Piaget: Cognitive Psychology and Moral Development

The most recent studies of cognitive psychology relating to the ethical awareness are those developed at Harvard University over the last thirty years by the late Lawrence Kohlberg and his collaborators. Their work fell at mid-point between "Skinnerian" behaviorism and "Rogerian" humanism. The first gave psychology more scientific rigor; humanism introduced an enriched conception of the human being.

In this very simplified context there arose a line of psychological reflection known as cognitive psychology. Its inspiration came from the studies of the Swiss researcher, Jean Piaget, who came to psychology by way of biology. His most important contribution was to trace the psychological development of the child. Focusing upon the cognitive process he looks to intelligence tests not for the differences in answers, but for the reasoning used by children at their different ages. His interest was not differential psychology, however, but what was common in the process of cognitive development. From the cognitive process Piaget proceeded to the social and affective, bringing out the relation between them. These studies suggested a study of the process of moral judgment formation in children, and its relation to the socialization process implied by the development in the cognitive and affective areas.

In this development Piaget observes two axis: a development from egocentrism towards socialization and toward founding moral judgments.

Kohlberg: The Development of Moral Judgment

Kohlberg's studies appeared in this context.¹ In general they have been called a "theory of the moral development." His original idea consists in taking Piaget's concept of the different stages of cognitive structures, and applying them to the study of moral judgment. He concluded to three levels, each with two different stages, in the development of moral judgments. This division does not come from preestablished definitions, but from an empirical analysis of the form of people's reasoning. He tries also to bring out what is common to the process in different people, rather than their differences. His method focuses upon the reasoning used to answer preestablished moral questions or dilemmas.² His clinical method, which allows the subjects more liberty to express their different types or forms of reasoning, is directed toward identifying their different ways of reaching moral judgments. His interest is more in the process than in the answers.

Kohlberg called his three levels of moral judgment: preconventional, conventional and post-conventional. Each of these levels has two stages, forming Kohlberg's six stages. The notion of stages implies the following: (1) qualitative differences in the way of thinking, (2) the formation of an overall structure, (3) constituting with the others an invariable sequence, and (4) hierarchical integration of the prior stages.

Preconventional Level: At this level the child responds to rules which give a sense of good or bad. This is enforced by their physical consequences: good means reward, bad means punishment and pain. These consequences are impressed by the physical power of those who enforce the rules: parents, school, adults.

This level includes two stages:

Stage 1 - Punishment and obedience. In this stage the reasoning is very elemental: the immediate consequences especially on the negative side (punishment), and the consequent submission to authority are evaluated as constitutive reasons of good and bad, without any reflection on what might justify the punishment, reward or obedience to authority.

Stage 2 - Instrumental orientation. This is still concerned with actions; now, however, these are justified by the good will of the subjects providing a criterium for good and bad. Relations begin to appear in the formation of moral judgment, but on a pragmatic basis, rather than as a matter of justice or loyalty.

Conventional level: On this level inclusion in a social group appears as a value, without looking at consequent pleasure or pain for the subject. This level includes the following two states:

Stage 3 - Interpersonal Relations. The opinion of the group is important. This attitude is not just a matter of convenience or to avoid punishment, but one of identification and loyalty: one's intention is noted and valued.

Stage 4 - Law and order. Inclusion in the group is expanded to cover the broader society; moral judgments are based in the social order as basing ethical values.

Postconventional level: Without doubt, this level has led to more controversy from the philosophical point of view and may be the hardest to diagnose from the answers to the moral dilemmas. On this level the intention is to reach a self-definition of the moral values that will go further than authority or the opinion of the group. This level includes two stages:

Stage 5 - Legalistic orientation of the social contract. The goodness of the actions is defined in terms of individual rights recognized by society through its laws. There is more emphasis upon legal value, moral strength and obedience to the Constitution and to laws. Changes or amendments in the Constitution bring a thought that leads to the following stage.

Stage 6 - Universal ethical principles. Here the good is defined by one's conscience based upon ethical principles chosen by oneself. These are universal principles of justice, equality, human rights and respect for the dignity of the person.

This sequence of stages in moral judgments progresses according to age, but the social environment and education can accelerate or delay it, and at times even terminate it.³

Kriekemans: Pre-Moral Stages

Kohlberg's studies begin with children of ten years of age. For Kriekemans,⁴ moral formation is important also at an earlier stage. For him it is necessary in the first two and a half years to cultivate the "biological conscience: a well functioning body. At this stage it is necessary to emphasize the sense of order that will help the child find the road to his goals. It is also very important in this time of his life to receive and understand love which is necessary to make possible a well-ordered constitution. With R. Scholl, he agrees that trouble of harmony with the mother is the moment of the birth of conscience.⁵

Kriekemans's second stage extends to age four. Here the child is beginning to distinguish between his ego and the super ego. There is not yet the concept of the interior ego, but the appearance of the practical ego allows the child to speak with himself. This pre-moral stage is related more to the development of social relations than to the development of morals. Two important mechanisms develop at this stage: the first relates us to a model and the second strengthens our autonomy. Identification without opposition would lead to conformism; equilibrium between both mechanisms brings about the formation of a healthy consciousness. The third stage, until age six or seven, emphasizes the formation of a realistic attitude towards valuing. There is also the magical development of the norms which are accepted not because they are good or bad, but because they are universal. Kriekemans does not consider these stages to be yet part of the moral world; still they are very important for the current formation of the future personality.

The fourth stage, until age nine or ten, constitutes the beginning of moral life. Here there appears a sense of duty; it is "the age of reason". Next comes the stage of deliberation when the child discovers numerous possibilities of action, begins to deliberate, and develops his moral judgment. This stage is attached to the first stage of the Kohlberg method, since the child starts to consider alternatives and participates in situations as a "role player."

In the formation of moral judgment, as in the development of cognitive operations, there is an interaction between the person and the external world, as well as with physical and social realities.⁶ That is why so much effort is put into the diagnosis of the development of the youngsters' moral judgment through the parents, schools or classroom discussions. Such studies here are relatively recent but include those by Irma Matute⁷ regarding the formation of moral judgement, Arelys Moreno,⁸ Ana Maia Ferrer,⁹ Levys Faias,¹⁰ and Cornelia Gathman and M. Angélica Romero.¹¹

Development of Moral Judgment: Biography and History

Despite the fact that interaction between the organism and environment is fundamental to Kohlberg's focus, the specific contribution of these studies remained in the field of consciousness. They did not take account of the external reality which interacts and makes concrete the debate over the behavior of the subject in his moral life.

The pre-conventional stage with its orientation toward avoiding punishment-pain and obtaining pleasure directly or instrumentally can be compared historically with the hedonistic ethic built upon the goal of acquiring as many forms of pleasure as possible since life is uncertain and those pleasures may not be attainable in the future (Richard B. Brandt).¹²

This constant insecurity and the fear leads one to establish a social contract in which one renounces one's own rights in favor of a supreme power, the state, Society, etc. Hobbes holds the social contract between people to be the basis for morality.¹³

Motivation: From Judgment to Actions

For Kohlberg motivation is fundamental to providing orientation regarding the significance of personal life, and therefore a sense to its moral dimension. Without an ideal, inspiration or reason for living it is difficult to achieve the commitment needed to direct us to a moral life. Victor Frankl considers this search for a purpose in life to be the primary motivation of a person, not a secondary rationalization of one's instincts, for a person is able to live and die for his ideals and values.¹⁴ What is that inspiration, that search for the purpose of life that will bring us to the integration of moral action? Savater would ask: "Where will we find something really fundamental for human existence, something one will really appreciate and not just as an instrument"?¹⁵

For many centuries the religious dimension was for many the inspiration and orientation that gave sense to life. Today the significance of religious thinking is of less extension and depth. That is why we ask ourselves what is the ideal that motivates and gives youth a purpose in today's world? It is interesting to observe how in the post-war period there have been so many studies and treaties about ethics and morals. In this century in many countries two or three generations of young idealists dedicated their best years to the moral and ethical ideal for which they went to war. It was a fight to defend honor, home, nation, liberty and justice. (Before going to war, Muslims declare it a holy war.) Most of the revolutionary movements of history have been based on moral and ethical aspirations for liberty, equality, fraternity and justice (Octavi Fullat).¹⁶

It is evident that the ethical ideal of liberty and democracy inspired a generation that fought, suffered and worked for it. But it is difficult for the young to see in today's system the ethical issue that inspired it. The laws of time have crystallized in forms of power whose defense generates corruption. Today, especially for the young, politics does not represent an ethical idealism.

However, the ideal of rejecting injustice still lives. It grows every day because of a more humanitarian coexistence between the members of society: people feel closer to each other, there is solidarity between nations, war becomes less likely and peace more necessary.

There is need for basic studies for the motor of ethical dynamics. Psychologists usually explain in detail theories of motivation based upon biological and social necessities. When it comes to explaining the motivations for moral actions such as honesty, ideals, loyalty, love, etc., however, usually they give only reductive explanations as if these were defense mechanisms.

At this point we might leave psychology aside and look for explanations in faith and teleology, for the spirit that gives strength to our hearts. Perhaps we will have to look for explanations in memories and heroic actions such as those recounted by Robert Coles,¹⁹ which, if analyzed according to Kohlberg's method, would be a preconventional or premoral stage. It is possible that there might be found there also the solution for the fundamental problem of how there develops the conceptualization, moral judgment and commitment for a life in the service of goodness and justice.

Universidad Catolica Andres Bello

Caracas, Venezuela

1. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco, Harper, 1984); The Psychology of Moral Development (San Francisco, Harper, 1984).

2. Richard H. Hersh, Joseph Reimer and Diana P. Paolito, El crecimiento moral. De Piaget a Kohlberg (Madrid: Narcea, 1984), p. 52.

3. Charles Dennis Marler, Philosophy and Schooling (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975), p. 232.

4. A. Kriekemans, Pegagogia General (Barcelona: Herder, 1977), chap. XI.

5. R. Scholl, Das Gewissen des Kindes (Stuttgart, 1956), p. 27, cited by A. Kriekemans (op. cit), p. 427.

6. Lawrence Kohlberg, op. cit., p. 11.

7. Irma Matute, Desarrollo Socio-Emocional (Manual del Estudiante, Caracas, Instituto de Mejoramiento Profesional, 1987).

8. Arelys Moreno, Desarrollo del Juicio Moral en estudiantes de distintos estratos sociales de Caracas (Caracas: UCAB, 1987).

9. Anna Maria Ferrer,, Desarrollo del Juicio Moral en el niño guajiro (Maracaibo: URU, 1985).

10. Levy Farias, Para una definición más comprensiva del juicio y la madurez moral (Caracas: AVEPSO, 1986).

11. Cornelia Gathman and Maria Angélica Romero, Desarrollo del Juicio Moral en estudiantes de niveles socioeconómicos alto y bajo en Caracas (Caracas: UCAB).

12. Richard B. Brandt, Teoría Etica (Madrid: Alianza, 1982), p. 382.

13. Alasdair Macintyre, Historia de la Etica (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1970), p. 133.

14. Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search of Meaning (Washington: Square Press, 1985), p. 121.

15. Fernando Savater, Invitación a la Etica (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1982), p. 66.

16. Octavi Fullat, Filosofías de la Educación (Barcelona: CEAC, 1978), p. 288.

17. Gustavo Gutierrez, La Fuerza Histórica de los Pobres (Lima, 1979), cited by Moreno Rejón, p. 93.

18. Rejon Moreno, Teoría Moral desde los Pobres (Madrid: PS, 1986), p. 154.

19. Robert Coles, The Moral Life of Children (Houghton, 1986), p. 27.