of totalitarianism there is a tendency to expand maximally the area of control. Therefore almost inevitably totalitarianism means an imperial policy which sooner or later leads to war. But one who unleashes a war must take into consideration the possibility of losing. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany sought victory, but suffered a military defeat which was the sole cause of collapse of totalitarianism in the West.

As this cause is purely external it cannot be said that in World War II democracy defeated totalitarianism. The main military adversary of Nazi Germany and its allies was the totalitarian Soviet Union. It was a victory of one sort of totalitarian state over another. In this war democracies played a rather secondary, subsidiary role. The notion of World War II most popular in the West is rather opposite to the above, but does not appear to be correct.

The collapse of totalitarianism in general is at best only loosely connected with the military victory of allied powers over their enemy. Of course, this does not mean that military factors are irrelevant when speaking about the collapse of totalitarianism. In recent years in the West and in the East many authors tried to explain Gorbachev's perestroika and "new thinking" as an attempt to remove the unbearable burden of military expenditures. But why did this burden become unbearable in the 80s when it had been endurable in 40s and 50s?

The answer would appear to be that by the beginning of 80s the Soviet Union and the whole Soviet block were no longer totalitarian in the strict sense of the word. The disintegration of the totalitarian system had begun much earlier. The main cause of this process was not the challenge of modern Western military technologies; the process was more complicated.

The start of the process goes as far back as 1953, the year of Stalin's death. This may be nothing new, but from the theoretical point of view it is rather strange that the death of the dictator had so great an impact on the disintegration of the system which was not his own invention or creation. After all, the death of V. Lenin who created the Soviet system had practically no effect on his work. You can expect that the death of a dictator may exert a strong influence on the destiny of the authoritarian state, but in the totalitarian state all manifestations of social activity are under the control of a bureaucracy which to a great extent is anonymous. A bureaucracy seeks to realize the main principles of the system and to protect its own political and economic interests. So why was Stalin's death so fateful for totalitarianism?

Thus far there has not been a totalitarian state without a dictator at the top of its power structure. The only known form of totalitarianism is authoritarian, although it is rather difficult to prove that a nonauthoritarian form cannot exist. For this reason the death of the dictator is quite dangerous for the totalitarian system of power. Generally speaking this danger is not mortal. A young, developing totalitarianism can survive the death of its leader. In 1924, the year of Lenin's death, totalitarianism in Russia was not full-fledged and the process of transferring power to enable continuation of the same social order went smoothly, of course in the totalitarian manner (i.e., some heads were cut off). But the death of a dictator is fateful for a fully developed totalitarian system.

Stalin's Soviet Union was a totalitarian state par excellence. First, people were deprived of all rights including the right to have private property--which was not the case in totalitarian Italy and Germany. Hence, they depended on the state completely; second, the totalitarian principle of government, "Use as much terror as possible," was put into practice with exceptional effect up to its utter, logical limit. But reaching the limit is very dangerous not only for an individual, but for any form of society, totalitarian as well as liberal.

As long as some principle plays the role of a regulative idea and is treated as an ideal to be striven for, a society can grow and develop. But when the limit is reached a change of direction of the movement is unavoidable. In Jenseits von Gut un Böse F. Nietzsche said something similar: in reaching your ideal you exceed it. He had man in mind, but the maxim is valid for society as well.

Putting the principle "Use as much terror as possible" into practice Stalin reached the limit in many respects. The scale of repression was unprecedented, but perhaps more importantly he used terror against his closest associates as well: arrests and even executions of the nearest relatives of the men devoted to him heart and soul, such as Molotov, Kaganovitch, Kalinin and others. It was essential for him that his closest aids should be grateful not only for privileges, but for the very fact of their physical existence. He wanted them to be aware constantly of the danger of extermination.

After the dictator's death there was at least one extremely powerful man eager to continue to play Stalin's diabolic role. But others from Stalin's clique were overstrained. It was unbearable for them to live any longer on the knife's edge. Hence, in rather dramatic circumstances they chose for the top position a man who did not excite enormous fear. The choice of Khrushchev was fateful: a first step which changed the direction of the social movement.

If the reasoning about the importance of reaching the boundaries is correct this change of direction of the movement was in some sense necessary (if there be such thing as historical necessity). After the first step others in the direction of liberalization of the system followed. Of course, resistance by the totalitarian system even to the most timid attempts at liberalization was enormous. It is important to stress that when you move back from the limit you have a new opportunity to move forward again. Hence, the period of thaw was followed by a period of so-called stagnation. In the 70s the restoration of some more rude elements of Stalinist order was, of course, possible, but not very successful.

Why? Because at that time the process of disintegration of the totalitarian system was far advanced. This may sound quite incredible. Many people, both East and West, are afraid even now of a new totalitarian dictator in Russia. Dictatorship in that country is possible and it is not sure whether B. Yeltsin's rise to the newly established post of President in Russia decreased or increased the probability of dictatorship. But it seems extremely unlikely that any possible dictator of Russia would be able to become a totalitarian dictator.

The changes begun after Stalin's death led to a decrease in the power of the apparatus of terror, which had played not only a political, but also an economic role. On the one hand, it supplied a cheap labour force; on the other hand, the fear it raised substituted for material work incentives for those outside the Gulag. So after its power had diminished it was again necessary, even if restrictively, to use such incentives. Hence, it was necessary to make some alterations in the ideology; modification of cultural policy also became inevitable. All these changes meant the beginning of the erosion of the totalitarian system.

It should be emphasized that there are no mechanisms of self-regulation in a totalitarian system. Hence, the loosening of bolts began the deregulation of the system. Further, the supergoal of the totalitarian system is to breed a "new man" with qualities contrary to those of the man of the old "decaying" society. On the whole this goal was achieved--the breed "homo sovieticus" without a trace of personal initiative or personal responsibility.

The "new man" was to be a perfectly functioning small screw in the big state machine. But after the deregulation of the machine such a man lost the meaning of his existence. He became a cynic and was not so brave as the totalitarian ideologists expected him to be. For the sake of the triumph of a glorious idea he was not willing to sacrifice his personal interests, for he had no sense of personal responsibility. He tried simply to adjust himself to the ill-functioning system, but was absolutely incapable of strengthening it.

By definition totalitarianism requires a demonstration of active support. In the 20s some parts of Russia's population were truly captivated by totalitarian (Communist) ideas, but the number was not great and was constantly decreasing. In the 60s and especially in the 70s it became excruciatingly small. Thus active support was gradually changing into its simulation and by the end of the 70s even simulation of active support became unnecessary--passive support sufficed. That meant the conversion of totalitarianism into simple authoritarianism.

Certainly, the changes after 1985 were especially spectacular, but their way was prepared by the less visible but no less important earlier process of the slow destruction of totalitarian order. It is worth mentioning that in these earlier processes, as well as those which followed, an important role was played by intellectuals taking every opportunity to expand the narrow limits of free thought and free expression and to show that totalitarianism was not the only way to live. These opportunities were very scanty in the mid-50s, but in the 70s the situation changed quite considerably. The new generation of intellectuals was not so afraid of repression as was their fathers' generation.

On the other hand, the technocrats who took power in the 60s were less interested in ideological dogmas. They were more pragmatic and not so eager to waste energy on witch hunting. Most of them were corrupted to a very great extent; for them the system was not an absolute value, but only a means to serve their own interests.

Cynics and timeservers brought up by totalitarianism eroded the system from within. They could not form such a strong nucleus of the system as had the staunch Bolsheviks. For this reason perfect totalitarianism could not endure. Paradoxical as it may be, totalitarianism can be realized only by men brought up in a nontotalitarian society. After the extermination of the Old Guard (which Stalin was especially eager to carry out as soon as possible) and after the extinction of the old generation in general, the inevitable process of decay of totalitarianism began. Totalitarianism is in bad need of idealists, but it is practically incapable of producing them.

This circumstance is fatal for totalitarianism: the sooner it eradicates all remnants of the old society, the sooner it digs a grave for itself. All social activity gradually becomes uncontrollable. The economic crisis which shattered the Soviet Union in the early '90s is a natural result of that deepening degeneration of the system.

As early as the 70s the degree of erosion was so great that to call it a totalitarian system would be an exaggeration. It was rather an ill-functioning authoritarianism with totalitarian ambitions, but without the possibility of control over society; at best it was an agonizing totalitarianism.

This agony may continue for there are many of hindrances to the radical reforms of the political and economic structures of society in the direction of liberal democracy and a free market. The most important is the stereotype of the totalitarian mentality lurking deep within the head of almost every person, not the interests of the partocracy. These stereotypes very seriously complicate the formation of civic society and a liberal political system.

The viability of the stereotypes is conditioned by the above mentioned success in creating the "new man". But the "new man" is by nature unable to ensure the durability of totalitarian system. Yet very effectively, although often unconsciously, he prevents the final and total destruction of totalitarianism. This can be seen especially clearly in the Republics which were annexed by the Soviet Union and now are struggling to realize their new independent forms. Lithuania may serve as an example. The overwhelming majority of Lithuanians unconditionally support their newly independent Republic and want to be free of the reflexes of the totalitarian empire. But in attempting to form their own political structures they very often reproduce the old, essentially totalitarian, patterns under new names. The political thinking of some leaders is not new, even in the Gorbachev sense.

The most important totalitarian stereotype in Lithuania and other former Soviet Republics is the sharp division of all citizens into champions and adversaries of the right cause. Another is the notion that the state has its own interests differing from those of its citizens, which effectively elevates the state above individuals.

Liberal ideas are not very popular. Of course, the declarations of faithfulness to human rights are common here, but only a few politicians support the liberal idea that the most important, if not the sole, function of the modern state is to protect the rights and freedoms of the individual. Therefore it is quite natural that few are devoted to the principle of the division of powers.

The role of the state in our society is still enormous. And the degree of concentration of power is very high. There is a good excuse for this, for political leaders claim the need for a concentration of power, and hence they call for national unity rather than for a free play of political forces. They appeal to people to make a sacrifice, but the notion that authorities must protect the people, and not vice versa, is alien to many of our politicians.

How explain the rejection of essential liberal ideas in a country which so resolutely has sought liberty? The question is rather rhetorical, because I tried to explain this phenomenon in general terms above. There are some interesting observations in J. Goldfarb's book⁴; here I would add only two remarks.

First, when the real priority for most Lithuanians was an independent nation, the needs of the nation state had priority over those of the individual. But there is another reason too. The appeals to unite and to sacrifice for the sake of independence were a very convenient way of disguising the requirement of unconditional support for a definite policy and definite political leaders.

Thus, though for a long time totalitarianism in the Soviet block was being demolished both from the top and from the bottom and was a colossus with feet of clay, if someone would now ask directly: "Is totalitarianism at last dead?" one could not answer simply "yes". Totalitarianism does not exist at present in East Europe as a firm social order, but human minds, economic activity and political decision making are contaminated by its numerous relics. Were totalitarianism to be dead, the prospects for liberalism would be good; but this is not so in East Europe and it is rather doubtful that they will improve in the nearest future.

For most countries in East Europe the immediate future would appear to be a more or less enlightened statism with some elements of political democracy and free market economy. These countries will have a mixed and not well-balanced social system; to find an adequate label for this is quite difficult. As the mixture of elements of totalitarianism and liberalism, authoritarianism and democracy, state planning and free market is quite explosive, the danger of political and economic crises in this region is obvious.

As it is rather difficult to draw a sharp line between statism and mild totalitarianism. For if the elements of statism in the social order of (some) Eastern European countries are strengthened then the probability of a backward devolution will increase. I do not think that such a devolution would lead these countries back to a pure or classical totalitarianism, but who said that a social order must be pure?

Democratically-minded politicians and political scientists in Eastern Europe comprehend the imminent danger of strengthening statist tendencies in their countries. Many of them, especially in the former Soviet Republics, do not see the real political powers within their countries which could prevent such a turn.

Second, these leaders look with great hopes towards Western Europe, especially towards the EC. They argue as follows: (1) Democracy in Western Europe is of great value; (2) the economic integration of East Europe into Western Europe is inevitable; (3) hence, economic necessity will stimulate developments in East Europe in the direction of liberal democracy. They believe that this is a very strong external stimulus for democratization of their countries; but are they right?

First, the prospects of swift integration of Eastern Europe into Western Europe are not as good as these politicians and political scientists would think. It is not that such an integration is nonsense logically or geographically; if we understand what we are really talking about, we may put aside such formal perplexities. But there are important economic hindrances to such an integration, for it is quite difficult to integrate ruins into a well-balanced economic system.

Second, the modern Western economy may not be a firm warrant for a liberal political order. Who would claim that at end of the twentieth century liberalism reigns in the West? Francis Fukuyama from the U.S. State Department would do so, but many political scientists reject such a claim as absolutely unsound. M. Rothbard would rather insist that the present is the time of the decisive battle by real liberals, i.e., libertarians, against an aggressive and corrupting statism.⁵ Perhaps he exaggerates somewhat, but one cannot speak of a triumph of liberalism, even in the West.

Today Western governments are ever more deeply engaged in numerous social, scientific and other programmes. By financing them, governments acquire the right and ability to control various domains of intellectual, cultural and social activity which were outside governmental control only a few decades ago. In this way governments acquire more and more power. If this reasoning is correct then statism has not only a gloomy future in the East, but a rather strong presence in the West.

East Europe strives for a free market and free societies, but is modern Western society as free as L. von Mises or F. von Hayek would like? Perhaps J.M. Keyes and F.D. Roosevelt made an irretrievable step and it is now simply impossible to stop the creeping expansion of governmental power to control everything? If this is not a sheer fancy then we must wait a moment before burying totalitarianism.

1. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. Vols. 1-2 (London: Routledge, 1980).

2. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1951).

3. Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London, 1944).

4. Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).

5. Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Libertarian Review Foundation, 1989).