The chapter of M. Brabeck below regarding some psychological theories of moral development proposes an integrated moral theory and comments regarding an ethics of love and those working in this direction. These pages will add elements about an integrated psychological model as a foundation of a theory of development and moral education in its diverse stages: childhood, adolescence and youth. I do not pretend to refer to all the aspects of this theme, which would entail psychological models for moral development, the processes of moral development, moral conduct, moral education, and an integrated psychological model for development and moral education.

Rather, I will focus on three aspects: (1) moral education and its "traditional profile" as power generator of better foundations; (2) psychological theories regarding morality; and (3) reflections on Kohlberg's proposal for a developmental theory and moral education.

MORAL EDUCATION

Interest in moral education has been one of the forces that has played an important role in the search and generation of a psychological model for moral development. The different psychological theories of moral development inevitably end up contributing to moral education. Conversely, the crisis experienced in what can be called the traditional model of moral education led to the search for psychological models that explain and can serve as a basis for such education. In some way, it is supposed that moral education would be better if there were a better explanation of the psychological structure of moral conduct, or if we understood better the psycho-evolutionary development of morality.

Piaget (1975) considered that the basic defect of traditional moral education resides in the atmosphere of authority it implies and inspires. Its result is to develop a moral over the students, as if it was enough for it to be presented "with the authority of the teacher." Eventually, the moral "lectures" would reinforce that moral of obedience with a system of stimuli and punitive sanctions. This is what Kohlberg has called a moral education reduced to the mere socialization of the student. In the end, it is Durkheimian: education is reduced to conformity with social norms and rules.

To limit moral education to inculcating some virtues in the students through a series of examples from the adult world, accompanied by reward and punishment stimuli, leaves little difference between teaching table manners and education. Morman Bull characterizes traditional direct moral instruction by:

- its abstract character, which means that it has been imparted in an abstract and general way that prohibits vice or proclaims a virtue.

- its deductive rather than inductive character, which means that the virtue proclaimed was justified by turning to a supernatural authority and transcendental sanctions.

- its passive character; in traditional moral education the student was a passive subject: the teacher taught and the child learned, that is, the child had to obey and accept without discussion.

Further, drawing upon Piaget's investigations, Bull emphasizes continuously that the abstract character of traditional moral education does not take into consideration the evolutionary psychology of the child. In the end, traditional moral education is to be blamed for being a process of socialization, that is, of inducing conformity to rules or norms. The crisis of moral education is rooted in this practice which, in turn, has produced a crisis in the lives of many people.

J. Wilson of Oxford University has dedicated his life to the study of moral education from an educational point of view. He talks about eight ways to educate morally; these informal ways of educating lead to promoting a mistaken notion of morality and in the end to its crisis or disuse ("eight things people do to avoid thinking") (Wilson, 1973). A brief summary of each of these follows:

- authority: a way of not thinking is by obeying or rebelling. These opposite forms are alike inasmuch as in both cases there is a firm escape from personal reflection: in obeying one takes what the other says, and in rebelling one goes against everything conventional just to oppose.

- ideal people: to limit oneself to imitate an admiral person without knowing why.

- purpose and meaning: some people think that everything is given in life, that the only thing to do is follow blindly some universal or spiritual rules, thereby making obsolete the need in one's life for everyone to choose by themselves.

- special experiences: some people take as a point of reference a special experience which serves them as a source of authority, for example an intuition, a feeling, etc. These could be valid experiences, but one always must think about them and not follow them without evaluation.

- "faith": another defense for avoiding thinking is expressed thus: "The reason is too limited; one must make a leap of faith," forgetting that the faith does not eliminate reason.

- "this is what they taught me": one believes what they have told us in our childhood without evaluating this belief. In that way something is right or wrong because it is what has always been said.

The fundamental question a moral education must ask is: while respecting people's autonomy and beliefs, how to educate persons who will be capable of transforming the surrounding world and creating a society with more justice and in which importance is given to fundamental and ethical values. Basically, it is a question of how to educate a responsible person capable of living according to ethic principles.

THE STUDY OF MORALS: KOHLBERG AND OTHER MODELS

It is not possible here to refer to the most important psychological models now in use. I will limit myself to some general observations on a number of models and focus upon the one which attracts more attention and interest nowadays, but this should not lead us to ignore the other points of view. Inclining towards a theoretical model does not mean that it has solved satisfactorily all our worries; in this sense it is not presented here as a model.

Cognitive Development Theories

In twenty years the cognitive-evolutive theory has become one of the main theoretical frameworks for the study and comprehension of human behavior. Hundreds of studies have been made about moral development (Sprinthall, 1986).

The international scientific community has an enormous debt to Lawrence Kohlberg, whose contributions in the area of moral philosophy, moral development and moral education qualitatively compare to those of Freud and Piaget, though they have studied broader subjects.

But neither Kohlberg and his moral development proposal nor cognitive psychology is exempt from limitations or critiques. This is not the moment or the place to evaluate cognitive psychology. In other chapters there have been references to this aspect. There are both coincidences and discrepancies in the theories of the development of moral knowledge. Among moral psychologists many have been concerned to establish a sequence of stages with their corresponding levels in the development of the child and adolescent. There is no unanimity among them, though with their contribution we can construct a sufficiently valid theory about the development of the moral sense. Piaget (1932), Bull (1969), Beltran (1977) and Gilligan (1982), to mention authors from different geographic areas, exemplify the coincidence and divergences on this point.

We could group them all under theories of cognitive-evolutive development and in consequence they would all agree that "all development demands and shares a certain degree of evolution." To talk about moral development is to talk about the evolutive formation of the moral personality. This would indicate that the development about which we are talking is structural and corresponds to the ages in which moral personality is developed. At adulthood moral development implies growth and variation within the structure; but the development to which we are referring relates to the ages in which the moral subject receives his or her basic structure (some talk about structure development) (Langdale, 1986). That is why the horizon of reflection is circumscribed to the stages from childhood to youth.

Some factors create divergent approaches. First, to talk about moral development in a psycho-evolutive way, in terms of the moral personality, supposes the acceptance of the notion and reality of stages organized within a more or less stable sequence. Second, there is a difference in the interpretations of what evolves, what is developed; what evolves is the "moral conduct," but this concept contains various factors. Thirdly, we should mention the philosophical worldviews and their implications for understanding the developmental structure. As Kay used to ask some time ago (1976), is moral development quantitative or qualitative? Is it gradual (slow) or does it depend upon critical situations? Does it depend on heritage or on the medium?

Other Models

There are two large alternate groups: (1) the person-centered and psychodynamic models or explanations, and (2) the theory of social learning.

Regarding the first there are some good reviews like those from Henry (1983) and T. Tice (1980). Many new and renewed arguments insist upon the utility and need of approaching morality from the perspective of the psychology of personality.

Without disregarding the contribution of Freud's psycho-analytical theory about the super-ego, most recent theorists could be synthesized in three groups: the inter-actionalism of N. Haan (1977, 1978, 1982), his theory of interaction between moral development and the development of the ego; the socio-analysis of R. Hogan (1973, 1975, 1982; Hogan, Johnson and Emler, 1978) or their socio-analytic theory of conduct and moral character; and finally, the morality template model of Lifton (1985) or what could be called the "consensual representation of the moral personality," which we all have on a conscious or semi-conscious level and which leads us to judge actions as moral or immoral.

We regret that in the latest theoretical studies everything related to personality has been omitted. In that sense, the study of morality is not well focused because almost absolute primacy has been given to the process of intellectual development. On the other hand, and in contrast with the theories of cognitive development, some think that for a theory of morality to be really comprehensive it should be able to explain some key theoretical relations. Its fundamental points would be: (1) the constant development of the moral stages throughout life; (2) the consequences of going from one stage to the other; (3) the criteria for establishing that a determined stage has been achieved completely; (4) the origin of the moral stages and values; and (5) the relationship between morality and concepts like good-bad, just-unjust, social laws and universal ethical principles.

A detailed review of the theory of social learning can be found in Burton (1984) and Burton and Casey (1986). Although the investigations by those adhering to the theory of social learning still center on the development of the capacity and ability of the child to overcome the temptation to break the moral norm, it is true that some important theoretical changes have occurred as well. Lately, the study of the cognitive processes and how these influence the internationalization by children of norms and rules imposed from outside (especially important in this sense are the studies of Mischel and Mischel, 1976, 1983) have achieved great importance and are very similar to other studies proposed by the cognitive development trend (Rest, 1984; Kohlberg and Candee).

AN EVALUATION OF THE THEORY OF L. KOHLBERG

Here we want to center our attention on L. Kohlberg and his theory, and for various reasons: first of all, because this author's work is the one we know the most, the one we have studied more thoroughly, and have seen develop in practice. Also because it has become an obligatory reference for those involved in or concerned about the teaching of morals -- even many alternate propositions, to a large degree begin from the experience had with this theory; thirdly because for many years in our milieu interest has developed regarding its contents and it has generated much research, especially in some schools of education and psychology. Two theses have been done (Vanez, 1987) in the Catholic University Andres Bello's School of Psychology, both supervised by Luis Azagra. Similar efforts have been made in Rafael Urbaneta University of Maracaibo (Ferrer, 1985) and at The Metropolitan University (Quintero and Herrera, 1984; Quintero, 1987), as well as in such other sources as the review: Matute (Social-emotional Development. [Caracas, Instituto de Mejoramiento Profesional del Magisterio, s/f]). The Journal of Moral Education (1977) presented an evaluative review by scholars from various disciplines -- psychology, education, philosophy, etc. In other years many equally interesting evaluative studies appeared: W. Conn focused on structure; P. Philbert (1975) criticized some of the philosophical factors based upon the philosophical tradition of virtues and habits; Craig (1977) centers his attention on the formalist character of Kohlberg's theory. These and many other observations led to the publication by Kohlberg of a reformulation and response to the critiques (Kohlberg, Levine and Haver, 1983). Especially, we would like to focus upon the following aspects:

1) a global evaluation of the theory,

2) the weakness of the formal theory,

3) the concept of justice,

4) the proposal of an evolutionary moral education system,

5) the notion of habit, and

6) the role of affection

A Global Evaluation

Kohlberg's work deserves recognition for its theoretical and investigative effort, for its verification in different cultures, and for having tried to distinguish the specific modes of the moral judgment and to explain the ethic-philosophical background present in his theory. He has managed also to use his theory for educational proposals. His attempt to generate a theory of moral development and moral education in terms of universality (valid for all) in a pluralistic world, and centered upon the principle of justice, is a truly notable contribution. In a world where there is a tendency to refuse many values or to limit ethics to the individual's perspective, in a world of moral relativism, this ethical effort is really to be praised. Some positive aspects which cannot be forgotten are: his interdisciplinary, investigative support, its pedagogical application, the dynamic vision of the human person, the importance given to justice, his three levels of moral development, and the proposal of an evolutionary moral education that respects the individual and is centered in the development and formation of moral judgment.

Let us consider now some of the critical issues: the first two evaluations are from ethics, while the other comments are from psychology and pedagogy. We note both these aspects because throughout his work he has claimed not only psychological but ethical validity for his theory.

The Weakness of the Formalistic Theory

Kohlberg frequently insists that his study of moral judgment is centered on the formal and not on the material aspect; in other words, what is of interest to him is the structure of reason present in a moral judgment, not the moral content. But, can one separate the form and content of the moral judgment? He centered his attention on the formal structure while trying to suggest some moral principles capable of illuminating the moral judgment. This seems not possible without some principle of content. Indeed, in Kohlberg there are some principles of content-justice (equally and reciprocity), human well-being, respect for society.

Kohlberg insists so much on form because his interest is to elaborate a universal theory, valid for all cultures; he wants to formulate six stages of moral judgment that would be valid universally. At the same time, the rational structure of the stage includes some principles, as guides for acting. When Kohlberg points out ethical principles, he tries to present them in a formal way as functional principles, rather than as principles of content.

Often the understanding of the moral judgment has been limited to answering or solving a moral problem, making the moral judgment a matter of casuistry. This is especially characteristic of traditional moral education. That is why we consider valid Kohlberg's worry when he insists upon the decision-making process of forming the moral judgment, rather than reducing it to the structure of stimulus and response.

But the same concrete moral judgment needs some principles of content for reference. This is the case of children when they do not know what to do in a concrete situation and ask if an action is right or wrong. In this case, it is useless to present them with a formal principle of justice, because they would not understand it. On the contrary, we would have to translate into content the formal principle of justice, although Kohlberg has told us that this is indoctrination. All will depend on how the content is presented, but the formal principle of justice also could be considered as indoctrination. A minimum of principles of content seems indispensable in order to make a concrete moral judgment. In the post-conventional level there is no problem, because each would assume these principles automatically, but at the lower levels we encounter this problem in moral education.

Education implies two elements: formation and information. The formation is oriented towards the realization of the potentialities of the students; it seeks the integral growth of the person. But is it possible to have formation without information? If we are discussing abortion, for example, it is right to insist upon the maturity of the moral judgment, but it is essential also that those who participate reach a conclusion about the theme. To reach that conclusion, one has to be based in concrete principles and principles of content such as the right of human life and personal responsibility.

Content and form cannot be separated: the formal structure influences the way of assuming the content, but also the content corrects the formal structure and enlarges it, because it presents elements that have to be integrated in the formal structure. For the same reason, moral education has to provide both formal elements (the formation of the moral judgment) and material elements (the necessary information that a moral judgment has to integrate).

The Concept of Justice

We can summarize Kohlberg's theory in this manner:

1. The development of the moral judgment is considered philosophically in terms of universality and prescriptiveness (Hare, 1972); in Piaget's terms these translate psychologically as better integration and differentiation.

2. This development is assumed in the principle of justice, because philosophically it implies reciprocity of rights and duties and considering impartially from the perspective of a conflictive situation (Rawls, 1973). This corresponds to Piaget's psychological concept of balance. Moral development is considered as a philosophically and psychologically better moral equilibrium.

In Kohlberg's theory the concept of justice is crucial because it is the only principle capable of solving moral conflicts (Kohlberg, 1981). But, what does Kohlberg understand by "justice"? In summary we could say that it is a method of distributing or defining claims that have two elements:

- distributive equality, treating everyone equally; and

- commutative justice or reciprocity, fulfilling treaties, repairing damage, gratitude, etc.

But equality has priority over commutative justice or reciprocity. Kohlberg (1971) gives us a list of contents, but insists that the principle of content is primarily a method of solving the rights and duties involved in a conflictive situation between people. But, what does he understand by claims? Does he refer to a conflictive situation when there is an overt explosion, or does it include latent injustices when the victim of the injustice is quiet because he has no voice? This vision of the principles of justice seems to reduce moral expression to a minimum by limiting it to the conflictive. But the principle of justice is also in force when the other does not claim his rights. It includes improving social relations between the strong and also between those who are not that outstanding. In other words, instead of talking about distributive justice and commutative justice, we would talk in terms of social justice, because only social justice lets us look from everyone's perspective in an impartial way. The concept of social justice involves questioning society itself, whereas the concepts of justice used by Kohlberg tend to accept as good the prevailing social order.

Kohlberg also states that benevolence, in the sense of love, empathy, sympathy, human worry, humanism, etc., can never be a principle of option. By not taking these into account his theory handles a very limited concept of "benevolence." If we understand benevolence as altruistic preoccupation for others, then it is a principle of option, because it implies the perspective from which the principle of justice takes shape. Worry for others, as an altruistic attitude, not only is a requirement for experiencing the moral conflict, but also a mechanism of moral resolution, because where there is no concern for others there could be no considerations for equality and reciprocity.

It is then indispensable for a principle of concern for others to accompany a principle of justice. Only such an attitude permits one to assume justice as a criterion of one's option in a moral conflict. To state simply, as he does, that it is a "principle for decision-making" or of option does not eliminate the fact that the principle of justice is also a principle of content. It is a principle of option precisely because it is a principle of content, because it formulates criteria for reaching a decision.

Kohlberg elaborates John Rawls's theory of justice, describing it as an expression of the six stages. But what explains this adhesion to Rawls, and does he assume Rawls's ideas? Rawls says much more than Kohlberg uses and given the importance that it has in his theory, the concept of justice needs to be clarified. It would appear to need to include or integrate the following elements:

- Justice can be understood from those who suffer injustice. It is not appropriate to limit the concept of justice only to the perspective of everyone; it would be more just to say that the principle of justice implies the assumption of the perspective of those who are disadvantaged.

- Vision or perspective permits not only the perception of conflict, but also causing conflict, if necessary. This was the case of Martin Luther King in the United States and Bishop Romero in El Salvador, etc.

- A real principle of justice implies an altruistic attitude, the principle of concern for others.

- Lastly, the principle of justice cannot be relegated to an individualistic posture; it has to be expressed in content. Justice refers to an objective order, not only to a subjective one. Justice belongs to the sphere of meta-ethics in that it implies a worldview.

Here we can locate some of the discoveries of those who propose moral development in terms of feelings of love, compassion, care, etc. (Lyons, 1983). Perhaps, as Langdale indicates the ethic of justice is more logical, rational, objective and associated more directly with the moral thinking, while the ethic of care of Gilligan and others is more intuitive (illogical and irrational), more subjective, and more directly related to moral feelings. Feelings and reason are two aspects of the same reality, man himself. The principle of justice needs a principle of affective concern for others because a just man is one who loves others, while one who loves must be just in his judgments. Kohlberg does not agree with this position, although sometimes he gives the impression of being convinced that what is said here is understood in his proposal.

A Proposal for a System of Evolutive Moral Education

The disadvantage of the moral education proposed by Kohlberg is that it seems indispensable to have deep knowledge of the theory. Some authors (Bolt and Sullivan, 1977; Hers and Reimer, 1984) have noted the dangers of using the Kohlbergian method without a previous knowledge of his theory. We would add something related to the previous point, but more oriented to moral education.

Kohlberg emphasizes the importance of the formation of moral judgment in terms of an education for justice. The moral education proposed by him respects the individual and at the same time stimulates the development of moral judgment, the criteria of its choice and discernment. This is extremely valuable. But as was noted above, the almost total absence of content because moral education cannot limit itself to the development of the general power of moral judgment (how do I judge a situation or a problem?), but has to decide upon a determinated posture in the presence of a moral problem (what should I do?). We insist that we do not think that moral education has to be reduced to some concrete responses, but along with the formation of moral judgment it is necessary to help the student, respecting him, to have an ethic posture. In moral judgment not only do we need to know how to come to a decision; we need also to have a minimum of content from which to make a decision. In moral education the presentation of some attitudes, like a starting point, from which to base a moral decision is indispensable. B. Lonergan notes in his book Insight that judgment is based upon information.

Kohlberg defends the validity of the system of moral education he proposes, stating that it is not a doctrinal system. But we must be careful not to understand this as ethical neutrality, because ethics imply a lack of neutrality inasmuch as an ethical posture means an option in favor of some values.

Lately, we ask if the moral system proposed by Kohlberg is "for the system "meaning, does it prepare the students for society with some values or does it only prepare them to integrate and form society, as is. In theory, the goal of moral education is the fifth or sixth state, the principles of justice for the ethics of a society. But as mentioned before, considering the central importance that this concept has in his theory, Kohlberg considered it important to define more clearly what is meant by justice in order for it really to be possible to affirm or deny that the moral education he proposed is appropriate for the existing moral system.

The Notion of Habit

It would seem evident that Kohlberg has some kind of prejudice against "moral habits." No doubt moral education centered exclusively in habits or moral features has its deficiencies, as he states. He holds also that a moral education based on the teaching of virtues leads to the reduction of education to mere socialization, because if we define our moral objectives in terms of virtues and vices, we are defining them in terms of reward and punishment, with the dangers this involves. He seems to understand virtue as a social value, that is, those qualities society considers right.

But that is not the only way to interpret it. Philibert (1975) criticized this concept without referring to Kohlberg. Haring (1978) recognizes that there is a certain aversion among psychologists towards these concepts. The real meaning of virtue has nothing to do with the desire of self-perfection; on the contrary, virtue implies that our leitmotif or fundamental option integrates body and soul in our lives and in consequence transforms our desires, our institutions, our imagination; these fundamental intentions become our fundamental attitudes. This is the real meaning of the word "virtue." If then by habit or moral virtue we understand a way of confronting reality or an attitude, then a moral education which includes the formation or stimulation of attitudes, as recommended by W. Kay (1976), is perfectly conceivable.

Kohlberg's moral stages are rational attitudes whose different levels each bespeak a particular attitude which enables one to make a moral decision. If an attitude also determines the preference of a person in deciding in one sense or another in a situation (Berelson and Steiner, 1964), we are getting a better integration of rationality and affection. In the end, a moral attitude, which is a modern expression of what virtue really means, is the principal source of moral judgment, for a fundamental option is expressed in corresponding attitudes from which concrete moral judgment depends.

In sum, we cannot agree with the statement that a moral education which promotes the formation and development of attitudes, such as the altruistic attitude, is reduced to a mere socialization because to have an attitude implies being a follower of stable principles.

The Role of Affection

Another critique of Kohlberg has been that his theory does not clarify the role of affection in the moral judgment. In reality many of his references induce us to think that all his attention is centered in rationality, because it is the cognitive aspect that seals the morality of a decision. In Kohlberg (1971b), we find strong statements on this matter: "We state that in the personality, the moral strength is of a cognitive character. It is true that moral decisions are involved in affective forces, but affection is neither moral nor immoral. When an affection appears and is oriented in moral directions, then that affection is moral; any other way it is not").

But, cannot the same be said of rationality? Kohlberg says that affective forces are amoral per se and only when reason directs and assumes an affection, can we talk about the morality of an affection. But, following the same reasoning, we could say that by itself reason is amoral and enters the field of morality only when it is directed towards a moral object and implies values. Further, the role of affection in the moral judgment is of great importance. A person can have some principles of justice and equality, but at the point of decision affectivity or feeling plays an important role. It can be expressed in terms of prejudice; in this case the moral judgment is justified from the prejudice that interprets the principle of justice and equality in a partial way. We believe that the cognitive and affective elements have equal importance in the moral judgment, and that it is not valid to give a subordinate role or no role to affection.

Thus it is necessary to explain further the role of affection in moral judgment, because affection and feelings grow and mature. The affective experience of a child and of an adult are in no way the same. For the child, love is a feeling strongly related with egocentrism, while for the married adult it can become a feeling of self-giving and family life. This affective experience is going to impact moral judgment because a loving experience, in terms of self-givenness, would ease the objectivity of the equality principle, while love with an egocentric base would distort it.

Similarly, role-taking has a very important affective aspect. Adhesion to the principle of justice needs cognitive understanding and affective support to be used in a role-taking situation. Further, one has to see everyone's viewpoint, including the one we do not like because of racial prejudice, social status, or whatever. In order to be able really to assume the principle of justice (equality and reciprocity) it is indispensable to have the feeling of love towards everyone.

Universidad Nacional Abierta

Caracas, Venezuela

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