CHAPTER VI

There is a common human inclination to explain away incon-venient phenomena in terms of easily and conveniently under-standable, and accordingly manageable, events. When politicians take such alluring tacks, a long term disaster can loom on the horizon. This exactly is what has been happening continuously as regards post-communist nationalism from 1989 till now.

Currently western moral indignation over this phenomenon follows this pattern: In the aftermath of the demise of communism, much of the East European nations, with the conspicuous exceptions of Poland, the Czech Republic, and to a certain extent Hungary, clearly regressed to the primitive atavism of crude and hateful nationalism.

However, such a characteristic Western examination of present post-communist nationalism is too superficial to grasp its time nature. In fact, the prevailing Western attitude itself constitutes a significant regression of responsible political understanding. In order to elucidate this widespread misunderstanding, at least a summary of post-communist nationalism is necessary.

Basically, post-communist nationalism is inconceivable if we so concentrate on nationalism that it overshadows the nature of the post-communist situation itself. In other words, the eruptions of chauvinist nationalism in the post-communist countries after 1989 could not take place at all without the preceding, long and firmly rooted communist totalitarian domination. More precisely, the communist networks of power and influence have cleverly abused the surviving, but heretofore only partly employed, jingoist resent-ments in respective post-communist countries. The more recent and obviously successful manipulative activities, either with or without civil wars, is the continuation of their earlier exclusive political do-mination, and its considerable strengthening by means of systema-tically aroused, nourished and exacerbated national sentiments.

The common ground of the manifold East-Central European nationalism consists in an intersection of two basic political factors of the neuralgic zone of Central Europe between Germany and Russia. On the one hand, this territory of minor nations reaching from Finland in the north to Greece in the south is symptomatically marked by overlapping national and state borders. In contrast with the western part of Europe, this central belt of middle Europe does not have the almost pure nations found in the West due to its high level of national interpenetration.

On the other hand, both Germany and Russia very often abused the national diversities of this key European zone so as to establish their respective domination. The typical bias of these two European powers was, and still is, caused by the extraordinary importance of this unique part of Europe for the decisive orientations and tendencies of Europe as a whole. Its succinct kernel is ex-pressed by the notorious statement of Bismarck : "Who is the master of Bohemia, is by that same token the master of Europe." Conse-quently, in order to master the central zone of Europe between Germany and Russia, both European powers always have played with its characteristic national complexities. Moreover, the pre-vailing success of either power in this effort each time laid the decisive grounds for the succeeding Pan-European wars which spilled over into the world wars of our century, including the more than forty years of cold war.

A viable historic alternative to those precarious European, and now world prospects was developed in the course of history as well. Its evident logic runs as follows: the often unstable belt of nations and states between Russia and Germany must become a firm and stable territory of free and democratic masters of their respective fortunes. This natural conception of democratic independence of Eastern Central Europe had been consistently developed especially by František Palacký (1798 - 1876) and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850 - 1937). They elaborated conceptions marked by a stress upon the inevitability of a mutual democratic consensus by the nations in this area. Such a necessary consensus has universal validity, and a spiritual foundation along the following system of democratic tenets: intrinsic and international relations must not be grounded in the rude force of one great power or on a balance of several such powers. Such a materialist kind of peace can be only temporary; in fact, it is always a path to war. European and world peace, if it is to have lasting prospects, must be founded in equal rights of all regardless the individual nation’s size, and it has to be rooted in democratic moral principles. Accordingly, the bedrock of any prospects of democratic peace amounts to acceptance of principles which reach beyond the selfish interests of individuals, nations and states.

First of all, these principles embody recognition of the sovereignty of human, national, and state efforts at life from the point of view of eternity, instead of living for selfish, violently achieved advantages and out of fear. Genuine equality and peace, both internal and international, can be born only on this basis.

Geopolitically, the implementation of this democratic alterna-tive would trigger two crucial long term effects. On the one hand, democratic overall-European unity would be grounded firmly, in-cluding its central ties with the United States, and other democracies outside Europe. On the other hand, such an historical turn for Europe would influence decisively the democratic situation of the old eastern question, i.e. the vital relationship between Europe and Asia with Africa in terms of a shared democratic future. In other words, the key importance of the neuralgic national zone between Germany and Russia arises naturally from its position bridge position from Europe towards the Middle Eastern crossroad. Hence, the prevailing character of political regimes in this kernel of Europe is decisive with regard both to the character of Europe as a whole and to the pre-dominant European influence upon Asia and Africa, and vice versa.

The partisans of the privileges of sheer force and the materia-lism this involves rightly understand that the democratic alternative for the whole of Europe via Eastern Central Europe places them in deadly jeopardy. Solving "the eastern question" in terms of equal, morally anchored rights naturally would eliminate their selfish, materialist ambitions and aspirations. For this reason they attempt always and by all means to annihilate this truly democratic alter-native of a democratic European unity and that of other continents which are willy-nilly united with Europe.

The most recent example of such pernicious activism is the effective instigation of nationalistic conflicts in post-communist European countries, and elsewhere, by the strong communist power networks, especially after 1989. The revival of the nationalistic turmoil this created, reaching from basically non-military forms in Slovakia to civil wars in Jugoslavia, not to mention the same characteristic inducement of nationalist wars in the Caucasus, always has the same primary power effect: it saved and firmly legitimized the originally communist, but now nationalistic totalita-rian domination which had been restored in the respective countries following a very uncertain period.

Naturally, in most of those post-communist regions where the nationalistic cause was not so divisive, pervasive and acute, e.g. in Poland, the Czech Republic, and today also in Lithuania, parts of Hungary and Bulgaria, the regressive communist management of national sentiments obviously failed. This is why these states have good chances of strengthening their post-communist democratic regimes and thereby establishing their new democratic traditions of political culture. Consequently, the core post-communist struggle occurs along the present, dynamic fault-line between the totalitarian nationalistic regressions, and the stabilization of democratic forms of rule on the basis of a shared respect for human rights. This context seems to explain the central anti-democratic role of the post-communist national chauvinism today.

The validity of these explanations is demonstrated by the present political situation in the Czech Republic, where the networks of totalitarian regression continue via three major interconnected channels.

First, both extremist political parties in the Czech Republic -- the Communist Party and the fascistoid Republican Party -- em-phasize characteristically frustrating visions of a deadly menace to the nation. The racist Republicans stress the national minority of Gypsies and other distinct races from within, as well as the danger of German domination via the Sudeten Germans living in Germany from without. The Communist Party focuses on the exaggerating German imperialist tendencies, identifying this with both NATO and the European Union. The fascistoid Republicans dismiss NATO and the European Union. Thus, both major extremist parties in contem-porary the Czech Republic play the same nationalist card, though with little political effect.

A third, less provocative, trend on the recent Czech political scene, seems to have more important impact by providing the two extremist tendencies with a more fashionable rhetoric. This is the mainstream of the present Social Democratic opposition party. Its major political support consists of many sorts of originally communist believers who in fact did not abandon their persuasions regarding overwhelming central control in the management of State and society. This non-democratic tenor of the Czech Social Democratic Party often assumes the form of a mixture of both social and materialist demagoguery.

In this context, the nation is being depicted as in serious jeopardy caused by the uncontrolled forces of the free market, foreign companies, and selfish and greedy capitalists. There are seen as conspiring, also politically, with their domestic criminal breeds against the sound national interests of this state. Typically enough, the Social Democratic approval of joining NATO appeared as a result of the west European Social Democratic influence on this political party. However, the Czech Social Democratic Party´s standpoint was that such a step must be subject to a national referendum.

In sum, the leading phrases of the Czech Social Democrats revolve mostly around an artificial construct of a sort of criminal conspiracy threatening the future of the Czech nation. This political simplicity of the prevailing Social Democratic evaluation of present democratic rule in the Czech Republic constitutes a dangerous nationalistic continuum of the Communist and fascistoid Republican extremism with the mostly ex-communist Social Democracy in the contemporary Czech Republic.

There is a similar dynamic fault-line in the lasting struggle for democracy in each country of this sensitive post-communist region. The convinced democratic side of the political landscape is involved in a long-term battle closely entangled with the task of how to define post-communist national independence in terms of the values of democratic civilization. This crucial mission of post-communist de-mocracies amounts to building a mood of democratic national culture after the devastating experiences with totalitarian communist re-gimes. Only such a primary civic mood promises to provide a viable alternative to the present acute danger of chauvinistic nationalism in the post-communist environments.

The best possible solution of this problem seems to consist in a cogent public identification of national perspectives with a de-mocratic culture of just behavior. In this context, the justice of the democratic national spirit is anchored in the largely recognized, spontaneously acquired duty to behave to others as we wish that they should behave towards us. Along this line, democratic national dignity grows out of the efforts of civil society to prove in action that citizens respect in the spirit of unity the active contributions of others to the morally grounded benefit of neighbors and of the citizenry as a whole.

Conclusively, democratic humanist nationalism stands or falls with the resolve to act congruently with these moral and spiritual principles, and to take the incidental risks. This type of resolve and action of civil society is an inevitable precondition for building the democratic state, its maintenance and strengthening. Only thus can human and civic virtues be acquired, and their bearers be ready to put them into practice in any condition. Only in this way are people really deserving of freedom because they act as dignified citizens. In other words, the common notorious finding that regimes must be maintained by the same skills and powers as at the time of their foundation is no less valid for the exercise of freedom.

The greatness of nations in a democratic civilization results from a persevering and consistent pursuit of the principles of hu-manistic democracy. If the contemporary and future life of nations is to have a viable democratic prospect after devastating decades of communism, it must develop a cogent integrity of character and education, as well as their outer exercise. Without accepting this type of attitude, all material efforts are actually disadvantageous.

Such a problem is not at all limited to the extreme cases of aggressive selfishness in post-communist nationalism, for the existing political democracies, i.e. national democracies, very generally embody only partly finished attempts at democracy in its proper, humanist sense. These are the never completed striving after justice on the basis of efficient love of fellow-citizens, and of all people of good will.

Consequently, the best way to overcome some faults of freedom is more freedom, i.e. the freedom to investigate them critically and openly with a view to reform. The repeated finding that without the prevalence of a distinct civic atmosphere of cooperation among free citizens no humanistic democracy as a way of life is possible is true not only for individuals and communities, but for nations and states, and for their interaction. All political activities can have relevant meaning only on the basis of a cooperative attitude among individuals and nations based upon lasting principles. Human rights and freedoms are justifiable only as exterior concrete safe-guards of these principles.

The humanist democracy of individual nations constituted of the dignified free life of citizens is not a matter of course. Its exercise must always grapple with self-indulgence and egoism, both internally and externally. Accordingly, to the basic moral resolve of democratic nations must be added its armed defence. Such a decision applies the law of nature that whoever violates the rule of behaving towards others as one wishes them to behave towards oneself breaches the rationally verifiable law of nature, and consequently endangers one’s natural right to life, freedom and estates. In other words, the natural human rights of democratic nations are senseless if they do not entail natural moral obligations.

On these spiritual and moral foundations a cogent discrimina-tion of legitimate national needs, illegitimate chauvinistic appeals and the post-communist manipulation of both is possible. From this point of departure, one can gain a grounded insight into the manifold versions of nationalism and its jingoish abuse. Two basic sorts of nationalism emerge. On the one hand, a chauvinistically and materia-listically anchored negativism and aggression as a self-centered and entirely exclusive identity. On the other hand, the spiritually and morally based cosmopolitan version of nationalism which cogently legitimizes individual and national responsibilities as irreplaceable constituents of the complex democratic unity of our common world.