In Plato's Apology Socrates says to Callias: "If your two sons were horses or bullocks and you wanted to have them trained, you would send them to a horse trainer or an animal trainer; but now they are boys, to whom will you send them? Who is it that knows what a man and a citizen ought to be?"

Up until the last two decades, psychologists in the United States have been curiously inattentive to Plato's question. In the 1920's two researchers, Hartshorne and May tried to study moral virtue by examining such character traits as honesty. They conducted their research on a large sample of students in a variety of situations, using 33 tests of deceit and concluded from their exhaustive study that there is no such thing as the trait of honesty. Perhaps because of Hartshorne and May's discouraging results, the study of morality was abandoned by mainstream psychologists during the next 50 years. During that time, psychologists were consumed with the pursuit of objectivity. Empirical, predictive validity was the goal of a science that was, itself, developing. Psychologists avoided any attempts to advocate a moral stance; Plato's question, "Who is it that knows what a good person ought to be?" would not be answered by U.S. psychologists.

PIAGET AND KOHLBERG

Yet in the late 1950's Jean Piaget's (1932) work on the universal development of children's logical reasoning and moral judgments about rules, came to the attention of a graduate student at the University of Chicago. Lawrence Kohlberg, who (1969) was to change the discipline of psychology by daring to present his theory as an answer to Plato's question.

Kohlberg began his inquiry into morality with the observation that since the holocaust of World War II, moral relativism is untenable. Kohlberg had been active in smuggling Jews out of Nazi Germany and his life-long "work" was an inquiry into the conditions under which it is morally defensible to break the law. Kohlberg extended Piaget's observations that the ability to think about moral issues is tied to one's intellectual development and that intellectual development follows a universal, hierarchical sequence. He proposed that this development through the sequential stages is due both to the maturation of the person (it is age related) and to experience (proper educational experiences will promote development). Kohlberg challenged the prevailing view that moral behavior is the consequence of shaping by the culture and socializing agents. He argued that even a child is a "moral philosopher," who actively constructs the moral meaning of social interactions.

If one is to understand the way that a child constructs moral meaning, Kohlberg argued, one must use a methodology which engages the child in solving moral dilemmas. Thus, Kohlberg's methodology for studying the development of moral reasoning consisted in describing moral conflicts to people of all ages, of different social groups, and from different cultures, and inviting them to make judgments about social relationships and conflicting rights. He asked people to determine what is fair and what is unfair, and to justify their decisions and choices. From the responses of individuals at different ages, Kohlberg described the six stages in the development of structures of meaning that people impose on the moral dilemmas. His theory is summarized on Table number I. Following the neo-Kantian philosophy of John Rawls (1971), Kohlberg argued that humans are capable of deciding the right thing to do and making moral choices that are guided by the "Golden Rule": that justice be accorded each individual, and that fairness, reciprocity and respect for others and for the sanctity of human life guide moral choice.

Cross cultural studies have examined Kohlberg's claim that moral reasoning as he defined it is universal and is not culture bound. Research on Kohlberg's theory has been conducted in Mexico, Israel, Turkey, Taiwan, Zambia, India, the United States, many countries in Europe, as well as in Venezuela. Kohlberg's cross cultural and longitudinal studies of the development of the individual's moral reasoning over time (Colby, Noam) have demonstrated that the pattern of moral development, at least for the first four stages of his theory, occurs across cultures in a predictable sequence.

This sequence (see Table I) begins with concern for one's own rights, and moral choices are made on the basis of the consequences (e.g., punishment or rewards). The middle stages of development are characterized as conventional, and moral action is judged on the basis of conformity with the expectations of others or with the rules and laws. At the highest stages, moral choices are made on the basis of one's contractual obligations guided by the universal principle of justice.

AN INTEGRATED THEORY

Kohlberg has defined an important aspect of the moral agent, how one defines what one ought to do. However, we know too well that knowing the good does not always translate into doing the good. St. Paul says, "For the good that I would, I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do (Romans 19: 366-317). Research on Kohlberg's theory and moral actions (Rest, 1986) has shown that moral deliberation alone is not sufficient to ensure moral behavior. A number of writers, including Kohlberg (1985) have recently argued (Rest, 1983) that morality is multi-faceted and that his theory captures one component of morality, moral reasoning -- the ability to arrive at a moral conclusion regarding what a person ought to do. However, morality is more than the rational determination of the moral ought; it involves also the ability to see that a situation has moral dimensions. James Rest (1983) calls this moral sensitivity. Morality requires that one have the motivation to behave morally; often we call this moral character. And in order to behave morally the person must have the skills to determine a moral solution.

The psychology committee of the moral education project of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy worked for two years to develop an integrated theory of morality that addresses the limited focus of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. Figure I presents the model that the committee developed. At the center of this model is the self, which we view as a moral agent with the moral virtues that motivate moral behavior. The self has three components: cognition, the ego, and affectivity.

The circle of cognition represents the thoughts, beliefs and ability to use reason to know what is the good. This is the circle in which Kohlberg's theory is instructive. Thus, in our model as the child matures and is instructed by parents, the child learns to reason about what is the right or the moral way to behave. In the early years, the child behaves morally in order to avoid punishment or in order to get something the child wants, for example, a child at Kohlberg's stage two will reason: If I am good and do good things, my parents will be good to me, will reward and praise me for being good. Therefore, I will act in good ways. As the child becomes more conventional in moral reasoning, the child will view morality as conforming with the "Golden Rule" of doing unto others what you would that others do to you, or, at stage four, abiding by the rules of the country or the rules of God.

The circle of the ego represents developing knowledge of who one is. The model draws heavily from Erikson's theory of the developing ego and the resulting virtues of the ego which help guide moral action. The ego develops as the child matures and becomes physically more competent and as society (parents, peers, teachers) presents new challenges and expectations. Thus, the baby experiences love and care from a parent and develops a self that is trusting; from this the virtue of hope begins to develop. A toddler develops the muscles that enable him or her to walk and parents begin to expect the child to exert greater self-control. With this physical maturation and new expectations from parents, comes a new sense of autonomy and the virtue of will begins to develop.

The affective component of the self also is developing during childhood,. The child must learn to handle negative feelings such as anxiety and fear and to control aggressive impulses; positive emotions such as anger at injustice, and empathy and compassion must be acquired. One must become skilled in empathically understanding others, and develop from that a concern for maintaining harmonious relationships, sensitivity to the needs and concerns of others, and care about their well being.

The self and its virtues in our model are central but the three components that form the virtuous self overlap. Affect influences cognition as when our concern about the suffering of others leads us to advocate a just way of treating them. Affectivity and cognition are affected by the developing ego. For example, when the child has developed the virtue of will, the child has the moral character necessary to delay self-gratification and to act as reason would indicate one ought and as feelings move one to do. Thus, our model is interactive. The components of cognitive, affective and the socialized ego interact in the process of developing moral virtue (See Knowles' chapter in Knowles & McLean, 1992 for an elaboration of the model.) Our model is also a developmental model that charts the different challenges presented to the individual, and the resulting changes in the affective, cognitive and ego components of the self. These developmental challenges and changes of the cognitive and ego components are described in Margaret Gorman's chapter, and I will not go into them further here. Rather I shall turn to some recent work among American psychologists on the affective component of a moral character. In another chapter Margaret Gorman and I present our psychological research on emotions related to morality: anger, anxiety, guilt, shame and love. I will discuss the development of one of these emotions, love.

LOVE AND CARE AS MORAL EMOTIONS

The Christian heritage has always emphasized the virtue of love. We are told that God so loved the world, he sent his only son (John 3:16). Love is called the "greatest virtue" (1 Corinthians 13:13). Jesus said, "By this they will know you are my disciples: that you love one another." We are

commanded to love our neighbors as ourselves (Leviticus 19:18, Matthew 19:19) and even to love our enemies (Luke 6:27).

Yet it is only recently that psychological theories of morality have paid attention to the ethic of love. Erik Erikson (1968) described love as an adult virtue that transcends bodily needs, ego or social aspects and involves concern for others beyond one's self. However, Erikson did not describe how the virtue of love develops, nor did he fully examine what the virtue of love is. Recently, Carol Gilligan has used the work of Erik Erikson, as well as of Kohlberg, to develop her theory of love, which she has called an ethic of care. Other researchers (e.g., Nel Noddings, Jane Roland Martin, Nancy Eisenberg, Lawrence Blum, etc.) are examining the philosophical, theological, and psychological foundations of caring, love, empathy and altruism. Here I will focus on only one theory of the ethic of care, namely, the ethic of care described by Carol Gilligan (1982).

Carol Gilligan was a researcher working with Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning at Harvard University. While using the Kohlberg interview, she found that some respondents did not fit Kohlberg's scheme. For example, when asking children whether a man should steal a drug from a druggist in order to save his dying wife, some children saw the question as, should the man steal the drug or shouldn't he?" For these children, the issue was "what is the fair, the just thing to do for the man, the wife, and the druggist?" Other children saw the question as "should Heinz steal the drug, or should he do something else to save his wife?" For these children, the issue was "how can the man behave in a caring way toward his wife, and not hurt himself or the druggist."

Gilligan observed that the response to the second question was likely to be scored, in Kohlberg's interview scoring scheme, as lower than the response to the first question. She also observed that girls and women were more likely to frame the question as "how can the man behave in a caring way toward his wife, and not hurt himself or the druggist?" From observations such as these, Gilligan developed a theory that males and females frame the moral issue in different ways. Further, she argues that the different ways that males and females frame moral questions are attributable to fundamental psychological differences between them.

Males, she argues, define themselves as separate from others, and affirm that definition of self by referring to their individual achievements, and the rules that ensure protection of the rights of individuals. They see the world as hierarchically ordered and, thus, are more concerned about such abstract and highly individualistic principles as justice. Kohlberg's theory, she suggests, accurately describes their moral development.

Females, Gilligan claims, define themselves as connected to others, and affirm that definition of self by referring to their relationships with others and the caring response that reduces threats to harmonious relationships. They see the world as a web of connections and are more concerned about concrete, contextual solutions that protect people from becoming alienated or being hurt. She describes their moral orientation as guided by an ethic of care, that no one be hurt and no one be left alone. She labels this moral orientation that is guided by both reason and affect, a different voice. Thus the title of her book is In a Different Voice.

I have outlined what Gilligan (1977;1982) proposes are the differences between the ethic of justice and the ethic of care on Table I. Like Kohlberg, Gilligan (1977) has suggested that development of the ethic of care proceeds through developmental levels. She describes three levels and two transition periods in the development of the ethic of care:

Level I: Orientation to Individual Survival. At the first level, the self is the sole object of concern. Issues of survival of the self are of paramount importance and morality is a matter of imposed sanctions on the self.

- The First Transition: From Selfishness to Responsibility. During the first transition the moral conflict is between what one "would" do (what is good for me) and what one "should" do (what is good for the other person). Resolution of this conflict leads to the second level.

Level II: Goodness as Self-Sacrifice. This is the level of the conventional view of morality derived from social norms and consensus. Concern for others, particularly the feelings of others and the possibility of inflicting hurt, is of major concern to people at this level and goodness is equated with self-sacrifice and the need for approval. This level corresponds to Kohlberg's stage 3.

- The Second Transition: From Goodness to Truth. During the second transition the individual comes to see that a morality of care must include care of self as well of others. As the particular situation, intentions and consequences of action become more important than the evaluation of others, the next level develops.

Level III: The Morality of Nonviolence. The conflict between selfishness and responsibility to self is resolved at this level in a principle of nonviolence. A moral balance between self and other is achieved by equally applying an injunction against hurting. At this level care becomes a universal obligation to avoid hurting self and others.

For Gilligan the ethics of care is marked by concern with particular moral situations rather than abstract principles; with care for others and with concern that no one be hurt rather than with the rights of others; with the maintenance of harmony and loving relationships, rather than with moral rules; with fairness or respect for others. The motivation for moral action in Gilligan's care orientation arises from a concern for others, empathy with their pain, and love. In Kohlberg's justice orientation, the motivation for moral action arises from a desire to protect the rights of all individuals in a fair and just manner.

Gilligan has claimed that the development of the ethic of care is more likely to be found in the responses of women and girls then men and boys. How do these differences emerge; what accounts for different lines of development of the moral ideal for males and females? In part the answer may lie in the neo-psychoanalytic (Chodorow, 1978) description of male and female conceptions of self. This story begins with the observation that in virtually all human societies women are the primary care-givers, particularly during infancy and childhood when one's sense of self as male or female develops. Mothers form a more intimate bond with their daughters than with their sons because they identify more closely with the same-sex child. Because of this closer relationship, mothers encourage less psychological separation from their daughters. Consequently daughters develop a sense of self as intimately involved with the mother, and this generalizes to a sense of intimate connection with others. The girl's fundamental psychological understanding of self is, then, based on herself in relationship and affiliation with others.

In contrast, mothers perceive their sons as different from themselves and encourage greater psychological separation from the mother-infant relationship. In achieving his male identity, the boy must reject the close, intimate relationship with his mother. He must separate from his mother and identify with his father. Thus, in the earliest years, while the girl is pulled to define herself as affiliated with others, the son is pushed to define his self as separate from others (that is, in infancy from the mother). This separation, Chodorow and other psychoanalytic writers (e.g., Eichenbaum & Orbach, Dinnerstein, Flax) have argued, results in the male having a repressed relational self, and repression of intimacy and affiliative needs.

Because of these differences in early experiences, and the resulting differences in one's core sense of self, Chodorow and Gilligan see males and females developing different needs and feelings. Females have a greater need for affiliation, are more likely to become anxious when relationships are threatened, and are more empathic. Males, these authors suggest, have a greater need for independence, are more likely to become anxious when their autonomy is threatened, and are more concerned about achievement.

Society reinforces these differences (See for example, Eisenberg, Block,) by emphasizing individual achievement of boys and men and affective relational concerns of girls and women. For example, in the adult years as a mother and a wife, a woman is expected to maintain harmonious relationships, to be the empathic, caring center of the family and of both professional and informal groups. Men's occupational roles in the adult years become the dominant concern in their adult lives. Often these concerns leave little time for concerns about relationships or the development of affectivity.

According to Gilligan, men bring to moral dilemmas a sense of self as individual, achieving, autonomous and independent. They are more concerned with resolving moral conflicts in ways that protect their rights, and the rights of others; thus, the moral principle of justice, guides their moral thinking. In contrast, women bring to moral conflicts a sense of self as connected to others and a responsibility for maintaining close, harmonious relationships. The virtue that guides their moral deliberation is care.

What evidence is there for Gilligan's claims? First let me summarize what we know regarding male and females' ability to reason abstractly and to appeal to principles of justice. Recall that Gilligan has suggested that males excel in moral reasoning as described by Kohlberg. In recent meta-analytic studies (a statistical method that allows one to combine many studies to examine the degree of an effect) examining sex differences in justice orientation (Brabeck, 1983; Lifton, 1985; Walker, 1983; Walker and de Vries, 1985) males and females have been shown to be equally able to resolve moral dilemmas by appealing to justice principles. The few differences in moral reasoning that have reported finding females scoring higher tended to occur in homogeneous samples of school and university students, those favoring males were more heterogeneous samples in which the sexes differed in education and occupation. Since education and work experience affect moral development level, these experiences must be considered in evaluating sex differences. Thus, ample evidence is available to conclude that Gilligan's claim that males are better able than females to appeal to principles of justice when resolving moral dilemmas is not supported.

Are men and women also equally capable of identifying and responding appropriately to the pain, hurt of others? Are women and men, girls and boys, equally likely to engage in care orientation? We know that the socialization of girls and boys by parents, teachers, adult friends, family and peers, results in some consistently and reliably reported differences between men and women. We know that parents, teachers and peers treat boys and girls differently. We know that at a very early age children self select into some sex peer groups and that they report to have very little understanding of the other sex's group (Maccoby, 1985). We know that there are differences in friendship patterns among boys and girls: Girls have larger numbers of close, intimate relationships, boys' friendships seem to center around common interests, sports and work (Rubin). Girls and women are more frequently sought for support from both males and females (McGill) People expect girls to be more nurturing (Block), and girls expect that of themselves (Miller). We know that teachers and peers rate girls and girls rate themselves as more empathic and altruistic (Eisenberg). Boys are socialized more than girls to control the expression of feeling, while asserting themselves; girls, more than boys, are taught to control aggression, including assertion, while they learn to regard the world of the family as their proper interest (Block, 1973)

We also know that while these differences are consistent, they are also very small and that gender alone is not a good predictor of a person's attitudes and behaviors (Hyde). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that girls and women are socialized to be more caring, empathic and concerned with relationships than males. But are these differences, such as they are, also found in studies examining the moral orientation of males and females?

The empirical evidence for Gilligan's argument that females, more than males use the care orientation is less conclusive than the research on sex differences in the justice orientation. This is to be expected for while studies of Kohlberg's theory stretch back to the 60's, work on Gilligan's theory is more recent There are, however, a few studies available that provide the beginnings of an answer to the question, are females more likely to use the care ethic than males. I have described these studies elsewhere (Brabeck, 1986; Brabeck, 1987; Bebeau & Brabeck, 1987) and will offer only a brief summary of what we have learned from these studies.

First, we know that the ethic of care can be identified in people's responses. The ethic of care has been identified and reliably scored in response to both real and hypothetical dilemmas (Lyons, Walker ). This suggests that the ethic of care identified by Gilligan is indeed an aspect of moral response. Second, we know that most studies of the care ethic report males and females as equally able to use the care ethic (Walker, 1985). Thus, both males and females have been found to be concerned about the potential pain others might suffer, and consider human relationships important moral considerations. Third, when sex differences are found, females are more likely than males to use the care ethic (Langdale, Lyons, Haste, ) and males the justice ethic. This is particularly the case when people are asked to identify a personally experienced moral conflict and describe how they resolved it. I have argued elsewhere (Bebeau & Brabeck, 1987) that female dental students were as principled as male dental students in their moral reasoning, as measured by Rest's (Rest, 19 ) objective measure of Kohlberg's theory. However, females identified more ethical aspects of patient-doctor relationships.

The studies of the care orientation use different tests to assess the care orientation and even different definitions of care. They cannot, therefore, be considered definitive; much more research is needed. Nevertheless, these studies indicate that while the care-response orientation can be identified in the responses of subjects to hypothetical and real life moral dilemmas, the claim that females use a care orientation and males use a justice orientation is not clearly established.

In summary, the evidence from psychological research has shown that males and females are equally able to reason abstractly and equally likely to appeal to principles of justice when examining the moral imperative, when determining what one ought to do. However, while both males and females are capable of, and in fact often use, the ethic of care, females may be more likely than males to view the interpersonal issues of a situation as important, particularly when describing a real life, personally experienced moral dilemma.

Finally, I have suggested that Gilligan's theory of the ethic of care enlarges the description of morality offered by Kohlberg, and more fully describes the virtue of love offered by Erikson. The ethic of care that Gilligan heard in the voices of the women whom she interviewed and which has been found in subsequent research in the responses of both men and women expands our notion of morality to include the principle of caring for and nurturing life. Gilligan's work can be understood as adding what we have come to call the feminine principle: caring, compassion and concern for others, to what we have come to call the masculine: the rational, abstract and logical.

I have suggested that Plato's question, "Who is it that knows what a good person ought to be?" is being addressed by a number of theorists. I have argued that this work expands our understanding of morality and suggests that an integrated moral theory is a theory of human potential in which autonomy is achieved in community. This view insists that the basic rights of individuals be respected and upheld, and that mercy be shown each person. It is a view which joins the affective ethic of care with the rational ethic of justice. Much work on how to help students develop the ethic of justice (Higgins, Power, Kohlberg,) has been accomplished. Researchers, theorists, and educators must now turn attention to developing a greater understanding about how care, compassion, love are developed and to designing curricula that will promote this essential component of morality.

Boston College