HERMENEUTIC PRINCIPLE OF UNDERSTANDING AND ROMAN INGARDEN’S INTERPRETA­TION OF AESTHETIC OBJECT AS TWO CONVERGENT WAYS OF ARGUMENTATION STRENGTHENING THE NEED OF DIALOGUE AND COMMUNICATION

 

ZBIGANIEW WENDLAND

Warsaw Agricultural University

Department of Human Sciences

 

The problems of dialogue and communication among people as individuals, among social groups and nations, the need of dialogue and communication among cultures and civilizations did become in contemporary times so important that we as philosophers ought to seek argumentations strengthening these issues anywhere it is possible. I think that the allies in this matter are many contemporary philosophical currents like for example phenomenology, hermeneutics and — even postmodernism. I would like to say some words about argumenta­tions strengthening the need of dialogue and communication coining from hermeneutics and from the phe­nomenology of Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden.

Hermeneutics has a long history of its own, dating back to antiquity, but today it is regarded most read­ily as a “shoot on the tree of phenomenology” (in accordance with the definition formulated by French phi­losopher Paul Ricoeur), despite the considerable contribution made to hermeneutics by philosophers who lived prior to the twentieth century and thinkers who did not belong to the phenomenological tradition. Contempo­rary thinkers, who are regarded as members of this philosophical orientation, acknowledge that all the reality resembles a written text, which requires that its meaning and truth have to be understood and interpreted. This is precisely what hermeneutics is trying to do by basing itself on the premise that the meaning or truth of reality are never direct data, nor do they impose themselves with irrefutable obviousness, but that capturing them compels for indispensable, complicated and time-consuming efforts of a cognitive-interpretative nature. The most important premise in hermeneutics is that it is impossible to grasp the meaning or truth of text, speech, work of art, or reality itself differently than in connection with some sort of subject. The latter, i.e. the cogni­tive or interpretative subject, always consists of individuals living in a certain historical period, in given cul­tural conditions, and possesses some amount of fore-knowledge, prejudices, superstitions as well as anticipa­tions, practical interests and existential problems. All this constitutes a sort of encumbrance; the burdened sub­ject of cognition or interpretation tries to become acquainted with its object; it aims to determine its truth or to describe its meaning. The most important elements which form the conditions for hermeneutic understanding of texts or reality as a whole include such components as: concepts, words, linguistic structures, and rules of thought and speech which possess its own indelible significance or permanent functions, and thanks to which is predetermined the understanding and interpretation of the objects which are the centre of our interest; subse­quently. they make it possible to express the obtained knowledge in a verbal display because this two (under­standing and its verbal expression) are the main tasks of hermeneutics. The outcome of all those undertakings is a situation to which contemporary hermeneutics draws attention by claiming that the truth which is the target of cognition and understanding (not only of written texts or spoken speeches) is a historical process that real­izes itself in an infinite number of revelations, through superimposed cognitive acts, fusions of different hori­zons, assorted acts of understanding, and linguistic interpretation, and thanks to an infinite input of collective effort, in other words, in the course of inter-personal and inter-cultural communication.

The above argumentation, present in works of representatives of hermeneutics, intends to legitimize the critique of cognitive absolutism and objectivism, i.e. metaphysical stands which claim to recognize absolute truth, historically invariable and unconditioned. One could reduce this interpretation to several statements, such as: representatives of each epoch, or each culture, are the possessors of their own truth; truth as a whole is al­ways open and incomplete; no one can claim that his reasons are exclusive, etc. This situation was summed up by Gadamer who in one of his studies expressed the laconic view that: “Statements which are simply true cannot exist. One of the reasons is that the truth of particular statements always depends on the truthfulness of our holistic vision of the world in accordance with Hegel’s “Das Gauze ist das Wahre”, and that the truth of the whole is a historical process realized according to the principle of an incessant merge of eternally new and dif­ferent horizons. In other words, successive and differently determined points of view. That is why from the hermeneutic point of view the task of understanding and interpretation which leads to meaning and truth al­ways involves communication and dialogue among men, peoples and cultures.

Before Gadamer also Heidegger described the problem of understanding in relation to the individuals, which live in given historical and cultural conditions, regarding this problem as the most important philosophi­cal question presented by the author of Sein und Zeit in the form of the analysis of Dasein. Heidegger believed that philosophical reflection should be not concerned with Being but with “being of Being”, and that under­standing of “Being ‘s being” is something which characterizes human existence in the most essential manner. Moreover, “being of Being” is always an open question, a constant “becoming”, and is always the result of human’s active participation. When we speak about Heidegger’s view which essence is among others the rec­ognition that “man is the shepherd of Being”, that he permits “Being to be” and that Being is the only object of his concern, i.e. he grants Being meaning and direction, grasps its truth, and helps his truth to “take place”, and when Heidegger proclaimed that the most essential ontological determinant of man’s being is comprehending Being in general (“existence is possible only upon the basis of understanding Being”2), etc., then all this means that at a certain moment Heidegger’s analytics of Dasein passes into hermeneutics, which was so successfully continued by Gadamer. By Heidegger himself the another of most essential attributes of human being (beside understanding) is its co-existence with the others (German Mitsein). So the Heidegger’s Dasein can fulfill his tasks towards Being only in the way of historical process in which both the thinkers and the poets have to play the most important role.

Beside Heidegger and Gadamner, the Polish philosopher, founder of die phenomenological center in Cracow (Jagiellonian University), Roman Ingarden was the man who undertook a far-reaching destruction of metaphysics of Being which did not acknowledge any contribution from the side of human being. Some of Ingarden’s genuine philosophical ideas can be truly compared to those of the good known representatives of con­temporary hermeneutics. Ingarden, belonging to the closed circle of Husserl’s co-workers, began his scientific carrier from a trial, which consisted in applying the phenomenological method to create durable phenomenol­ogical foundations for the theory of art, and in the next phase also for the widely comprehended aesthetics. The good known book Das literarische Kunstwerk3, published in 1931, was Ingarden’s result in this matter. In this relatively early interpretation of many concepts in the fields of theory of art amid esthetics the Polish philoso­pher was an author of some philosophical ideas, which can be understood as a considerable weakening of Husserl’s absolutism amid idealism. Nevertheless the most significant result of Ingardens phenomenological phi­losophy was his book from 1947-1948: Der Streit um die Existenz der We14. In discussion with his master Hus­sel Ingarden expressed his own point of view on the question of ontological and epistemological realism as considerable distinguished from Hussel’s attitude of transcendental idealism. By Husserl the only kind of sub­ject, which played an important role in cognitive relation was the transcendental ego. In Ingarden’s opinion sensational data originated from existing things are the real ground of every process of knowledge. On the ba­sis of these data the transcendental consciousness passes in acts of eidetic intuition to indirect watching the very essences of things (this watching is in German language called Wesenschau). Even in cases of objects, which seem to be in principle creations of consciousness, like an imagined hero of a literary novel, somebody’s painted picture, or like a discovered by any researcher scientific theory (in sum: all the works of art, culture and sciences), all objects of this kind were not interpreted by Ingarden as exclusively creations of pure conscious­ness (transcendental ego). The Polish philosopher considered this kind of objects as “derivatively intentional”, i.e. lie said they had iii acts of consciousness sources amid causes of their being, but the foundation of their exis­tence amid the basis for the inter-subjective identity for these objects were always specific beings which were real-physical things; these are for example physical books, pictured canvas, creations of technique and so on. The very achievement of Ingarden in matters of truth and meaning which could be compared with the achievements of representatives of twenties century hermeneutics like Heidegger and Gadamner, was his inter­pretation of work of art as a creation by its author not to the end defined, left by its creator in intended manner schematic, amid without any ultimate concretization. The very significance of Ingarden’s conception consists here iii the fact that the left by au author of work of art, not to the end defined, aesthetic objects, containing many “empty” places, cause that the life of work of art persists in time, and relies on perpetual ever new con­cretizations undertaken by always new receivers. Thus every receiver of work of art is iii the same time its co­creator: amid always consist many possibilities of view concretizations. A work of art constantly provokes its consumers to disclosing in it continually new meanings and to create continually new interpretations. A really great work of art speaks to people of different times and to men shaped in different cultures with many mean­ings amid tells them many truths. Amid so in the case of Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetics the existence of work of art causes its permanent transformation into many aesthetic objects amid this hike in the case of hermeneutics involves people to dialogue and communication.

    1. Gadamer H-. G., Goz to jest prawda [What is Truth?], in: ibid., Rozum, slowo, dzieje (The Reason, the Word, the His­tory], Warszawa 2000. p. 45

    2. Heidegger M., Kant a problem metafizyki [Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics], Warszawa 1989, p. 253.

    3. Ingarden R., Dos literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschafi, Halle 1931.

            4. lngarden R., Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, German edition Bd. 1 Tubingen 1964, Bd. 2 Tubingen 1965.