The discussion of morality in the last decades of the 20th century is the most urgent present problem confronted by philosophy, cultural anthropology and psychology. Ethics is now the only place where philosophy can be really creative; having gone through all the other possibilities of rational theory, only in ethics does it have something new to offer. To do so, however, philosophy must cease being too introspective and self-critical. For their part, cultural anthropology and psychology must overcome the positivism which has excluded matters of "value" and "meaning" and which make their descriptive, reductionistic and purely functional methods appear as aberrations. It has never been as necessary as it is now to have communication between moral philosophy, philosophical and cultural anthropology and psychology in order to clear up the confusion that reigns in the field of ethical precepts.

There is need for a universal ethic of justice and kindness between men in which the spiritual perfection of each human being can be achieved based upon a transcendental source of love. In other words, the love of a unique transcendent God demands the universal practice of an ethic of justice and love in the exercise of human freedom.

This ethic is not stoic, heteronomic, autonomous or humanistic. Nor is it a penitential ethic, for we suffer not as a punishment, but as a result of two realities. The first is the laws proper to material nature with its terrible randomness. The second can be called psychic nature which, through history, has constructed a world that induces all kinds of alienations, unfairness, lack of love, idolatry, envy, egoism, vengeance and finally, the negation of responsibility. All this leads to our being engaged in structures, functions and social systems which are closed in upon themselves. Hence, from the psychological point of view, moral education requires a clarification of the real origin of evil and suffering.

Further, the universal ethic of love, justice and peace is weakened by the fact that men seem not to need it. Daily, it is rejected practically by individuals and institutions; on the theoretical level it has been rejected by a great majority of philosophers as well as by scientific thinking. I will discuss some of these refusals, for when a universal ethic based upon love, justice, the affirmation of life and respect for the dignity of others crumbles due to being refused philosophically we are left with only rigid moral precepts, which mock morality; increasing narcissism and idolatry for technology; and democracy as a fight for radical changes of the dominant and unfair economic structures, and a struggle for freedom and human rights.

PARTIAL OR SECTORAL ETHICS

The rejection of moral obligations based on the spirit brings a partial or divided ethics proper to a limited vision and a logic of its own sector; these are closed ethics, like those described by Bergson, which live in contradiction. But even the closed morals described by Bergson which always had a religious facet differ from the partial ethics of today which remind us of what Anna Karina wrote of the pre-columbine tribes: "only the Caribe is man": only my fellow policemen, the members of my company, or the followers of my religion are human. Purely functional and merely utilitarian ethics have shifted attention from what is good or bad for all, to what is convenient for my company, ethnic organization or nation -- everything that is not convenient is bad.

The theoric refusal of the capacity of persons for internal freedom, substitutes moral obligations upon free and responsible persons by the auto-regulation of an individual system. Then self-direction by the individual is demanded in the place of self-determination with the result that ethics becomes merely operational, functional and utilitarian. Rarely, however, is a person absolutely enclosed in but one economic, political or social structure; what is self-regulated may be closed in upon itself, but it must function in two or more structures. Then, there appears the phenomenon of the perfectly conscious ethic which permits the individual to identify simultaneously with two or more operant ethical codes. Sometime the same person functions as a member of a cruel organization and at the same time belongs to a wider social group which demands kind and considerate behavior. This great contradiction seems well tolerated, with no apparent internal conflict.

The contradiction between positivism's criticism of the possibility of internal freedom or responsibility on the part of the person, and its insistence upon external freedom, license, absolute autonomy and upon transcending good and evil is solved apparently by the regulation imposed upon the individual for the good of the operation of the system. But these purely psychological systems, for lack of a frame of superior ethical values, permit a broad array of possible conduct responding to the different conceptions of life according to various psychotherapeutic schools.

Western societies today, whether developed or not, are characterized by a phenomenon that is not new in the history of humankind, but recently is acquiring a more terrifying character, namely, the many merely operative and functional rationalities that have divided the social world. Cold logic disintegrates the notion of humanity so that the general unity of human, social and cultural life disappears within a series of subsystems, each with their concrete goal. At heart these sectors work with cynicism and a total lack of scruples. Another study would be needed in order to comment upon and define in detail the characteristics of some of their rationales. For now we can only list them: the logic of money, the logic of the political party, the penal process, preparation for war, multinational corporations, etc. As can easily be understood, humanitarian ethics is almost empty, becoming seemingly unreal, abstract and sentimental. From these sectorial perspectives there is no general duty for mankind, nor any global commitment -- functional ethics alone is possible, its only purpose being a more efficient system whose subsystems possess their own secret rewards.

Some historical factors supposed to influence actual cultural attitudes regarding morality include the following: a) the tremendous political and economic abuses against people in the name of religion or of Christian morality, b) the rise of humanism, technology and science, c) the struggle for political freedom, d) the excessively negative traditional ethic, e) the degradation of ethics, and f) science and technology.

STAGES OF ETHICAL AWARENESS

Penal Ethics

The ethical ideal of Christianity today faces two great difficulties. The first involves two negations of transcendental morals: one philosophical and aesthetic, the other pragmatic. The other great difficulty resides in the absence or weakness of the strength necessary for superior and universal moral conduct. We must reflect on this second difficulty because it entails the principal moral problems in our world.

We know that a sense of "ought" (that one ought to do this or that) forms part of a human being; along with knowledge it is the immediate distinctive characteristic of humankind, and any human action which is not purely physiological implies some sense of "ought." This is shown in many ways: as wanting to have, wanting to change, and as duty in regard to others and oneself. In other words, the feeling of "ought" is the contrary of an entity being closed in its own compact being. Any behavior which refers to moral duty necessarily restricts the determined tendencies and needs of the individual. There is no moral without restriction imposed either from the outside or from within. In both cases, the source from which the restriction arises is always supra-individual. Two great sources of moral restriction exist; one obliging and the other attracting. The first one is manifested as a strength that pushes the individual to behave in a determined manner -- or else! Its strength comes from the punishment of any infringement: it is a moral identified with the objective justice of a penal law, with its prescriptions and rules, whether written or not. It is then a penal moral whose main objective is the survival of the group.

Morals of Aesthetics or of Style

Having obtained penal justice for survival and for minimal association between equals and unequals, with properly urban life and its civilized refinements the luxuries of life in society appeared. With them come manners and style so that a certain degree of ritual becomes necessary. In the majority of ancient societies, ruled by one or more superior castes, these manners, styles and rituals quickly became immoderate in ostentatious luxury and richness so that even religious life was strongly shaped according to the style of the caste. It is possible that in these caste societies aristocratic mores which in their beginning had an ethical character were quickly absorbed by no less demanding aesthetic rules. As the ethical precept disappeared the demands of a more refined aesthetic level came to dominate.

But there were at least two societies in which this typically decadent process was stopped or kept under control for many centuries, namely, Greece and Rome. The Greeks had humanistic ethical concerns which in the end became purely aesthetic categories. Concretely, in the 6th century (BC) in Athens a humanistic ethic appeared, the real source of whose power was the "polis." "Arete" acquired an ethical sense as did the "sophrosine," the avoidance of the "pleonexia," self-dominion, austerity and "economy" by the practice of "askesis." All these were to tend toward a mean or middle point avoiding "stasis" in a city full of economic problems and proud people. Obviously this moral for living together always transforms itself into a kind of aesthetics of ethics and later gives birth to the appearance of living on an aesthetic level, completely free of properly ethical duties. The moral tone then becomes that of an aesthetic custom; in these sectors of life "good" and "bad" disappear, appearing rather as good and bad taste.

When applied to our times this absorption of the ethical by the aesthetic hides unexpressed moral concerns behind the aesthetic worries which are permitted to appear. Also, for an increasing number of people, besides the fear of committing crimes, the only thing which rules their normal behavior are the ethical precepts implicit in a certain mode of life -- or life style. This means living for appearances. Humanistic morals then convert into an ethic of elegance and instead of their intrinsic value, acts are praised by such phrases as: "a noble act," "a beau geste"; on the contrary, unless it be a crime, we usually do not say that it is a bad act, but that it was unkind or inelegant. This is the moral practice of elegance; it is only a question of style.

It cannot be denied of Greek humanism, however, that it invented political democracy. This, too, has come with the humanism of Western modernity which, despite its great and inevitable stumbles, has given us as its fruit political democracy and universal human rights. Democracy demands an ideal, and this ideal is moral in nature.

Attraction and Superior Justice

Besides these morals of survival or of life with a minimal of social order, and of sacred duties towards the gods, the hierarchy of the church, high political authorities and groups in economic power, from another source there appears another moral order in terms of new and more strict justice. This is the moral of attraction, contrary in principle to that of obligation by which one is pushed to fulfill a determined duty. In this new moral a person is attracted by an object or situation of superior joy that must be reached freely by refusing the enjoyment of objects or situations which are lesser in this regard. This implies a more demanding justice, a love for others strengthened by a universal source of love and a sense of the fulfillment and realization of each person. This moral of attraction is not a matter of forcing one's way towards what is loved; rather, it pursues an ideal justice of respect and love based on ascending towards a superior sphere of perfection that is desirable for all men. Hence, Christian civilization implies a sense of sin and subjective guilt, for the moral of attraction demands a refusal of certain legal pleasures. This is why the Christian ethic speaks of restrictions upon sexuality, pride, power, riches and many other things.

It is very difficult to talk about how and why the kindly appeal to a superior and free moral conduct has been accompanied in history by a special kind of excessively authoritarian subjection. This is similar to secular penal justice, which in many cases transforms subjective guilt and spiritual punishment into objective guilt and purely social and penal punishment (e.g., the inquisition and its much regretted excesses). Worse than anything, the temporal powers took over the implications of moral attraction which they converted into penal obligations, confusing the name of a loving God, punishment of the people and the excesses of political and economic powers.

It is difficult to be fair to the Catholic Church in this matter. Was it necessary that the appeals of Christ to purify the soul be converted into judicial orders -- perhaps, yes. Was it necessary that the precepts of the Church were converted into a penitential system emphasizing the fear of eternal punishment given by an angry God -- perhaps, yes. It is possible that only few were initiated into a religion of love for an entirely transcendental God, that these people would feel an irresistible passion to give people the way to salvation, and that their impatience could drive them to impose what should have been a spontaneous moral arising from numerous enlightening and inspiring experiences.

We cannot suppose that the source of a moral which by free decision discards certain enjoyments to prepare the soul for salvation as a loving union with God can be found in the experience of offense and punishment. The punishment is given to man by himself in order that he be capable of salvific union. Remaining alone, incomplete and lost in one's own labyrinth of commitments is very different from eternal revenge from God. Mortal sin is the kind of act which does not allow our internal transformation and closes us more and more in egocentric and psychic habits which take us far from God and leave us in the most complete loneliness.

Let us return once more to the urgent problem of how the morals of attraction has been contaminated by a morals of compulsion. The search for explanations takes us back to the religions before Christianity: to national religions in which the gods held positions in their systems of penal justice. These cosmic gods, at times fearful and arbitrary, were behind the established powers (clergy, hierarchy, monarchy, etc.), imposing their morals of survival, living and domination; these gods were absolute executions of punishment. It is not easy to rid oneself of this feeling of primitive religion which is mixed with the duty of survival, internal order and growth on the part of the group, city, nation and empire. A religion of love can be contaminated by psychic immersion in those primitive religions. Above all, the temporal powers will try to use it, thereby confusing a God of justice derived from love with a penitential God at the service of the most powerful.

In the church there always has been and still continues a struggle to rescue the life of religion and its superior morals from the hands of those secular structures of domination. However, in the name of Christ the temporal power of the Church, as well as the secular economic and political powers, fell more and more into a moral of domination that is precisely its contrary. Wherever it appears this moral of domination creates material conditions of life which greatly compromise the disposition to a superior spiritual life. From the beginning the conflict between those two moral attitudes broke down the heart of Christianity.

At the same time Christianity with its insistence upon the individual self with its liberty and ethical responsibility, when combined with desacrilization, provided ideal conditions for the development of self-consciousness, critical thought and scientific knowledge. It was not easy to oppose ascetism and erase the difference between the secular and the religious. However, this developed and became more and more organized until the establishment of humanism. At first this was parallel to, and in a way conditioned by, the religious; then it became independent; lastly, armed with science and a philosophical epistemology it entered into open war upon religion. In the history of man this humanism manifests a more logical and powerful character than that of classical Greece or Rome. It produced all the revolutions we know in the Christian West, and broke down the powerful and authoritarian church and the aristocratic class. This breakdown of the authority principle, which had emphasized a socialized moral of domination and suggested the image of a mediocre and unfair God, meant for many the death of God. Hence, the West found need for a universal humanistic ethic.

The impact of this has been horrible, for it has meant that any humanism is a good substitute for the superior justice ethic based upon the universal love of man for God. To fill the emptiness produced by the weakening of the Christian ideal people have turned to science and technology so that we now live in a techno-industrial civilization. Humanism fails to provide a rational ethic because its sphere is by definition rationalized, and not rational. Thus, ethics depends upon a stoic attitude, and values conceived in this way are like car batteries which work while new but run down and have a short life. There appear the theme of fanatical nationalisms, the theme of progress, the totalitarian state, the mystic of a superior race and the ethic of pure science. Today the aesthetic attitude through which many sought to justify life seems to be looking upon "nature" as a mystical sphere, even considering earth as a personal divinity at the same time that the Eastern mystical search for the absolute appears to have broken down due to narcissism. Today, the plastic arts, poetry literature, philosophy and even science look fundamentally to one another; there is a weak sense of immanence, but none can give what they do not have. Meanwhile, the majority are left in great confusion between contradictory morals without knowing what to do and, in general, spiritually too weak to confront the limits of their existence: to these peoples technological progress seems the only compensation.

When we talk about the great present-day crisis of morals and of the sense of life, it is important not to exaggerate the negative, nor to forget the positive. Thus, the work of the humanist and the anti-religious rebel remains important for the complex and exhausted world in which we live. For example, despite some consequences, political democracy, the revolutionary positions of Marxism's naturalistic ethic and such political and economic ideals as a sense of justice have done much for mankind in our time. Indeed, they are the only obstacle to a complete human mutation to a limited technological rationality.

The major goal of our analysis of this situation is to clarify what is distinctive of the ethical attitude and conduct of our time. Always there has been economic injustice, violence, abuse of power and immorality. What is really characteristic of our problems is that veneration of technology and compulsive consumption have become the most powerful rivals of spiritual development and its corresponding moral. Technology has overshadowed morality. The absolute dependence of human life upon technology imposes its own rationality, its own forms of life and ethics. Big changes are required in order to achieve spiritual and psychological independence from the need for and the enjoyment of human products. The relation between the products of technology and us has become one almost of companionship and the possession of those products is a matter of social prestige for those who possess them. Inhabitants of big cities personalize such objects as a substitute for weak and mediocre human contacts.

All these factors lead to a compulsive narcissism as a way to evade or escape reality. Psychoanalysts tell us that a little narcissism is necessary for proper human development, but that beyond that point it becomes highly destructive as men become highly egocentric. In products of technology they find automatic satisfaction without danger of negation. For the narcissist who considers those things to be projections of him or herself in a world full of injustice and loneliness, technological narcissism becomes a solution.

Specific characteristics of the present cultural life are then: the use of technology just described, incompatible morals lived without apparent conflict, the partial logic of money and its power and the sexual revolution. Within the individual there remains only the automatic and primitive moral imposed by the Super-ego; outside there is the penal justice of survival and convenience. There begin to disappear little by little self-domination, fidelity to one's word, decency and truthfulness in speech, mutual respect and, lastly, urbanity.

PROBLEMS FOR MORALS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE

Psychotherapies and Ethics

The "ego" is an historical phenomenon due probably to the restructuring of the psyche produced by Christianity and later by post-Renaissance humanism. The original rationalist self-consciousness of philosophical thought reflected the aristocratic class of Athens. The strong spiritual force of Christianity provoked a notable psychic reordering that reflected the death of a series of obsolete structures in the social-cultural area and the probable repression of related psychic contents, leading to a series of forms of physical life -- some beautiful, others horrible -- related to socio-cultural absolutes.

The relatively lonely, self-sufficient and self-conscious "I" comes probably from a series of socio-cultural repressions. Over the "I" there was the "super-ego," a psychic control which Freud described as "that" (the concept is actually in decadence), automatic, rigid, stupid and unconscious. From such a psychic situation with a similar correlation of unstable forces contemporary psychology and psychotherapy arose. They try to establish an equilibrium of the "ego" avoiding possible destruction by the unconscious from automatic moral regulations. Today psychotherapists leave completely aside ethical considerations, which at times they contradict. Though some hold the necessity of morals, they do not apply it. Psychotherapeutic techniques originated in the 18th century and made it possible to uncover the existence of an unconscious psychic zone charged with tension and deeply depressed by unconscious forces. Because such forces have moral connotations, which psychoanalysis had related to the cruel "super-ego," a serious ethics for the "ego" was placed under the automatic operation of the "super-ego," forgetting that the "ego" could have certain thoughts which were totally immoral, and even at times criminal.

Through psychotherapy the "ego" can be controlled and achieve an equilibrium. Psychotherapists help individuals deal with depression, cultural restrictions from the past, and the cultural alteration of love. They deal also with technological influences which for lack of love, provoke a rigid and tyrannical attitude in personal consciousness and intensify the law of the jungle in the unconscious. All this causes psychic changes and illness. Often instincts are perverted or weakened due to a lack of love resulting from moral confusion in the dedication of mothers and fathers to their function as educators.

However, psychotherapists believe that the equilibrium of the psychic system of the individual is enough for the balance and the behavior of the person. They speak not about duties, but about equilibrium or balance. Freud emphasizes as an example genital maturity as the automatic regulator; the highest point that one can achieve in love or work is the reduction of any cruel tendencies and self-direction. Though in his theory Freud discounted morals, in his life and practice he was a moralist, considering uncontrolled sexual liberty to be due to the presence of cruel instincts.

However, in these days there appear a series of psychotherapies built upon the notion that sexual impulses and tendencies to greed are irresistible. Psychotherapies generally allow persons to do almost anything to "satisfy themselves," except criminal acts which may be punished. These types of psychotherapies give great importance to the body. Other psychotherapies are not that permissive. Some are more exigent regarding self-control. This poses a very interesting ethical problem inasmuch as sacrifice and abnegation for each other often are defined as immature and cruel psychic games.

We are used to seeing morality used as an iron mask for compulsive goodness, masochism and sacrifices which keep the individual from interior peace and self-determination. Nevertheless, such things do not justify defining all abnegation, giving and sacrifice as neurotic. What is important is to see if there is a free will behind such conduct. Where the behavior of the individual is rigid we may say that it is neurotic; when such behavior is not accompanied in the individual by a clear consciousness of his or her capability and wishes there is a neurosis. Depression appears in defense of destructive impulses; when such reactions do not exist there is a free will.

Lately some psychotherapeutic theories take account of what are called "altered states of consciousness," proposing a psychotherapy "beyond the `ego'." Two months before dying Freud wrote this phrase: "Mysticism: that Kingdom located further than the I, and the that."

Moralism and Morality

For many people in the Western world any moral precept or invocation of moral duties has become extremely unpopular, especially when it touches upon their private conduct. In general morality is required of major officials in public affairs. In some countries people expect also a correct attitude in private sexual life. In general, in the public domain we expect a traditional ethical behavior, but in private we refuse any absolute morals, allowing for the co-existence of several opposite ethics according to the socio-cultural structures. There are crimes, but not sins; there is confusion about ethics relating to erotic behavior, but no doubt about the amorality in commercial transactions: both moralist and anti-moralist agree that no sin is possible in the economic field.

Let us attempt now to define moralism. It would seem that moralism is restrictive due to the fact that moralists attack sexually uncontrolled acts in relation to the family, while being less concerned for people who undergo economic hardship. In fact, the ethical bond which allows the moralist to criticize determined moral infractions in others condemns their not exercising this power over those committing economic infractions. Besides being restrictive and preferential, moralistic ethics is basically penitential. Sometimes the moralist is severe because he projects his own unconscious behavior. In conclusion it is very easy to become a moralist: first of all one frees from guilt the immoral part of one's own conduct and that of his class, then one focuses upon any immoral act or behavior by those he considers to be different.

Humanism and Moral

Morals as a specific area of the philosophical and anthropological thought seems to have appeared in the Christian West in the 18th century with such questions as: to be or not to be moral; which moral should one follow; is there a natural moral love? Certainly this has to do with the breakdown of the powerful religious environment. The same thing happened in classical Greece where the increasing power of humanism brought a need to strengthen ethical principles with the help of philosophy. Socrates was the first philosopher to see moral as something upon which one can and must reflect. Before that time rules for correct conduct were a direct consequence of the religious duties to the gods. Aristotle felt obliged to write two books about ethics as conceptual philosophical shields against the deteriorating conditions of human existence. It is very difficult to imagine a Greek citizen doubting whether there should be a moral or which ethic to choose. His doubts on this subject probably concerned whether or not to obey a moral precept, never the validity of norms opposed to his wishes.

Today, men find themselves in a totally different position. In human history we find a series of socio-cultural absolutes which confirm human existence. In the past these were based on myths of the tribe or clan, from which were derived the necessary minimal rules of survival and life with others. The Christian West also had socio-cultural absolutes whose weakening entailed theoretical and practical problems for morals. The reasons are similar to those of civilizations in the past. The weakening of monarchies, the appearance of classes, along with the development of technologies led to a gradual weakening of absolutes in favor of liberalism. With the breakdown of absolutes the alternatives have not been sufficient for secular humanism to ground an ethics. With the loss or in some cases, the weakening of their authority, religious, urban, philosophical and family principles have not been successful in withstanding opposition to all kinds of rigid ethical order. There is a tendency toward total moral relativism. With the lack in many people of any religious inspiration, the only moral which survives is the penitential one which secures survival and the minimum of community indispensable for some functioning of social life.

People today are very worried concerning the great existential crises: How to reorganize the economy so as to cause the poor less suffering, how to diminish the cruel socio-economical differences between classes. What moral education will enable people to face today's problem and those of the future? Technology cannot give the answer to these questions. People will have to believe more in law and brotherhood; they must sacrifice their useless and expensive goods in order to share with the poor; they must experience something transcendent.

Pure humanism can attempt to solve some of these difficult problems; but it lacks completely the strength to help with the liberation of the people, for it has no ethic or moral to follow: confusion is the word of the day. People need a stronger ethic to defend themselves from those who abuse their power in the sexual, political and socio-economic areas. While people tend to regret the disappearance of socio-economical absolutes, they forget that that emptiness can be filled with the first important step towards transcendence.

In conclusion: people would consider a moral prohibition to be fake, silly, useless or irrational; especially in powerful countries where ethics and moralities have been replaced by the "system" structured so as to achieve their own narcissist goods.

The following are the characteristics of a contemporary ethics:

- External subjection to penal law due to the law being made more fair and to the growing process of depenalization achieved by democratic humanism.

- Accelerated processes of social and economic criminal organization creating a separate world with its own hierarchy, political, social and economic influence which competes with the world of law, moral and ethics.

- Excessive freedom in sexual matters.

- Disregard of moral codes.

- Exchange of moral for operational codes according to the requirements of the system.

- Failure of humanism to develop a moral of attraction.

All these can be found in the present moral situation which, being unsatisfactory, can make possible an opening for love, justice and peace between individuals.

Family and the Autonomous Youth Culture

There have been basic rules for interaction between the young and adults in the nuclear family. Perhaps the only exception is found in poor families which have been weakening for at least fifty years. Earlier rules for relations of authority and obedience between parents and children are transmitted by the family.

Some families, due to the high cost of living, must live in marginal areas but still retain an acceptable level of economic culture. In Venezuela the great problem of marginalization plus the lack of ethics among the higher classes could make one believe that the family is losing its function as a transmitter of culture. The middle classes, however, retain a certain level of stability and coherence.

Venezuelan society can be described by the following characteristics: social divisions, corruption, acceptance of economic crime, ethical contradictions, crime by white collar workers, lack of education, etc. It is worse still for the underclass lacking identity, order or education, frustrated and angry, facing strong job competition and difficulty in entering schools which provide superior education.

Living in these conditions, youth usually have abnormal behavior characterized by visible and lasting anger. Children accustomed to a lack of love during their primary education, on the secondary level turn to violence and amorality, and end up becoming part of the marginal group. These are extremely narcissistic with a pervasive lack of moral or rational principles. Not believing in politics, they become anti-political or part of a gang. Their families are characterized by suffering, martyred mothers and a broken-down fathers. The educational plans of government institutions collapse.

After World War II there was a universal change in Western societies. Morals and ethics began to become confused for several reasons: a) criminal tendencies of youths in the U.S. and Europe, b) delinquency and crime by alienated rebels, c) earlier the hippie movement, and now d) drugs.

The youth revolution has taken over the industrial revolution: the big cities are there to be occupied and enjoyed by the young; cars and motorcycles are their symbols; and the products of technology (the electric sound, TV, and computers) abound. The women's and sexual revolutions contradicted the image of the father as an archetype. The principal problem is change at the political, social or economic levels and whether the young fight against it or in favor of it. This opens a question for the future: in what kind of society will we live when our children become parents? Will it be one with a strong sense of family and close relations, one of computerized pornography and sexual freedom, or will man's place be taken over by machines?

The characteristics of the present-day youth culture might be listed as follows:

(1) the tendency to draw closely together, to be satisfied with their achievements and uninterested in the history and politics of their society. The tendency of Venezuelan youth to be apolitical, as noted by Ramon Velasquez in the newspaper El Nacional, appears to be worldwide. After the 1968 riots in Paris and the political explosion of North American youth against the Vietnam war, political interest by the youth of the most developed countries has declined. In Venezuela college students abandon political ideals and the goal of changing the world and its socio-economical structures, which historically had been characteristic of students. Today they have a pragmatic preoccupation: they want to assure a more stable socio-economy which day by day becomes more difficult and competitive. Political interest is more local and concrete, limited to particular neighborhoods. It is difficult to make of youth, not a period of transition, but a goal in life. This is the first time in history when youth have had a consciousness of themselves and their values. It tries to interpret the world and life out of its own experience, without drawing upon the vital experience and concepts of older generations.

(2) Technology. There is a great fascination with machines, motorcycles, cars, music, stereos, computers, etc. Attacks against computer exhibitions did not last; many now want to own them and are very capable in running them; many more are attracted by their usefulness.

(3) A decay in language: the reduction in reading in favor of television decreases the critical power of the imagination and converts young people into passive receivers of information.

(4) The possession of extensive concrete practical information about sex, drugs, pornography and machine management.

(5) The change of fashion every five years.

(6) The wish to live adolescence as an end in itself, not as a transitory stage. However, there is an incongruity here. The criminologist, Professor Lopez Rey, holds that the communication media generates a precocious intellectual and sexual maturity which causes economic and professional immaturity as youth become more economically dependent upon their parents.

(7) The influence of such oriental religions as Buddhism.

(8) The close relationship of youth culture and rock music, dancing and drugs.

(9) Sexual freedom and the frequency of transitory and erratic unions without love.

The youth "revolution" is not simple and one-sided; like every social event it is complex and multifaceted. For example, not all adolescents are affected to the same degree by the immorality mentioned above. Our theory is that if a youth grows in a stable family environment, then the possibilities of falling into immoral acts are more remote. If the family is not stable or strong enough to offer the youth security, then children go in search of something that might provide this.

The juvenile environment is fundamentally hedonistic; it requires space, parties, cars, clothes and education which not all families can afford. This causes conflict between the youth and his or her family when it cannot afford or keep up with their consumer demands. If the youth has become a dependent consumer, he may reject familiar ethical values as well as a strong environment, which later may lead to the use of drugs, crime or even suicide.

The contemporary youth atmosphere is a potent rival of traditional family life and its internal hierarchy. Egocentric or immoral parents sometimes are not strong enough to tell their children what to do, thus inducing great insecurity in adolescents. On the other hand, if the family is lovable, respectful and moral, without suggesting weakness, the education and protection of the children becomes easier, not only for the parents but also for school and society.

This can happen only through well-defined communication, for the goal is not to change the music or to make computers disappear, but to keep all within basic ethical principles.

Another important aspect of group formation in the new generation of families is its mental health. Where the children are protected we find three developing human phenomena: richness and variety of nuclear identification; diminution of primary impulses, and lastly sublimation through adequate stimuli and the vivid values.

The moment has come to decide whether the revolution in youth culture will be characterized by a dissolution of man or by the survival of the principles of life.