The collapse of the economico-political system in the citadel that was the communist bloc, together with its resulting worldwide repercussions, has revealed yet another division of the world, one that is more durable from an historical point of view. This division is not so much a matter of economic and political systems, as a matter of culture in the broadest sense of the word.

There are obvious lacunas in Beedham’s fivefold civilizational division of the world; the Buddhist societies of South-East and Central Asia sandwiched between Confuciania and Hinduland, Con-fuciania’s offshore islands, Japan’s remarkably thorough integration of several cultural layers, all deserve to be marked in special colors on the map of civilizations. The other large areas of the world where the classification deserves special comment are Black Africa and Latin America. Both continents are specific because of their socio-cultural heterogeneity. In Black Africa, Islamic and Euro-American cultures permeate the autochthonous cultures along horizontal as well as vertical lines. In Latin America, there are zones where the relics of various Amerindian cultures form a specific type of civilization.

From our perspective, however, it is not so much the number as the diverse nature of civilizations that matters. Different spiritual orientations, different values, in short the different paradigms of the human predicament are at the hub of the sociocultural diversity that is likely to create problems of co-existence.

Of the five basic paradigms of the human predicament four are still alive and internalized in people’s minds. Four constitute the backbones of living civilizations: the anthropocentric (man-cen-tered) paradigm in Euro-America, the theocentric (god-centered) paradigm in Dar-al-Islam, the psycho centric (soul-centered) para-digm in Hinduland and in the adjacent Buddhist orbit, and the crato-centric (rule-centered) paradigm in Confuciania. The only one of these five paradigms not to survive its social basis in the Pharaonic civilization of Egypt is the very special thanatocentric (death-centered) paradigm focused on the overcoming of death by various elaborate techniques. At present Eurasia is in a state of transition; its new paradigm may be a kind of crossbreed.

Obviously, the anthropocentric paradigm has been the most conducive to preoccupation with the co-existence of humans on a more or less equal basis, where reciprocity and contract have played the key roles. A comparatively wide scope for personal freedom, though often limited to differently assorted elites, and acceptance of other possible paradigms as complementary value systems were the by-products of this anthropocentric orientation.

Anthropocentrism, however, never was and perhaps never can be the exclusive focus of any sociocultural orientation. In the Graeco-Roman civilization it was modified by belief in an anthro-pomorphic pantheon and by various mystery cults. When this com-plex world view ceased to fulfill its integrative role in society the quest for a more comforting orientation led to the spiritual resources of the Middle East. The Judaic theocentrism ultimately provided the new source of inspiration.

In order to be accepted in the Hellenised and Romanised world, however, the Judaic understanding of God had to undergo a significant mutation. Instead of limiting himself to a covenant with one chosen people, God now addressed all mankind and sent Jesus Christ, his only son, to all peoples as the teacher who in due course was to die in martyrdom for the sake of their salvation. Greek philosophy and the Roman sense of law and order provided the rest: they worked out the ecclesiocentric (church-centered) paradigm of the human predicament. In a charismatic institution, endowed by its divine founder with sacramental powers, providing the believer with a safe conduct to salvation, theocentrism met anthropocentrism half way. As long as this paradigm was credible, it constituted a firm and exclusive bond of socio-cultural integration.

Once, however, the ecclesiocentric paradigm began to lose its spiritual appeal and to need force rather that conviction to sustain it, elements of the traditional European anthropocentrism began to reenter the stage. First, in the Renaissance, this was a matter of style rather than of substance. Nevertheless, the religious vigor of both the clerical and lay elite was weakened and the sacramental power of the Church came into question. The call ‘ad fortes’, for direct inspiration by Holy Writ, opened the door to alternative interpreta-tions of Christ’s message and to the fragmentation of Latin Christian civilization.

At that very time, the anthropocentric legacy received a new impetus as the Enlightenment initiated a comprehensive socio-cul-tural mutation. The resulting change in paradigms can be outlined as follows: Natural rather than supranatural forces mould the destiny of human beings. Faith ceased to be the linchpin of man’s mental orientation. In the pursuit of knowledge reliance came to be vested in the scientific approach. Ethics as a contractual type of morality, Do as you would have others do to you, would gain acceptance. On the communitarian plane, ethnic and party political loyalties came to be more relevant than belonging to particular religious bodies.

Yet the Enlightenment did not leave us a clear-cut legacy on all these points. Apart from the variations concerning Christian beliefs, the main contrast to emerge was that between those who favored equality and self-assertion throughout the whole social fabric and those who wanted to remain within the confines of a new intellectual and moral construct such as the general will or the laws of history. Thus two contrasting paradigms of the human predica-ment crystallized from the mental ferment induced by the Enligh-tenment. These twins may be called the paradigm of human rights on the one hand, and the paradigm of social engineering on the other. "Open" versus "closed" society is another more familiar but less telling label for this contrast.

It is significant that in practice the development in Western Europe and North America at large fell in line with those philoso-phers who stood for the paradigm of human rights. Only excep-tionally and as a transient arrangement did a general will or a supposedly scientific truth dominate particular societies in the West. Specifically, this was the obscurantist absolutism of fiercely nationa-listic dictators which took Europe by surprise in the 1930s and ravaged the continent until the mid 1940s.

The legacy of the philosophical protagonists of a closed so-ciety was to be taken over by societies outside the West European orbit, such as Orthodox Christian Russia and countries of predo-minantly Confucian tradition. Marxism in the West played the role of counter culture, but was not hostile to the advance of technology; thus it had a good chance of gaining a sympathetic hearing in countries which needed to catch up with the technological advance of the West but did not want to give up their socio-cultural identity. In those parts of the world the ground already had been conditioned to give the concept of social engineering a chance. But not all countries in such a situation followed Marx-Leninist guidelines. In some, the inspiration from the ‘official’ West won the upper hand. On the other hand, the Leninist civilization of social engineering was able to extend its testing ground over a good deal of Central Europe, including countries not affected by the catch-up syndrome.

With respect to the different paradigms of the human predicament it may be quite understandable why the anthropocentric paradigm of human rights would not be readily acceptable to peoples educated in other than the Euro-American tradition. But there is yet another good reason why peoples of other civilizations hesitate to accommodate the Western concept of human rights. There are obvious motives for opposition on the part of the rulers in the countries concerned. However, it is the imbalance between rights and duties or responsibilities that makes the current Western inter-pretation of human rights so much of an irritation. In particular the permissive morality is viewed as a provocative intrusion.

1. contrast between the rights of different individuals (the right of one person impinges on the right of another person);

2. contrast between what is considered normal behavior and what is considered peculiar or deviant; here it is mainly the impact on public life which matters;

3. contrast between the rights of individuals and the rights of collectivities, in particular the rights and responsibilities of the organs of the state;

4. contrast between the rights of living persons and the anti-cipated rights of future generations; this implies responsibility for the environment, whether natural or manmade (including the cultural heritage);

5. contrast between different religious and/or secular ideolo-gies, which impose on people different and mutually incompatible duties whilst allowing different rights;

6. contrast between collectivities identified in various ways (ethnic, professional, etc.); at stake is the delimitation of mutual rights and duties;

7. contrast between human interests and the imputed rights of animals; this means human responsibility for considerate behavior towards other living creatures.

Wherever these contrasts lead to outright collisions, the state is supposed to arbitrate, and if necessary help the party least able to represent its interests. A special case of this is the majority-minority issue (applicable mainly with respect to points 1, 5, and 6.) Some topical issues of this type are discussed in the second part of this paper.

8. As far as the state’s arbitration is concerned there is a contrast between its concern for those who violate the rights of other people and concern for those who are victims of those violations or feel themselves inadequately protected against crime. After a long history during which savage punishments for trivial offenses were the norm, the legislature and judiciary in the contemporary West are moving towards the opposite extreme. Lenient punishments prevail, and calls for more effective preventive measures against crime clash with concern over civic liberties.

Socio-cultural differences in the understanding and obser-vance of human rights are not only a matter of various paradigms of the human predicament, manifested in the beliefs, rules of conduct and symbols which together mould the socio-cultural profile of individual civilizations. Often the divergent interpretations of human rights and duties have to do with various communitarian loyalties that may divide peoples within one and the same civilization. Also in such a case human rights and responsibilities are at stake not merely as personal issues, but as a matter of collective rights and respon-sibilities.

In our context, the most susceptible to divergent views, and hence conflicts, are situations where peoples belonging to different socio-cultural entities happen to live in a territory dominated by one of them. The issue is between two loyalties: loyalty to a political framework in which one lives, and loyalty to a community where one has his or her ethnic origin.

In terms of institutionalized societal power, legitimized by mutual recognition, by the end of 1995 the world was divided into 185 states, members of the international association called ‘The United Nations’. This parlance implies that nation and sovereign state are synonymous terms. Such is the usage of these words in English and also in the Romance languages where, consequently, nationality means citizenship.

The difference between ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ is, however, not only a matter of grammar. The noun ‘nationality’ is not always understood as a derivative of nation. It can stand as a noun des-cribing a different phenomenon. In Central Europe the difference between the words ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ developed into a most significant dichotomy, namely between the ‘national or nation state’ on the one hand and ‘the state of nationalities’ on the other. (The German equivalent sounds more succinct: Nationalstaat against Nationalitatenstaat.) The first stood for a one-nation state, the second for a multinational state. This became a hotly debated issue between the leading nations and national minorities in the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.

The official terminology in some Central European and Com-munist-ruled states has made the following adaptation of this distinction: ‘nation’ stands for the majority ethnic group in a state; ‘nationality’ stands for an ethnic minority in that state.

The identification of the state with the nation, words which by their etymology are better fitted for different meanings, is not a fortunate one. Most other European languages, like the ancient Greek and Latin, uphold a clear distinction between ‘state’ (politeia in Greek, respublica in Latin) and ‘nation’ (ethos in Greek and natio in Latin), which is helpful both for a scholarly discourse and for legal provisions.

This distinction may be reconciled with the current usage of the term ‘nation’, by using appropriate epithets: political nations on the one hand and ethnic nations on the other. Political nations are identified by political status such as statehood or, possibly, also by membership of a federation or regional autonomy. ‘Political nation’ is basically a geographical or, to put it more succinctly, geopolitical concept; the individuals acquire their membership by birth in the country concerned (Pius soli). Ethnic nations are identified by attributes of culture such as language (this is most often the case), religious allegiance and particular tradition (historical experience). ‘Ethnic nation’ is a demographic concept; membership is inherited from the parents (Pius sanguinis). In the case of ethnically mixed marriages or adoptions there is an element of choice. Ultimately, belonging to an ethnic nation is a matter of personal awareness (national consciousness). Its presence, with an adequate number of people, adds a third, subjective, dimension to the concept of nation. In German, this trichotomy is appositely described, that is Staat-snation, Kulturnation, Bewusstseinsnation. People who constitute a self-conscious ethnic nation in the aforementioned sense and are at the same time organized in a state of their own (and who are thus also a political nation) may be described as a ‘full-scale nation’.

In the light of what has already been said, the term "nation state", which is often used to denote the standard type of modern state, is misleading. In terms of international law it is a pleonasm: each sovereign state is a nation. But members of a federation (federal nation state) are called merely states and never nations. In a historical context, however, the term nation state may make more sense; but even here it is beset by ambiguity.

Of 185 member states of the United Nations there are about two dozen so small, and often ethnically heterogeneous (most of them are islands), that even in official usage there is some hesitation in describing them as nations: the term nation state would be wholly out of the question.

For the sake of clarity and meaningful discourse it is advisable to uphold the time-honored distinction between the political and ethnic aspects or ‘nationhood’: not to refer to states and nations as identical entities, and to reserve for nationality its grammatical meaning of belonging to a nation in contrast to citizenship implying belonging to a state.

For English and French speakers, such a distinction may appear obvious. They may well understand that there are stateless nations such as the Kurds or the Ibo, and, on the other hand, that there are states such as India (Bharat) or South Africa whose popu-lation is composed of more than one nation. But such a distinction between state and nation might be less acceptable where only parts of various nations constitute one state such as is the case with Switzerland or Belgium. A similar difficulty emerges where there is a ‘melting pot’ of immigrants and autochthonous nations such as in most states in America and Oceania. Here the term nation is pri-marily a political concept. A common language of European origin is the hallmark imported by the first settlers who had come in sufficient strength to avoid being swamped by those who arrived later.

Where states are built up from various tribal elements, as in most Black African countries, with borders arbitrarily imposed upon them by former colonial powers, the term nation is an expression of intent rather than of an actual situation. The fact that the languages of former colonizers -- even if the latter did not settle in the country in significant numbers - became official languages in Black African states points to the lack of a domestic contribution to the geopolitical framework of the nations in the making.

As far as the composite nation state is concerned, reference to European experience may be useful. A newly created composite nation state made up from ethnically kindred elements, as was the case with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, did not survive a lifespan of 74 years. A composite multi-ethnic state, such as Switzerland or Belgium, survived, but only after heavy internal strains had been overcome and complete equality of individual ethnic groups had been guaranteed and observed. Furthermore, in these two latter cases there was the element of timing: the idea of a common citizenship took root in peoples’ consciousness before the different ethnicity, manifested in language, became the main factor of division. For the two-nation state, Canada, at the time of writing, either way is still open.

Problems of multi-ethnic or ethnically composite states reflect the basic issue of state-nation relationship in modern Europe. The last 150 years of history revolve, albeit sometimes indirectly, about its solution. From the start of the Greek uprising against Ottoman rule in 1824 till the inter-ethnic war on the territory of the unfortunate Yugoslavia in the 1990s, all the European wars were fought either for ethnic emancipation, ethnic unification, promotion of one nation state’s power (whether real or alleged) or ethnic adjustment of the states’ borders.

After World War II, however, this trend came to be matched by an opposite development: immigration from poorer or not so well-organized states -- not only from Europe but increasingly from Overseas -- to those states which, on both counts, were better off. Against the decline of autochthonous minorities there has been an increase in heterochthonous minorities, often with a distinctly non-European socio-cultural background. Thus ethnic diversity came to be combined with diversity in civilization. The scope for inter-ethnic tension acquired a new, more sharply profiled view. Diversity in civilization moved from the macrocosm of the world stage to the heart of Europe. Often this diversity became reflected in different levels of social stratification. For quite a number of European countries socio-cultural diversity of this kind has become an internal problem.

1. The Economist, September 1, 1990.

2. F. Fukuyama, in K. Jensen, ed. A Look at the End of History (Washington, D.C., 1990) and F. Fukuyama, Trust: New Foundation of Global Prosperity (London: Hamilton, 1995).

3. S. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993.

4. J. Krejci, The Human Predicament; Its Changing Image (London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martins Press, 1993).

5. This process has been thoroughly analyzed in the widely acclaimed book by David Martin, A General Theory of Seculari-zation (first edition Oxford: Blackwell, 1977, reedited at Gregg Revivals, Hampshire: Aldershot, 1993). The book contains frequent hints at a sociological explanation, or interpretation of these varia-tions, rather than an explicit, coherent theory of this phenomenon, let alone a general one.

6. For more detail on the role of Marxism in the socio-cultural transformation of China and also in the changes that took place in Eastern Europe, see J. Krejci, Great Revolutions Compared, the Outline of a Theory (Hempstead: Harvester -- Wheatsheaf, 1994).

7. For their more recent admonition see A. King and B. Schneider, The First Global Revolution, a Report by the Council of the Club of Rome (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991).

8. H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (Frankfurt: Insel-Verlag, 1979).

9. A. Etzioni, ed., New Communitarian Thinking; Person, Virtue, Institutions and Community (Virginal: Virginia University Press, 1995).

10. E.F. Francis, Inter-Ethnic Relations; An Essay in Sociological Theory (New York: Elsevier, 1976), p. 394.

11. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 21-7.

12. P.M. Milyukov, Nationality, Its Origin and Development (Czech translation from Russian) (Prague, Orbis, 1930), p. 69. The importance of communication for building national consciousness was discovered long before the American scholars began to apply ‘communication theory’ to the study of nationalism.

13. For more detail before 1980 see J. Krejci and V. Velimsky, Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe (New York: Martin’s, 1981), pp. 61-73.